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Document 848 2nd October 1980 
AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 1st-4th December 1980 
I. Political Questions 
l. Political implications for Europe of the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
2. Future of European security 
Il. Defence Questions 
l. State of European security 
2. SALT and the British and French 
nuclear forces 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
l. Energy and security 
2. International industrial consortia and 
collaborative arrangements for the pro-
duction of high technology military 
equipment 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
l. Budget of the Assembly for the finan-
cial year 1981 
2. Accounts of the Administrative expendi-
ture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1979 - The Auditor's report and 
Motion to approve the final accounts 
3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the 
ministerial organs of Western European 
Union for the financial year 1980 
V. Rules of Procedure 
l. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of 
the Rules of Procedure 
2. Methods of voting 
VI. Relations with Parliaments 
Half-yearly information report: Activities 
of the Committee - Relations between 
parliaments and press 
lO 
Report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Fliimig on behalf of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges 
Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges 
Information report tabled by Mrs. Knight 
on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments 
Document 849 25th November 1980 
DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 1st-4th December 1980 
MONDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
11 a.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary 
sesswn. 
5. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands; 
Nuclear, biological and chemical protection: 
Votes on the draft recommendations in Documents 837 and 838 postponed from the last 
session. 
6. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
7. Methods of voting: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
Afternoon 2 p.m. 
3 p.m. 
6 p.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Future of European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
Debate. 
Information meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
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TUESDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
10 a.m. 
I. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 -The 
Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
l'otes on the draft text.1 
3. Draft opinion on the budget of the mimsterial organs of Western European Union for the 
financial year 1980: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
J 'ote on the draft opinion. 
4. State of European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
11.30 a.m. 
5. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
6. Future of European security: 
l'ute on the draft recommendatiOn. 
Afternoon 2 p.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
3 p.m. 
1. State of European security: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the drafi recommendation. 
3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic. 
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3. Energy and security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. FHimig on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the drafi recommendauon. 
WEDNESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 8.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Socialist Group. 
10 a.m. 
I. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces: 
11 a.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendatwn. 
2. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly. 
11.30 a.m. 
3. Address by Dr. Christoph van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
.\llcrnoon 3 p.m. 
The political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
T'ote on the dra(i recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
I. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high 
technology military equipment: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Relations between parliaments and press: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1979 
General 
I. The following financial statements, toge-
ther with an explanatory memorandum, were 
submitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1979 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 
1979 (Appendix 1). 
(h) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1979 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix 11). 
(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Wes-
tern European Union, London, in 
respect of contributions to the 
Assembly of Western European 
Union budget for 1979 (Appendix 
Ill). 
(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1979 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
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Summary vf1ncvme and Expenditure 
(Appendix f) 
(a) General 
3. The approved budget provided for 
expenditure ofF 8,904,000 of which F 387,000 
was expected to be covered by miscellaneous 
receipts and the balance by contributions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted 
to F 8,832,484. Income amounted to 
F8,933,353 compnsmg F8,517,000 from 
contributions requested and received and 
F 416,353 from miscellaneous receipts. There 
was thus an excess of income over expenditure 
of F I 00,869 arising from a budgetary surplus 
of F 71 ,516 (as shown in Appendix 11) and 
extra miscellaneous receipts ofF 29,353. 
(b) Pension Scheme 
5. Under the common pension scheme 
implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated 
organisations, Western European Union, Coun-
cil of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European 
Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the 
Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assem-
bly's budget and staff contributions under the 
scheme are credited to the budget as miscella-
neous income. In 1979 these staff contribu-
tions amounted to F 218,101 (Appendix 1). 
/ 
I 
6. Staff members who had been employed 
before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to 
join the new scheme were required to meet the 
cost of validating their past service through 
surrender of their provident fund holdings. 
Where these were insufficient for that 
purpose because of withdrawals, staff members 
were required to meet the deficiency, plus 
compound interest at four per cent per annum, 
by payment over a period of five years 
from 30th June 1978. In 1979, payments by 
staff members under these arrangements 
amounted to F 80,440 and were credited to the 
budget as miscellaneous income. 
7. Pensions paid in 1979 totalled F 187,038 
(Appendix 11, Head VI). In paragraph 8 of my 
report on the Assembly's 1978 accounts, I 
referred to a decision by the Council of Western 
European Union that the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Government Budget Experts 
should examine whether the implementing 
instructions issued by the Secretary-General of 
Western European Union, under which pension 
awards were calculated, were in accord with the 
pension scheme rules. The Co-ordinating 
Committee has received an interim report from 
two experts who were nominated to undertake 
the study but the Committee has not yet issued 
its final decision. 
Statement o( budget authonsations. 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix I/) 
8. The transfers between sub-heads within 
the same head of the budget, shown in this 
statement, were duly authorised in accordance 
with Article 6 of the Financial Regula-
tions. These regulations contain no provision 
for the authorisation of transfers between heads 
but, m accordance with a procedure approved 
by the Council in 1973, the Council were 
informed in April 1980 that expenditure of 
F 104,038 had been incurred on a leaving 
allO\·'Iance in excess of the budget provision in 
Head VI. The excess expenditure ofF 104.038 
was met from savings on Heads 11, Ill, IV and 
V. 
9. Of the overall budgetary surplus of 
F 71 ,516, F 69,4 77 arose on Salaries - Head 
I. Increases in salary scales retrospective from 
July 1979 were not approved by the 
Co-ordinating Committee of Government Bud-
get Experts until March 1980. None of the 
increases was charged to the 1979 accounts 
and, in accordance w1th Article 9 of the 
Financial Regulations, the Assembly has 
informed the Council of Western European 
U ;uon that the unexpended balance ofF 69,4 77 
on Head I will be carried forward to 1980 to 
15 
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meet further salary payments due in respect of 
the period July-December 1979. 
Prov1dent {zmd 
(Appendix /V) 
I 0. The assets of the pro'Vident fund of the 
Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of 
the provident funds of the other organs of 
Western European Union in joint deposits 
administered by the office of the Secretary-
General. The joiPt deposits have continued to 
be held in French francs, the currency in which 
the provident fund accounts of staff members 
are kept. 
11. In paragraphs I 0 and 12 of my report on 
the Assembly's 1978 accounts, I recorded the 
circumstances under which the provident fund 
accounts of staff members had been over-
credited in respect of gains on exchange and 
under-charged in respect of transfers required 
for pension validation purposes, both at the 
expense of member governments. Correcting 
adjustments totalling F 75,925 were made in 
1979, and overpayments to staff members have 
been or are being recovered. 
12. The balance held in the provident fund 
at 31st December 1979 OQ the accounts of 
Assembly staff members totalled F I ,29 1,8 77. 
13. I have received a certificate from the 
depositary showing the amount of the joint 
depos1ts held at 31st December 1979 and a 
statement from the office of the Secretary-
General confirming the share of those 
deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's 
provident fund in the office's books at 31st 
December 1979. 
14. wish to record my appreciation 
of the willing co-operatiOn of the officers 
of the Assembly during my audit. 
Sir Douglas HENLE'I', K.C.B. 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
L'111ted Kingdom) 
Ex1emal A udilvr 
30th June 19RO 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President tp the Auditor of the 
Assembly in connection with the financial year 1979) 
I. The statements attached hereto refer to: 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
financial position as at 31st 
December 1979 (Appendix I): 
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(h) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 71 ,516 remains unexpended. 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F I 00,869. The difference 
between these two figures, F 29,353 represents: 
- Bank interest ...... . 
- Sundry receipts .... . 
- Sale of publications . 
- Contributions 7 % .. 
- Reimbursement of 
loans on validation .. 
- Less receipts for 1979 
estimated in the bud-
get ............... . 
F F 
88,679 
9,526 
19,607 
218,101 
80.440 
416,353 
387,000 
29,353 
3. An amount of F 69,477 in Head I 
represents unexpended credits in respect of staff 
expenditure connected with the 1979 general 
review on emoluments. The Council approved 
the increases for the " A " and " L " grades and 
the allowances for all grades for the period July 
to December 1979 on 26th March 1980. In 
accordance with Article 9 of the Financial 
Regulations these amounts have been carried 
forward to the budget for the financial year 
1980. Nevertheless an additional amount of 
F 57,266 on Head I and F 25,000 on Head 11 
for interpreters' fees is necessary to cover the 
total increases. The Council has been infor-
med of this. 
Validation olpensions 
4. On 31st December 1979 there remained 
six outstanding loans on validation of pensions 
totalling F 123,976. In accordance with the 
regulations the outstanding loans must be 
cleared in 1983. 
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Transfers 
5. Excess expenditure amounting to 
F 15 7,945 has been met by transfer between 
sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless, excess 
expenditure resulting from the paym~nt on 
Severance Grant Head VI amountmg to 
F I 04,038 has been deducted from the overall 
amount of unexpended credits in Heads 11, Ill, 
IV, V. The Council has been informed of this. 
Contributions 
6. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1979. 
Provident fund 
7. The Assembly's funds are incorporated 
with those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
8. The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in French francs with the International 
Westminster Bank Ltd., London. 
9. The Assembly's provident fund has been 
considerably reduced since the introduction of 
the pension scheme and on 31st December 
1979 amounted to F I ,291 ,877 as shown at 
Appendix IV. At 1st January 1979 there 
remained loans to three staff members 
amounting to F 193,450. A further loan of 
F 30,000 was granted during the year. Repay-
ments of F 45,600 reduced the loans out-
standing as at 31st December 1979 to 
Fl77,850. 
I 0. Some adjustments to the calculation of 
validation amounts for members of the staff 
have been dealt with in the accounts for the 
financial year 1979. 
11. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United 
Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
30th May 1980 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL 
President olthe Assembly 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1979 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) .............. . 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts ............................................ . 
Sale of publications ........................................ . 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7 %) 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc) ..... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix 11) 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head VI 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1979 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ........................................ . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable .......................................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Certified correct : 
88,679 
9,526 
191607 
218,101 
80,440 
I 
8,728J446 
104,038 
99.237 
112,315 
98,431 
209,,114 
100,869 
Siegbert ALBER 
8,517,000 
416,353 
8,933,353 
8,832,484 
F 100,869 
309,983 
F 309,983 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HuMBLET 
Clerk o( the Assembly Chairman v.f the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
30th June 1980 
Signed: Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
17 
DOCUMENT 850 
API 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE A 
DETAILS 
HEAD I - ExPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
B and C), including travelling expenses and 
French social security 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(A) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Children's allowance 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
(c) Provident fund 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates 
not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking 
examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
Total of Head I 
I. Document 782 and Addendum. 
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Total budget for 
1979 1 
3,754,000 
14,000 
135,000 
170,000 
310,000 
10,000 
20,000 
60,000 
2,000 
275,000 
150,000 
73,000 
1,600 
1,500 
3,400 
4,500 
10,000 
3,000 
4,997,000 
APPENDIX 11 
~ 11 
EXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
3,754,000 3,691,546 62,454 
19,020 33,020 33,020 -
135,000 132,982 2,018 
22,721 147,279 142,274 5,005 
10,477 299,523 299,523 -
2,924 7,076 7,076 -
4,617 24,617 24,617 -
13,069 46,931 46,931 -
1,550 450 450 -
42,865 317,865 317,865 -
8,180 141,820 141,820 -
2,199 75,199 75,199 -
1,600 -
360 1,140 1,140 -
3,400 -
1,872 2,628 2,628 -
2,757 7,243 7,243 -
209 3,209 3,209 -
68,910 68,910 4,997,000 4,927,523 69,477 
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DETAILS 
HEAD 11 - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 I. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. Linguistic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessiOns of the 
Assembly 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
Total of Head 11 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 Premises 
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head Ill 
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Total budget for 
1979 
460,000 
193,000 
170,000 
407,000 
5,000 
221,000 
41,000 
1,497,000 
337,000 
26,000 
363,000 
APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
14,000 446,000 437,314 8,686 
19,079 173,921 173,616 305 
33,079 203,079 203,079 -
14,511 392,489 374,176 18,313 
5,000 3,714 1,286 
7,190 228,190 228,190 -
7,321 48,321 48,321 -
47,590 47,590 1,497,000 1,468,410 28,590 
1,165 335,835 317,817 18,018 
1,165 27,165 27,165 -
1,165 1,165 363,000 344,982 18,018 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, trans-
port of documents 
Sub-Head 7 Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Sub-Head 8 Printing and publishing of Assembly docu-
ments 
Sub-Head 9 Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Sub-Head 10 Official cars 
Sub-Head 11 Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 Travel and subsistence allowances and insu-
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
rance for the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of 
the Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not else-
where provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(d) Orphans' pension 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(d) Relief allowance 
(C) Severance grant 
Total of Head VI 
TOTAL 
Total budget for 
1979 
295,000 
181,000 
740,000 
25,000 
44,500 
500 
1,286,000 
70,000 
110,000 
3,000 
170,000 
27,000 
142,500 
142,500 
3,000 
10,000 
678,000 
46,000 
24,000 
13,000 
83,000 
8,904,000 
The expenditure figures m elude charges for goods delivered and serv1ces rendered by 31st December 1979. ~ 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL Francis 
President o(the Assembly Clerk oft 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
5,000 290,000 289,167 833 
8,407 189,407 189,407 -
16,899 756,899 756,899 -
4,106 20,894 20,778 116 
16,000 28,500 27,635 865 
200 300 25 275 
25,306 25,306 1,286,000 1,283,911 2,089 
11,862 58,138 36,266 21,872 
110,000 101,102 8,898 
2,764 5,764 5,764 -
333 170,333 170,333 -
8,765 35,765 35,765 -
142,500 125,338 17,162 
142,500 138,075 
3,000 1,178 1,822 
10,000 6,799 3,201 
11,862 11,862 678,000 620,620 57,380 
1,135 44,865 44,865 -
1,015 22,985 22,985 -
962 12,038 12,038 -
3,112 3,112 107,750 1104,038 I 
3,112 3,112 83,000 187,038 1Jo:t.038 I 
157,945 157,945 8,904,000 8,832,484 71,516 
1d for up to 31st March 1980. m accordance with the Fmanc1al Regulatwns of the Assembly. 
UMBLET Siegbert ALBER 
Assembly Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1979 
Contributions Budget surplus Main Net Member states 600ths overpaid budget contributions 
in 1978 1978 for 1979 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 38,262 (-) 33,962 837,505 765,281 
France 120 (-) 77,822 (-) 69,074 1,703,400 I ,556,504 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 77,822 (-) 69,074 1,703,400 I ,556,504 
Italy 120 (-) 77,822 (-) 69,074 1,703,400 I ,556,504 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 1,298 (-) 1,151 28,390 25,941 
Netherlands 59 (-) 38,262 (-) 33,962 837,505 765,281 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 77,822 (-) 69,074 1,703,400 I ,556,504 
600 (-) 389,110 (-) 345,371 8,517,000 7,782,519 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1979 
F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at lst January 1979 1,149,722 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 115,406 
Repayments of loans by staff members 45,600 
Interest received during the year Ill ,585 
I ,422,313 
Transfer to pension validation accounts 
Withdrawals 
Accounts of existing staff members as at 
31st December 1979 
Siegbert ALBER 
F 
25,352 
105,084 
I ,291,877 
I ,422,313 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HuMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that In 
my opinion this statement is correct. 
30th June 1980 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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Document 850, Addendum 18th September 1980 
Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1979 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary A/fairs and Administration2 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1979, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulation's, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
I. Adopted unan1mousl} by the Committee. 
2 . .\femhen of the Commi/tee Mr . . ldnaen1em (Chair-
man), MM. lager. Kwe/mann (Alternate for Ahrens) (VIce-
Chairmen); MM A/her. Depietn. £1·en. Fletcher (Alter-
nate: Lord .\fcNQ/r), Lord Hu!(h£'1, MM Jeamhrun. Kneps. 
Martmo. Orione. Pecten. Petrilll (Alternate: A!(nmr). 
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Schlener (Alternate: Prgnron). Smrth. Stamton, Tnpod1. 
Tummers, I ohrer. Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra (Alternate: 
l'an Hu/11). 
N.B. The name1 of th01e ta/..mg part rn the I'Ote are tmn-
ted 111 rtalrn 
·Document 851 18th September 1980 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981I 
submitted on behalf of the Comm,ittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Head! 
Head II 
Head Ill: 
Head IV: 
Head V 
Head VI: 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of Estimates for the Fmancial Year 1981 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1981 
Details 
Expenditure for staff .................................. 
Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............. 
Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ 
General administrative costs ............................ 
Other expenditure ..................................... 
Pensions •••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 0 0 ••••• 0 0 •••• 0 0 •••• 0. 
ToTAL EXPENDITURE ....................... 
ToTAL RECEIPTS ........................... 
NET TOTAL ............................... 
Estimate for 1981 
F 
6,883,000 
1,920,000 
' 383,000 
1,526,000 
I ,000,000 
106,000 
11,818,000 
460,000 
11,358,000 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee and approved 
by the Presidential Committee with I abstention. 
2 . . \4emhen of the Comnu11ee Mr. Adnaen1en1 (Chair-
man); MM. lager. Killelmann (Alternate for Ahrens) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. A/her. Depietri, El'ers. Fletcher (Alternate: 
Martino, Orione, Peeter\. Petrilli (Alternate: Agmm), 
Schleiter (Alternate: Ptgnwn), Smtth. Staniton, Tnpodi, 
Tummers, l'ohrer. Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra (Alternate: 
mn Hu/.11) 
Lord McNatr), Lord Hughes. MM. Jeamhrun, Krieps, 
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Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Details 
Head / - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment ............ . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances .............................. . 
(B) Social charges ........................... . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival 
and departure of permanent officials ....... . 
ToTAL oF HEAD I .................... . 
Head//- EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 : I. Temporary staff ............................ . 
2. Linguistic staff ............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment during sessions ..... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions .... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 .................... . 
Head///- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : I. Premises .................................. . 
2. Work on the building (joint areas) ........... . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment ............................ . 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill ................... . 
Head /V- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents ................................... . 
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines ............ . 
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents .. 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . ... . 
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .................................. . 
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges ................................. . 
ToTAL oF HEAD IV ................... . 
Head V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 : Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of 
Committees and Rapporteurs .................. . 
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions ...... . 
Sub-Head 14 : Committee study missions ..................... . 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk ........................................ . 
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information ................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ........... . 
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for .................................. . 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ......................... . 
ToTAL OF HEAD V .................... . 
Head VI- PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 : (A) Pensions ................................ . 
(B) Allowances ............................. . 
(C) Severance grant .......................... . 
(D) Supplementary insurance ................ . 
TOTAL OF HEAD VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estimate for 1981 
F 
5,194,000 
904,000 
753,000 
32,000 
609,000 
979,000 
5,000 
270,000 
57,000 
283,000 
83,000 
17,000 
325,000 
210,000 
910,000 
30,000 
50,500 
500 
85,000 
132,000 
3,000 
215,000 
50,000 
250,000 
250,000 
3,000 
12,000 
104,000 
2,000 
6,883,000 
-
I ,920,000 
383,000 
1,526,000 
I ,000,000 
106,000 
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Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate: F 5,194,000 
Estimate: F 5,172,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
The Clerk .............................................. . Hors cadre I 375,000 
The Clerk Assistant ..................................... . Hors cadre I 318,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . A5 5 I ,523,000 
First Secretaries ........................................ . A4 2 515,000 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 I 234,000 
Secretaries-Translators/Publications ...................... . A2 3 520,000 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ....................................... . B6 I 171,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 4 515,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 6 630,000 
Switchboard Operator ................................... . B3 I 111,000 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . C6 I 98,000 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . C4 1 2 162,000 
28 5,172,000 
N.B. This table includes the credits required for making the part-time post of Clerk a full-time post. 
It in no way prejudges any decisions which may be taken concerning the status of the Clerk nor 
any other possible changes in the establishment of the Office of the Clerk. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and insurance 
Estimate: F 22,000 
I. Regraded posts. 
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(a) Household allowance 
Rank 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
Clerk .................................................. . 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................ . 
First Secretary .......................................... . 
Secretary ............................................... . 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . 
Estimate: F 904,000 
Estimate: F 194,000 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
Hors cadre I 22,000 
Hors cadre I 19,000 
A5 4 72,000 
A4 I 15,000 
A3 I 14,000 
B4 2 15,000 
B3 3 20,000 
C6 I 6,000 
C4 2 11,000 
16 194,000 
(b) Children's allowance Estimate: F 193,000 
7,700 F per year per child: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 193,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Rank 
Counsellors 0 ••••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 0 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 0. 0. 
First Secretary ••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 0 0 •• 0 ••••••••••••• 
Secretary •• 0. 0. 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••• 0 0. 0 
Secretary-Translator/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator •• •'• ••• 0 ••••••• 
Personal Assistants ....................................... 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ••••••••• 0. 0 0 •••••• 0 ••• 0 0 •• 0 •• 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
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Estimate: F 410,000 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
A5 3 174,000 
A4 I 51,000 
A3 I 47,000 
A2 2 58,000 
B4 2 47,000 
B3 2 33,000 
11 410,000 
Estimate: F 15,000 
Estimate: F 30,000 
Estimate: F 60,000 
Estimate: F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
Estimate: F 753,000 
(a) Social Security Estimate: F 441,000 
28 officials F 441,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate: F 175,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate: F 137,000 
14 % of basic salaries x 980,000 F F 137,000 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews 
and cost of marking examination papers 
(h) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and depar-
ture of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
Estimate: F 32,000 
Estimate: F I ,600 
Estimate: F I ,500 
Estimate: F 3,400 
Estimate: F 7,000 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 8,500 
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Head 11- Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate: F I ,920,000 
Sub-Head 3 
I. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Function 
Head of the sittings office ................................ . 
Heads of sections ....................................... . 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................. . 
Precis writers ........................................... . 
Verbatim reporters ...................................... . 
Assistants .............................................. . 
Head ushers ............................................ . 
Ushers ................................................. . 
Roneo/ Assemblers ...................................... . 
Daily 
remuneration 
F 
750 
512 
672 
586 
426 
586 
426 
586 
586 
730 
411 
372 
281 
242 
215 
195 
325 
195 
Paris : I 0 days 
No. 
2a 
2a 
4b 
I b 
2a 
2b 
4a 
4h 
12 h 
6c 
4b 
23 b 
6a 
10 a 
2a 
12 a 
4b 
12 a 
112 
Total 
F 
24,000 
42,500 
7,000 
22,600 
45,000 
137,000 
163,500 
5,200 
39,000 
23,200 
509,000 
a. Recruited locally. 
h Recruited outside France. 
c Recruited as free-lance staff. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 100,000 
F 609,000 
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2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function 
No. Total F 
Interpreters 0 ••• 0 ••••••••• 0 0 •• 0 0. 0. 0 ••••• 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 ••• 0 •••• 12 220,000 
12 220,000 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . F 16,000 
F 236,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions . . . . F 230,000 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Estimate 1 Function remuneration No. F F 
Revisers •• 0. 0 ••• 0 •• 0 0 ••••••••• 0. 0 0 •••••••••••••• 0 •• 0 •••• 672 3a 198,000 
1,072 4b 
Translators ••• 0 ••••••••• 0 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 •••••• 0 0. 0 544 4a 180,000 
894 4b 
Assistants • 0 0 ••••••••••••• 0 ••• 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 0. 0 •• 0 0 ••••••• 0. 411 3b 119,000 
372 2b 
281 4a 
242 3a 
27 497,000 
I. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a Recruited locally. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . F 16,000 
F 513,000 
b. Recruited outside France. 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
Estimate: F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
-Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment .............. . 
- Installation of telephone booths .................................. . 
-Installation of a teleprinter " France-Presse " for the Press Service ... . 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
- Removal expenses .............................................. . 
-Medical service (Doctor and Nurse) .............................. . 
-Hire of typewriters and technicians ............................... . 
-Servicing of lifts ................................................ . 
F 243,000 
F 16,000 
F 11,000 
Estimate: F 270,000 
F 5,500 
F 7,500 
F 6,000 
F 12,000 
-Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 14,000 
-Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 12,000 
Head 1/1- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
I. PREMISES 
-Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simulta-
neous interpretation equipment .................................. . 
-Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance ........... . 
-Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture .. 
-Miscellaneous .................................................. . 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
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Estimate: F 57,000 
Estimate: F 383,000 
F 15,000 
F 240,000 
F 20,000 
F 8,000 
Estimate: F 283,000 
Estimate: F 83,000 
Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
- 2 typewriters ......................................... . 
- l tape recorder ....................................... . 
F 14,000 
F 3,000 
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Estimate: F 17,000 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimate: F l ,526,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE. TELEGRAPH CHARGES. TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage .............................................. . 
- Telephone ........................................... . 
- Telegrams ............................................ . 
- Transport of documents ............................... . 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and 
other office supplies 
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing 
Sub-Head 8 
F 205,000 
F 105,000 
F 10,000 
F 5,000 
Estimate: F 325,000 
Estimate: F 210,000 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of 
debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
- Brochures 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimate: F 910,000 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate: F 30,000 
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Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
- Hire of official cars Estimate: F 50,500 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
Estimate : F 500 
Estimate: F 1,000,000 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY. 
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate: F 85,000 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate: F 132,000 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate: F 215,000 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR 
Estimate: F 50,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate: F 250,000 
Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate: F 250,000 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate: F 12,000 
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Head VI- Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension ................................... . 
(b) Invalidity pension .................................... . 
(c) Survivors' pension .................................... . 
(d) Orphans' pension ..................................... . 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
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Estimate: F 106,000 
Estimate: F I 04,000 
Estimate: F 58,000 
Estimate: pro mem. 
Estimate: F 30,600 
Estimate: F 15,400 
Estimate: pro mem. 
Estimate: pro mem. 
(b) Dependants' allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Est1mate: pro mem. 
(c) Education allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Income 
(A) Sundr.v rece1pts 
(a) Sale of publications ................................... . 
(b) Bank interest ......................................... . 
(c) Social security reimbursements ......................... . 
(B) Pensions 
Estimate: pro mem. 
Estimate: F 2,000 
Estimate: F I 00,000 
F 15,000 
F 75,000 
F 10,000 
Estimate: F 360,000 
(a) Contributions (7 %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: F 306,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) Estimate: F 54,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 11,358,000. The budget for 1980 amounted to 
F 9,701,477. The difference is therefore F 1,656,523 (17.07 %). 
2. Head I- Expenditure for staff' 
The increase (F I ,0 14.523) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1980 in basic salaries, expatriation and 
household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social 
security; 
(ii) annual increments; 
(iii) the probable effect of any salary increases m 1981 due to inflation. Increases are esti-
mated at 9.8 %; 
(ir) the creation of a full-time post of Clerk; 
(r) the regrading of two Grade C.3 posts to Grade C.4. 
3. Head ll- Expendilllre relating to session.\ o(the Assemhly 
Sub-Head 3.1 -Temporary staff 
The estimated increase is F 99,000. 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council. the 
WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year. all increases in salary scales as and 
when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. These increases 
follow the trend of salary scales for permanent staff. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) -Interpretation services 
The increase (F 50.000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases 
in the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable 
to interpreters. These increases also follow the trend of salary scales for permanent staff. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B)- Translation services 
The increase (F 57 .000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to scales applied in the 
Council of Europe. It is linked with increases in salary scales for permanent staff. 
Sub-head 3.4 -Installation of equipment for sessions. 
The increase (F 26,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected 
increase in the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
4. Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 5- Capital equipment 
The sum of F I 7,000 is for the purchase of two typewriters (to replace two typewriters pur-
chased in 1968 and 1971 respectively) and orre tape recorder (needed for Committee services). 
5. Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-head 6- Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents 
The increase (F 30,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an expected increase in 
postal rates and telephone charges. 
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Sub-head 7 -Office supplies and hire of machines 
The increase (F 20,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of 
paper and office supplies. This sub-head also covers the hire of a photocopying machine and of an 
addressograph machine. 
Sub-head 8 -Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase (F 110,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase 
in the cost of printing. 
6. Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-head 12- Travel and subsistance allowances and insurance for the President of the Assem-
bly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
The increase (F 8,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling 
expenses and per diem allowances. 
Sub-head 13 -Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 12,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to ristng prices. 
Sub-head 15 -Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 28,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travel-
ling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1981. 
Sub-head 16 -Expenses of experts and the auditors. 
The increase (F 5,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable 
to the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 -Expenditure on information 
The sum ofF 250,000 requested in 1980 is maintained. 
Sub-head 18 -Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
There are now five political groups in the Assembly. The sum ofF 250,000 requested in 1980 
is maintained. 
7. HeadVI-Pensions 
In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid: one retirement, one 
survivor's and one orphan's pension. 
8. Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts in 1981 include: 
(i) sale of publications; 
(ii) bank interest; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund 
and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals. 
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Head I- Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate for 1981 ..................................................... F 5,172,000 
Budget for 1980 (including F 62,424 carried over from 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,390,454 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 781,546 
1979 expenditure: F 3,691,546 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses 
and insurance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 22,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =-F __ 20-'-"'-=-oo:....:..o 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
1979 expenditure: F 33,020 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff. 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES. SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 (including F 2,018 carried over from 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 132,982 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
194,000 
160,018 
33,982 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 193,000 
Budget for 1980 (including F 5,005 carried over from 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 181,005 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 11,995 
1979 expenditure: F 142,274 
This aliowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 299,523 
410,000 
356,000 
54,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
.::___:...:...z._:....:....:, 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
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1979 expenditure: F 7,076 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _F __ 22--'-,0-'0'-'-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
1979 expenditure : F 24,617 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 60,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .::...F_-=-65:.2.,0.:...:0~0 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
1979 expenditure : F 46,931 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F 450 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 317,865 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F 141 ,820 
(c) Provident fund 
441,000 
370,000 
71,000 
175,000 
175,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 13 7,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _F_....:.9_0-'-',0'--"0-=-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4 7,000 
1979 expenditure: F 75,199 
This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the 
provident fund scheme. 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
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1979 expenditure : nil 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1 ,500 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F 1,140 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,400 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,400 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : nil 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(d) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure: F 2,628 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F 7,243 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1981. 
(f) Medical examination 
7,000 
7,000 
10,000 
10,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,500 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,500 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
1979 expenditure: F 3,209 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the additional expenditure involved in changing 
the system of medical examinations for staff. 
Head ll- Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure : F 43 7,314 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 173,616 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 203,079 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 374,176 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
236,000 
226,000 
10,000 
230,000 
190,000 
40,000 
513,000 
456,000 
57,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure: F 3,714 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 228,190 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS 
270,000 
244,000 
26,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 57,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:..._f_..::..5..:...11 ,.:::..:00::.::::0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
1979 expenditure: F 48,321 
This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living. 
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Head 1/1- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
J. PREMISES 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure : F 317,817 
283,000 
243,000 
40,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
the hire of committee rooms. 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
Uoint areas) 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 83,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 76,000 
.:...__-'--'..z.:::..::....:.. 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7,000 
1979 expenditure : nil 
This represents the Assembly's share in work on the committee rooms. 
Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 17,000 
Budget for I 9 80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -=-F--=2=-=0.c.:,0=-=0..::.0 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
1979 expenditure: F 27,165 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE. TELEPHONE. TELEGRAPH CHARGES. TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 289,167 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure : F 189,407 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
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Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 756,899 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 9 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC 
910,000 
800,000 
110,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _F __ 2_8_,_,0__.:.0-'-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
1979 expenditure: F 20,778 
Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 50,500 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .::....F __ 4'--'42.::,5....:.0..::.0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
1979 expenditure: F 27,635 
In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of 
chauffeur-driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk. 
This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living. 
Sub-Head If 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure: F 25 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY. CHAIRMEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 85,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .::....F_---'7-'7-L,0=--=0-=-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
1979 expenditure : F 36,266 
Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
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with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure : F 101,102 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure: F 5,764 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 170,333 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
132,000 
120,000 
12,000 
3,000 
3,000 
215,000 
187,000 
28,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 50,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .::....F __ 4:..::.5..:.:,0:..::.0..:::.0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
1979 expenditure: F 35,765 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 125,338 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1979 expenditure: F 138,075 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
250,000 
161,000 
89,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F I, I 78 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1979 expenditure : F 6,799 
Head VI- Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS. ALLOWANCES. ETC 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
12,000 
12,000 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 58,000 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 51,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7,000 
1979 expenditure: F 44,865 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(b) Invalidity pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pro mem. 
1979 expenditure: nil 
(c) Survivors' pension 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,600 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _F __ 2-'"6-'-',0'--'0-'-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,600 
1979 expenditure: F 22,985 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
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(d) Orphans' pension 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,400 
Budget for 1 980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:....F __ l_4-'-,0'-'0-..:..0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1 ,400 
1979 expenditure: F 12,038 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(B) Allowances 
pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
pro mem. 
1979 expenditure: F 107,150 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate for 1980 .................................................... . 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
1979 expenditure: nil 
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DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 
Council's preliminary opinion on the WEU Assembly 
budget for 1981 
The CouNCIL TOOK NOTE of the Assembly's draft budget for 1981 as amended in paragraph 2 of 
C-B (80) 5, but are not yet ready to give their final opinion on this subject. 
The CouNCIL NOTE that recent studies carried out on a national level by certain member states 
have resulted in the conclusion that further economies in the WEU budgets, as well as in the budgets 
of other international organisations, must be made. The WEU budgets will not exceed in real terms 
the 1980 budgets, and should result in savings. 
The Assembly will be informed in due course of the further reductions to be sought. 
* 
* * 
Secretary-General's note 
WEU Assembly budget for 1981 
C-B (80) 5 
31st October 1980 
1. The draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1981 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (80) 4), 
circulated under reference B (80) 20, was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its 
meeting in London on 23rd-24th October 1980 (BR (80) 2, VII- to be circulated). 
2. The Committee's conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
Primary considerations 
There was a measure of agreement that increases should not exceed the anticipated level of 
inflation in France. There was, however, some concern as to whether that should apply to each and 
every expenditure or to the overall total of the WEU budgets. That total could not be ascertained by 
the Committee because of the particular problem affecting Head I of the Assembly's budget as a 
result of which the credits were temporarily blocked pending a decision referred to below: 
Head I - Expenditure for staff 
The Committee noted that Head I was under a general reserve until a decision had been 
reached about the successor to the Clerk. Delegates commented that any changes proposed should 
not lead to increased expenditure. They rejected the request to regrade two posts from C.3 to C.4 at 
a cost put at French francs 3,600 in 1981. 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
Sub-head 18- Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
It is recalled that the Assembly had sought to increase both credits in 1980 from French francs 
142,500 to French francs 250,000. The Council agreed to an increase in line with the inflation 
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forecast i.e. 13 %, as a result of which credits of French francs 161 ,000 were finally approved. In the 
1981 budget the Assembly again seeks to raise the credits to French francs 250,000 (an increase of 
French francs 89,000 in each case). 
Members of the Budget Committee were unable to accept those increases and recommended 
that there should be no change. 
3. The immediate consequence of the Committee's recommendations, assuming that the applica-
tion of inflation levels will only be decided when the total of Head I has been established, is to reduce 
Head V and the budget total by French francs 178,000. The modified total would be French francs 
11,180,000 instead of French francs 11,358,000. There should be a further reduction of French 
francs 3,600 under Head I in due course. 
4. Under the agreed procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets, given in the cover-note of 
document B (80) 20, the next stage was for the Council to give its opinion on the budget, indicating 
either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments. That opinion has to be 
conveyed to the Assembly prior to the opening of the next session on 1st December 1980 in Paris. 
After its adoption by the Assembly the budget will be referred back to the Council for final 
approval. 
5. The Council's opinion will be sought at the meeting to be held on 12th November 1980. 
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Re~·ision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Prb•ileges1 
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DR<\FT RESOLl TION 
to amend Rule 7 of the Rule~ of Procedure of the Assembly 
EXPL".'\".TORY MEMOR:\NDliM 
submitted b~ Mr. Gneve, Chamnan and Rapporteur 
I. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Memhen of the Comnul/ee Mr. Gnel'e (Chairman); 
MM. Cornelissen (Alternate), Stolfelen (Alternate) (VIce-
Chairmen); MM. Battaglia, Bo::::1, Brasseur (Alternate: 
LaKneau), Edll"ard.1, Giust, Glnener, Lord HuKhe.l, Mr. van 
Hul1t, Mrs. Knight (Alternate: ]esse{), MM. Lagourgue 
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(Alternate: Talon), Lemaire, Marquardt, Michel, Mondino, 
P1Knwn, Schauble (Alternate: £l'er.l), Sterpa, Voogd, 
Zebisch. 
N.B. The namn of" tho.1e taking part 111 the l'Ote are 
rmnted 111 llalto 
DOCUMENT 852 
Draft Resolution 
to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
The Assembly, 
Considering it necessary to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure as follows: 
I. The heading for this rule becomes: '"Substitutes and alternates". 
2. In paragraph I, replace the words '" may arrange to be replaced " by '" may be replaced ". 
Delete the last sentence. 
3. In paragraph 2, replace the words'" nominated in due form" by the words'" duly registered in 
accordance with Rule 24 ". 
At the beginning of the second sentence, replace the word '"They" by the word '"Substitutes". 
4. Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4 and reads as follows: 
'" Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates. 
Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from 
among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the 
consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representa-
tive or Substitute of the same nationality as himself. 
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. " 
5. Delete paragraph 4. 
6. Paragraph 5 becomes paragraph 3, 
DECIDES 
To replace former Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure by the following: 
"Suh.1tttute1 and Alternate\ 
I. Any Representative prevented from attending a sittin~ of the Assembly may be replaced by a 
Substitute. 
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives 
in the Assembly. 
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. 
3. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if 
he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to 
vote. 
4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alter-
nates. 
Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from 
among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent 
of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substi-
tute of the same nationality as himself. 
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. " 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grie1•e, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. The appointment of substitutes is provi-
ded for in Article 11 (h) of the Charter in order 
to allow enough members to be present for the 
Assembly to proceed with its work in spite of 
the hazards of parliamentary life which too 
often prevent some members taking their seats. 
This paragraph reads as follows: 
"Substitutes of the representatives of the 
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe 
may sit, speak and vote in the place of 
representatives prevented from attending 
a sitting of the Assembly. " 
2. The conditions in which substitution is 
organised in the Assembly and its Committees 
are set out in Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure. 
3. These provisions seem clear. However, 
members of the Assembly have on several occa-
sions noted certain difficulties in applying 
them, particularly during the June 1979 session. 
On that occasion, Mr. von Hassel, Presi-
dent of the Assembly, stated that the interpreta-
tion of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure should 
be examined in detail. He noted in fact that 
there was some question as to the moment from 
which substitution became effective. Was it 
when the President made his customary 
announcement to the Assembly at the start of a 
sitting? Was it still possible to sign on as a 
substitute after this announcement? Did sub-
stitution apply to the whole sitting? Could a 
substitute replace more than one representative 
at the same sitting? Could a representative 
speak but leave his substitute to vote? 
4. In order to remove all uncertainty about 
methods of applying Rule 7, the Presidential 
Committee asked the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges to submit the present 
report to the Assembly. 
5. In fact, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure 
may be interpreted differently according to 
whether the aim is to draw up a clear, final and 
unquestionable list of seats fi lied by representa-
tives and those assigned to substitutes for each 
sitting or rather to assemble the largest possible 
number of members when votes are taken. 
6. If the expression " prevented from atten-
ding a sitting" is interpreted strictly, the provi-
sions of Rule 7 in fact allow it to be determined 
at the beginning of each sitting which titular 
members and substitutes have the right to 
speak and vote. However, they prevent titular 
members or substitutes included in the attendance 
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register and obliged to be absent when votes are 
taken from being replaced. Their effect is 
therefore to facilitate roll-call votes but to make 
it more difficult to obtain a quorum. 
7. Presidents of the Assembly had therefore 
been led to interpret the rules more flexibly to 
allow a representative and his substitute to fill a 
seat in turn at the same sitting and consequen-
tly to have the right to speak and vote success-
ively. It was thus easier to avoid vacant seats 
when votes were taken. Conversely, it could 
arise that there was doubt as to which member 
of the Assembly should be called during a roll-
call vote. 
8. Hence, it should be determined: 
(i) when a substitute has signed the 
attendance register, whether he is 
to replace the titular member and 
exercise all the latter's duties 
throughout the sitting, or whether 
he should withdraw in the event 
of the titular member wishing to 
resume his place during the 
sitting: 
(ii) when a titular member has signed 
the attendance register, whether 
he is still entitled to have himself 
replaced in the event of other 
commitments compelling him to 
absent himself during the same 
sitting. 
9. The Committee was almost unanimous 
in considering that the expression "prevented 
from attending a sitting" should be interpreted 
strictly and that it was for each delegation to 
ensure the necessary discipline among its 
members so that representatives and substitutes 
whose names appeared on the attendance regis-
ter exercised their rights throughout the sitting, 
except in unavoidable circumstances. 
I 0. However, a small maJonty of the 
Committee felt that the aim of Rule 7 in 
making provision for substitutes was to allow 
delegations to fill all seats available to them. It 
therefore feels that too much importance should 
not be attached to the duration of the sit-
ting. It should be possible for a representative 
to arrange to be replaced at any time. More-
over, it may happen that a representative and his 
substitute are both absent at the same time. In 
that event, another member of the delegation 
should be able to fill the vacant seat. In short, 
the minority considered that the provisions of 
Rule 7 should be applied flexibly in order to 
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ensure that a quorum was obtained and recalled 
that this was what Presidents of the Assembly 
had done hitherto. 
11. The majority of the Committee preferred 
to give priority to the need for clarity and dis-
cipline rather than to obtaining a quorum, 
pointing out that members of the Assembly 
would be present in greater numbers when 
votes were taken precisely if there was more 
discipline in the delegations. 
12. However, the Committee voted in favour 
of a more flexible interpretation of the Rules of 
Procedure where the right to speak was concer-
ned in order to allow a member of the Assem-
bly who had already put his name down to 
speak and whose speech had had to be post-
poned until a subsequent sitting to speak even 
if replaced. 
13. The Committee pointed out moreover 
that by calling for discipline within the delega-
tions it removed the personal nature of substi-
tution which had seemed to apply under the 
present wording of paragraph I of Rule 7. In 
short, it considered that strict interpretation of 
the expression " prevented from attending a sit-
ting" meant amending the expression " may 
arrange to be replaced " insofar as the decision 
to appoint a specific substitute should be taken 
by the delegation organising its representation in 
the Assembly rather than by the representative 
prevented from attending. 
14. The Committee therefore felt that in 
paragraph I of Rule 7 the expression "may 
arrange to be replaced " should read " may be 
replaced ". 
15. Furthermore, in practice, it was not the 
representative prevented from attending who 
informed the President of the Assembly but the 
Office of the Clerk which communicated a list 
of representatives and substitutes present to the 
President on the basis of the attendance register 
and then to the Assembly in an appendix to the 
minutes of the sitting. The words " He must 
give notice thereof to the President, who will in 
turn inform the Assembly " should therefore be 
deleted and replaced by a reference in para-
graph 2 to registration of substitutes according 
to Rule 24. 
16. In its report (Document 843) on the 
interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Proce-
dure, the Committee proposed redrafting 
paragraphs 3 and 4, but on 3rd June 1980, the 
Assembly referred the report back to the Com-
mittee at the request of your Rapporteur. The 
reference back to the Committee was to allow it 
to study in detail the objections to this redraft-
ing formulated by Mr. De Poi in his capacity 
as Chairman of the Italian Delegation. 
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17. Because of the large number of political 
parties represented on certain delegations, Mr. 
De Poi could not in fact accept the rule where-
by, except with the special authorisation of the 
Chairman, titular members may be replaced 
only by a representative or substitute appointed 
for the purpose. In other words, he was 
against the idea of an official and permanent 
alternate for each titular member and consi-
dered that any alternate member of the Com-
mittee should be able to replace any titular 
member of the same nationality. 
18. The amendment in the present report 
takes account of Mr. De Poi's remarks. It first 
stipulates that titular holders of seats on 
Committees may be either Representatives or 
Substitutes and that titular members may 
appoint alternates. It then sets out two 
methods of appointment: (I) a titular member 
prevented from attending a Committee meeting 
is free to choose his alternate from among alter-
nate members of the Committee of the same 
nationality as himself; (2) with the agreement of 
the Chairman, a titular member may also 
arrange to be replaced by a member of the 
Assembly not belonging to the Committee, pro-
vided the Representative or Substitute concer-
ned is of the same nationality as himself. 
19. The text of paragraph 4 of Rule 7 modi-
fied by the Committee should therefore read as 
follows: 
"4. Representatives and Substitutes may 
sit on Committees either as titular 
members or as alternates. 
Any titular member who is prevented 
from attending a meeting may appoint an 
alternate from among the alternate 
members of the Committee of the same 
nationality as himself. With the consent 
of the Chairman of the Committee, he 
may also be replaced by any other Repre-
sentative or Substitute of the same 
nationality as himself. 
The alternate so appointed shall have the 
same rights as the titular member. " 
20. The last sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of 
the new text of Rule 7 is worded similarly to 
the provisions of paragraph 3 of the present 
Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure in that " the 
alternate so appointed shall have the same 
rights as the titular member". These rights 
should be made clear and distinguished from 
duties such as those of member of the Bureau 
or Rapporteur. Alternates who are "poten-
tial " members of the Committee become 
"full " members only for the duration of the 
meeting for which they have been appointed to 
replace a titular member. Only then do they 
have the same rights as the titular member they 
are replacing, i.e. the right to speak and to vote. 
21. Paragraph 4. the text of which was 
unsatisfactory. should be deleted since the new 
paragraph 3 renders it irrelevant. 
22. Paragraph 5. relating to procedure for 
replacement in plenary sittings, should follow 
straight on from the first two paragraphs and 
become paragraph 3. 
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23. Finally, the heading for Rule 7 should 
now be "Substitutes and alternates". 
24. The Committee therefore proposes that 
the Assembly adopt the attached draft resolu-
tion to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Proce-
dure and apply the provisions of the rule thus 
amended strictly. 
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Draft Resolution 
to amend Rules 34 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
I. To replace paragraph 2 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following: 
"2. Whenever ten or more Representatives so desire, the vote shall be taken by roll-call. 
The roll shall begin with the names of those requesting a roll-call vote. Should there be less 
than seven of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped 
and the vote taken by sitting and standing. "; 
2. To replace paragraphs I and 4 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure by the following: 
" I. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half the Repre-
sentatives or their Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 
above. " 
"4. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until a subsequent sitting of the 
same part-session. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the 
said part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, 
which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the 
Assembly or referred back to Committee." 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Boz~i. Rapporteur) 
I. The Committee alreadv submitted a 
report on methods of voting at· the Assembly's 
twenty-fourth session (Document 794). The 
draft order in this report advocating the full 
application of Rule 34 of the Rules of 
Procedure was adopted unanimously by the 
Committee on 22nd November 1978. It has 
since been decided to instruct the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to make 
an overall review of the Rules of Procedure. 
2. In view of. the continuing difficulty in 
obtaining a quorum. the Presidential Commit-
tee has asked the Committee to give priority to 
its examination of the question of methods of 
voting. 
3. The rigorous voting conditions which the 
Assembly imposed upon itself have not always 
been understood. 
4. On occasion. the Assembly has in fact 
not been able to vote on important but contro-
versial texts. Rather than being a sign of 
weakness. your Rapporteur considers that this 
rigour is an expression of dignity and illustrates 
the importance the Assembly attaches to its 
task. 
5. In Document 794 mentioned above. it 
was stated that: "Unlike a national parliament, 
the WEU Assembly is a purely consultative 
body. It has no legislative powers and cannot 
overthrow a government. The value of a 
recommendation adopted by the Assembly thus 
lies in the force of the political conviction it 
expresses and the degree and genuineness of the 
support it receives. A recommendation adop-
ted by a narrow margin and not an effective 
majority of the members of the Assembly 
would carry little weight. " 
6. However. this opinion no longer seems to 
be so widely shared. Some consider that the 
Assembly should be released from the statutory 
shackles which sometimes prevent it from 
voting. 
7. Some Committee members felt that the 
only effective procedure for guaranteeing the 
adoption of draft recommendations or opinions 
on whicl1 there has to be a vote by roll-call 
would be to introduce proxy voting. now prohi-
bited under Rule 3 7, paragraph I. of the Rules 
of Procedure. 
8. These Committee members proposed that 
a representative who had attended at least one 
sitting and found it impossible to be replaced 
by a substitute might ask another representative 
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or substitute to vote on his behalf on one or 
more texts on which there was a roll-call vote 
during a sitting or part-session. No member of 
the Assembly should be able to vote for more 
than one other member. 
9. A large majorit) of the Committee was 
opposed to these suggestions. 
I 0. Other members proposed the idea that 
normal procedure should be to vote by sitting 
and standing. In their view. roll-call votes 
should be the exception. 
I I. Advocates of this view therefore sug-
gested bringing the Rules of Procedure of the 
WEU Assembly into line with those of the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and. to this 
end. wished to follow the provisions of para-
graphs 3 and 4 of Rule 35 of that Assembly's 
Rules of Procedure which state that votes shall 
be taken by roll-call whenever ten or more 
representatives so desire or. in the case of a 
vote on a draft recommendation. resolution or 
opinion as a whole. whenever five or more 
representatives so desire. 
12. The new paragraph 3 of Rule 34 would 
therefore read as follows: 
" The vote on a motion to disagree to the 
annual report. or to any part of it. shall 
be taken by roll-call. 
The vote on the draft reply to the annual 
report and on a draft recommendation or 
opinion considered as a whole shall be 
taken by roll-call whenever five or more 
representatives so de si re. " 
13. However. other Committee members had 
reservations about this. Your Rapporteur for 
his part feels that the remarks on which the 
Committee's earlier report to the Assembly was 
based still apply. He therefore considers it 
would be politically inexpedient to make more 
tlexible the provisions of Rule 34 relating to 
methods of voting. 
14. He also considers that greater recourse to 
the simplified procedure referred to in para-
graphs 6. 7 and 8 of the abovementioned 
report would foster uncertainty over proce-
dure. Such uncertainty has already, on occa-
sion, provoked complaints in the past when 
simplified procedure has been applied. 
15. The simplified procedure should there-
fore be applied more strictly. Announcement 
of a single vote " against " should make the 
application of normal procedure mandatory. 
Simplified procedure might be considered 
acceptable for saving time when there are only 
abstentions. 
16. Your Rapporteur recognises the need to 
find a means of avoiding a minority being able 
to manceuvre to make it impossible for the 
Assembly to vote on a controversial text, i.e. by 
expressing its opposition and then withdrawing 
from the chamber to ensure that there is not a 
quorum. The majority of the Assembly should 
in fact be guaranteed the right to express its 
convictions by voting on a text. To this end, 
your Rapporteur suggests giving a more precise 
definition of the quorum and stipulating in 
Rule 36, paragraph I, of the Rules of Procedure 
that account is taken of those present rather 
than of those voting. 
17. Such a provision \\-ould conform to the 
spirit of the rigorous interpretation of Rule 7 of 
the Rules of Procedure given by the Committee 
Chairman, Mr. Grieve, in his report. 
18. The obligation incumbent on a represen-
tative or substi-tute who signs the attendance 
register to exercise all attendant rights and 
duties throughout the sitting in question allows 
him to be considered as present even if. for any 
reason whatsoever, he does not take part in the 
vote. An Assembly document, i.e. the atten-
dance list appended to the minutes of the sitting 
concerned, is official proof of his pre-
sence. 
19. Your Rapporteur proposes that the atten-
dance register rather than the number of those 
taking part in the vote be taken as the basis for 
determining whether there is a quorum, and 
suggests amending paragraph I of Rule 36 to 
read as follows: 
"The Assembly shall not take any deci-
sion by roll-call unless more than half the 
Representatives or their Substitutes have 
signed the Register of Attendance pro-
vided for in Rule 24 above. " 
20. The result of the vote would then be 
announced as follows: ayes ... , noes ... , absten-
tions ... , did not take part in the vote .. . 
21. It should be pointed out that there have 
been cases of sufficient members being present 
according to the attendance register but the 
number of votes cast in a roll-call vote being 
less than the 45 required. The proposed provi-
sions would have allowed the Assembly's deci-
sion to be recorded. 
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22. Moreover, rather than systematically 
postponing the vote until the next session, your 
Rapporteur believes it might be preferable to 
refer to the Presidential Committee any matters 
left outstanding for lack of a quorum. Thus 
the Committee which prepares the Assembly's 
agenda could decide, case by case, whether the 
text in question will still be topical six months 
later or whether it should be referred back to 
Committee. 
23. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes 
amending paragraph 4 of Rule 36 to read as 
follows: 
" In the absence of a quorum, the vote 
shall be postponed until a subsequent sit-
ting of the same part-session. Any mat-
ter on which it has not been possible to 
vote before the end of the said part-session 
in the absence of a quorum shall be referr-
ed to the Presidential Committee, which 
shall decide whether the text should be 
put to the vote at the next part-session of 
the Assembly or referred back to 
Committee. " 
24. Finally, to avoid manceuvres to prevent 
the Assembly voting on matters other than 
those requiring a roll-call vote under the Rules 
of Procedure, your Rapporteur proposes adding 
the following text to paragraph 2 of Rule 34 on 
methods of voting: 
" The roll-call shall begin with the names 
of those requesting a roll-call vote. 
Should there be less than seven of 
them present to answer when their names 
are called, the roll-call shall be stopped 
and the vote taken by sitting and stan-
ding." 
25. In conclusion, your Rapporteur recalls 
that the required quorum represents only one-
quarter of the total number of representatives 
and substitutes. The sy~tem of substitutes 
should therefore allow the requisite number of 
members to be present whenever necessary for 
voting purposes. 
26. It should be repeated that it is for the 
chairmen of delegations and political groups to 
come to grips with absenteeism and ensure dis-
cipline and for each member of the Assembly 
to be conscientious in contributing to the work 
of the Assembly whenever his presence is requi-
red. 
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Amendment 1 
Methods of voting 
AMENDMENT 1 ' 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen 
1. After paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, insert the following: 
28th November 1980 
" To replace paragraph 3 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following: 
3. The vote on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, shall be taken 
by roll-call. The vote on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation 
or opinion considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call whenever five or more represen-
tatives so desire. The roll-call shall begin with the names of those requiring a roll-call 
vote. Should there be less than three of them present to answer when their names are called, 
the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing. " 
Signed: Stoffelen 
1. See 8th Sitting, 1st December 1980 (Amendment amended and negatived). 
60 
Document 853 
Amendments 2 and 3 
Methods of voting 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Lord Hughes 
1st December 1980 
2. In paragraph 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 4, leave out "present" and insert 
"Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in 
Rule 24 above ". 
3. In paragraph 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 3, leave out from" Representatives" 
to the end of the paragraph and insert " the Representatives or their Substitutes has not signed the 
Register provided for in Rule 24 above". 
1. See 8th Sitting, 1st December 1980 (Amendments agreed to). 
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6th October 1980 
I. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 2 with 
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(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Berrier (Alternate: Baume[), Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von 
Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini (Alternate: Amadez), 
Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: Vohrer), Hanin 
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McNair (Alternate: Kershaw), MM. Mangelschots (Alter-
nate: van Waterschoot), Mende, Mommersteeg, Miiller, 
Peridier, Lord Reay, MM. Thoss, Urwin, Va!tante, 
Vecchietti, Voogd. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the future of European security 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to 
consolidate peace and promote detente and disarmament; 
Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable beoause of the Soviet 
Union's superiority in many fields; 
Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat 
to the economic and political fields; 
Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members; 
Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the 
European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy; 
Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater 
effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to 
conventional weapons; 
Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of 
armaments; 
Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint 
views on questions which are outside the Community's purview; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the 
basis of European security; 
Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising 
that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and 
now to face up to the requirements of European security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU 
to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular: 
(a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibilifY· namely defence, 
armaments and disarmament; 
(b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters 
which concern them are discussed; 
(c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to 
identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security; 
(d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC have applied for 
membership or are European members of NATO also to negotiate th~fr accession to the 
modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their associatiory with the activities 
ofWEU; 
(e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the St~nding Armaments 
Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments polic~. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the future of European security 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the WEU Assembly remains the only European assembly with responsibilities 
in defence questions; 
Considering that the election of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities by 
direct universal suffrage gives that assembly new authority in the framework of the Rome Treaty; 
Considering it desirable to establish links between these two assemblies, 
DECIDES 
I. To instruct the Presidential Committee, on its initiative, to consider with the Bureau of the 
assembly of the European Communities the possibility of organising an exchange of observers 
between the two assemblies; 
2. To instruct its President to examine with the President of the European Parliament all the 
questions raised by this exchange of observers; 
3. To instruct the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee to contact the Chairman of the 
Political Committee of the assembly of the European Communities with a view to co-ordinating the 
political work of the two assemblies. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur) 
I. Europe's security aims 
I. There were about eight million victims 
during the first world war in Europe. In the 
second world war, almost 45 million Europeans 
were killed. The subsequent growth in arma-
ments, and nuclear armaments in particular, 
has been such that there is every reason to 
think that a third world war would leave Eur-
ope in a state of almost total devastation and 
that the population would be practically wiped 
out, even if nuclear weapons were not used. 
But this is hardly probable. It is enough to 
glance at a map of the world to see that Europe 
could not be spared in the event of hostilities 
between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Its wealth, its population and the narrow 
confines between the iron curtain and the 
shores of the Atlantic make it a vital stake 
and any future war will inevitably be fought on 
its soil. 
2. There is therefore no interest, whether 
national or ideological, which would warrant 
the risk of any European country or nation 
sparking off a war. This fact cannot and does 
not escape any of the Western European coun-
tries and, since the end of the second world 
war, no European government has even thought 
of using force, let alone done so, to obtain 
benefits of any kind whatsoever, at least in 
Europe. 
3. No political party, whether in govern-
ment or in opposition, has ever considered war 
as a means of attaining aims of any kind what-
soever. This means that some have accepted a 
situation which, in another age, would have 
seemed intolerable, such as the division of Ger-
many and the German people and the situation 
imposed on Berlin. But no one, in Germany 
or elsewhere, has done anything to start a war 
that might change this situation. No one has 
even considered doing so. Consequently, any 
accusations that may have been levelled at a 
European state, or even a party, of militarism, 
revanchism or aggressiveness are and were un-
fair, completely unfounded and slanderous. 
They are, and remain, dangerous insofar as they 
are liable to incur or perpetuate mistrust for 
which today there is no justification but which 
may sow discord between nations with common 
situations and aims. 
4. Peace can be secured only if an opponent 
refrains from the idea that an attack on Western 
Europe could be of advantage to him. The 
West's policy must also be a defence policy, 
which means the opponent is deterred from any 
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attack or pressure. This policy is no longer 
conceived as an instrument of a foreign policy 
directed towards the attainment of national 
goals but merely as a means of ensuring secur-
ity, i.e. peace, no longer for pne country or an-
other, but for the whole of Europe, since no 
one can hope to evade a war which might break 
out on the European continent. 
5. This desire for peace does. not mean that 
Europe is not prepared to make the sacrifices it 
considers necessary to defend its freedom. The 
whole population of all the countries of Europe 
has steadfastly accepted such sacrifices because 
it realised the need for them. Most Western 
European countries have compulsory military 
service for their youth. All spend a consider-
able proportion of their gross national product 
on maintaining and equipping their armed for-
ces. When, in 1979, it became apparent that 
an additional financial effort was necessary to 
ensure Europe's security, all the members of 
NATO accepted the principle of an annual in-
crease of at least 3 % in constant values in their 
defence budgets, in spite of the difficulties they 
were all experiencing due to a long-term 
deeply-rooted economic recession. 
6. Thus, there can be no ambiguity in Eur-
ope's attitude towards everything contributing 
to a policy of detente. All Europeans seek 
detente in East-West relations provided it does 
not weaken their security. They all have the 
same interest in limiting as far as possible the 
sacrifices which they have to make to ensure 
their defence. But they cannot agree to a 
foreign policy which diminishes the effect of 
these sacrifices, i.e. which jeopardises their 
security. 
7. The policy of detente cannot therefore be 
separated from Europe's overall defence pol-
icy. It is closely linked with and an integral 
part of defence policy since it seeks to streng-
then security while reducing expenditure on 
armaments. It is therefore an unassailable res-
ponsibility of Western European Union under 
the modified Brussels Treaty. It has long been 
prominent in WEU's work and the Assembly 
has on many occasions examined its aspects 
and implications, even after nine-power Europe 
took over many of these questions in the frame-
work of political consultations between the nine 
governments. 
8. Disarmament and the limitation of arma-
ments have always been a major aim of Euro-
peans but only in the framework of a global 
policy which includes consultations amongst 
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allies and negotiations with the Sovied Union, 
its allies and all countries concerned. In 
varying ways and to a greater or lesser extent 
they have all taken part in disarmament nego-
tiations, particularly in the framework of _the 
Geneva Disarmament Committee. The U mted 
Nations special session on disarmament in 1978 
showed the interest and importance of disarma-
ment for European countries whichever alliance 
they belonged to or whether they were neutral 
or non-aligned. Europe played a decisive role 
at that session and was very largely responsible 
for the changes then made in the composition 
and methods of work of the Disarmament Com-
mittee. 
9. Although the European countries were 
not asked to take a direct part in the SALT 
negotiations, they have followed them very clo-
sely, particularly in their consultation~ with 
their American partner, and have made 1t clear 
that they wish them to be successful as long as 
they do not in any way compromise Europe's 
security. Similarly, the European members of 
NATO have taken part in the MBFR talks and 
have tried to make them advance in the same 
direction. 
10. Your Rapporteur points out that after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan some politi-
cians were heard to say that the only way to 
overcome the mounting tension would be by a 
policy of disarmament. Your Rapporteur is in 
favour of all serious talks on disarmament. 
But those who believe this might be a remedy 
for the crisis should note that the Geneva Com-
mittee held its 867th meeting in 1980 without 
recording any major results in terms of Euro-
pean security and disarmament. The least that 
can be said is that its work is desperately slow, 
even assuming that there is still hope of some 
outcome. Naturally, events in 1979 and 1980, 
particularly the invasion '?f . Afghanistan, . d~d 
nothing to raise hopes and 1t 1s now unreahst1c 
to base a policy on disarmament which would 
be tantamount to responding to a succession of 
challenges to Western Europe's security by a 
display of weakness and an attitude of appease-
ment, the effects of which would probably be 
the reverse of the aim sought, i.e. the consolida-
tion of peace. Indeed, at the present juncture, 
the development of detente and disarmament 
cannot be envisaged without, to say the least, a 
new appraisal of the threats to international 
peace and an assessment of the forces deployed 
by the Soviet Union and its allies. 
11. Any initiatives the Soviets may take at 
present in the name of detente and disarma-
ment do not seem to be aimed at achieving 
concrete results based on maintaining the bal-
ance and developing peaceful relations but 
rather at undermining the unity of Europe and 
the Atlantic Community and weakening their 
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determination to continue to make the sacn-
fices necessary for their security. 
12. Europe's freedom is indivisible and the 
West must do its utmost to avoid being carried 
away by proposals which conceal such dangers. 
In facing up to the implications of the P!e-
sent situation and examining the threats facmg 
Europe our sights must be set firmly on the ob-
jective of security based on detente and effective 
disarmament. 
13. Soviet moves to denounce NATO as a 
militarist, aggressive or revanchist undertaking 
must be discounted straight away. The Atlan-
tic Alliance is in fact purely defensive and 
NATO is in no way designed for an offensive 
policy, nor an offensive strategy: NATO is 
absolutely unable to attack. There are there-
fore no grounds for ideas that the West should 
show understanding for the Soviet Union 
which feels itself surrounded and hence threat-
ened by the West. Such views take no account 
of the Soviet Union's perfect knowledge of the 
text of the North Atlantic Treaty, the structure 
of NATO and the democratic decision-taking 
machinery of all the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance under parliamentary supervi-
sion. The Soviet Union fully realises what it 
is doing in pursuing, for ·political purposes, this 
line of propaganda which seeks to divide the 
West and weaken its defence effort. The West 
must not forget that peace in Europe since 1945 
cannot be attributed to international opinion, 
the United Nations Charter and its application 
or talks on detente and disarmament but only 
to the balance of force guaranteed by NATO 
which alone has given certain shape - still ill-
defined - to an international order which it 
alone maintains. This means that however 
great may be the attachment to peace and the 
desire to bring about real disarmament and 
detente on the part of the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, they would be running 
counter to their aims if they did not first seek to 
maintain -or, at the present juncture, restore-
the balance without which there can be neither 
peace nor law. 
11. Threats to European security 
1. Political aspects 
14. The seizure of power by the Communist 
Party in Russia in 1917 introduced a comple-
tely new concept of international relations on 
the part of the Bolcheviks. They saw the Rus-
sian revolution merely as a step towards world 
revolution and revolution in any one country 
meant the power, army and external policy 
of the Soviet Union being placed at the service 
of that revolution. Since then, therefore, the 
cause of revolution and that of the Soviet 
Union have become merged in the eyes of 
communist leaders the world over -admittedly 
with a few exceptions such as Tito in Yugosla-
via and Mao Tse-tung and his successors in 
China. Hence, they consider that it is the class 
struggle - which they believe to be history's 
principal driving force - which is expressed in 
international relations and that this struggle 
cannot come to an end until communists have 
assumed power throughout the world. 
15. However, this does not mean the Soviet 
Union is prepared to leap blindly into any ven-
ture in the name of revolution. On many past 
occasions, it has shown great flexibility in 
implementing its schemes and has applied them 
very realistically. As long as the "capitalist 
world " has sufficient cohesion and force to 
inflict defeat or intolerable losses on the Soviet 
Unjop in the event of open hostilities, the latter 
will be deterred from taking the risk of a 
direct confrontation, in Europe at least, as long 
as it knows the West will not hesitate to use its 
full force to ensure its security. This has led it 
to use other means of weakening the capitalist 
side, leaving itself room to build up its strength 
and perhaps, tomorrow, to win the day while 
avoiding open confrontation. 
16. But such means can be deployed only 
under cover of Soviet strength. The Soviet 
Union has therefore started to build up what is 
probably the largest and best equipped army in 
the world, forming a navy equal to the strongest 
in the world, i.e. that of the United States, and 
developing nuclear power equal to that of its 
potential enemy in every field and which now 
in many respects is in the lead. 
1 7. The economic and social cost of this tre-
mendous armaments effort has been consider-
able and has left the Soviet people far behind 
Western Europe and the United States in terms 
of personal consumption. To impose these 
sacrifices, the Soviet Government has for seve-
ral decades had to maintain a dictatorship diffi-
cult to tolerate and a main effect of which has 
been the complete isolation of the population 
to prevent it from knowing the true situation in 
the rest of the world. This dictatorship is an 
essential condition for the success of Soviet 
external policy. 
18. A revolutionary policy has been worked 
out for countries where capitalism is firmly 
entrenched which includes weakening western 
positions outside Europe and cutting the west-
ern countries off from their essential resources, 
particularly Middle East oil and ores for the 
European market mainly from southern Afri-
ca. It is from every point of view in the inte-
rests of the Soviet Union to win over to its 
ideological system the countries recently freed 
from colonialism or bring them under its domi-
nation. If at one time it had such illusions, its 
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experience with China certainly quelled them. 
The communist order is intended for indus-
trialised countries in which it can lean on a 
large and organised working class, but marxist 
logic, which here corresponds to a fairly realis-
tic assessment of the facts, holds that capitalism 
is inherently condemned to expand continually 
and consequently all fordes opposing such 
expansion can halt it and thus provoke its self-
destruction. 
19. That is why the Soviet Union has no 
hesitation in encouraging all movements capa-
ble of destabilising regions whose production or 
markets may be useful to the West and to this 
end it relies equally on nationalist forces and 
religious, ethnic or economic movements. 
This does not mean the Soviet Union gives 
equal support and assistance to all such forces 
but it is liable to make use of them or even stir 
them up if they are likely to play a role in 
world strategy. This is probably the explana-
tion for the operations instigated or supported 
by the Soviet Union in South-East Asia, the 
Near and Middle East and Africa. 
20. A look at a map of the Indian Ocean 
indicating all the subversive movements encou-
raged, aided or provoked by the Soviet Union 
and its conquests and those of its allies in the 
past five years would show a threefold pincer-
movement closing on the ocean through which 
most Middle East oil has to pass: much of the 
oil consumed by the United States, 60% of th.if 
consumed by Western Europe and 90 % of 
Japanese requirements. As long as the West 
remains as dependent as it now is on oil 
imports from the Middle East, the ability to 
close the Persian Gulf will give the Soviet 
Union strong means of pressure. The West 
has of course sensed the danger and taken steps 
to allow it to escape this pressure in the future, 
first by building up oil reserves which now 
amount to about four months' consumption 
and second by developing, as decided in V en ice 
in June 1980, alternative forms of energy for 
the western economy to depend less closely on 
Middle East oil, its price and supply routes. 
However, the effects of the$e measures will be 
felt only in the long term and, for the next ten 
years at least, the West will remain very largely 
dependent on that area of the world. 
21. On the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, 
the three claws of the pincer are clearly discern-
ible: the seizure of the whole of Vietnam by a 
pro-Soviet regime, the domination of Laos, the 
conquest of Cambodia and the outbreak of 
fighting between Vietnam and Thailand in June 
1980 indicate that the Indochinese peninsula is 
in the process of falling entirely into the hands 
of the Soviet Union or its friends. The inva-
sion of Afghanistan in Dec~mber 1979 allowed 
the Red Army, in crossing the highest moun-
tain barrier in the world, to come 500 km closer 
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to the Strait of Hormuz from which It IS now 
separated only by a crumbling Iranian state and 
the Baluchi province of a singularly weakened 
Pakistan. Finally, the third claw of the pincer 
is in the northern Near East where the Soviet 
Union is encouraging continuous internal dis-
turbances in Turkey with several hundred vic-
tims of terrorism each month, where Syria 
seems on the brink of another revolution and 
Iraq has an army almost entirely equipped by 
the Soviet Union. 
22. In face of this direct or indirect thrust by 
the Soviet Union towards the south, the deve-
lopment of Soviet influence in the Arabian 
peninsula and Africa is the second part of the 
pincer movement closing on the Indian Ocean. 
The Arabian peninsula is threatened by a 
dynamic South Yemen, with the powerful assis-
tance of the Soviet Union, and by a Palestinian 
diaspora which may now be said to be threaten-
ing the stability of nearly all the states in the 
region. Although little is still known about the 
events in Mecca in autumn 1979, they indicate 
that the strength of dissenting forces has be-
come considerable, even in Saudi Arabia. 
There are numerous Palestinians and they hold 
key positions in the Gulf oil states. They have 
their political and military organisation and 
constitute a major threat to stability in the area. 
23. In Africa, the Soviet Union has found a 
series of staging posts, some in the north, others 
in the centre or south of the continent, inter 
alia in Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Guinea, Benin, 
Zambia and Mozambique. The presence of a 
large Cuban contingent and a number of techni-
cians from East Germany allows these countries 
to be used as a base for bringing pressure and 
steady threats to bear on South Africa and for 
fomenting instability, unrest and dissent in most 
African countries. But South Africa alone 
accounts for 40 % of African industry and 45 % 
of its mining output, 86 % of world platinum 
output, 83% chromium, 14% vanadium, 49% 
gold, 48 % manganese and 46 % fluorine, not to 
speak of the importance of the Cape route for 
world trade since 78 % of Europe's oil supplies 
pass by that route, including 68 % of those of 
the Federal Republic and 99 % , of those of 
France, plus 80% of Western Europe's imports 
of raw materials. 
24. It is therefore impossible to isolate the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from a 
whole series of other events occurring all round 
the Indian Ocean and which show a coherent 
attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to use 
this region in a global strategy. 
25. The present economic crisis in the West 
provides the Soviet Union with an excellent 
opportunity for developing this undertaking by 
strengthening all the elements of internal 
dissension in the " capitalist " countries. The 
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communist parties may play this role, but they 
do not have a monopoly. The development of 
terrorism in Turkey and its continuation in 
Italy are alarming factors of destabilisation. 
The crisis also allows advantage to be taken of 
growing differences between the western coun-
tries' economic interests in order to break up 
the cohesion of the capitalist world. Commu-
nist party exploitation of national feelings in 
certain European countries and above all the 
spread of nationalist claims in the industrial, 
trade and even agricultural fields indicate that 
this is a concerted operation designed to ruin 
the western alliance and weaken the ability of 
each western country to resist Soviet pressure 
and, furthermore, to annihilate the West's 
overall ability to resist this pressure by 
destroying its cohesion. 
26. Such an undertaking implies the use of 
propaganda as an essential means of separating 
the West from the third world countries by assi-
milating the cause of the West's security to that 
of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. 
This propaganda campaign of course finds 
many footholds in the third world and in the 
West and its effectiveness cannot be denied. 
The exploitation of feelings left over from past 
history, however unjustified they may now be, 
is a habitual method of destroying the West's 
cohesion. Anti-Americanism in Europe or 
anti-Germanism in certain countries are the 
themes of propaganda which has been pushed 
relentlessly ever since the end of the second 
world war. Moreover, the assimilation of 
Soviet policy to the interests of peace or even 
justice and freedom is a leitmotiv propagated by 
a large number of organisations, some of which, 
directly or indirectly run by Moscow, such as 
the "Peace Movement", aim at weakening the 
western societies' will to resist. In this field 
too times of crisis favour the development of 
such propaganda. 
27. These various factors do not allow it to 
be concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing 
for a final assault on the capitalist world. It is 
far more likely that it is seeking a position of 
force from which to negotiate with the capitalist 
powers, whose inevitable decline can but be 
speeded up by the economic crisis, in order to 
work out, at least in the first stage, a sort of 
division of the world, of influences and of 
wealth. Without taking any risks, of nuclear 
war at least, the Soviet Union would thus have 
gained a strong position for the subsequent sta-
ges of a necessary world revolution in face of 
which the West would be divided, weakened 
and demoralised, if not neutralised. Shifting 
from the class struggle to the foreign policy and 
diplomatic field also means proceeding with 
caution and moderation so as not to compro-
mise certain results by resorting to reckless 
policies. 
28. This probably explains the moderation 
shown by the Soviet Union once it realised that 
its intervention in Afghanistan might jeopardise 
its whole external policy, make it lose the 
advantages it had gained and create tension 
which could but isolate and weaken it. At the 
end of June 1980, just before the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council, the Soviet Union, 
announcing the withdrawal of a few troops 
from Afghanistan after having told the world a 
few weeks earlier that it would apply the Brezh-
nev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist 
states, showed that it did not intend to press on 
with the confrontation with the West, which 
was determined to refuse the fait accompli and 
had the support of a large proportion of the 
non-aligned countries. It should be noted 
moreover that according to available informa-
tion the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghan-
istan were immediately replaced and every-
thing indicates that the size of the forces enga-
ged in that country increased during the sum-
mer. 
29. It is with this in mind that the Soviet 
Union's military threat to the free world must 
be assessed: for the Soviet Union, there is no 
truly military field separate from the political 
field, the military being placed at the service of 
a highly political cause, particularly since poli-
tical action itself is thought out as strategy. 
2. Military aspects 
(a) Armaments 
30. Such a policy could not in fact be pur-
sued without the Soviet Union building up 
military strength which on the one hand ensu-
res the country's security and, on the other, 
allows it to protect its operations against any 
intervention by the capitalist powers and fur-
nishes a means of acting against and bringing 
pressure to bear on countries where it wants its 
will to prevail. This explains why, since the 
1917 revolution, the Soviet Union has been 
making a steady armaments effort. Since 1945, 
its aim has been to ensure that it has over-
whelming military superiority over absolutely 
any adversary in every field. Since that date, it 
has regularly assigned 11 to 15 % of its gross 
national product to defence as compared with a 
current figure of less than 6% for the United 
States and 3 to 4% for most European mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance in the last five 
years. In 1979, NATO decided on an increase 
of 3 % at constant values in the military bud-
gets of member states. But it will take about 
ten years for this decision, if effectively and 
continuously applied, to produce an increase of 
even one per cent in the proportion of gross 
national product assigned to defence since it is 
only about 1o1oo of the GNP. This constant 
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imbalance in military expenditure between the 
two sides explains why, for the past few years, 
the Soviet Union has bet~n on the way to 
becoming the world's leading military power, 
although NATO still considers it can to a cer-
tain extent make up for its quantitative inferio-
rity by its more advanced te~hnology. 
31. (i) Where strategic nuclear forces are 
concerned, the SALT 11 agreements, signed in 
1979 but whose ratification by the United 
States Senate was postponed sine die after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, reflected the real 
balance of forces by acknowledging that the 
Soviet Union can claim definite superiority as 
regards the number of delivery vehicles. In 
view of the characteristics of the means of deli-
very, the number of MIRVed warheads on each 
side, the number of nuclear submarines 
deployed and the total number of strategic 
nuclear weapons available, this numerical supe-
riority does not seem to give the Soviet Union 
decisive superiority over the United States. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Soviet 
Union has, to say the least, achieved parity in 
such weapons. 
32. (ii) For long-range theatre nuclear wea-
pons the situation is quite different. Since 
1978, the Soviet Union has been deploying a 
new generation of multi-warhead missiles, the 
SS-20, particularly on the European side, which 
already ensure overwhelming superiority and 
this will be the case for some time to come. 
These weapons are capable!: of attaining with 
extreme accuracy any target whatsoever on the 
territory of Western Europe and are thus very 
largely capable of disarming NATO forces 
without the latter being able to retaliate with 
weapons of an equivalent type. It is currently 
estimated that there are 450 Soviet SS-4 and 
SS-5 missiles and 180 SS-20 missiles (each with 
three nuclear warheads making a total of 540 
nuclear warheads) deployed in Europe. To 
these should be added the long-range nuclear 
weapon-carrying bombers known in the West as 
the " Backfire " bombers. SS-20 missiles are 
being deployed at a rate of more than one a 
week, which means that if the West keeps 
exactly to its present time-table, in 1983, when 
the first western long-range theatre nuclear wea-
pons are deployed, the Soviet Union will 
already have deployed about 400 SS-20 missi-
les. In these circumstances, for a long time to 
come the Soviet Union will be able, in the 
event of hostilities, to choose the level of 
operations and hence dissociate the interests of 
the United States, which are above all to avoid 
using strategic nuclear weapons, from those of 
Europe which has as much to fear from SS-20s 
as from strategic missiles. 
33. (iii) In conventional weapons, the Soviet 
Union and its allies have long had considerable 
numerical superiority in troops, aircraft and 
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tanks and now the same is true for the quality 
of their equipment since the Soviet Union, for 
instance, has already introduced a third genera-
tion of aircraft since the second world war 
whereas NATO is still at the second generation. 
In spite of the larger number of weapons 
deployed by the Soviet Union, the West for 
many years considered that its superior techno-
logy allowed it to have more perfected, reliable 
and effective weapons systems, thus offsetting 
its quantitative inferiority. However, large-
scale investments by the Soviet Union in its 
armaments industry and the systematic guidance 
of its best scientists, engineers and managers 
mean, according to all available information, 
that it has now achieved qualitative parity, thus 
depriving the West of its last remaining advan-
tage. With a long period of military service, 
some 27,000 combat tanks in Europe compared 
with 11,000 for NATO, very powerful artillery 
and a numerous and modern air force (5,800 
tactical aircraft for the Warsaw Pact in Europe 
compared with 3,300 for NATO), the Soviet 
Union is almost certain of being able to beat 
NATO forces in the event of generalised hosti-
lities which remain below the nuclear thres-
hold. The Soviet Union is therefore able to 
force NATO into the difficult position of 
having to be the first to use nuclear weapons, 
which may obviously raise doubts about the 
western deterrent, i.e. about the determination 
of the NATO countries to resist Soviet pres-
sure. 
34. It can thus be seen that Leonid Brezh-
nev's promise to the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party in Prague in February 1977 is grac;lually 
coming true: "In 1985, we shall have attained 
most of our objectives in Western Europe and 
the reversal of forces will then be so decisive 
that we shall be in a position to impose our will 
each time this is necessary ". 
35. (iv) In the naval field, the Soviet Union 
has made a major effort in the last ten years 
and it now has a nuclear or conventional capa-
bility of intervening anywhere in the world. 
Admittedly, it has fewer and smaller aircraft-
carriers than the United States and its allies but 
the presence of Soviet aircraft-carriers in the 
Indian Ocean is a means of bolstering Soviet 
political and military influence there. The 
entire Soviet surface fleet numbers 132 vessels 
compared to 196 for the United States but its 
naval tonnage exceeds that of the United States 
and, in view of the United States' need to 
defend long lines of communication, this 
ensures the Soviet Union clear superiority. 
36. It has 305 submarines of which 87 have a 
missile-launching capability, 83 are nuclear-
propelled attack submarines and 135 conven-
tionally-propelled attack submarines, compared 
with 41 strategic submarines, 70 nuclear-
propelled attack submarines and 8 convention-
70 
ally-propelled submarines for the United Sta-
tes plus 9, 11 and 49 submarines of the three 
categories for the European Community coun-
tries. The Soviet Union is therefore ahead of 
the West and can intervene in force along the 
lines of communication between Europe and 
the United States. Thus, following recent 
naval manceuvres, the Soviet commander-in-
chief announced triumphantly in a wireless 
message, not in code, that he was in a position 
to cut the links between Western Europe and 
the United States for five days in the event of 
hostilities. 
(b) Strategic positions 
3 7. The Soviet Union is therefore becoming 
the world's leading military power and its 
qualitative and quantitative lead is growing 
steadily. Its power is further strengthened by the 
strategic positions threatening the West's secu-
rity that it has gained since the second world 
war and which enhance the value of its arma-
ments. 
38. (i) In Europe itself, from the North Cape 
to the Black Sea, it is deploying nuclear-
warhead missiles capable of destroying in a few 
minutes the principal towns or a large number 
of military installations in all the Western 
European countries and thus practically annihi-
lating the forces deployed by NATO. The 
stationing of the Soviet army in Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 placed it at the very centre of Europe 
and, even with conventional forces, it can 
threaten the principal route between Northern 
and Southern Europe. 
39. (ii) In Asia and Africa, the Soviet Union 
now has a large number of bases which allow it 
to maintain a vast fleet in the Indian Ocean and 
supply any of its allies with weapons and 
equipment at very short notice. If it is borne 
in mind that, for the Soviet Union, the distance 
from its frontiers or coasts to the oil-producing 
areas of the Persian Gulf varies from 1 ,400 to 
2,400 km by air and is 2,800 km by sea (to 
Syria), whereas for the United States the dis-
tance varies from 6,000 to 7,000 km in the first 
case and from 10,000 to 15,000 km in the 
second, that the Soviet Union has 15 airborne 
divisions which can be brought into the area, 2 
of them within 5 days, whereas the United Sta-
tes has to allow about 18 days to bring 2 divi-
sions into the Gulf, and that the occupation of 
Afghanistan has further improved the Soviet 
transport capability, the magnitude of the 
Soviet Union's ability to intervene can be seen. 
Control of Aden and the coast of Ethiopia 
further increases its superiority and extends its 
reach to a large part of the African continent. 
40. Conversely, countries wishing to rely on 
the West for their security, whether in Asia or 
in Africa, are now threatened. In particular, 
this is so for Pakistan, shut in between a hostile 
India and Afghanistan which is occupied by the 
Red Army, Thailand, now under direct attack 
by Vietnamese forces armed and assisted by the 
Soviet Union, and South Africa, isolated by 
Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique which are 
also to varying degrees armed, assisted or ad vi-
sed by the Soviet Union. 
(c) Soviet aims 
41. This incredible military deployment is 
not necessarily destined to make an all-out 
assault on the free world, in the immediate 
future at least, but rather to weaken the West 
materially and place it at the mercy of Soviet 
good will for supplies of oil and raw materials 
needed for its economy and to induce the west-
em countries to seek security by coming to 
direct terms with the Soviet Union because they 
no longer have confidence in the effectiveness 
of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union 
has already announced that it could guarantee 
Western Europe's oil supplies, which is the 
same as saying that it could also deny them. 
In this way, the Soviet Union would assume an 
overwhelming influence over the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and would 
deprive NATO of its substance by gaining 
control over the economic survival and military 
capability of these countries. 
42. In the event of war, the Soviet Union 
would be able to choose the level of hostilities 
and consequently place the enemy before the 
choice between escalation, thus assuming res-
ponsibility for and risk of destruction, or 
bowing to Soviet demands. Thus, the ultimate 
aim of all these military means designed to un-
dermine the Atlantic Alliance and to disrupt 
NATO is to isolate the Western European 
countries in face of Soviet pressure and to give 
full effect to the political means used to ensure 
Soviet preponderance in the world. 
43. Admittedly, in recent years the Soviet 
Union's intentions have seemed peaceful. It 
has taken major steps in the limitation of 
nuclear weapons and in security and co-
operation in Europe, it has given up its claims 
to control West Berlin and has taken part in the 
MBFR negotiations and the Geneva Disarma-
ment Committee. But for it to continue along 
this course the Atlantic Alliance must remain 
strong: the stronger it is, the longer the Soviet 
Union's peaceful intentions will last. 
44. But since 1970 the Soviet Union's mili-
tary potential has become strong enough for it 
to enjoy the full spectrum of political and 
military options and it can henceforth under-
take anything anywhere at any time. All in 
all, this potential will be a far greater danger to 
the West than any intentions that, rightly or 
wrongly, may be attributed to it. 
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Ill. The requirements of western security 
45. Faced with such a many-sided threat 
covering so vast an area, the West's security 
depends on unyielding cbhesion. No state, 
probably not even the United States, can think 
of taking on the Soviet challenge alone. 
1. Military solldarity 
46. In the military field, only the United Sta-
tes, thanks to its own nuclear potential, is able 
to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet strate-
gic weapons. This is beyond the ability of 
even the European powers that have nuclear 
weapons and for Europe there is no alternative 
to the NATO guarantee that the American 
deterrent will work. NATO ensures the pre-
sence of American conventional and nuclear 
forces on European soil and hence that any 
attack on Western Europe will meet United 
States and Canadian forces and, consequently, 
the whole spectrum of American strength, 
including its strategic nuclear weapons. 
4 7. When General de Gaulle worked out and 
described the basic strategy for the French 
nuclear force, he made it clear that France did 
not intend to leave the Atlantic Alliance and 
that its strategy had a place only in relation to 
the strength of American deterrence and in the 
framework of a policy of collective defence 
which gave the national character of the French 
strike force its full value: insufficient on its own 
to deter Soviet aggression, it sought to give 
France, a European power, a means of trans-
forming any conflict whatsoever into nuclear 
war and therefore gave Europe a new element 
of deterrence and hence of security. 
48. The very concept of the British nuclear 
force is closely linked with that of the United 
States, and it is placed under NATO integrated 
military command in peacetime, subject to the 
right to withdraw it in the event of the United 
Kingdom's vital interests being at stake. There 
is therefore no question otf the United King-
dom's defence being separated from that of the 
Alliance as a whole. A fortiori, the defence 
policy of all the other European countries 
depends on the integrated defence system which 
guarantees the umbrella of American strategic 
weapons as well as the reinforcement of United 
States theatre nuclear weapci>ns on the continent 
ofEurope. ' 
49. In these conditions, anything that may 
weaken the links between W estem Europe and 
the United States and Canada is a serious dan-
ger for the security of all and especially of the 
European members of the Alliance. The 
Soviet Union is aware of this and, in peacetime, 
deploys every political means available to stir 
up differences between the members of the 
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Atlantic Alliance and, in wartime, its strategy 
would be first and foremost to break the links 
between Europe and the United States and 
Canada. Hence, any indication of Europe 
moving away from its North American partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance would be a serious 
threat to the security of Europe. There is a 
risk of any call for Europe to become indepen-
dent of the United States and Canada leading to 
a break-up of NATO, thus destroying the secu-
rity of the western world and above all of the 
part of Europe which has remained free. 
2. Political solidarity 
50. This obviously does not mean that Eur-
ope has no right to criticise the United States, 
but in its own interests its criticism must not be 
overdone and Europeans must not lose faith in 
American policy nor, above all, in the determi-
nation of the United States to defend Europe in 
the event of attack. Any signs of this might 
well induce the United States and Canada to 
react negatively towards Europe as happened to 
some extent in the early months of 1980, when 
American public opinion felt that Europe was 
not giving President Carter its full support in 
the dispute with Iran and in his strong com-
plaints about the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Any increase or prolongation of such reactions 
from American public opinion would inevitably 
leave room for doubts about the United States' 
determination to use all the means at its dispo-
sal to ensure the defence of West ern Europe 
and would consequently make a de facto divi-
sion between Europe and the United States and 
therefore weaken the European defence system. 
51. Moreover, if the two groups of partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance were thus to drift apart, 
it might induce certain European states to try to 
ensure their own security by means which 
would quickly break up the Alliance and wea-
ken collective security. This would be the case 
in particular if some sought, through direct and 
isolated closer contacts with the Soviet Union, 
the illusory guarantee of their own security at 
the expense of that of the European continent 
as a whole. Together, these two effects would 
be a real triumph for Soviet strategy since they 
would allow the Soviet Union to attain one of 
its principal goals without even having to resort 
to force. It is therefore evident that such 
attacks, aimed at destroying the solidarity of the 
Atlantic Alliance, are part of the Soviet Union's 
political and strategic calculations and that 
Europe must be careful not to heed them. 
52. To be effective, the Atlantic Alliance's 
defence policy must be based on a realistic view 
of the threats to the West and take account 
inter alia of the fact that detente is possible 
only if the Warsaw Pact powers, which are the 
other side of the world balance with the Atlan-
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tic Alliance, are absolutely convinced that they 
must take the free world, its determination and 
strength seriously. This means that to ensure 
its security the West must be united and deter-
mined to remain so, it must be well-enough 
armed to meet any threat effectively and res-
pond to any attack and it must be resolutely 
determined to defend itself. 
3. Flexible response 
53. None of the experts, whether in universi-
ties or in the armed forces, any longer denies 
the fact that the Warsaw Pact has far more 
armaments than are needed for a defensive stra-
tegy and a military policy based merely on the 
defence of its positions. Its armed forces are 
organised and deployed in terms of an offensive 
policy, not a defensive one. 
54. In view of its situation, Europe cannot 
consider a strategy of confrontation with the 
Soviet Union and must consequently base its 
security on deterrence alone, which does not 
, mean, in the present state of the balance of for-
ces, that only nuclear forces play a part. For 
deterrence to be fully effective, it is in fact 
essential that the timing and nature of the 
West's retaliation to any aggression should be 
and remain uncertain and incalculable for the 
Soviet leaders. For instance, they must not be 
sure of being able to conduct aggression at a 
level fixed by them beforehand and they must 
have to reckon on American nuclear retaliation 
before Western Europe has been invaded. This 
element of deterrence is essential if the Soviet 
Union is to be prevented from relying on its 
conventional superiority in order to envisage 
winning a war by keeping it at conventional 
level and convinced that the risk it would take 
by attacking would be impossible to calculate 
beforehand. The same is true of its superio-
rity in medium-range nuclear weapons as long 
as the American decision to station 600 Per-
shing 11 and cruise missiles in Europe (i.e. with 
three warheads per missile, a total of 1 ,800 
nuclear warheads) has not been implemented. 
55. The doctrine of flexible response is there-
fore the only one which meets the needs of 
Western European security. It means that at 
every level NATO must have means of beating 
Soviet aggression and, short of this, it must be 
able to escalate the fighting to a higher level 
without immediately launching an exchange of 
strategic nuclear weapons between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. NATO forces 
must be deployed so as to convince Soviet mili-
tary planners that there could be no certainty 
or even serious hope of conducting the fighting 
on their own terms. 
56. The effectiveness of the flexible response 
therefore depends on the Alliance being in 
strong enough shape to assure observers that 
Europeans and Americans are determined to 
defend Europe and that they have the means of 
doing so, i.e. that they have sufficient forces, 
equipped with weapons of all kinds, to make 
credible any threat on their part to resort to 
escalation to counter possible attacks. This 
has military implications - not to allow the 
Soviet Union to have a weapon against which 
the West has no means of retaliating, as tends 
to be the case at present for long-range theatre 
weapons - and political implications - the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. 
4. Requirements of a policy of deterrence 
57. A long history of international relations 
has shown in fact that it is often for lack of 
internal cohesion rather than because of attacks 
from without that alliances fail to work in that 
either they no longer manage to avoid war or 
they break apart - sometimes during the wars 
they have not been able to avoid. Thucydides 
already gave a masterly demonstration of this in 
relation to the Athens maritime confederation, 
and the history of Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries provides many other 
examples. 
58. The unity and solidarity of the western 
community have already proved their effective-
ness. Thus, the West's vital interests have not 
been defied or called in question whenever the 
West has clearly demonstrated that it was uni-
ted in its determination to defend them. A 
first instance was the attempt to blockade Ber-
lin in 1948, when the United States found the 
appropriate response and showed that any fur-
ther escalation of the Soviet operation would 
run up against American military might. 
59. This determination and the maintenance 
of a balance of force in Europe in spite of the 
gigantic military effort made by the Soviet 
Union over the years led to the emergence of 
detente and its progressive development 
through increased trade, meetings, conferences 
and negotiations on the limitation of nuclear 
weapons, the reduction of conventional forces 
and security and co-operation in Europe since 
this process called for mutual confidence which 
could not find a guarantee in the Soviet 
Union's need to respect force. Thus, far from 
being an obstacle to detente, as communist 
propaganda has been trying to show for more 
than a quarter of a century, the West's strength 
and solidarity are a condition of detente and, 
more than any other factor, they have preven-
ted any attack on the territories guaranteed by 
the Atlantic Alliance ever since its formation. 
60. There is no reason to doubt the future of 
this cohesion, whatever might have been said or 
thought in recent years. France's withdrawal 
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from the NATO integrated military organisa-
tion may have opened the door for such specu-
lation, but General de GauUe and his successors 
have never called in question France's determi-
nation to stand by its undertakings under the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. All that is known about the trend 
of its defence policy and its foreign policy, its 
nuclear effort and the deployment of its forces 
totally negates the idea that; it might be a weak 
link in the defence system of the Alliance. 
61. Your Rapporteur believes there is no 
question of making an indirect attempt to bring 
France back into the NATO integrated com-
mands. As then Federal Minister of Defence, 
your Rapporteur deplored France's withdrawal 
from NATO. But this is now a fact and 
France's decision must be respected: the defence 
of Europe must be based on the idea that France 
will not return to NATO in the foreseeable 
future but will in no way call in question its 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance. This 
seems to be a basis of understanding between 
France and its partners, particularly as political 
circles in all the countries of the Alliance fully 
realise that there can be no European defence 
policy without the United States and France. 
Similarly, discussions in France about defence 
show that that country too considers there can 
be no defence without the participation of the 
United States. Outside NAITO, France plays a 
special role and, because it feels responsible for 
Europe's security, it is a pa11ticularly strong ele-
ment of the European pillar of the Alliance. 
In his speech at the lnstitut des Hautes Etudes 
de Defense Nationale on 11th September 1980, 
Mr. Barre left no doubt about this role, under-
lining the priority France gaive to deterrence, its 
determination to have the most effective wea-
pons and its concern not to dissociate its secu-
rity from that of its neighbo1:1rs. 
62. Similarly, the unswerving determination 
of all members of the Alliance in face of 
· approaches or pressure by the Warsaw Pact 
countries to make them go tiack on their under-
takings in the Atlantic community is most pro-
mising for the future. For thirty years, there 
has been no rift in the solidarity of the Atlantic 
community for the defence of the freedom of all 
its members, nor has any member tried to avoid 
its commitments. 
63. It is precisely this remarkable success of 
the Alliance that now raises the question of 
its adaptation to take account of the changes 
that have occurred both inside and outside the 
Atlantic community and of the evolution of the 
threats it is designed to meet so that it may 
continue to play its full role in the interest of 
the security of all its memb~rs and of peace and 
the pursuit of detente. 
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64. Here, it is the joint management of the 
Alliance that ensures that efforts made by each 
member country have a maximum effect for the 
benefit of the security of all. 
IV. The European pillar of the Alliance 
1. Europe's place in the Alliance 
65. The West's security cannot be guaranteed 
unless account is taken of the nature of the 
political aims of the Soviet Union, the strength 
of the Warsaw Pact forces deployed against 
Western Europe and the close link between the 
development of detente and the maintenance of 
security. There can be no question of any 
member of the Atlantic community conducting 
its policy in the light of just one of the joint 
aims and, in particular, the idea that the North 
American members of the Alliance might spe-
cialise in defence and the European members 
might play the role of detente would have disas-
trous consequences and destroy the solidarity 
on which deterrence is based. Everyone's secu-
rity depends closely on the policy of common 
defence and the development of detente. 
66. This means that the Alliance must, so to 
speak, be jointly managed by all its members so 
that, on the one hand, each one's efforts pro-
duce the maximum results for joint security 
and, on the other hand, no rift may. form bet-
ween the members in questions of defence pol-
icy or in their relations with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. 
67. One way or another, strengthening 
NATO means strengthening its European ele-
ment. Changing circumstances and growing 
threats to world peace and the obligations they 
impose on the American partners of the Alli-
ance, particularly in areas not covered by the 
. North Atlantic Treaty and especiall·y in the 
Middle East, call for a special effort by Eur-
ope. Europeans must in fact be able, should 
the need arise, to take over from any American 
forces temporarily withdrawn from Europe for 
deployment in another part of the world so that 
the security guaranteed by the NATO military 
system is not jeopardised. It remains that the 
deterrent value of the Alliance is largely based 
on the physical presence of American forces in 
Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic, 
where no European forces can reasonably 
replace them. 
68. But apart from this particular problem, 
the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be 
truly ensured unless there is some degree of 
balance between its European and American 
components. This was the idea advanced by 
President Kennedy in his speech at Philadel-
phia on 4th July 1962 when he referred to the 
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organisation of an Atlantic community based 
on two pillars. This concept is still just as 
topical, even though it is taking longer to 
implement than John Kennedy thought. 
2. The European components of the Alliance 
69. The present growth of the European 
Communities is the first sign of this European 
pillar as it creates a community of interests bet-
ween the various Western European states. 
However, this community of interests does not 
always mean community of views on defence 
matters and a number of measures may be envi-
saged in order to strengthen the cohesion of the 
European pillar of the Alliance in the near 
future. 
70. For instance, Greece should be encou-
raged to resume its place in NATO without 
delay. Its differences with Turkey are not 
sufficient reason for Greece to sever ties with its 
allies, particularly as it has no true deterrent of 
its own. 
71. At the NATO ministerial meeting in 
Ankara in June 1980, Mr. Muskie, United 
States Secretary of State, held separate talks 
with the Greek and Turkish Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and subsequently said there 
were quite good prospects of Greece returning 
to the organisation which it had left after the 
Cyprus affair in 1974. The Greek Government 
for its part agreed that priority should be given 
to returning to NATO in connection with a 
bilateral Greek-American agreement on Ame-
rican military bases in Greece. In other 
words, Greece seems convinced that joining 
the EEC and returning to NATO are two 
parallel steps, the aim being for Greece to play 
a full part in both. 
72. In the case of Spain, its accession to the 
Atlantic Alliance has become a necessity and 
the Spanish authorities seem to be aware of 
this, as recalled by President Carter on 25th 
June 1980 when he was visiting Madrid. 
Spain is linked to the United States by a treaty 
of mutual assistance which expires in 1981 and 
grants the United States one naval base and 
three air bases on Spanish territory in exchange 
for economic and military assistance amounting 
to $ 1,250 million but the United States and the 
Spanish Government have apparently agreed 
to replace this bilateral treaty by Spain's acces-
sion to NATO: Mr. Ouja, Spanish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, has announced that his country 
would apply for accession in 1981 and might 
become a member in 1983. However, Mr. 
Ouja asked for two guarantees: 
(i) that the process of integrating Spain 
into the EEC would be continued 
because of the interdependence bet-
ween the economic and military inte-
gration of Spain in Western Europe; 
(ii) that the Spanish-British negotiations 
on transferring the sovereignty of 
Gibraltar to Spain be well under way, 
preliminary negotiations having 
already begun between the United 
Kingdom and Spain. 
73. Apart from a 200,000-strong army, a 
48,000-strong navy and a 40,000-strong air force, 
Spain would bring the Alliance a highly 
valuable strategic position both on the Mediter-
ranean and on the Atlantic, thanks to the Can-
ary Islands. 
74. Conversely, it might be in the joint inte-
rest of the Europeans to link the accession of 
Spain to NATO with membership of the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Its accession to 
NATO might be examined at the same time as 
its admission to the EEC. In fact, just as Spain 
does not intend to join NATO without being 
admitted to the EEC, and for the same reasons, 
its partners may link its admission to the EEC 
with membership of NATO. Moreover, there 
is every indication that the Spanish socialists, 
who were for a long time hostile to Spain's par-
ticipation in the Atlantic Alliance, will no lon-
ger refuse to have Spain take its place in the 
West's collective defence system in Europe. 
As a condition, they wish the Spanish people to 
be consulted by referendum. Nor would any-
thing prevent the three countries which have 
applied for membership of the European Com-
munity being encouraged to accede at the same 
time to the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, 
thus giving an institutional framework to the 
European pillar of the Alliance. Finally, a 
solution should be found whereby Ireland, in 
view of its special situation, might be associated 
in one way or another with its European part-
ners in the defence field. 
75. Broader foundations might naturally be 
envisaged for the European pillar, particularly 
since Norway and Turkey are members of 
NATO and the Mediterranean is still Europe's 
mare nostrum, providing access to its vital cen-
tres whose control is essential for its security, 
and the Norwegian Sea is a route between 
Europe and North America, inter alia for 
Soviet submarines. 
76. As a result of a referendum, Norway refu-
sed to join the EEC. The distances separating 
its most exposed territories - the Great North 
and the islands in the Barents Sea - from the 
central sector of European defence are so great 
that Norway is hesitant about its defence being 
too closely associated with that of the Central 
Europe sector and hopes for a special contribu-
tion to its defence from the United States and 
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Canada. In these circumstances, an attempt 
should be made to find a special solution to the 
problem of its participation in the European 
pillar of the Atlantic community. 
77. This also applies to Turkey, whose rela-
tionship with the EEC will have to be deter-
mined in the next few years and whose position 
at the heart of the Middle East and on the 
frontiers of the Soviet Union raises particular 
problems. 
78. The fact that the means of all the Euro-
pean members of the Atlantic Alliance are not 
identical in no way weakens the cohesion of the 
European pillar of the Alliance. On the 
contrary, the British and French nuclear forces 
can, and in fact do, make a major contribution 
to collective secui-ity. In recent years, the Uni-
ted Kingdom has been wondering whether to 
modernise its nuclear force, by adopting a new 
generation of means of delivery. It has decided 
to make the necessary financial sacrifices to 
modernise its nuclear force· and has thus com-
mitted itself to a long-term defence policy in 
which nuclear weapons will play an essential 
role. 
79. France for its part is in the process of 
modernising its strike force. It is replacing the 
missiles on the Plateau d' Albion by more 
powerful and more accurate means. It has 
just decided to build a sixth nuclear submarine 
and on 27th June 1980 President Giscard d'Es-
taing announced that research had been carried 
out since 197 6 for developing enhanced radia-
tion weapons and missiles with mobile laun-
chers. The French neutron weapon should be 
ready for deployment in 1983. 
80. The existence and modernisation of the 
British and French nuclear forces considerably 
strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capability 
and more effectively than could be done by a 
European nuclear force wb.ich has often been 
mentioned but never seriously envisaged by the 
governments of any of the countries capable of 
playing a major role in its formation. The 
United Kingdom has never responded to 
approaches about the development of Franco-
British nuclear weaponry. At the very time he 
was setting up the French strike force, General 
de Gaulle announced that he intended this 
force to remain under the sole responsibility of 
the French head of state. The idea of Franco-
German nuclear co-opera6on has never been 
part of the French Government's policy nor 
that of the Federal German Government. 
81. Indeed, the Federal Republic has always 
considered that it would derive no advantage 
from the possession of nuclear weapons and to 
have them would involve a strong risk of spe-
cial difficulties in its relations with the Eastern 
European countries. Moreover, it fears that 
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the production of a European nuclear weapon 
might provide a reason or pretext for reducing 
the American presence in Europe. 
82. This does not mean that the Federal 
Republic, any more than its European partners, 
is against the existence and development of the 
French and British nuclear forces. It therefore 
considers, as the North Atlantic Council for-
mally declared in Ottawa in June 1974, that the 
French and British nuclear forces make a most 
useful contribution to the joint defence of the 
West on the one hand because of the weapons 
themselves and on the other - and above all -
because they help to make it even more diffi-
cult for the Soviet Union to calculate the nature 
of the response to be expected in the event of 
attack. 
3. Europe's armaments 
83. Further, NATO, and particularly its 
European component, must make a major effort 
to make up for the time it has lost in the last 
ten years in the power and modernisation of its 
armaments, both nuclear and conventional. In 
the nuclear field, which mainly concerns the 
Americans, this implies inter alia the introduc-
tion of new weapons in response to the long-
range theatre nuclear weapons deployed by the 
Soviet Union, particularly the SS-20s. These 
weapons are Pershing 11 and cruise missiles. It 
is surprising how slow the European members 
of NATO are to agree to the deployment of 
these weapons, which are essential for Europe's 
security, on their territory. At present, the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom are 
known to have accepted the principle and in 
June 1980 the British Government even indi-
cated the sites it was reserving for cruise mis-
siles on its territory. Italy has also agreed to 
the deployment of cruise missiles on its terri-
tory. Belgium has again postponed taking a 
decision, and there has been no positive sign 
from the Netherlands. Europe therefore bears 
heavy responsibility in the delays accumulated 
by the Alliance in the sector of long-range 
theatre weapons. 
84. However, it should be noted that it will 
not be possible to start deploying the Pershing 
11 before 1983 and that, in view of the present 
rate at which the SS-20s are being introduced, 
the Soviet Union will still have a considerable 
lead in theatre weapons for a long time to 
come. 
85. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming 
tank superiority of the Soviet Union and its 
allies it seems essential for NATO to introduce 
as soon as possible a weapon capable of pre-
venting the Soviet Union taking advantage of 
this superiority, i.e. enhanced radiation missiles, 
commonly known as neutron shells. It is well 
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known that for several years the Soviet Union 
and the communist parties have been conduct-
ing a vast propaganda campaign to induce the 
West to renounce this weapon for the very rea-
son that they consider it to be effective. It 
would be most dangerous for the West to pay 
heed to such propaganda and further delay the 
development of this weapon. The French 
Government for its part seems to have under-
stood this. 
86. In fact, the Alliance as such has already 
taken its decision. In 1965, when Federal 
Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur had an 
opportunity of discussing with his then United 
States counterpart, Mr. McNamara, the need to 
increase the credibility of the Alliance's deter-
rent capability by developing an extremely 
accurate and highly mobile nuclear weapon 
with a very limited target area- about a square 
kilometre - and little fallout so as to cause only 
a minimum of radioactive pollution over a 
small area and for a short time in order to meet 
the challenge of Soviet conventional armaments 
- and particularly its tank superiority -
without jeopardising the survival of a civilian 
population far from the battlefield. Such limi-
tation of its effects should make the use of such 
a weapon credible and make it an effective 
instrument of deterrence. This weapon, which 
is merely a piece of artillery, is now being deve-
loped and meets the Alliance's requirements in 
the framework of a defensive strategy based on · 
deterrence. 
87. The deployment of new conventional 
weapons mainly concerns West ern Europe. 
This is essential since Europe has fallen 
well behind the Soviet Union, particularly 
where aircraft are concerned. Thus, NATO 
forces must now be equipped with anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft missiles with conventional 
warheads to prevent the Soviet Union taking 
advantage of its superiority in these two areas. 
88. This effort is quite clearly in Europe's 
interest since it must prevent the United States 
being faced with a choice between nuclear war 
involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons 
and abandoning Europe. Only if Europe has 
the means and determination to defend itself 
effectively will the United States find itself 
really committed to apply the strategy of flex-
ible response. A passive or cowardly attitude 
on the part of the Europeans can but spark off 
isolationist reactions in the United States and 
consequently aggressive reactions in the Soviet 
Union. 
4. European armaments policy 
89. This would mean the European members 
of NATO calling up troops who would have to 
be armed and equipped at very -short notice. 
This has implications in many fields, including 
that of armaments. The symposium organised 
by the WEU Assembly in Brussels in 
October 1979 showed - if it was not already 
evident - how incoherent the armaments 
policies .of the European states are and how 
intolerable such a position is becoming. In 
spite of an agreement of principle on the need 
for interoperability of equipment of the 
various armies deployed in Europe, progress in 
this field has been insignificant and the forces 
having to take part in a common system on the 
same territory may well not be capable of 
operating because every country clings jealously 
to national concepts based more on traditions 
and peculiarities of military headquarters than 
on necessities. 
90. It is essential for NATO to ensure 
without delay that all the forces that might 
have to operate on the Central European front 
can stock up in the armouries of any national 
army and that a maximum of interoperability is 
achieved as soon as possible. In Central 
Europe, there is no longer any national defence 
or any particular theatre of operations. In the 
event of war, any commander-in-chief must be 
able to call on contingents from any other 
country to meet the urgent requirements he has 
to handle. 
91. The absence of standardisation and a 
fortiori inadequate joint production of arma-
ments lead to competition in weapons produc-
tion by European manufacturers with ruinous 
repercussions on military budgets and, hence, 
European taxpayers. Unit production costs are 
too high, making users prefer, in many cases, to 
procure the armaments they require outside 
Europe, which further increases the waste of 
public money and prevents the best use being 
made of the already inadequate credits ear-
marked for defence equipment by the European 
countries. 
92. Since WEU started, its member countries, 
through the Standing Armaments Committee, 
have been defining European defence equip-
ment requirements and types of armaments 
corresponding to these requirements so as to 
unify the European armaments market as far as 
possible. It has to be recorded that the SAC 
has so far managed to achieve only very limited 
results with considerable loss of time. Even its 
study of the situation in the European 
armaments industries is advancing at the speed 
of a tortoise, not by fault of the international 
secretariat of the SAC which has zealously tried 
to pursue its study but rather of the govern-
ments which have been very parsimonious in 
providing the necessary elements of information 
and above all have shown no interest in a task 
which they themselves decided should be 
undertaken. It may be wondered whether the 
vast amount of work already done is not des-
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tined to lie dormant in the drawers of national 
administrations without their doing anything to 
draw the consequences in the field of joint 
production. 
93. Further, the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance organised the Independent 
European Programme Group, also intended to 
promote co-operation between military head-
quarters and the appropriate departments of 
Defence Ministries with a view to promoting 
the joint production of armaments. Although 
its sub-groups have proliferated, this group has 
in turn met the same difficulties resulting from 
an absence of will to succeed on the part of 
national departments which intend to remain 
de facto masters in their areas of responsibility. 
94. Finally, it is on a hi- or trilateral basis 
that a number of weapon$, including a few 
surface ships, aircraft and missiles, and even, 
more recently, tanks have been produced on a 
joint basis. But the stand~rdisation of Euro-
pean armaments is essential and will become 
increasingly so, and the European Community 
will no longer be able to dissociate itself from 
this matter, as Mr. Davignon, member of the 
Commission, underlined at the Brussels 
symposium. 
95. However, since the European countries' 
forces are solely or almost solely intended for 
deployment in a European theatre of opera-
tions, unlike American forces which may have 
to intervene in any part of the world, there is 
no technical reason why European armaments 
should not be unified. The only explanation 
for these difficulties and delays is the rigid atti-
tude of military headquarters and of the rele-
vant technical services or the special interests of 
armaments-producing firms and the pressure 
they are able to bring to bear on states. Simi-
larly, the lack of determination on the part of 
governments to overcome these obstacles leads 
to incredible delays both in fnteroperability and 
in joint production or standardisation of arma-
ments in Europe. 
5. Inter-allied consultations 
96. Finally, all these necessary arrangements 
require increased consultations between the 
American and European partners of the Alli-
ance in the framework of NATO, without it 
being necessary to extend the defence area 
defined in the North Atlantic Treaty or to offer 
Europe's military support for an American 
policy aimed at curbing Soviet expansion in Asia 
and Africa This policy was expressed inter alia 
in the " Carter doctrine ", announced after the 
invasion of Afghanistan, according to which 
any further steps by the Soviet Union to attain 
its objectives would be considered sufficient 
reason for military action and thus involve an 
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inestimable risk. Such a declaration is particu-
larly important in view of the threat to 
countries such as Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Oman, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. It implies a redeploy-
ment of American forces, particularly in the 
Indian Ocean, and, above all, much greater 
mobility. 
97. The West's aim is not and must in no 
case be to bring about a "division of the 
world " into two zones of influence but on the 
contrary to prevent Soviet policy imposing its 
views - as in Afghanistan - on countries which 
wish to remain non-aligned. The West can 
respond to the Soviet challenge by defending 
the freedom of peoples to choose their own 
course in their political, economic and social 
systems and in their external relations. This is 
the purpose of the measures taken by the 
United States. 
98. The Soviet Union must not be given the 
impression that this American reaction might 
bring the advantage of separating the United 
States from its European allies. Consequently, 
Europe must show unremitting interest in and 
support for American policy outside Europe, 
but this it will not do if procedure for consulta-
tion in the framework of NATO is not conside-
rably improved. 
99. Hence, for the sake of western security 
Europe must participate to a greater extent than 
in the past in decisions taken jointly by 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly 
in the framework of the North Atlantic 
Council. Such participation is essential if 
there is to be a real increase in the sacrifices 
made by Europeans for the joint defence, finan-
cially and where troop levels are concerne~, 
and if decisions taken by the American authon-
ties without consulting their European partners 
are not, as on several occasions in the recent 
past, to arouse misunderstandings and negative 
reactions among Europeans. It might also be 
said that, in the same way, decisions taken by 
one or other Western European country or even 
by the Nine on several occasions in recent 
months have aroused similar reactions among 
the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance 
because there was no prior consultation. The 
slow reactions of the Nine in following up the 
decisions taken by the United States regarding 
the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the steps 
taken by the Nine to express their views on the 
Palestine situation provided several examples 
which are still fresh in our minds. Consulta-
tions between allies should be extended sys-
tematically to cover all aspects of the threat to 
the Atlantic Alliance, including those which 
concern its plans or its periphery and also the 
non-military aspects since a global challenge 
should be met by a global strategy. It is in no 
one's interest to exclude countries which are 
not able, or are not called upon, to take part in 
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military measures which might be taken by one 
country or another. 
I 00. Generally speaking, it seems clear that 
Europe is in no way willing or prepared to 
intervene in any way whatsoever in the Middle 
East whereas the United States is setting in plac~ the military means to counter a. po~sible 
Soviet aggression in the area by stahonmg a 
naval force uff the coast of Oman, reorganising 
its Diego Garcia base and building up, on 
American territory, a combat-ready force of 
110,000 men with the necessary air trans-
port. But this in no way means that ~urope 
can or wishes to dissociate itself from th1s area, 
which is vital for its oil supplies. 
I 0 I. Certain European countries have forces 
capable of intervening outside the European 
theatre, particularly in Africa, where several 
military operations have been conducted on a 
limited scale in which others did not wish to or 
could not participate. Insofar as such opera-
tions concern the security of Europe and of the 
whole western world, they should be the subject 
of consultations between the partners in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
102. These consultations should also cover 
doctrine for the use of weapons, particularly 
nuclear weapons. Countries without nuclear 
weapons are closely and directly concerned by 
the way the nuclear powers intend to use their 
forces, and in particular their tactical nuclear 
weapons, in case of hostilities, since _fighting 
would inevitably cover the whole terntory of 
Europe. It should be added that a doctrine 
based on deterrence concerns all countries 
taking part in the deterrence, even if they do 
not make a nuclear contribution. 
103. Although the idea of a European nuclear 
force does not seem to conform to Europe's 
true possibilities today, this in no way means 
that the Western European countries have no 
interest in jointly examining their approach to 
the problem of their defence which can no 
longer, in present technical conditions, be 
ensured by each country in isolation. On the 
contrary, there is every reason for them to 
examine together how the forces of each 
country should be deployed in peacetime and 
used in wartime to ensure maximum effective-
ness and there is nothing to prevent these 
consultations also covering the use of nuclear 
weapons and their deployment in the NATO 
system. hi view of the special status of the 
French deterrent and the role it plays m 
Europe's defence policy, consultations 
Franco-German in particular - on its use 
might make a useful contribution to the 
western deterrent. 
104. Finally, consultations should also cover 
all problems linked with the limitation of arma-
ments, force reductions and disarmament. 
There is a problem with regard to the SALT 
negotiations where the American participants 
obviously kept their allies informed, in the 
framework of NATO, of the progress of work, 
but such consultations were sometimes inade-
quate or too late. Naturally, negotiations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions in 
Europe cannot succeed - and cannot even take 
place - without close consultation between all 
the members of NATO but, if these negotia-
tions are to be continued, it would be desirable 
for France to take part in them so that all the 
problems raised by maintaining or transforming 
the balance of force in Europe may be consi-
dered. Finally, the prospects of a meeting to 
be held in Madrid in autumn 1980 to examine 
and verify the application of decisions taken at 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe and which is inter alia to cover 
confidence-building measures, or of a European 
disarmament conference proposed by France, 
imply the existence and operation of a system 
of close consultations between the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
6. The frameworks of European co-operation 
105. Whether it is a question of armaments 
production, the preparation of disarmament 
negotiations, the limitation of forces and arma-
ments or events which concern international 
peace but which take place outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, there are 
obviously differences between the ways in 
which these matters are understood or 
handled on either side of the Atlantic. But if 
Europe wishes its American partners to listen 
to it, it must be in a position to know, express 
and uphold its views and interests in face of the 
United States which individual European states 
cannot do. The existence of a European pillar 
in a balanced alliance means Europe must exist 
politically. 
106. The European Community is of course 
the principal factor of cohesion of this Euro-
pean pillar, even if not all the European mem-
bers of the Alliance belong to the Community 
and certain members of the Community are not 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. Neverthe-
less, the establishment of a European economic 
entity expresses and strengthens de facto econo-
mic solidarity. This solidarity has been streng-
thened by the creation of a monetary union bet-
ween several countries and the recent election 
of the European Parliament by universal suf-
frage which have made Europe more and more 
of a reality. However, in defence matters 
there is no satisfactory expression of solidarity 
since the Communities have no responsibilities 
in this area and certain Community countries 
are radically opposed to Community responsi-
bilities being extended to cover defence. 
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107. Although it is evident that joint industrial 
policy concerns the armaments field and nine-
power political consultations concern defence 
policy, which forms part of foreign policy, 
particularly where East-West relations are 
concerned, it does not seem possible at the 
present time to consider overcoming the 
obstacle constituted by opposition to extending 
the Community's work to include the military 
field. 
108. Furthermore, Western European Union 
which, under the modified Brussels Treaty, has 
undeniable defence responsibilities, does not at 
present have a sound basis of solidarity and has 
never been able to work out a European 
defence policy for lack of agreement between 
the European governments on this point. The 
second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance therefore 
in fact exists at economic level but it has never 
been possible to build anything solid in the 
field of foreign policy and still less in that of 
defence. 
109. Yet the development of the European 
Communities leads towards European defence 
policy being handled by Community bodies pri-
marily because of the place occupied by the 
armaments industry in the European economy, 
a place which is continually growing and 
which, thanks to the development of the latest 
technology, in particular in the nuclear, electro-
nic, computer and aircraft sectors, means 
that today the number and skill of firms work-
ing· for defence and armaments are growing. 
But for this reason it is increasingly difficult to 
distinguish firms working solely for the civil 
sector. Commercial, technological and finan-
cial exchanges between European industries are 
and will become ever more numerous, so a 
common industrial policy henceforth calls for a 
common armaments policy. 
110. Moreover, the Community has expressed 
the wish to give shape to the co-ordination of 
member countries' foreign policies in the 
framework of nine-power political consulta-
tions. This has had noticeable results and, 
during the first months of 1980, Community 
positions and declarations have been worked 
out on many matters relating to Euro-
pean security. But those consultations do not 
seem to have prevented certain governments 
from taking unilateral action, without warning 
their partners beforehand, in a number of 
matters which nevertheless related to the secu-
rity of Europe as a whole. The development 
of nine-power consultations, soon to be twelve 
or thirteen powers since there is talk of Turkey 
being associated with them even before it joins 
the EEC, and the practice of holding consul-
tations at short notice in the event of emer-
gency are becoming an absolute necessity. 
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111. Finally, the European Communities quite 
evidently constitute the hub round which the 
Europe of the future is in the process of 
organising itself which means that security and 
defence questions must one day find a 
place in the work of the Communities. The 
necessary immediate measures can therefore be 
of only a provisional nature and designed to 
prepare for this Community future of which 
there are now glimpses. 
112. The day the obstacles are removed - the 
present limitation of Community responsibili-
ties, the refusal by certain countries to have 
these responsibilities extended and the fact that 
several European members of the Alliance are 
not yet members of the EEC - it will probably 
be possible to achieve early and complete iden-
tity between the European Community and the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
V. The organisation of European security 
1. The modified Brussels Treaty 
113. In present circumstances, WEU is still 
the only truly European organisation with res-
ponsibility for defence matters, which should 
enable it to help to form the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. Article IV of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty confers this duty on it, pro-
viding for close co-operation between WEU and 
NATO: 
"In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall 
work in close co-operation with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO 
for information and advice on military 
matters." 
114. There is therefore no legitimate reason 
for setting a European defence organisation, 
WEU, against the Atlantic Alliance since the 
Brussels Treaty was modified specifically in 
order to organise Europe's participation in 
western defence. However, the same treaty 
gave a special dimension to European solidarity 
in its Article V, which provides for all the 
WEU member countries to afford each other 
automatic assistance in the event of one of 
them being attacked. This is an extremely 
serious undertaking since the party attacked has 
to be afforded " all the . . . assistance in their 
power " and is therefore far more binding than 
the corresponding article in the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which makes provision only for consul-
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tations in the event of an attack on one of the 
signatories. Consequently, any speculation there 
may be about the nature of the participation of 
any of the members of WEU in the common 
defence would be based on the supposition that 
the member concerned would not respect its 
signature, which there is no reason to think 
would be the case. 
115. Moreover, Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty is completed by Article VIII 
which set up a Council that can meet at short 
notice at the request of any one of the member 
countries to examine all matters relat-
ing to co-operation between these countries in 
every field so that the Alliance might effectively 
be based on true solidarity. 
116. But WEU suffers from a number of poli-
tical handicaps. First, it groups only some 
members of today's Community Europe and a 
fortiori a smaller proportion of the members of 
the future Community, which will probably 
have twelve or thirteen members. Moreover, 
the WEU Council has never really exercised all 
its responsibilities under the modified Brussels 
Treaty since, from the outset, it relied on 
NATO for everything relating to defence proper 
and the exercise of its cultural and social res-
ponsibilities was subsequently handed over to 
the Council of Europe. Since the accession of 
the United Kingdom to the European Commu-
nity, it has relied wholly on the Community to 
exercise its economic responsibilities, and the 
development of nine-power consultations has 
removed much of the substance of consultations 
held in the WEU Council. 
117. The Council as it now is no longer plays 
any role at all. This might be welcome if its 
responsibilities were effectively exercised satis-
factorily in wider frameworks. This is ob-
viously not so for all that relates to defence 
and armaments, and the weakness of the WEU 
Council corresponds to a very real weakness of 
Europe. 
118. The modified Brussels Treaty also inclu-
des differences between the rights and obliga-
tions of its members which were perfectly com-
prehensible at a time when, less than ten years 
after the end of the second world war, the pro-
tocol modifying the Brussels Treaty was drawn 
up, signed and ratified. Some of these inequa-
lities are still topical. For instance, the fact 
that the United Kingdom has to maintain an 
army and an air force on the territory of the 
Federal Republic is as necessary as ever for 
Europe's security. Similarly, the Federal 
Republic has no desire to have the restrictions 
on the production of NBC weapons lifted as it 
has no intention of acquiring them. 
119. Conversely, the restrictions on the pro-
duction of conventional weapons by the Federal 
Republic hindered the competitive capacity of 
that country's naval industries without meeting 
any present need and made it more difficult for 
the Federal Republic to take part in a joint 
armaments policy until the WEU Council deci-
ded, on 21st July 1980, to accede to Germany's 
request by removing the naval restrictions 
imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
120. Finally, there are differences of interpre-
tation about the way certain powers intend to 
fulfil their undertakings in the event of a crisis. 
This applies essentially to France, which 
withdrew from the NATO integrated com-
mands at the time it developed its nuclear 
force. It is understandable that the French 
Government should wish there to be some un-
certainty about the cases in which it would 
engage its nuclear force. This is in the interest 
of the joint deterrent, in view of the fact that 
France has never questioned its signature of the 
North Atlantic Treaty or the modified Brussels 
Treaty which commits the French nuclear force 
under Article IV. Nevertheless, this ambiguity, 
particularly when it extends to the deployment 
of France's conventional forces in the Federal 
Republic, may be a factor of weakness for 
Europe if France's withdrawal from NATO is 
not offset by its close participation in military 
consultations between the European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. WEU bodies 
121. If WEU is to play its due role in setting 
up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, 
its structures must be adapted to Europe's joint 
defence ambitions. In particular, the Council 
should regularly include defence questions on 
its agenda, including matters relating to disar-
mament, which means that the Ministers of 
Defence or their representatives should take 
part in the work of the Council. As long as 
the WEU Council only includes representatives 
of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, it is hard 
to see how it could co-operate effectively in 
building a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The Council might also meet at an 
appropriate level prior to meetings of the North 
Atlantic Council so as to ascertain Europe's 
point of view on matters to be handled subse-
quently in the Atlantic framework. 
122. It would also be advisable to make full 
use of the Standing Armaments Committee, as 
your Rapporteur has suggested above. In its 
· reply to Recommendation 331, the Council 
recently agreed that the SAC might carry out 
work for the Assembly. It is now for the 
Assembly to avail itself of this possibility, but 
such co-operation must not be detrimental, as 
the Council specifies, moreover, to the pursuit 
of the SAC's normal work or of its present 
study; placing a ministerial institution at the 
disposal of a parliamentary body must in no 
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way be taken to mean that the government 
authorities are losing interest! in that institution. 
123. Finally, WEU should be enlarged to 
include all the members, and consequently also 
the new members, of the EEC so as to involve 
them more closely in the examination of the 
requirements of joint security. Article XI of 
the modified Brussels Treaty provides for such 
enlargement and there is no 111eed to let it lapse, 
although it has never been applied in the 
twenty-five years of WEU's existence. 
124. Consideration of all the questions raised 
by this necessary adaptation of the structures of 
WEU to the realities of European security 
should be undertaken immediately since it 
meets an urgent need both in the field of arma-
ments and in that of Europe's defence and secu-
rity. It is naturally the WEU Council that will 
have to assume responsibility for this examina-
tion and to this end it should set up a perma-
nent working group on which member coun-
tries would be represented. This group should 
be instructed to decide on measures to be taken 
with regard to the activities of WEU, including 
the revision of Protocol No. Ill, action to be 
taken on the SAC's study, the possible enlar-
gement of WEU to include all member coun-
tries of the European Community and the 
countries which have applied for membership 
and the new course to be given to the Council's 
work, with all the implications this may have, 
inter alia through the effective participation of 
representatives of the Ministries of Defence. 
125. Moreover, the WEU Assembly must be 
associated with this work and it should instruct 
the General Affairs Committee, through offi-
cially-communicated inform~tion, to follow the 
work of the Council and consider what subse-
quent action should be taken. 
3. The WEU Assembly 
126. The WEU Assembly for its part might 
play an active part in setting up the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Community. As the 
European parliamentary organisation responsi-
ble for defence, armaments and disarmament 
matters, set up under Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, it has sole responsibility for 
defence matters. At the present juncture, it 
would not be reasonable to call in question the 
modified Brussels Treaty in view of the security 
benefits Europe derives from Article V. All 
the governments seem agreed on this point. 
The full treaty must therefore be applied effec-
tively, including Article IX which specifies that 
the Assembly shall be "composed of represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eur-
ope", while allowing the WEU Assembly to 
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become the effective parliament of Europe in 
areas which are its sole responsibility. 
127. However, it is clear that, because it was 
elected by direct universal suffrage, the Euro-
pean Parliament is destined to become the par-
liamentary component of the Europe of tomor-
row. In the future it will therefore be its task 
to constitute the parliamentary element of a 
Community whose responsibilities would be 
extended to cover defence and armaments 
matters and it would be logical for the WEU 
Assembly and the European Parliament to be 
brought closer together now. It is not possible 
to have identical membership in the immediate 
future because the modified Brussels Treaty 
specifies that it is the delegations of the WEU 
countries to the Council of Europe Assembly 
that constitute the delegations to the WEU 
Assembly and, very soon, these delegations, or 
most of them at least, will no longer include 
any members of the European Parliament 
because of the latter's election by direct univer-
sal suffrage which often makes plurality of 
office impossible de facto if not de jure. 
128. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has an 
organic link with the national parliaments 
which alone can supervise member states' 
defence policies and it is through these parlia-
ments that the WEU Assembly can and does 
exercise an influence - naturally difficult to 
assess - on national defence policies and hence 
on Europe's defence policy since this is still a 
mere conglomeration of national policies. 
129. However, the WEU Assembly must here 
and now associate itself with the European Par-
liament, which represents some 250 million 
inhabitants of Western Europe, will represent 
even more in a few years' time and supervises 
the European Communities over which it exer-
cises effective powers. 
130. Cutting the links between the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments has at 
the same time the effect of conferring specific 
legitimacy on the European Parliament because 
it is based on the will of its European electo-
rate. A connection between the two assemblies 
seems clearly necessary, but for the time being 
this cannot be done officially. A connection is 
possible however through the appointment of 
permanent observers to each other's assembly. 
131. Answering Senator Boucheny on 6th 
June 1980, Mr. Franc;ois-Poncet, French Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, said: 
" There is no provision in the Brussels 
Treaty or the Rules of Procedure of the 
WEU Assembly for inviting observers. 
To create special observer status for a 
delegation from the assembly of the 
European Communities would be to dis-
regard the respective responsibilities of 
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the WEU Assembly and of the assembly 
of the European Communities, the latter 
not being competent to discuss arma-
ments or defence questions. As far as 
the French Government is aware, more-
over, no such proposal has yet been sub-
mitted to the Assembly or the Presiden-
tial Committee of WEU. " 
132. This answer invites comment for, 
although the composition of the WEU Assem-
bly was specified in the treaty, the invitation of 
observers has never been the subject of any pro-
visions by the governments which have always 
accepted the practice of all the European par-
liamentary assemblies inviting parliamentary 
observers. There is wide experience of this 
since observers from the parliaments of several 
non-member countries of WEU, members of 
the Atlantic Alliance, attend each of the WEU 
Assembly's sessions. 
133. Observers sent by the European Parlia-
ment to the WEU Assembly might however 
play a larger role. They might, for instance, be 
more numerous - a figure of about twenty 
might be agreed upon, which would represent 
hardly more than a fifth of the number of mem-
bers of the WEU Assembly - but, unlike obser-
vers from national parliaments, they would no 
longer have to confine their speeches to matters 
of direct concern to their countries. Every-
thing that concerns Europe concerns the Euro-
pean Parliament, so its observers should have 
all the rights of members of the WEU Assem-
bly, i.e. the right to speak and the right to 
attend committee meetings. Only the right to 
vote could obviously not be granted to them. 
134. Your Rapporteur realises this proposal 
arouses some mistrust and reservation among 
members of the WEU Assembly. However, he 
wishes to recall that the modified Brussels 
Treaty was drafted and adopted at a time when 
the European Parliament did not exist. Had it 
then existed, the WEU Assembly would have 
been associated with that parliament rather 
than with the Council of Europe for consti-
tuting its delegations. 
135. At the present juncture, it is therefore 
normal to allow all the main tendencies in the 
European Parliament to be represented in a 
delegation of observers which should be large 
enough, but not so large as to upset the normal 
course of work in the WEU Assembly. Insofar 
as these observers would not be entitled to vote, 
this would have no effect on Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Their presence 
would obviously not be as beneficial to the 
European Parliament as to the WEU Assembly 
since the latter would be able to take advantage 
of the potential strength of the European Parlia-
ment and its political groups, whereas the Euro-
pean Parliament would have little to expect of 
observers sent to it by the WEU Assembly, 
except perhaps for the link with the national 
parliaments which it will be lacking in the near 
future. 
136. In any event, if some such solution is not 
found in the fairly near future, it will be impos-
sible to prevent the European Parliament from 
discussing matters which are as vital for Europe 
as peace and war, security, detente and disar-
mament. To take cover behind claims of ex-
clusive responsibility will remain without effect. 
It is better to make the most of a situation than 
to hide one's head in the sand without a 
thought for the future. 
13 7. In the long run, it is hoped before the 
end of this new decade, such participation 
should lead to a merger of the two assemblies in 
a single European Parliament with universal 
powers, i.e. capable of being the true parlia-
ment of a Europe master of its destiny. The 
present proposal merely paves the way for this 
solution, without requiring any revision of the 
modified Brussels Treaty or of the treaty setting 
up the European Community. It is hard to see 
what principle could be invoked for refusing to 
allow the members of Europe's Parliament to 
take part in the work of the only European 
assembly with responsibilities in defence mat-
ters. 
VI. Conclusions 
138. As Professor Wilhelm Grewe, former Per-
manent Representative of the Federal Republic 
to NATO, said in a recent speech at Wolfsburg: 
" Criticism within the Alliance is inevitable and 
legitimate, but it must be constructive and 
strengthen its resolve, not just assert verbal soli-
darity in order to evade the issue. " This is 
the sense of the present report. 
139. A few obvious facts should therefore be 
recalled: 
(i) Although detente and disarmament are 
Europe's goals, it cannot consider sacrificing its 
security for them, as was stressed in the Harmel 
report which, already in 1967, examined mea-
sures to be taken to achieve a better balance in 
NATO. 
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(ii) Security is above all the result of deter-
rence, ensured mainly by the United States, and 
means maintaining American forces in Europe 
as a guarantee of the United States' determina-
tion to defend Europe by every means at its dis-
posal. 
(iii) It is therefore ensured by the cohesion of 
the Atlantic Alliance and by all the forces that 
NATO can earmark for a strategy of flexible 
response. 
(iv) Cohesion. essential for meeting both poli-
tical and military threats, means the Alliance 
must rest ~m a strong European pillar, based on 
the awareness of the European members of the 
Alliance of the interdependence of their desti-
mes. 
(v) Any adaptation of the Alliance to a 
world in which threats are becoming increasing-
ly imminent depends on the formation of the 
European pillar. 
(vi) This calls for a regrouping of the Western 
European countries, the elaboration of a com-
mon armaments policy and close co-ordination 
of their foreign and defence policies, also cover-
ing areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty 
area. 
(vii) The European Community is the natural 
framework for this regrouping. 
(viii) At the present juncture, WEU is still the 
only European organisation in which member· 
countries are required to co-ordinate their 
defence policies. 
(ix) Consequently, WEU must be quickly 
adapted to the present requirements of the 
Atlantic Alliance so that it may help to form 
the European pillar of the Alliance. 
(x) At the same time, WEU must help to 
prepare the future, which, in the parliamentary 
field, means establishing permanent links bet-
ween the WEU Assembly and the European 
Parliament. 
(xi) To this end, the WEU Assembly should 
extend a permanent invitation to observers 
from the European Parliament to take part in 
all its work, but without the right to vote. 
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Amendment 1 
Future of European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
1st December 1980 
1. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution proper, after "to instruct", insert "the Chairman of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
1. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved). 
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Amendment 2 
Future of European security 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by MM. Wilkinson and Stainton 
1st December 1980 
2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft resolution. 
In paragraph I of the draft resolution proper, line 1, leave out from " Committee " to the end 
and insert " to examine means of associating more fully parliamentary representatives of the 
European member countries of NATO with the work of the Assembly ofWEU; ". 
Leave out paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution proper. 
Signed: Wilkinson, Stainton 
I. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved). 
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Amendment 3 
Future of European security 
AMENDMENT 3 I 
tabled by Mr. Stainton 
1st December 1980 
3. At the end of the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution, add "though 
defence is ultra vires that treaty;". 
Signed: Stainton 
1. See I Oth S1tting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved). 
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Amendment 4 
Future of European security 
AMENDMENT 4 ' 
tabled by Mr. Caro 
1st December 1980 
4. In paragraph (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " also to negotiate their 
accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the 
activities of WEU" and insert "to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible 
participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty ". 
1. See I Oth Sitting. 2nd December 1980 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 5 
Future of European security 
AMENDMENT 5 ' 
tabled by MM. Baume/ and Valleix 
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph (d). 
I. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment negatived). 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the political implications for Europe of 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
Considering the invasion of Afghanistan to be a challenge to international law and a violation 
of the final act of the Helsinki conference, particularly paragraphs 11 and VIII of the declaration on 
principles; 
Considering that security and co-operation in Europe require respect for human rights within 
each of the countries taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe; 
Considering therefore that the verifications to be effected at the meeting of the CSCE in 
Madrid and the decisions it will take must concern to an equal degree the fields of security, economic 
co-operation and guarantees granted to persons; 
Considering moreover that the balance of forces which ensures peace in Europe is threatened 
by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range 
nuclear weapons, that the limitation of armaments and the reduction of forces and weapons, provided 
this helps to restore the balance, are still an essential means of ensuring Europe's security and that 
realistic proposals made by several countries for limiting or reducing forces and armaments or for 
confidence-building measures should allow significant progress to be made in this field in the coming 
years; 
Considering that application of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, 
independence and territorial integrity remains a basic aim to which the West must give priority in its 
relations with the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge and remind the governments of member states to emphasise that the presence of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan is a continuing unacceptable violation of international law and human rights 
and call for the removal of these troops; 
2. Follow attentively developments at the CSCE meeting in Madrid and ensure close consulta-
tions between its members so as to allow substantial and a comparable degree of progress to be made 
with all the various items on the agenda; 
3. Urge all participants in the CSCE to apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act in full; 
4. Endeavour to ensure that the subsequent meeting of a conference on disarmament in Europe 
proceeds without serious delay; 
5. At the same time pursue consideration of developments in the MBFR talks and encourage 
ratification of SALT 11 and the opening of SALT Ill with the aim of achieving true parity of forces 
and armaments in Europe and an overall nuclear balance; 
6. Ask the governments of member countries to respect undertakings they have entered into, 
particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in 
Europe in both conventional and nuclear fields should progress in the achievement of disarmament 
not be made; 
7. Continue and intensify the assistance which the EEC grants Yugoslavia; 
8. Encourage application of the agreements between the Polish state and strikers of September 
1980, inter alia by affording Poland economic and food assistance; 
9. Pursue efforts undertaken in the framework of nine-power consultations to promote the 
establishment of a just peace in the Middle East; 
10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equip-
ment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the with-
drawal of its forces from Afghanistan; 
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11. Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment 
within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations; 
12. Show its determination to use all necessary means to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to 
shipping; 
13. Do its utmost to circumscribe the conflict between Iran and Iraq, to obtain a cease-fire and to 
seek the conditions for a fair and lasting peace between these two countries; 
14. Maintain its support for the efforts of the United States with a view to obtaining the liberation 
of the American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The massive intervention of Soviet forces 
in Afghanistan in December 1979 is an essen-
tial reason, and not the only one, for 
re-examining all the problems raised by W es-
tern European security. This invasion in fact 
affects the balance of forces in Asia at the 
expense of those countries most in favour of 
normal co-operation with the West, particularly 
as it occurred shortly after the Vietnamese 
intervention in Cambodia which for its part 
ensured the preponderance of the Soviet 
Union's allies in South-East Asia. Events in 
Iran and the unrest rife throughout the Near 
and Middle East made the region particularly 
sensitive, and the massive military presence of 
the Soviet Union close to this area which is 
vital for the economy of Western Europe is in 
itself a threat the West must take fully into 
account. 
2. In many respects, it may be considered 
that the military coup d'etat in Turkey and the 
war which broke out between Iraq and Iran in 
September 1980 were influenced by the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. 
3. Second, the reasons given by the highest-
ranking Soviet leaders, beginning with Mr. 
Brezhnev, to justify the invasion of Afghanistan 
invoked the famous " Brezhnev doctrine " used 
for the first time in 1968 with regard to Cze-
choslovakia. This meant that the idea that 
the sovereignty of countries with so-called 
" socialist " regimes was limited by the overall 
interests of the communist cause, i.e. that of the 
Soviet Union, is and remains one of the essen-
tial bases of Soviet policy, in spite of the final 
act of the Helsinki conference, both the spirit 
and the letter of which proclaim the " sovereign 
equality " and " respect for the rights inherent 
in sovereignty " of states and in spite of all the 
progress which might have been made towards 
East-West detente and co-operation. The 
unrest in Poland in August 19 80 means parti-
cular attention must be paid to Soviet reactions 
to any calling in question of the economic and 
social, or even political, regime of a people's 
democracy by its own working class. The 
Brezhnev doctrine is certainly a challenge to 
international law, its application is hardly 
compatible with the pursuit of detente and 
there is even a risk of its leading to further 
international crises and opportunities for 
conflict in which the western countries will 
perhaps not always be able to remain specta-
tors. 
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4. The invasion of Afghanistan is a very 
direct violation of the United Nations Charter 
but also of the Helsinki final act of 197 5 which 
formed a kind of juridical basis for detente. 
Admittedly, most provisions of the Helsinki 
final act concern only relations between partici-
pating states and do not apply to Afghanistan. 
However, paragraph 11 of the " Declaration 
on principles guiding relations between partici-
pating states " extends undertakings relating to 
" refraining from the threat or use of force " to 
all international relations in the following 
words: 
" The participating states will refrain in 
their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general, from 
the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations and with the present 
declaration. No consideration may be 
invoked to serve to warrant resort to the 
threat or use of forces in contravention of 
this principle. 
No such threat or use of force will be 
employed as a means of settling disputes, 
or questions likely to give rise to dis-
putes, between them. " 
5. Similarly, paragraph VIII of the same 
declaration, entitled: " Equal rights and self-
determination of peoples ", is in no way limited 
to the signatory countries: 
" The participating states will respect the 
equal rights of peoples and their right to 
self-determination, acting at all times in 
conformity with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United 
Nations and with the relevant norms of 
international law, including those relating 
to territorial integrity of states. 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full 
freedom, to determine, when and as they 
wish, their internal and external political 
status, without external interference, and 
to pursue as they wish their political, 
economic, social and cultural develop-
ment. 
The participating states, reaffirm the uni-
versal significance of respect for and 
effective exercise of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples for the develop-
ment of friendly relations among them-
selves as among all states; they also recall 
the importance of the elimination of any 
form of violation of this principle. " 
6. Thus, the Soviet intervention in Afghan-
istan in itself calls in question the fundamental 
text on which detente was based and it is to be 
wondered whether the Soviet Union has not 
thereby put an end to detente. This would 
mean that all the agreements between western 
countries and the Soviet Union, whether they 
concern disarmament, the limitation of arma-
ments or economic and cultural co-operation, 
would have been rendered null and void by this 
intervention, particularly as the resistance of 
the Afghan people has led the Soviet Union to 
increase its intervention forces, in spite of its 
undertaking to withdraw them by stages at an 
early date, which makes it very unlikely that 
the situation will in the near future evolve in a 
direction favourable to detente. 
7. The NATO countries examined this 
question in the early months of 1980 and 
reached agreement on a number of important 
points. 
8. First, they all agreed to refuse to recog-
nise that the invasion of Afghanistan gave the 
Soviet Union any rights to seek to maintain 
either presence within or control of that 
country. 
9. Second, none of them considered the 
direct use of force to oppose the Soviet inva-
sion, but they all agreed to improve the West's 
defensive capability in order to meet the newly-
created situation, with a view to deterrence 
limited not only to the case of a massive aggres-
sion by the Soviet Union in Europe but also 
covering threats of peripheral action, aimed in 
particular at the Near and Middle East. The 
United States is known to be establishing and to 
have started deploying a large military force in 
the Gulf area. 
10. Third, all the western countries agreed 
to maintain the planned date of the meeting of 
the review conference of the Helsinki final act, 
due to open in Madrid in autumn 1980. In 
view of the dates fixed for the United States 
presidential elections in particular, it would 
perhaps have been reasonable to postpone the 
conference for a few months since there is a risk 
of strong clashes between East and West and 
also of certain differences of views between the 
western countries on the consequences to be 
drawn from the invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, the West thought it preferable to 
maintain what had been planned rather than to 
seem to neglect a major opportunity for a dia-
logue with the Soviet Union and with its 
partners. 
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11. Conversely, the United States Govern-
ment decided not to submit the SALT 11 agree-
ments to Congress for ratification and the 
opening of the SALT III negotiations was there-
fore postponed to a date still to be fixed, in 
spite of a Soviet proposal not to await the ratifi-
cation of SALT 11 before embarking an a first 
examination of matters relating to theatre 
nuclear weapons. However,' on 16th Septem-
ber 1980 the Soviet Union and the United 
States decided to organise a meeting in Geneva 
on 15th October with a view to defining condi-
tions for SALT Ill, although it is clear that no 
major decision can be taken in this field before 
the American elections on 4th November. 
12. But it became clear that measures for 
applying the principles defined in the frame-
work of NATO in the early months of 1980 
raised difficulties and serious divergences of 
views between the western countries. For 
instance, it was most regrettable that the West 
was unable to take a common decision with 
regard to its participation in the Olympic 
Games, held in Moscow in the summer of 
1980. Admittedly, the absence of American 
athletes and athletes from a number of other 
western countries was a demonstration of pro-
test which could not go unseen among the 
Soviet people, but the fact that other member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance took part in 
the games also gave the itppression that the 
West was far from united and that certain west-
ern countries were perhaps not prepared to take 
part in such demonstrations. It should be 
noted that those present in Moscow during the 
Olympic Games were unable to inform the 
Soviet people of their feelings, although some 
tried to do so, because of the very strict 
measures taken by the Soviet Union to isolate 
foreigners who went to Mosoow. 
13. The economic measures envisaged or 
taken by certain western countries, particularly 
the United States, have not always been 
followed by all the Western European coun-
tries. This removed much of the impact of 
these measures and aroused the mistrust and 
displeasure of American public opinion towards 
the European members of NATO. 
14. There were also divergences over the 
possibility and necessity of pursuing diplomatic 
talks with the Soviet Union. Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing's visit to Warsaw, followed by Mr. 
Helmut Schmidt's visit to Moscow, brought 
these divergences out clearly. 
15. Can disarmament talks continue when 
an armaments effort seems essential for the 
West's security? Can consideration be given to 
increasing arms limitation measures when 
dealing with a partner who does not respect his 
undertakings and sees su<fh limitation as a 
means of strengthening the military superiority 
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acquired in recent years? Is it conceivable to 
discuss with such a partner measures relating to 
the freedom of persons and human rights when 
it is quite evident that the measures agreed 
upon in Helsinki are not applied within that 
partner's frontiers nor in the countries under its 
control? 
16. In the West, there is an ever -growing 
tendency to consider that detente is impossible 
as long as the Soviet Union has not shown it is 
thoroughly changing its intentions and methods, 
while for another section of European public 
opinion detente remains an aim which must be 
pursued even if serious difficulties are encoun-
tered. Depending, for instance, on whether 
one considers the Helsinki final act to be a 
reference and an encouragement for those who 
uphold respect for human rights in the Soviet 
Union or on the contrary that such encourage-
ment in itself made the Soviet authorities 
harden their attitude towards dissidents of all 
kinds and towards other countries within its 
sphere of influence, the Madrid meeting will be 
tackled with very different prospects in mind. 
Depending on whether one considers that 
detente weakens the democratic countries' 
desire to defend themselves or that it causes 
splits in the Soviet camp, its pursuit and deve-
lopment will be viewed more or less favourably. 
17. In any event, the West must be very 
careful to avoid the kind of unconcerted and 
sometimes contradictory unilateral measures 
which have been increasing in number since 
December 1979 and hold more consultations 
during and after the Madrid conference on all 
measures concerning its relations with the East 
and its security in order not to aggravate the 
political and military repercussions of the 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
11. Conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe 
1. Background 
18. For several years it had been planned to 
hold a conference to review application of the 
Helsinki final act in Madrid in autumn 
1980. A preparatory conference was held at 
the beginning of September 1980, the minis-
terial meeting being planned for November. 
Meetings of experts were already held in 1979 
and at the beginning of 1980. 
19. The question of whether it was possible 
and expedient to maintain the Madrid meeting 
arose after the invasion of Afghanistan. It will 
be remembered in particular that a review 
conference held in Belgrade in 1977-78 was in 
every respect a failure. But the circumstances 
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prevailing in 1980 seem even less favourable 
than those in 19 77. The Afghanistan affair is 
of course a backcloth which makes any talks 
between the Soviet Union and the western 
countries, as well as the neutral and non-
aligned countries, difficult, because it endangers 
the balance of forces on which peace is based 
and makes the confidence needed, if such a 
conference is to progress, even more impossible 
and because, as has been shown, the invasion of 
Afghanistan is a direct violation of the Helsinki 
agreement. 
20. But this is not the only affair to have 
created a rather unpropitious atmosphere for 
making a serious review of application of the 
Helsinki final act and a fortiori progressing 
towards co-operation, detente and disarm-
ament. In its internal affairs, the Soviet 
Government has in fact constantly infringed the 
undertakings entered into in Helsinki. As from 
1975, it became apparent that the Helsinki final 
act provided arms for those known as the Soviet 
" dissidents ", i.e. those who call for greater 
freedom within the Soviet Union. Far from 
granting such freedom, the Soviet Government 
put down attempts at dissidence, in the best of 
cases expelling persons contesting the regime or 
simply protesting against certain of its excesses 
and depriving them of their Soviet nationality 
or, more generally, by interning them, with or 
without trial, sometimes in psychiatric hospitals 
regarding which there has been much informa-
tion about them being subjected to inhuman 
treatment and sometimes in prisons or concen-
tration camps, often situated in regions with 
particularly rigorous climates. 
21. Holding the Olympic Games in Moscow 
in summer 1980 might have provided an 
opportunity for various kinds of contact 
between the many westerners who attended and 
the Soviet people. The Soviet Government did 
its utmost to prevent such contacts by restric-
ting the freedom of circulation and expression 
of those westerners who, in spite of the invasion 
of Afghanistan, took part in one way or another 
in the Olympic Games, and by evacuating a 
large number of inhabitants from Moscow 
before the games started, under the pretext of 
making room for foreign visitors. These mea-
sures allowed the Soviet Government to avoid 
responding in any way to the numerous approa-
ches made on the occasion of the Olympic 
Games in favour of the dissidents and, the very 
day the games ended, to resume the arrest and 
repression of " dissidents " or those accused of 
being so. 
22. Everything is as if the Soviet Govern-
ment considered .that the country's very regime 
would be fundamentally called in question if its 
citizens were granted more freedom and came 
in contact with nationals of non-communist 
countries. Proof of this is to be found in the 
resumed jamming of western Russian language 
broadcasts, a clear sign of this will to isolate the 
Soviet people and prevent them having any 
contacts with the outside world. As long as 
the Soviet Union continues to consider that the 
highest interests of the state and regime pre-
clude application of the principles to which it 
thought it could subscribe when signing the 
Helsinki final act, it must be noted that any 
verification of the application of this act will 
result in accusations being levelled at the Soviet 
Union by western public opinion and probably 
also by that part of public opinion in the east-
em countries which can be informed of what is 
happening in Madrid. 
23. Moreover, it is hard to see how the 
Soviet Union could subscribe to concessions 
which go further than the undertakings it 
entered into in Helsinki in the field of human 
rights and the free movement of persons, when 
it seems incapable of applying the principles 
defined in 1975. It should be added that 
events in Poland in August 1980 may make it 
still more difficult to pursue detente and ensure 
the success of the Madrid conference where the 
right of peoples to self-determination is concer-
ned in view of the mistrust which developments 
in the people's democracies cannot fail to 
arouse in Moscow and in view of the reaffirma-
tion of the Brezhnev doctrine in connection 
with Afghanistan. 
24. The events in Poland were in fact 
accompanied by two demonstrations of the fear 
of continued detente felt by the leaders of the 
eastern bloc. It was understandable that Mr. 
Gierek should have renounced his planned visit 
to the Federal Republic of Germany, in view of 
the internal situation in Poland, but for the 
Government of the German Democratic Repu-
blic at almost the same time to have made it 
necessary for Chancellor Schmidt to renounce 
his visit to the German Democratic Republic in 
September 1980 clearly shows that the Polish 
affair has had repercussions even on relations 
between the two Germanies which everyone 
knows are an essential element of detente in 
Europe because the Pankow Government may 
be unable or unwilling to take the risk of a 
contact between the East Germans and the 
Federal Republic. These visits have been post-
poned sine die and everything indicates that 
they will not take place before the Madrid 
conference. This means that the conference 
will meet without such essential problems as 
those of relations between the two Germanies 
having been examined seriously by the heads of 
government the most concerned by the applica-
tion of the Helsinki final act. It will be 
recalled that the Helsinki conference was pre-
ceded by many contacts between the two parts 
of Germany. 
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25. Finally, the question has arisen to what 
extent the Mediterranean col:mtries not on the 
European continent might participate in the 
Madrid conference. Israel and Egypt were 
allowed to take part in the meeting of experts of 
the CSCE countries held in Valletta in 1979, 
which to a certain extent heralded their partici-
pation in the Madrid meeting. This seemed 
reasonable in the context of an extension of 
detente, security and co-operation to all the 
shores of a sea bordering on Europe and essen-
tial to Europe's security from both a strategic 
and an economic standpoint. The European 
countries on the shores of the Mediterranean 
had insisted that the Helsinki conference raise 
Mediterranean problems essential to their 
security. It might have seemed normal for 
non-European Mediterranean countries to go to 
Madrid, particularly in view of the fact that the 
presence of the United States :and Canada at the 
CSCE along with thirty-three European coun-
tries prevented an over-restricted limit being 
placed on the geographical criteria for partici-
pation. 
26. But the policy embarked upon by Israel 
in the occupied territories, particularly in Jeru-
salem and on the West Bank, and in Southern 
Lebanon has led Egypt itself to interrupt the 
process of detente in Palestinian affairs which it 
had been working for since the Camp David 
agreements. At present, no element of a solu-
tion can be found to the Palestine problem in 
the framework of the CSCE, but there is a 
strong risk of its distracting attention from truly 
European problems, allowing the Soviet Union 
to engage in intense propaganda against the 
West and compromising the results of the 
conference. 
27. It would probably be rather unreason-
able at the present stage to ipclude other states 
in the Madrid meeting, but it is difficult to 
agree to the Palestinian question being raised 
there in the absence of the Arab countries 
concerned and it may be felt better to drop this 
matter from the agenda of the conference, 
which would mean not accepting the partici-
pation of any country on the southern shore of 
the Mediterranean. 
2. Topics of the conference 
28. In spite of all these difficulties, the 
NATO countries decided by common agree-
ment to continue to prepare for the Madrid 
meeting, and the Soviet Union, its allies and 
the neutral European countries have done like-
wise, which means this meeting is now almost 
certain to take place. However, even before it 
is held it must be realised that its results can 
but be very limited, or even negative in many 
respects. 
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29. Where the principles laid down in 1975 
are concerned, and in particular human rights, 
it is hard to see how any progress can be made 
in relation to the Helsinki final act. It would 
already be a major success to recall what was 
decided upon with regard to co-operation in 
humanitarian and other fields, including infor-
mation. 
30. Although no illusions must be cherished 
about what it will be possible to achieve in this 
field and although, in the interests of peace, 
security and co-operation, the Soviet Union 
must not be placed in a situation which 
compels it, in order to protect its own security, 
the stability of its regime and internal peace, to 
take measures directly opposed to those binding 
it under the Helsinki final act, it must also be 
demonstrated that the West considers detente to 
be indivisible and that the Soviet Union can 
expect no progress with regard to economic 
co-operation or confidence-building measures if 
nothing is achieved with regard to human rights 
and personal relations. In Helsinki, this 
requirement allowed positive results to be 
achieved. Neither verification of the application 
of the Helsinki decisions nor the extension of 
these measures can be confined to one area, and 
no area can be neglected, particularly when 
such essential matters as respect for human 
rights are involved. 
31. Economic co-operation also raises serious 
problems because a number of measures 
were taken in the West, and by the United 
States in particular, following the invasion of 
Afghanistan in order to use economic sanctions 
to induce the Soviet Union to renounce its 
intervention in Afghanistan. What the western 
powers then wondered was to what extent one 
or other side would benefit from increased trade 
between East and West. Those in favour of a 
boycott felt that the Soviet Union was sufficien-
tly short of a number of resources essential for 
its security and even its food supply for a boy-
cott policy pursued by all the western countries 
to force it to modify its foreign policy. 
32. For instance, it is known to have diffi-
culty in obtaining grain and its industry cannot 
produce the equivalent of certain items which 
the West supplies and which are essential to the 
development of its industry or even its arma-
ments. But nor should it be overlooked that 
the western countries too - and particularly the 
Western European countries- need to maintain 
their trade with the Eastern European coun-
tries, on the one hand because they too suffer 
from certain shortages, particularly where energy 
is concerned, and import admittedly rather 
small quantities of Polish coal and Soviet oil, 
but above all because their balance-of-payments 
difficulties make it very difficult for them to 
give up markets which may be large and pro-
vide work for their firms. Nevertheless it 
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would be appropriate for greater recognition to 
be afforded to the extent to which western 
economic activity and resources sustain the 
Soviet Union. 
33. These matters have been a subject of 
disagreement between the United States and its 
European partners and the pursuit of economic 
co-operation, particularly between the Federal 
Republic, Italy or France and the Soviet Union, 
has certainly aroused strong reactions in the 
United States, where the European countries 
have sometimes been accused of practising . 
dedicated egoism in this field at the expense of 
the elementary principles of international ethics 
and the cohesion which the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance need in their relations with 
the Soviet Union. 
34. However, it should be noted that the 
United States Government has not always 
consulted its allies before taking measures of 
this kind and that the latter, while respecting 
the formal undertakings entered into by all the 
western countries to submit to a ban on 
delivering to the Soviet Union products or 
techniques included in the so-called COCOM 
list and on the other hand not to take advantage 
of the application of boycott measures to seize 
markets in the Soviet Union, have been able to 
carry out some worthwhile business thanks to 
the American boycott. 
35. In fact, some of the western countries' 
trade with and investments in the Soviet Union 
seem to be contrary to these principles, even if 
they do not actually violate them. This is in 
particular the case of the Franco-German 
consortium which started to build an alumi-
nium factory in Siberia when ALCOA stopped 
building factories for the same purpose. 
36. A major article by Mr. Giovanni Agnelli, 
who is particularly representative of Euro-
pean leaders, in the summer issue of the Ameri-
can revue Foreign Affairs defines the principles 
which he would like to have applied to econo-
mic and trade relations with the Soviet Union 
and he sums up his views as follows: 
" 1. Trade, according to western values 
and culture, is, in itself, a good thing, and 
we should pursue it with the eastern bloc 
as well, unless there are compelling rea-
sons to the contrary. 
2. The idea that Soviet global or domes-
tic policies can be modified and impro-
ved through trade ' linkage ' has been 
proved unrealistic. One cannot reduce 
the expansionist impact of Soviet policies 
by withholding trade. On the contrary, 
one might even increase it. 
3. The claim that Soviet policies will 
become more moderate and peaceful as a 
result of a higher level of trade and eco-
nomic interdependence 'with the West is 
also beyond proof. Yet, experience tells 
us that the growth of trade strengthens 
forces and individuals inside Soviet soci-
ety which are recognisably committed to 
detente with the West and to peaceful 
policies. 
4. The danger that economic ihterde-
pendence may bring about the 'Finlandi-
sation' of Europe and the West remains, 
for the time being, purely a theoretical 
possibility, not a reality. The true 
danger of ' Finlandisation ' was actually 
removed when Western Europe became a 
powerful economic community, strongly 
embedded into the fabric of international 
trade. 
5. A certain number of well-defined 
areas of strategic importance ought to be 
excluded from East-West trade, in order 
to deprive the other side of goods which 
could be used for military purposes. 
6. A distinction should be made bet-
ween trade with the Soviet Union and 
trade with the eastern bloc countries. 
Some of the political arguments being 
currently advanced in the West against 
excessive dependence of our economies 
on trade with the Soviet Union could be 
used in favour of an increasing level of 
trade between some of the Soviet Union's 
European allies and the West. Should 
two separate sets of rules be devised? 
7. Any strategy agreed upon in the 
matter of trade with the Soviet bloc must 
either be a common policy for all western 
countries, or it will be no policy at all. 
If the rules of the game are not respected 
by all (the present rules very often are 
not), no policy will prove workable. 
(For example, it is known that the recent 
Paris agreements on government-assisted 
credit aids have been overtly violated by 
some countries just a few hours after the 
signature). 
8. In view of the ·different relative 
importance of trade with the Soviet bloc 
for western countries, it is not advisable 
that policy changes be decided unilater-
ally by any single member of the western 
alliance, without prior ·consultation and 
agreement among all nations concerned. 
At present, the political instruments for 
achieving this new kind of co-ordinated 
policies do not seem to exist. It is 
unthinkable that it is just up to the busi-
nessmen to fill up such a vacuum. 
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9. Unilateral actions of any kind, crea-
ting a fait accompli and facing others 
with an apparent choi~e between ' loyalty ' 
and ' vital interest ' are dangerous for the 
unity of the western alliance. The lack 
of a comprehensive western strategy 
today is evident: so long as the situation 
remains so, the prime beneficiary will be 
the USSR. Necessary rules should be 
established that takel into account the 
relative exposures to .risks of the indivi-
dual members both in economic and 
political terms. " 
3 7. These points of view are certainly 
not shared by a large section of American 
public opinion and are a major source of 
divergence between the European and Ameri-
can partners of the Alliance. If the Madrid 
conference were to stress the development of 
economic trade at the expense of the other 
Helsinki "baskets", the Soviet Union would 
achieve a considerable success since it would 
then manage to ensure tacit condemnation of 
the American boycott measures, divide the 
West and make it look, in the eyes of 
its own public opinion, as if it were res-
ponsible for the inadequate application of 
the Helsinki final act. The West must 
therefore be particularly careful to stand 
united on this question aQd accept increased 
economic relations only insofar as substantial 
progress is achieved in otherl " baskets ". 
38. Where confidence-building measures are 
concerned, it seems that the Helsinki final act 
has been applied more or less satisfactorily by 
all signatories and that it may be possible to go 
into the undertakings entered into in Helsinki 
in greater detail and extend their scope, particu-
larly where the announcement of manreuvres 
on European territory are concerned. In parti-
cular, the limit above which any manreuvre 
must be announced might be lowered to 10,000 
men, the invitation of observers to these 
manreuvres made compulsory and obliga-
tions relating to land manreuvres be extended to 
naval manreuvres without affecting the vital 
interests of any participants. This is one of the 
only points on which it seems possible to make 
significant progress on the Helsinki final act. 
But we know that the impact of measures 
of this kind is still very limited and that 
mutual confidence depends less on the 
announcement of military rnanreuvres than on 
the general policy pursued by signatory 
countries. 
39. There remains one point which was not 
on the agenda at Helsinki but which is to be on 
that of the Madrid conference, i.e. the proposals 
which have been made with regard to disarma-
ment in Europe. These c<J>nsist essentially of 
the French proposal to cG>nvene a " confer-
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en~e on disarmament in Europe", made in 
spnng 1978, the Soviet proposal for an 
"all-European conference on military detente 
and disarmament", made in March 1979 and 
the Polish proposal to hold a European c~nfe­
rence on disarmament in Warsaw, made by Mr. 
Gierek in February 1980. These three propo-
sals have common aspects which may allow 
them to form a good foundation for future 
negotiations since all three are addressed to all 
participants in the CSCE, come within the 
framework of this conference and envisage a 
progressive procedure starting from measures 
intended to establish confidence, leading subse-
quently to a reduction in armaments. 
40. At the outset the French proposal is 
known to have encountered reservations among 
the member countries of NATO which feared 
that the pursuit of the MBFR talks might be 
compromised by a wider project, which also 
included the neutral countries and concerned 
the whole European continent, and that it 
might become even more difficult to achieve 
results in such conditions. Today, these reser-
vations seem to have been overcome, particu-
larly because of an assurance that the MBFR 
talks would in any event continue. The neu-
tral countries were worried because the French 
proposal concerned only conventional and not 
nuclear weapons. In present circumstances 
and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is 
deploying SS-20 missiles on European territory 
as fast it can, while the West is lagging seriously 
behind in the deployment of continental-range 
missiles in Europe, it seems difficult to reach an 
agreement establishing a true balance in the 
~uclear field, because of the western countries' 
particularly unfavourable starting-point for any 
limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. 
Hence, it seems realistic to consider at least 
initially, only a stabilisation or red~ction of 
conventional weapons. The fact that this 
examination covers the whole of Europe is also 
a strong point in view of the possibilities which 
the Soviet Union has of taking advantage of an 
armaments freeze in Central Europe to streng-
then its flanks, while the West has far fewer 
possibilities in this respect. 
41. Finally, caution must be shown in 
approaching the Soviet proposal that the 
nuclear powers should undertake not to be the 
first to use nuclear weapons, since such a pro-
mise would give a considerable advantage to the 
first power not to respect it and above all in vi~w of the Warsaw Pact's conve~tional superi-
onty over the Atlantic Alliance, it would 
considerably reduce .the deterrent effect of 
western armaments and consequently help to 
make war less improbable. 
42. Naturally it cannot be expected that the 
text of a disarmament treaty will be drawn up 
at the Madrid meeting but a decision might be 
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taken to pursue negotiatiOns in this field at a 
specialised conference to be held within the 
next few years. 
43. There is thus every indication that in 
the military field proper the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe can make 
progress at the Madrid meeting, while at politi-
cal level and in cultural exchanges, movements 
of persons or economic co-operation, it is hard 
to see how the results obtained on paper at 
Helsinki but not achieved since can be 
improved upon. However, it will still be 
primordial not to ignore or neglect any of the 
Helsinki "baskets" in Madrid. The Afghan-
istan affair is a further reminder that detente is 
indivisible and that disarmament in Europe 
makes sense only if all the elements on which 
confidence can be based are the subject of a 
joint examination and are effectively applied. 
Respect for the sovereignty of states, non-
intervention in their internal affairs and 
freedom · of persons and trade remain the 
essential conditions for any true progress in the 
field of disarmament. 
44. The opening stages of the Madrid prepa-
ratory conference were hardly encouraging: it 
proved very difficult to draw up the agenda and 
order of business for the conference proper and 
in three weeks practically no progress was 
made. The principal obstacle was the time the 
Madrid meeting should devote to verifying 
application of the Helsinki final act. The West 
considers this to be an essential part of the 
conference and progress would be impossible if 
achievements were not checked first· it there-
fore wishes the weeks up to the Christ~as break 
to be concerned with this aspect alone. For 
reasons easy to guess, the Soviet Union and its 
allies wish, on the contrary, to move on quickly 
to the second part of the conference to examine 
areas where progress is to be made, glossing 
over as far as possible the questions raised by 
the defective application of the Helsinki final 
act. Clearly the West cannot bow to these 
demands. 
Ill. Peace and security in Europe 
45. In certain respects, it may be held that 
the invasion of Afghanistan, far from having 
aggravated immediate Soviet threats to Western 
Europe's security and peace in Europe, some-
what improved a situation which had been 
difficult because of the considerable growth in 
rece.nt years in Soviet conventional and theatre 
nuclear weapons. Although Soviet superiority 
in conventional forces and weapons had been 
clear for a long time, the rapid deployment of 
SS-20 continental-range missiles and the deve-
lopment of long-range Backfire nuclear born-
bers has in the last two years extended this 
superiority to the field of continental-range 
means of delivery. 
46. The West had for a long time been 
aware of the need to meet this threat and it was 
before the invasion of Afghanistan that the 
members of NATO undertook to increase their 
defence budgets by 3 % per year at constant 
values and the United States Government 
started to develop Pershing 11 continental-range 
missiles and cruise missiles. Similarly, the 
announcement in August 1980 that the United 
States Government was developing a nuclear 
bomber undetectable by radar shows that the 
relevant studies had been under way for some 
time. 
47. However, both in the United States and 
in Europe governments faced difficulty in secur-
ing public and parliamentary approval of 
increased defence budgets. Very active Soviet 
propaganda denouncing these measures appea-
red to be well received in a number of Euro-
pean countries. Moreover, most European 
countries we're having great difficulty in 
ensuring acceptance of the stationing on their 
territory of a new type of American missile 
with nuclear warheads, although they consi-
dered the deployment of these missiles in 
Europe to be essential for the security of their 
own countries. 
48. The invasion of Afghanistan seems to 
have reminded public opinion of the serious-
ness of the threat to Europe and thus allowed 
governments to do what they had not managed 
to do before. Thus, the United Kingdom and 
the Federal Republic of Germany have endor-
sed the stationing of Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles on their territory and this stationing 
has in fact since begun. Although Belgium 
and the Netherlands have not yet taken a final 
decision in this respect, they now seem less 
opposed to the idea. France for its part has 
announced that it has decided to pursue studies 
which should allow it to deploy the neutron 
bomb in a few years' time, and the United 
States Government has announced that work 
has started on a new undetectable aircraft. 
Furthermore, the governments of most Euro-
pean countries have managed to obtain an 
effective increase in defence budgets. 
49. This accumulation of armaments, arid 
nuclear weapons in particular, in Europe m~y 
of course be deplored, particularly as it seems 
likely to continue for some years. But insofar 
as it is the balance of forces and armaments 
that ensures Europe's security and the mainte-
nance of peace, the unbalanced situation which 
had been developing for several years was in 
itself a danger to peace and the decisions taken 
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by the United States and by the European 
members of NATO should allow this to be met 
fairly soon. 
50. In spite of the growing number of Soviet 
declarations since the beginrting of 1980, there 
is no proof that the West's cJesire to strengthen 
its defensive capability hampers progress 
towards disarmament or the controlled limita-
tion of forces and armaments in Europe. This 
appears even more clearly since the Soviet 
Union following the decisions taken by NATO 
in l9SO, seems far more prepared than in the 
past to make the necessary concessions so that 
the MBFR negotiations, which have been under 
way in Vienna since October 1973, may at last 
lead to a first agreement between the members 
ofNATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
51. In fact, the principle of " approxim.a~e 
parity " has now been recognised by all partici-
pants in those negotiations ~s the fundament~! 
condition for adequate secunty for all, and this 
has led them to accept the principle of " select-
ivity " in the reduction of arms and forces 
thanks to reductions affectibg each side to an 
unequal extent. Similarly, the principle of a 
two-stage process has been accepted which 
should make it easier to reach a first agreement 
without prejudice to the results of subsequent 
negotiations. On lOth July 1980, the .s?viet 
Union in reply to a proposed provlSlonal agree~ent submitted by tli.e western partici-
pants, agreed· that the withdrawal of 13,000 
men on the American side could be accompa-
nied by the withdrawal of 20,000 men on the 
Soviet side. Of course, there are still many 
difficulties, particularly about the method of 
calculating the forces now present on European 
territory. Apparently, however, the proposed 
withdrawals should lead to a numerical balance 
of forces at a level of about 765,000 men on 
each side in the central sector of Europe. This 
would be a very desirable first step in the 
reduction of tension. 
52. Moreover, probably because of the 
success of the confidence-building measures 
defined in the Helsinki agrecements, participants 
in the Vienna negotiations have accepted .the 
association_ of measures designed to re-establish 
confidence with the force r~ductions ancl, in a 
speech on the occasion of tlie thirtieth anniver-
sary of the German Demopratic Republic on 
6th October 1979, Mr. Brezhnev announced 
that the Soviet Union would henceforth be 
favourable to such measures. 
53. On 21st October, NATO made seven 
proposals aimed at extending to any movement 
of forces equal or superior to' a division the 
obligation to warn the other side, which should 
be allowed to send observers. Moreover, 
NATO proposed carrying out eighteen inspec .. 
tions a year on that portion of the territory of 
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the other side which formed part of the reduc-
tion zone and the stationing of permanent 
observers on the boundaries of that zone. 
Finally, it proposed the periodical exchange of 
information on force movements on either side 
and the creation of a consultative commission 
to facilitate the implementation of any agree-
ments reached. 
54. These proposals as a whole seem to 
provide a realistic basis for the pursuit of the 
MBFR negotiations which it is to be hoped will 
manage to reach a first agreement reasonably 
soon if other events do not arise which again 
disturb the mutual confidence of its partici-
pants. 
55. But the Afghanistan affair and ensuing 
reactions seem to have limited the Soviet 
Union's possibilities of action even more where 
relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Central and Eastern European countries are 
concerned. It was in fact first noted that the 
European members of the Warsaw Pact all, in 
different ways and sometimes only by their 
delay in approving the Soviet intervention, 
showed their disapproval of the invasion of 
Afghanistan. In any event, none of them took 
part in this purely Soviet operation. Conse-
quently, although the invasion of Afghanistan 
quite obviously reminded the Soviet Union's 
friends that the Brezhnev doctrine was still in 
force, it also showed the Soviet Union itself that 
its allies were either not prepared to become 
involved in a conflict which was of no direct 
concern to them or else accepted the applica-
tion of this doctrine in the case of Afghanistan 
only with the utmost reluctance. 
56. The Soviet Union could not ignore 
these reservations, and its caution during the 
events in Poland in August 1980 shows, as far 
as it is possible to judge at present, that it has 
learnt the lesson. In other circumstances, the 
Soviet Union would probably have been quick 
to deploy resources to control the strikers. 
But, when these events occurred, the Soviet 
Government did not appear willing to do so, 
whereas in 1968 it did not hesitate to invade 
Czechoslovakia with the forces of the other 
people's democracies at its side. It is naturally 
difficult to assess the extent of the concessions 
which the new Polish Government has said it is 
prepared to make, particularly as regards trade 
union freedom, and the way it will fulfil the 
promises it has just made. It is even more 
difficult to know to what extent the Soviet 
Union approves the concessions made to the 
Polish working class. It nevertheless appears 
that it did not oppose these concessions and 
that it has consequently left the Polish Govern-
ment some degree of freedom of reaction to the 
internal dangers it was running. If this attitude 
is compared with that adopted by the Soviet 
Government in 1968 when the Czechoslovak 
100 
Communist Government decided to make 
major and liberal concessions to local public 
opinion, it can be seen that the Afghanistan 
affair has had a calming influence on Soviet 
policy in Europe. 
57. But it was probably in the case of Yugo-
slavia, when the question of the succession to 
Marshal Tito at the head of the state arose, that 
Soviet caution was demonstrated the most 
clearly. Tito's death was admittedly not unex-
pected and the collegiate leadership which took 
power following his death had been able to pre-
pare for the event. It had to be alert to all the 
dangers which any sign of division on its part 
might have involved. Nevertheless, six weeks 
after Marshal Tito's funeral, these leaders were 
able to welcome President Carter to Belgrade 
and show, without giving rise to Soviet reac-
tions, that it was unanimously in favour of a 
policy aimed at preserving the independence of 
the state, the freedom of its foreign policy 
towards the blocs and an economic policy based 
on self-management. 
58. Agreed, the situation in Yugoslavia is 
far from reassuring. There are still many diffi-
culties, both in the economic field, where the 
deficit in the balance of payments amounted to 
$ 6,000 million in 1979 and Yugoslav indus-
try seems hardly competitive compared with 
industry in Western Europe, and in the political 
field where the problem of nationalities, per-
haps not taken sufficiently into account in 
Tito's policy, continues to weigh on the coun-
try's future. 
59. The Yugoslav Government is perfectly 
aware that the country's economic weaknesses 
aggravate a political problem and it has found 
widespread understanding in Western Europe 
since in spring 1980 it was able to sign a 
co-operation agreement with the EEC. The 
latter, in spite of the relatively slow economic 
development of Yugoslavia compared inter alia 
with the strides being made in countries like 
Spain and Greece, granted considerable assis-
tance to Yugoslavia in the form of very low 
interest-bearing loans. At the same time, at 
the end of 1979 the Yugoslav Government gave 
up attributing the difficulties encountered by 
Yugoslav exports to EEC protectionism. It 
fully realises that Yugoslavia's economic diffi-
culties are essentially domestic problems. 
60. It nevertheless seems that Yugoslavia's 
role as leader of the non-aligned countries, 
which it had played since 1955, will be to some 
extent eclipsed. This group is increasingly 
divided and until 1979 Yugoslavia was constan-
tly opposed to those who wished to make the 
Soviet Union the protector of the non-aligned 
countries. The inevitable decline, perhaps 
only provisional moreover, of Yugoslavia's role 
following the death of Tito could but strengthen 
the pro-Soviet tendency in the non-aligned 
group. But here too the invasion of Afghanis-
tan has had the opposite effect since that 
country belonged to the non-aligned group. 
For the immediate future at least, it may be 
thought that Yugoslavia has escaped the threats 
which many thought would face it as soon as 
the " post-Tito " era began. 
61. There is no question of Western Europe 
guiding Yugoslavia towards a more or less dis-
guised form of accession to the Atlantic bloc; 
the West must use all available means to help it 
to resist Soviet pressure, maintain internal 
cohesion and pursue its policy of true non-
alignment and a form of economic develop- · 
ment which conforms to its fundamental 
choices. 
62. There is every reason to think that the 
western countries, particularly the members of 
the EEC, have clearly understood that this must 
be kept in view in their policy towards Yugo-
slavia. Together with the unity and firmness 
being shown by the Yugoslav leaders, it may 
thus be hoped that Yugoslavia will manage to 
overcome the obstacles in the way of its conti-
nued independence and contribute, as it did in 
Tito's days, to the maintenance of peace in 
Europe and the security of southern Europe. 
63. The invasion of Afghanistan probably 
had some effect qn developments in Turkey. 
Threatened by internal instability due to a 
sharply declining economy and the develop-
ment of terrorism which was claiming a 
growing number of victims, Turkey could not, 
in view of its extensive frontiers with the Soviet 
Union, allow its internal situation to grow 
worse without its jndependence being threat-
ened. Unacceptable though it must be perhaps 
the military coup d'etat on 12th Septemb¥r 
1980 may not be entirely similar to the one 
which overthrew democracy in Greece in 
1967. Ever since the reign of Kemal Ataturk, 
the Turkish army has been a support for demo-
craqy in Turkey, particularly during the 1960 
and 1971 coups d'etat, and measures taken 
since the latest coup d'etat to restore order and 
security at home and to respect human rights, 
to form a provisional government and to draw 
up a new constitution give rise to some hope 
that this will again be the case. 
64. In any event, it seems premature to 
consider the western partners taking sanctions 
against Turkey - except perhaps in the frame-
v,:ork of the Council of Europe where, natur-
a~ly, only democratically-elected parliamenta-
rians may sit. But economic sanctions could 
but delay the country's recovery, which is 
necessary for the consolidation of democracy, 
and any measures which might separate Turkey 
from NIX TO could be catastrophic for the 
country's independence and the security of the 
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West. On the contrary, it is probably by 
assisting Turkey economically and keeping it 
closely associated with NATO that there may 
be hopes of encouraging the early restoration of 
a democratic regime. This is, in any event, the 
meaning of the decision taken by the Nine on 
16th September 1980 when they decided not to 
freeze Turkey's association with the EEC as 
they had done in the past in the case of Greece, 
while expressing the wish that the promises 
made by the new Turkish Government will be 
fully and quickly carried into effect. 
IV. Extra-European factors 
65. A number of factors in the world· _situa-
tion affect Europe's security more or less 
directly, and first and foremost the development 
of Soviet strength, particularly naval. 
66. In the last twenty years, the Soviet Union 
has built up a powerful fleet capable of inter-
vening on all the oceans of the world. It 
outclasses the American fleet in the number 
of ships, particularly submarines. However, 
western naval strength is still superior to that of 
the Soviet Union and its allies because of the 
number of aircraft-carriers belonging to mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the 
giant American nuclear-propelled carriers. 
67. Hitherto, the Soviet Union had been 
content with building three or four medium-
tonnage aircraft-carriers, but in summer 1980 it 
was learned that Soviet shipyards in turn were 
starting to build giant nuclear-propelled air-
craft-carriers. It may consequently be expected 
that the Soviet Union will soon have the most 
modern and powerful navy in the world, thus 
considerably increasing its means of action out-
side European and Asian territories. This 
growth in the Soviet Union's naval armaments 
may be one explanation for its attempts to 
obtain positions along the shores of the Indian 
Ocean, in Asia and in Africa and means that 
from now on the Soviet military threat has 
assumed world dimensions not only in nuclear 
weapons but also in conventional armaments. 
68. The invasion of Afghanistan may be 
viewed from two standpoints: increasing Soviet 
power and the Soviet threat in Asia. The 
deployment of Soviet forces closer to the Strait 
of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean makes it 
materially possible for the Soviet Union to 
intervene in the Near and Middle East, at least 
by air. However, the invasiou of Afghanistan 
has many worrying repercussions for the Soviet 
Union, both in the East and in Europe. In 
fact, all the Moslem countries, including those 
which are not at present on friendly terms with 
the West, have become extremely sensitive to 
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the Soviet threat and are anxious not to come 
under the Soviet area of influence, having seen 
clearly from the Afghanistan affair that their 
independence would be endangered if they 
came under Soviet protection or even had 
communists participate in their governments 
since such participation seems liable to make 
these countries subject to the Brezhnev doc-
trine, as was the case in Afghanistan. 
69. Thus, Iraq, where the tendency had 
hitherto been to co-operate closely with the 
Soviet Union, is trying to diversify its economic 
partners, particularly in Europe, and Iran, in 
spite of the crisis in its relationship with the 
United States and most western countries 
following the fall of the Shah's regime, the 
incarceration of the American Embassy hosta-
ges in Tehran and violent demonstrations in 
London, Washington and Rome, has shown the 
greatest concern to be independent of the Soviet 
Union and has extended its repressive measures 
to the leaders or even followers of the Tudeh 
Party, the local version of the communist party. 
Although India for its part had been able to 
obtain considerable Soviet assistance - military 
in particular - to strengthen its positions with 
regard to Pakistan and China, it has shown 
concern at the invasion of Afghanistan. 
70. The whole Middle East has been alive to 
the growth in the Soviet threat. This does not 
mean that most countries in the area have 
drawn noticeably closer to western positions. 
They are very largely prevented from doing so 
by the development of the situation in Palestine 
and in particular by the measures taken in 
recent months by the Israeli Government which 
has, on the one hand, established new settle-
ments on the West bank and, on the other, 
annexed the Arab part of Jerusalem and a 
fairly extensive area round the city. It has also 
increased its military interventions in southern 
Lebanon and is now threatening to annex the 
Golan Heights, where it has granted Israeli 
nationality to the Druse element of the 
population. 
71. This Israeli policy is in the process of 
dashing all hopes which some had placed in the 
Camp David agreements. One sign of this was 
seen in August 1980 when, on the one hand, 
President Sadat refused to hold any further talks 
with Israel in present circumstances and, on the 
other hand, United States abstention allowed 
the Security Council to adopt, with the unani-
mity of its other members, a resolution forbid-
ding United Nations member countries setting 
up or keeping their diplomatic representations 
in Jerusalem. The Netherlands and certain 
Latin American countries which had had their 
embassies in the Israeli part of the city since the 
early days of the state of Israel had to withdraw 
them. 
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72. In present circumstances, there is no 
doubt that the Palestinian affair continues to 
give a foothold to Soviet propaganda in Arab 
public opinion and that the West is still 
accused - very largely erroneously - of giving 
de facto support to the annexationist policy of 
Israel, in spite of the positions adopted by the 
Nine in 1979 and 1980 when the policy 
pursued by Israel in Palestine was condemned. 
73. In view of the fact that the position of the 
United States Government and its freedom of 
action in the Middle East may well be 
weakened for many months to come by the 
election campaign, Europe is particularly well 
placed to take steps to find a settlement to the 
Palestinian affair which takes account of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and the 
wishes constantly expressed by the international 
community since 1967 and expressed in the 
United Nations resolution. 
74. The Nine showed their intense awareness 
of the importance of this affair at the Venice 
summit meeting in June 1980 by instructing 
Mr. Gaston Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Luxembourg and President of the European 
Council, to make an on-the-spot study of the 
points of view of countries in the region on 
statements by the Nine with a view to prepar-
ing, for the European Council meeting on 2nd 
December 1980, a European initiative for 
promoting lasting, and hence fair, peace in the 
area. 
75. However, there is a risk of this initiative 
being hindered considerably by the outbreak of 
armed conflict between Iraq and Iran on 
21st September 1980. The Iraqi Government 
under Mr. Sadam Hussein alone may have 
found sufficient reasons for trying to reverse by 
force a situation imposed inter alia on 6th 
March 1975, in the Algiers agreements, by the 
Shah's government at a time when he domi-
nated the region: partitioning of the Shatt-al-
Arab, Iranian domination over the Khuzistan 
oil region, annexation of the islands in the 
Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a Kurd revolt 
fostered on Iraqi territory. The weakness attri-
buted to the new Iranian regime, the peace res-
tored with the Iraqi Kurds followed by the 
revolt of the Iranian Kurds, the assumed 
disorganisation of the Iranian army and the 
breakdown in relations between Iran and almost 
its only supplier of arms, the United States, 
brought about a situation favourable to revenge 
by Iraq, which could thus hope to go back on 
the concessions imposed on it by Iran's prepon-
derance in the region. The affair of the 
American hostages was a guarantee that the 
United States would not support its former 
allies. In short, Iraq had no need of Soviet 
advice to make it 'wish to take advantage of this 
reversal of the situation, and the early days of 
the war seemed to show that it was right. 
However, the Iranian army has not broken up, 
the state has not collapsed and, after 
initial successes, the Iraqi forces seem to have 
stopped advancing at the beginning of October. 
It is at this point that the possibility of 
Soviet involvement must be taken seriously. 
76. However, neither East nor West can 
dissociate itself from this new conflict, first 
because the military operations have taken 
place in an area which is very rich in oil (90 % 
of Iranian resources are in Khuzistan and 40% 
of Iraqi resources in the Rumaila area. Most 
oil from Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia comes from near the battlefield and 
were the conflict to spread to the Strait of 
Hormuz there would be a risk of Europe being 
deprived of 75% of its oil imports). Although 
the industrialised countries now have oil stocks 
equivalent to about four months' consumption, 
they would very soon be affected if they found 
themselves cut off from the Gulf oil sources. 
77. At the time of writing, the conflict seems 
liable both to become entrenched and to 
spread. Several Arab countries, particularly 
Jordan, and most of the states on the shores of 
the Gulf have proposed military assistance to 
Iraq. Saudi Arabia has received American 
early-warning aircraft equipped with the A W AC 
system and deliveries of American arms 
to Jordan are continuing. On 8th October, the 
Soviet Union for its part signed a treaty of 
friendship and co-operation with Syria. Fin-
ally, Iran has announced its intention to close 
the Strait of Hormuz if the Arab Gulf states 
join forces with Iraq. For all these reasons, it 
is to be feared that there will be a spread of the 
conflict from which the two great powers may 
not for long be able to remain aloof. The 
continued supply of oil to the West is thus far 
from certain even though Saudi Arabia and the 
other Arab producers seem to have decided to 
increase their oil output to offset the closing of 
the Iranian and Iraqi markets to western 
importers. 
78. The West clearly has no interest in 
becoming involved in this conflict as long as 
the Soviet Union does not intervene. But it 
could not tolerate the closing of the Strait of 
Hormuz and needs a very rapid return to peace 
in the region. The Soviet Union for its part 
seems anxious for this to happen because it 
cannot for long maintain forces both in Afghan-
istan and in face of Poland and Iran. Hence, 
there is a growing risk of this conflict conti-
nuing and spreading, bringing the two great 
powers into confrontation; it is not yet possible 
to foresee in what conditions. It is not only to 
defend principles but also because of impera-
tives which are vital for its security that it is 
absolutely essential for Europe not to intervene 
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but to encourage the restoration of peace and a 
return to a durably stable situation in the 
Middle East. It must be noted that in this 
field it has few of the instruments necessary for 
carrying out such a policy since among the 
various powers only the United States has sent 
a few forces to the Gulf area. Britain has one 
warship there. Your Rapporteur considers 
Western Europe's policy should be to press for 
the limitation of conflict, to keep the Strait of 
Hormuz open, to deter any impulse by the 
great powers to intervene 'and to encourage a 
cease-fire and peace negotiations between the 
belligerent parties. 
79. The WEU Assembly has made its views 
sufficiently clear as far as the Palestinian situa-
tion is concerned for there to be no need to 
repeat here what has been said, apart from 
underlining the interest with which the reply of 
the Council, i.e. Western Europe, will be 
examined by the Assembly. 
80. It is obviously not a matter of Europe or 
the West attempting to re-establish itself in the 
Middle East. It is on the ~ontrary a matter of 
calming the fears which may be felt by coun-
tries in this region in face of the approaching 
Soviet divisions and showing the importance 
which Western Europe attaches to the mainte-
nance of their independence, sovereignty and 
freedom to run their own internal affairs and 
their foreign policy. It is in no way an attempt 
to involve them in a western defence system but 
rather to provide them With any means and 
assistance they may request to defend their 
freedom themselves against any threat from any 
direction. 
81. The invasion of Afghanistan also led to 
increased tension and dang~r throughout South-
ern Asia, particularly as it occurred shortly 
after Vietnam, allied with the Soviet Union, 
had invaded Cambodia under the pretext of 
putting an end to a particularly odious and 
bloodthirsty dictatorship but also to carry out 
imperialist designs. The maintenance of Viet-
namese forces in Cambodia and Laos and the 
growing number of incidents between Vietnam 
and Thailand are a danger to peace in South-
East Asia and, apart from China, no state now 
seems capable of countering Vietnamese expan-
sionism, actively supported by the Soviet 
Union, and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
considerably strengthens the means of action of 
the Soviet Union in the area. 
82. It is quite evident that after the two 
Vietnam wars the West hardly has the moral or 
material possibility of intervening in that part 
of the world and that, here too, strengthening 
existing states and maintaining their stability is 
the best guarantee for the maintenance or res-
toration of peace which corresponds to the 
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West's fundamental interest. In face of Soviet 
imperialism, there is no solution other than to 
support the independence of states and peoples. 
83. It is not the purpose of the present report 
to examine the problems of maintaining a mili.-
tary - and above all nuclear - balance in the 
world. Since the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments is to devote one of 
its reports to the prospects of the SALT Ill 
negotiations, your Rapporteur will confine 
himself to recalling that the invasion of Afghan-
istan induced the United States Government 
to renounce the idea of proposing that Congress 
ratify the SALT 11 agreement. It probably 
knew that in any event ratification would 
encounter serious difficulties because of prevail-
ing anxiety in the United States about the grow-
ing imbalance of nuclear forces in the world. 
84. But in spring 1980 the Soviet Union, 
which had made ratification of SALT 11 a prior 
condition for opening the SALT Ill negotia-
tions, accepted the possibility of starting SALT 
Ill before ratification. Moreover, during the 
summer the Soviet Union, which had always 
asserted that the deployment of Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles in Europe would prevent the 
opening of negotiations on continental-range 
nuclear weapons, dropped this condition too, as 
Mr. Brezhnev already informed Chancellor 
Schmidt when he visited Moscow in June. 
Hence, the Soviet Union is apparently still 
prepared to hold talks with the West on prob-
lems relating to the limitation of weapons, at 
the level of both intercontinental missiles and 
Eurostrategic missiles. 
85. The Afghanistan affair has made the 
West drop the idea of such negotiations for 
some months. However, one may wonder to 
what extent this attitude may change Soviet 
policy in Afghanistan and make the Soviet 
Union withdraw its forces from the country. A 
fairly realistic analysis of the situation leads to 
the conclusion that it cannot do so. Conse-
quently, the interest for the whole world - for 
the West as well as for the eastern countries -
of seeking agreements on the limitation of stra-
tegic weapons is so great that it seems unreason-
able to wait for rather unlikely events before 
resuming talks on this point, provided particu-
lar attention is paid to ensuring that the West's 
security is not jeopardised. 
86. It should be added that, at its Thirty-
Fourth General Assembly, the United Nations 
adopted a resolution recommending that all 
countries examine the possibility of establish-
ing confidence-building measures comparable 
with those worked out in Helsinki in the Euro-
pean framework. On that occasion, it was 
decided to study these measures for the Thirty-
Sixth General Assembly. This opened at the 
end of August 1980. Through the inter-
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mediary of the United Nations, the principle of 
confidence-building measures might thus no 
longer be limited to the European area proper 
or to the framework of the CSCE but be 
extended world-wide through an international 
convention whose effect would be beneficial to 
peace throughout the world and to the security 
of the most threatened areas. 
8 7. Because of all these factors, your 
Rapporteur thinks the benefits the Soviet 
Union has so far derived from the invasion of 
Afghanistan are, to say the least, very limited. 
It had to engage a large force without obtain-
ing significant strategic results and it cannot 
consider withdrawing them without defeat 
becoming glaringly apparent to the world and 
the Soviet people, which would probably have 
grave consequences for present Soviet leaders. 
All the forecasts made by the latter, 
particularly about the possibility of a cut in the 
forces engaged in Afghanistan, have proved illu-
sory. The Soviet Union's relations with the 
third world as a whole and with a number of 
Middle East countries in particular have 
seriously deteriorated. It has not been able to 
take advantage of the crisis between Iran and 
the West to improve its relations with the for-
mer; on the contrary, plans for natural gas and 
oil co-operation, drawn up in the Shah's days, 
have been abandoned. Finally, the Soviet 
Union must be particularly careful in its rela-
tions with the Eastern European countries at a 
time when the effects of the world economic 
crisis are being felt in these countries and are 
endangering their stability. 
88. These various considerations indicate 
that the Soviet Union has a greater need than 
ever for developing, in coming years, agree-
ments on disarmament, the limitation of arma-
ments and economic co-operation. The time 
has probably come for the West to make it 
understand that this implies parallel develop-
ment of the political aspects of detente which 
cannot be limited to territories covered by the 
CSCE: the Afghanistan affair and subsequent 
reactions will probably have shown that, 
contrary to what the Soviet leaders had 
probably hoped, it is not possible to count on a 
sort of neutralisation of the European sector to 
undertake an imperialist policy in Asia and 
Africa and that if detente is not divisible into 
chapters at the Madrid meeting it is not 
divisible into geographical areas either. 
V. Conclusions 
89. Although in the last decade the balance 
of forces both in Europe and throughout the 
world seemed to be developing to the advantage 
of the Soviet Union, which might have thought 
that in the next decade it could enjoy the fruits 
of its policy of giving first place to armaments, 
the invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent 
events seem to show that this was not at all so. 
Cracks have appeared even within the Soviet 
Union, the Polish affair shows that nothing is 
permanently settled in its relations with the 
people's democracies, the resistance of the 
Afghan people demonstrates that its military 
power is not unlimited and the reactions of the 
non-aligned countries prove that its positions 
cannot be permanent unless they are effectively 
occupied by Soviet armed forces. 
90. Some might draw the conclusion from 
this that the West might be able to take advan-
tage of the situation which thus emerges to 
make up for lost ground, re-establish military 
superiority, recover lost positions in Asia and 
Africa and encourage the revolt of peoples 
under Soviet domination. This is not your 
Rapporteur's opinion. He considers on the 
contrary that the time is perhaps approaching 
to make a better effort to ensure peace based on 
limitation of armaments and forces and then on 
effective disarmament and at the same time on 
the principles defined in Helsinki. This does 
not mean your Rapporteur considers disintegra-
tion of Soviet society or the Warsaw Pact would 
necessarily be a factor of peace but rather that 
the Soviet Union's present fears should make it 
more aware of the need to ensure lasting 
peace. He sees encouraging signs in the Soviet 
proposals with regard both to the Madrid confe-
rence and to the MBFR or SALT Ill talks in 
the early months of 1980. 
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91. It would naturally be illusory and dange-
rous to base international peace on the mainte-
nance of Afghanistan under Soviet domination, 
but it would be no less dang~rous not to make 
use, because of Afghanistan, of circumstances 
favourable to the organisation of peace, in view 
of the fact that organising peace will necessarily 
mean granting a political status to the Afghan 
people which it would be prepared to accept. 
This may have been the basis of the 
British proposals for a neutralisation of Afghan-
istan: they were designed to allow the Soviet 
Government to withdraw its forces without 
having to present public opinion with the 
appearance of a bitter defeat. 
92. Since the Helsinki conference in 1974-75, 
western positions have not fundamentally 
changed: they still consist of viewing detente as 
a whole and linking it closely with the limita-
tion of forces and armaments, respect for sove-
reignty and frontiers, safeguavding human rights 
and economic exchanges. Your Rapporteur 
considers that this should remain the West's 
position towards the approaching Madrid 
meeting, the continuation of the MBFR talks 
and the opening of SALT Ill. To make the 
evacuation of Afghanistan a prior condition for 
any discussion with the Soviet Union would 
probably mean becoming entrenched in a fruit-
less position and allowing a good opportunity 
of consolidating peace to escape. To make it 
one of the aims of negotiations on detente, for 
which the Soviet Union seems more anxious 
than ever, seems to be a reasonable and realistic 
course. 
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Amendment 1 
Political implications for Europe 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Dr. Miller and Mr. Pavitt 
1. Leave out paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper. 
I. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Signed: Miller, Pavitt 
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Amendments 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Political implications for Europe 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
2nd December 1980 
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to respect undertakings they 
have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's 
defensive potential in Europe " and insert " to ensure that the balance of forces in Europe is 
maintained". 
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" inter alia". 
4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" 10. Afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing, 
to the Afghan people, whether refugees or on Afghan territory; ". 
5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper. 
6. In paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add "political" after "necessary". 
Signed: Dejardin 
I. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments 2, 4, 5 and 6 negatived; Amendment 3 agreed to). 
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108 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
pnnted in italics. 
'If I t./1 C::. 
DOCUMENT 856 
Draft Recommendation 
on energy and security 
The Assembly, 
Convinced that the most important aim of any European energy policy should be to achieve 
maximum independence from imported oil in the shortest possible time; 
Noting that costly long-term structural changes are needed to make a considerable reduction in 
oil consumption and Western Europe's dependence on imported energy for 63 % of its requirements; 
Seriously concerned that since 1973 neither the Western European countries nor the western 
world as a whole has been able to implement proposals and decisions agreed upon either by the 
European Council or by the leaders of the main industrialised countries; 
Endorsing the statement of the Venice summit conference of June 1980 in favour of the 
development of new coal and nuclear energy programmes as the only medium-term solutions to the 
energy problem; 
Aware that while oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transport and markets are becoming 
increasingly important strategically, Western European economies are becoming ever more dependent 
on trade with the East; 
Conscious of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly in the light of the 
war between Iraq and Iran, especially for Western European oil imports from Persian Gulf states, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Westerm European policy, 
convergent energy measures, and, together with the United States, Canada and Japan, formulate a 
co-operative global economic strategy, and also provide the necessary financial means for their 
implementation; 
2. To establish and implement common plans for energy self-sufficiency and common guidelines 
for better use and conservation of energy, and to encourage lower oil consumption and the use of 
other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources; 
3. To implement the coal objectives formulated by the International Energy Agency coal industry 
advisory board; 
4. To agree, for Western Europe's electricity requirements, on common plans for better use of the 
scarce uranium resources of the western world through increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder 
reactors which would consequently mean recycling spent fuel elements in order to recuperate 
uranium and to obtain plutonium for fast-breeder reactors or, in a mixture with uranium or thorium, 
for light-water reactors; 
5. To determine the acceptable threshold of safety and security for imports of energy or rare raw 
materials by the western world from the eastern bloc countries; 
6. To participate in contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes, such as 
the Strait of Hormuz. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Fliimig, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The North Atlantic Alliance guarantees 
security in Europe and its partners have means 
of co-operating to maintain their basic econo-
mic and social stability. However, recent 
events have made them realise that their conti-
nued well-being and safety depend on the world 
outside the treaty area. Oil and raw materials, 
sea lanes for their transportation and markets in 
which to earn the money to pay for them, have 
now become the strategic stakes. 
2. European Economic Community exports 
to the COMECON bloc consist of 88% machi-
nery and other industrial goods, the remainder 
being foodstuffs. Imports from the East are 
8% machinery, 17% semi-finished goods, the 
remainder being oil, gas and raw materials. In 
particular, imports from the Soviet Union show 
a growing prevalence of fuel, oil and raw mater-
ials. In the EEC, coal, oil and gas imports 
from the Soviet bloc amount to between 5 % 
and 6 % of the EEC's total primary consump-
tion. During the last decade the relationship 
between imported and exported goods has 
remained almost unchanged. The present 
overall levels of trade make the western econo-
mies increasingly dependent on eastern trade. 
3. The year 1979 also brought into the open 
geopolitical and internal revolutionary dangers. 
The collapse of the Shah's regime and Soviet 
aggression in Afghanistan illustrate the vulner-
ability of practically all the producing count-
ries. Europe has an overwhelming interest in 
Persian Gulf oil on which it depends for 60 % 
and will continue to do so for many years to 
come. 
4. The seven WEU countries all agree that 
if no major changes are made in their depen-
dence on imported energy they will reach a 
point where they will not be able to maintain 
basic economic and social stability. 
5. The main question on energy and secu-
rity is what action can be taken by the seven 
countries to diminish their dependence on 
imported energy resources. 
6. A distinction has to be made between 
fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, lignite and 
coal, on the one hand, and renewable energy 
resources such as biomass, hydroelectric, solar 
and wind energy on the other. Nuclear energy 
is, of course, in a special category. 
7. The seven countries are trying to reduce 
their dependence on imported energy in very 
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different ways: Belgium's electricity depends for 
25 % on nuclear energy, France is building up 
its nuclear energy power plants, while Italy is 
using oil to fuel its conventional power plants, 
and the Netherlands is even using gas as fuel for 
its power plants; the United Kingdom and 
Germany are still largely dependent on their 
coal, the United Kingdom having its own North 
Sea oil. How can one solution be found with 
these differing policies? 
8. The Western European governments 
have been trying to develop a western strategy 
involving the United States and Japan as well. 
The seven main western industrialised count-
ries discussed the energy position in Venice on 
22nd and 23rd June 19801 and considered that 
permanent machinery should be set up to forge 
better links between the western industrialised 
countries. The present system of ad hoc diplo-
matic consultation should be replaced by a 
framework for permanent diplomatic consulta-
tion. 
9. Within Europe several proposals have 
been made to restrict energy consumption. 
Energy prices and national plans now have to 
be harmonised in both the short and long term. 
10. Guidelines will have to be drawn up for 
better use of energy, lower oil consumption and 
the use of other energy resources such as coal 
and nuclear means. Without joint Western 
European guidelines investment programmes 
will lack coherence. 
11. It should not be forgotten however that 
the European Community is not authorised to 
deal with security matters, nor is there any 
treaty link between the economic policy of the 
Community and the security of energy sup-
plies. Some of these aspects are studied in the 
framework of European political collaboration, 
but more from the political than the security 
angle. The Coal and Steel' Community and 
Euratom were set up to deal respectively with 
coal and steel and nuclear energy, but they 
were granted no specific power in overall 
energy questions. 
12. The Community has prepared a number 
of documents on oil, coal, gas, nuclear energy 
and new sources of energy, but its aim is not so 
much to establish a stringent Community 
energy policy for all member countries as to 
induce governments to adopt convergent poli-
cies which certainly do not exist at present. 
However, it must be acknowledged that a true 
Common Market can hardly exist without a 
I. See the declaration issued after the summit conference 
in Venice at Appendix. 
common energy policy. For that reason an 
energy price and tax harmonisation programme 
will have to be introduced. 
I. Energy conservation 
13. Energy conservation measures will have 
to be adopted for buildings, households, indus-
try and transport. The Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany believes such 
measures should be promoted through informa-
tion and advice, voluntary action and financial 
incentives. Legal provisions such as raising the 
thermal insulation standards of new buildings 
might also have to be adopted as market forces 
are not directly operative for this type of 
conservation. The government can also set a 
good example in the public sector by convert-
ing public buildings to energy-saving techno-
logical concepts and installing energy-saving 
means of heating. So far, an increase in a 
country's gross national product meant its 
energy consumption increasing at the same 
percentage. This increase in use of energy 
should be reduced to 0.8 or 0.5 in relation to 
the increase in gross national product. This 
means that new techniques will have to be 
introduced to achieve the same growth in pro-
duction using less energy. 
14. A number of measures could be adopted 
to replace oil in power plants by converting 
them to use coal or nuclear energy. 
11. Oil 
15. For a long time to come Western Europe 
will be dependent on oil, especially for trans-
portation purposes, and it will take at least ten 
years to reduce this dependence from 61 % to 
about 55%. At present the oil market is in 
balance, but the situation is so volatile that 
foreign policy decisions or economic factors 
could sharply reduce supplies without notice. 
Our aim should therefore be to try to develop 
programmes" away from oil". 
16. It should be mentioned here that Western 
Europe is not without its own oil reserves. In 
1978 oil exploitation brought in 63 million 
tonnes, i.e. 12% of its consumption; 85% 
thereof came from oil in the United King-
dom. In the 1980s the United Kingdom's pro-
duction may rise to I 00-150 million tonnes of 
oil per year, but even this would not constitute 
more than 20-25% of Western Europe's requi-
rements. 
17. Your Rapporteur wishes to mention here 
that when the Committee met the United King-
dom Minister of State at the Department of 
Energy, Mr. Hamish Gray, and his collabora-
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tors, the Minister gave some useful information 
about the United Kingdom's energy policy. By 
the end of 1980 the United Kingdom may be 
producing as much oil as it consumes, although 
for reasons of refinery balance it will continue 
to import heavy crude and exwort a substantial 
proportion of the light crude produced in the 
North Sea. The United Kingdom's estimated 
indigenous resources in oil and coal will last for 
about 16 years and 300 years respectively. 
18. As far as other European countries are 
concerned, their companies have an interest in 
six of the fourteen oilfields in production and a 
further four oilfields under development as well 
as in three gas deposits in production. Compa-
nies of other member states have an interest in 
about one-eighth of the total area under licence. 
19. About half of the United Kingdom's 
North Sea oil production is exported, over half 
of this going to other European countries. In 
1980 they will probably receive some 65 % of 
the volume exported, i.e. one-third of total pro-
duction. 
20. The main purpose of Western Europe's 
longer-term policy should be: 
(a) to diversify oil imports in order to 
become less dependent on oil from 
the Middle East; 
(b) to promote prospecting for oil m 
Western Europe; 
(c) to promote prospecting· for oil m 
other parts of the world; 
(d) to promote oil conservation by the 
use of other fuels such as coal and 
nuclear energy. 
Ill. Coal 
21. As coal could be an important substitute 
for oil, the technology to make better use of 
coal should be promoted not only for heat but 
also, for instance, for the chemical industry. 
Moreover, it is possible to increase coal imports 
from America and Australia, 'but for this ship-
ping capacities and harbour facilities should be 
increased. The present main coal-producing 
countries in Europe are the ,United Kingdom 
and Germany; the Coal and Steel Community 
could help to finance investi!Dents in research 
and development of the liquefaction and gasifi-
cation of coal. Coal exploitation could also be 
mechanised, but this would result in the energy 
from coal becoming more expensive since man-
power cost is a very important factor in this 
field because in many countries coal miners are 
among the best paid workers. Germany also 
has a problem in that the layers of coal to be 
exploited are plunging deeper as the upper 
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layers run out. It exploits reserves at a depth 
of 1,500 metres and the minimum seam thick-
ness considered acceptable for mining is bet-
ween 0.5 and 0.7 metres, according to quality 
and recoverability. In coal-mining, improved 
means of extraction and a steady improvement 
in mining methods may lower costs. In parti-
cular, in situ gasification may be of great 
importance for reducing coal industry losses in 
the future. 
22. The German Government hopes research 
and development in the gasification and lique-
faction of coal will bear fruit in the mid-
1980s. It is earmarking some DM. 13 billion 
for this purpose from 1980 to 1993. Part of 
the money will be used to fight pollution which 
the use of coal or its derivatives will automati-
cally create. The German Government also 
hopes to have some industrial spin-off from this 
programme as other countries might wish to use 
German equipment for their gasification or 
liquefaction of coal. 
23. In the United Kingdom much has already 
been done on gasification problems, but success 
is certainly not round the corner as new diffi-
culties have arisen at every stage. 
24. Before and during the second world war, 
large-scale installations for coal liquefaction, i.e. 
the manufacture of liquid hydrocarbons from 
coal by hydrogenation, were being operated in 
Germany. Other types of liquefaction proces-
ses which will probably be more economical 
are in the research and development stage. 
The large-scale introduction of new coal tech-
nologies will involve long lead times. The 
viewpoint of the experts of the world energy 
conference, held in Munich from 8th to 12th 
September 1980 and attended by your Rappor-
teur, is that the economical large-scale intro-
duction of the manufacture of formed coke 
cannot take place before 1988-90. Coal lique-
faction will not be introduced before 1990 and 
the large-scale gasification or liquefaction of 
coal using the process heat from high-temper-
ature nuclear reactors will not take place before 
1995-2000. Improved combustion techniques, 
e.g. fluidised bed combustion, could open up 
substantial new markets for the use of coal in 
industry by the 1990s avoiding environmental 
problems as the emission of sulphur fallout 
would be very low. 
25. On 25th April 1980, the newly-estab-
lished International Energy Agency coal 
industry advisory board had its first meeting. 
The board stated that the difficulty of increas-
ing coal production, trade and use should not 
be underestimated. If governments and indus-
tries were prepared to act and exploit fully the 
present opportunities to increase the use of 
coal, the requirements for oil could be lowered 
considerably. 
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26. The board emphasised that due to the 
long lead times for securing approval, financing 
and implementation of projects, governments 
and industry would have to work closely toge-
ther to deal with the following matters if their 
coal objectives were to be met: 
{i) Although it is widely accepted that 
coal will have to be more extensively 
used in the future and coal produc-
tion and transportation capacity 
greatly expanded, the required in-
vestments are not being made. The 
investment climate must be im-
proved and there has to be a better 
understanding and harmonisation of 
consumer and producer interests. 
(ii) Government energy and trade poli-
cies should be reviewed and changed 
if necessary to ensure that invest-
ment is encouraged at all stages of 
the coal chain. 
(iii) The regulatory process in many lEA 
countries will have to be made more 
efficient to expedite coal projects. 
(iv) Bottlenecks in the transportation 
system are already a problem and 
more co-ordination is required bet-
ween the public authorities and pri-
vate entities involved. 
(v) It is accepted that important envi-
ronmental and land-use considera-
tions will have to be met at each 
stage of the coal chain from the 
mine to the consumer. Increased 
stability in environmental protec-
tion standards is, however, a require-
ment. Industry should be allowed 
more flexibility to introduce cost-
effective technology to meet environ-
mental standards. 
IV. Gas 
27. Gas is quite important as the reserves 
within the Community are considered to be 10 
billion metric tonnes, which is 4.5 % of the 
world's commercially exploitable gas reserves. 
53% of these reserves are in the Netherlands' 
and 27% in the United Kingdom's part of the 
North Sea. In 1978, production was about 135 
million metric tonnes, i.e. ab@ut 14 % of the 
energy used by the Community. It is consi-
dered that the Netherlands' production will 
reach its peak next year and that the United 
Kingdom will likewise attain maximum pro-
duction in 1985. This means that the EEC 
countries are obliged to conclude contracts with 
gas-exporting countries in order to increase gas 
imports. They should be increased by 300 % 
in 1985 and by 400% in 1990. 
28. There is, of course, the possibility that 
new gas deposits might be found in the North 
Sea. The British Government has already 
given its approval for a £1-£1.5 billion North 
Sea pipeline project; the network will be 572 
miles long. Norwegian interests might also be 
involved if gas from that sector flows into the 
pipeline. The recommended pipeline system 
would be capable of collecting all the gas avail-
able in the British Northern North Sea oil-
fields. Much of that gas would otherwise be 
flared. Production is estimated at 1 billion 
cubic feet a day by 1990, increasing to a peak 
of 2 billion by the end of the century. 
29. The price of gas in domestic markets and 
some sections of the industrial market in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands has been 
low compared with its true economic value and 
the policy of both governments is to raise prices 
to discourage waste of this important and irre-
placeable resource. New methods are being 
studied for the exploration and recovery of 
natural gas deposits. Conventional gas deposits 
are often abandoned when the well-head pres-
sure falls below the operating pressure of the 
pipeline. New technologies are being studied 
to bring the low-presure gas up to the pressure 
of the pipeline. 
30. It would be of great importance for 
Europe if the existing Western European net-
work of gas pipelines were standardised. At 
present many of the national and private net-
works have different specifications and cannot 
be interconnected. 
31. The Federal Republic of Germany im-
ports 17 % of its gas requirements from the 
Soviet Union. So far the Soviet supply has 
been steady and without difficulties. 
32. Your Rapporteur believes that in the 
field of energy or rare raw materials it is very 
important to agree on common policies in order 
to reduce western dependence on any single 
source of such vital resources. Present overall 
levels of trade with the East are still well below 
the point at which the western economies 
would become dangerously dependent on the 
East. Although trade with the East may still 
be within the safety limits there is an urgent 
need for a multilateral body capable of deter-
mining how close the limit of safety may be. 
V. Nuclear energy 
33. The progress of industrial nations in the 
last century was characterised by technological 
developments based on the steadily-growing use 
of energy resources. Until the end of the nine-
teenth century energy was coalbased, followed 
increasingly in this century by oil, and since the 
second half of the twentieth century by ura-
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nium and other nuclear fuels in addition to the 
two earlier sources. 
34. Since the second half of the 1970s there 
has been much uncertainty about uranium 
supplies and demand. From the 1950s on-
wards saturation in military requirements led to 
a slump in demand at a time of record produc-
tion which reached more than 33,000 tonnes of 
uranium in 19 59. The res).llting cutback in 
production and excess capacity lasted until 
1965, by which time civilian nuclear program-
mes had developed to the point where there 
was a significant requirement for nuclear fuel. 
This led to a gradual rise in production, 
mainly in the United States and Canada, South 
Africa and, to some extent, in Europe. By 
1978 annual production had risen to more than 
34,000 tonnes of uranium, mainly for enrich-
ment contracts for the nuclear utilities. 
35. In June 1980 the worldwide uranium 
industry published a report by the commodities 
research unit in London stating that a substan-
tial jump in productive capacity should be 
phased over the next decade. This increase in 
capacity will certainly lead to lower prices as 
there is already a substantial oversupply and 
reduced demand because of the slowdown in 
nuclear power development. 
36. The present trend suggests that world 
uranium requirements might 'remain quite high 
until at least the year 2000, but in quantities 
much lower than were considered valid in the 
early 1970s. Uranium prices have fallen from 
about $ 43 per pound to $ 32, 
3 7. The present instability of the market, 
high inflation rates and environmental concern 
have profoundly affected marl<:et structure, costs 
and prices. Over the longer term the rapid 
development of fast breeders and the possible 
introduction of nuclear fusion could abate the 
anticipated shortfall in uranium supply capa-
bility. 
38. The world energy conference estimates 
that by 1985 plant production capacity in the 
United States will be 30,000 tonnes of uranium 
annually and about 14,400 tonnes in Canada. 
The total production capability in Western 
Europe by 1985 is not expected to exceed 5,900 
tonnes of uranium per year, of which nearly 
70 % will be produced in France. 
39. The uranium resoutces of Western 
Europe are mainly in Sweden, Greenland and 
France. There are also some uranium resour-
ces in Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Austria, the United Kingdom 
and Finland. 
40. Because of downward revisions in nuclear 
plant construction there is an excess of supply 
over demand, but this is not expected to persist 
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beyond the 1990s and additional production 
capability must be established by then. 
41. The Venice communique of 22nd and 
23rd June 1980 on energy encourages the 
development of new coal and nuclear program-
mes. Great hopes are pinned on coal and 
nuclear energy as a medium-term solution to 
the energy problem, but both involve environ-
mental risks and, moreover, atomic energy will 
certainly encounter much political opposition 
in many countries. 
42. The great advantage of electricity from 
nuclear power plants is of course its cost. 
Electricity from oil power plants costs about 
20% more than from coal power plants and 
nearly 40 % more than from nuclear power 
plants. 
43. On 27th February 1980, the sixty-six 
countries of the International Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Evaluation Committee concluded that 
world nuclear energy development must be 
continued despite the danger of a proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. The committee's techni-
cal studies endorsed both the development of 
fast-breeder nuclear reactors and the reproces-
sing of used nuclear fuel rods. 
44. Will new safeguards, technical and insti-
tutional measures, such as multinational ventu-
res, constitute a promising approach? 
45. In March 1980, a publication by the 
nuclear research centre in Karlsruhe stated that 
a new step had been made in the development 
of a new type of pressurised-water reactor en-
abling a great saving in the use of uranium by 
converting the abundantly available uranium 
238 into plutonium 239. Another advantage 
was that this type of reactor could be derived 
from light-water reactors which existed in 
nearly all European countries. 
46. At the end of January 1980, the French 
Minister for Industry, Mr. Andre Giraud, stated 
that effective control of the uses of nuclear 
capabilities had been made possible by a new 
technology that was relatively resistant as 
regards proliferation if combined with a few 
additional political safeguards. He added that 
carefully increased western support for nuclear 
energy could actually improve the climate for 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Special protection should be given in the key 
areas of vulnerability: nuclear fuel, reactor 
choice and reprocessing. The resultant pluto-
nium could be placed under international safe-
guards. 
47. A major point is the energy self-suffi-
ciency which might result from the increasingly 
widespread use of fast breeders. By 1985, 
European stocks of plutonium will be consi-
derable and, if used in fast-breeder reactors, 
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would adequately cover all the electrical requi-
rements of Western Europe for half a century at 
the annual energy consumption level predicted 
for the year 2000. 
48. The importance of the fast-breeder reac-
tor does not lie primarily in its ability to gene-
rate electricity at comparatively low cost but in 
the fact that it allows plutonium from spent 
fuel to be used instead of having to store it for 
tens of thousands of years as nuclear waste. 
Fast breeders allow nuclear energy to become a 
practical, inexhaustible source of energy and 
hence constitute the necessary and logical 
consequence of nuclear power. 
49. During its visit to the nuclear research 
centre in Karlsrube on 14th October 1980, the 
Committee was briefed on the importance of 
the fast-breeder reactor for the energy supply of 
the Western European countries. Although 
there are several possibilities for developing 
other types of reactor, the scientists in Karls-
ruhe believed it was now time to take decisions 
on a follow-up for light-water reactors. They 
considered the fast-breeder concept to be the 
safest and, technologically speaking, the most 
realistic. However, the construction of fast-
breeder power plants would cost more than 
light-water reactors but the running costs may 
be less. The western world's first commercial-
size fast-breeder reactor, the Super Phenix at 
Creys-Malville, will be operational in 1983. 
VI. Other new sources of energy 
50. The fifth element to be mentioned is 
research and development in new sources of 
energy. However, it is not estimated that new 
sources will ever produce more than 5 % of the 
world's requirements. In Karlsruhe it is felt 
that this would be no more than 3 % of total 
energy demand. 
51. The most important types of renewable 
energy resources are geothermal, solar, wind, 
wave, tidal, ocean thermal and flow, biomass 
and hydraulic energy. 
52. Geothermal energy is mainly exploitable 
in the volcanic zones of the earth. The total 
installed electrical capacity of geothermal plants 
is some 1,800 megawatts. In the next decade 
an operational plant producing commercial 
quantities may be installed in one of the vol-
canic zones. Such a plant might in the future 
represent a domestic energy potential for deve-
loping countries with few natural resources. 
However, once new methods of deep drilling 
have been developed, this type of energy could 
also become important for industrialised 
countries. 
53. Solar energy is already used in different 
conversion devices to provide heat for warm 
water supply. However, much research and 
development will have to be done on produc-
tion of photovoltaic generators and solar 
mirrors to produce electricity. 
54. Wind energy, as in the case of solar 
radiation, involved the problem of limited 
temporal availability. Windmills, mainly for 
agricultural application, have a long tradition of 
successful operation. Wind generators for elec-
tricity production could help to conserve fossil 
fuels but could not, of course, replace them 
altogether. 
55. Of wave, tidal, ocean thermal and flow 
energy, wave energy is probably the most 
promising1• Tidal energy might be used at 
about only thirty chosen locations throughout 
the world. Unfortunately, there are not many 
sites in Western Europe where this type of 
energy could be exploited; very high tides are 
comparatively rare in Europe. 
56. Biomass production might make a subs-
tantial contribution to renewable energy resour-
ces. It could be used as a substitute for oil by 
producing gasohol. Your Rapporteur wishes 
to point out that the use of maize, wheat, sugar-
cane and sugar-beet as fuel should be seen in 
the light of the need for foodstuffs in third 
world countries where the populations are 
threatened with starvation. 
57. Hydraulic energy is traditionally used in 
suitable topological locations, but .the reserves 
of hydraulic energy in Western Europe are 
rather small as most of the sites for power 
plants are already in use. 
Conclusions 
58. When the Committee entrusted your 
Rapporteur with the task of writing a report on 
energy and security he did not foresee the many 
uncertainties and difficulties with which he 
could have to cope: 
- What will be the outcome of the Iraq-
Iran war? 
- What will be the outcome of the occu-
pation of Afghanistan? 
- What repercussions will there be on 
oil supplies, especially for Western 
Europe? 
- How will the negative outcome of the 
Geneva non-proliferation conference 
influence the exchange of nuclear reac-
tor technology? 
I. See Document 737, Safeguarding Europe's energy 
supplies - new maritime sources of energy, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Jessel.· 
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- What will be the consequences for 
Europe of the OPEC conference held 
in Vienna in September this year? 
- What dangers fa~Ce the developing 
countries as a result of rising oil prices? 
- How is it that the West cannot work 
out a way to share and withstand the 
common danger? 
- Will the price increases and material 
shortages of 1979 force governments 
and people to incrdase the efficiency of 
energy use or will they produce further 
stagnation and unemployment? 
- Can Europe have economic, political 
and military security without energy 
security? 
59. These and many other questions may be 
raised but cannot be answered since there are 
too many uncertainties. 
60. Recommendation 332, adopted by the 
Assembly on 19th June 1979, stated that the 
Assembly was " convinced that safety problems 
in respect of nuclear facHities and radiation, 
and environmental problems associated with 
new sources of energy call for solutions which 
cut across national frontiers", that it regretted 
"that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis 
since 1973 has failed to stimulate further prag-
matic arrangements for more joint action, co-
operation and the definitimp. of a medium- and 
long-term European energy policy", and that it 
was "aware of the enormous sums Western 
Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced 
that in the near future oil will have to be 
replaced by alternative sources of energy". 
61. The Assembly recommended that the 
Council: 
" Promote a major concerted research 
and development effort and launch a co-
ordinated programme in: 
(a) energy-saving technologies to be 
applied in households and industries; 
(b) alternative sources of energy based on 
new technologies such as non-con-
ventional gas, shale oil, liquified coal, 
and the use of solar, wind and water 
energy; 
(c) examining the possibilities of Euro-
pean co-operation in energy matters; 
(d) co-operation on the safety and envi-
ronmental impact of nuclear facilities, 
particularly where they create trans-
frontier dangers; " 
and "Start a detailed and continuing dialogue 
with the oil-producing countries with a 
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view to adjusting production capabilities 
and requirements; ". 
62. The Council of Ministers then replied on 
24th October 1979 that: 
" Current and future problems of energy 
supply represent a big challenge which 
can only be effectively met by a collec-
tive and intensified effort. In view of 
this, the Council attach considerable 
importance to continuous co-ordination 
of the energy policy measures of member 
states. This also applies to research and 
development. 
Particularly of late, member states have 
increased their co-operation in the field 
of energy policy, both within the Euro-
pean Communities and the OECD. This 
relates in particular to energy saving and 
the use of alternative sources of energy. 
The Council also attach great impor-
tance to international co-operation on 
matters concerning security in the 
nuclear field. In all of these fields, 
efforts are being made in the established 
agencies to find common solutions to the 
problems that have emerged as a result of 
recent events. Consequently, the Coun-
cil deem it unnecessary for WEU to take 
initiatives in energy policy matters. 
In view of developments on international 
oil markets in recent months, the Council 
support closer contacts between oil-
consuming and oil-producing countries. 
In this context, they consider discus-
sion of energy matters with the oil-
producing countries to be desirable and 
necessary and welcome steps which can 
be taken towards that end. " 
63. However, the "collective and intensified 
effort " led to results so meagre that at the 
Venice conference of the seven western leaders 
the central issue under discussion again was 
how to ride out the energy crisis in the 1980s 
and, in particular, how to formulate a co-
operative global economic strategy. What cri-
sis planning can cope with a sudden sharp cut 
in world oil production, as may possibly 
happen as a result of the Iraq-Iran war? 
Domestic economic decisions are very closely 
linked with foreign policy and security. The 
more money the West spends on oil, the less it 
is able to spend on its own defence and that of 
vulnerable oil producers. 
64. In the European Community the Council 
of Ministers rejected even an energy research 
budget of 95 million units of account. 
65. The energy problems of the free world 
are interwoven with each other and the world 
at large and your Rapporteur therefore wishes 
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to mention here that during recent visits to the 
United States he was informed of the terms of 
the United States' energy security act which it 
is estimated will help to create at least 70,000 
jobs a year in designing, building, operating and 
supplying plants for synthetic fuels and for the 
production of alcohol and other biomass fuels. 
The act provides $ 1 ,000 million for synthetic 
fuels. Production should be 500,000 barrels of 
crude oil equivalent per day by 1987, increasing 
to two million barrels per day by 1992. 
66. The financial resources available to the 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation for the next twelve 
years would rise to a maximum of $ 88 billion, 
subject to appropriations. The corporation's 
initial authorisation amounts to nearly $ 19 
billion. 
67. The defence production act was amended 
to designate " energy " as a " strategic and criti-
cal material ". 
68. The energy security act deals with syn-
thetic fuels, biomass and alcohol fuels and 
urban waste, energy targets, renewable energy 
initiatives, solar energy and energy conserva-
tion, geothermal energy, studies on acid preci-
pitation and carbon-dioxide, and, finally, the 
strategic petroleum reserve. 
69. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go 
into further detail. The report shows the many 
aspects of energy and security and the possible 
impact of an oil shortage. Convergent energy 
measures have to be adopted and a co-operative 
global energy strategy formulated and imple-
mented, for which the necessary financial 
means must be guaranteed. 
70. Regarding the use of nuclear energy, your 
Rapporteur wishes to stress how seriously the 
consequences of the Three Mile Island (Penn-
sylvania) incident are being examined in the 
United States. 
71. As may be seen in the explanatory 
memorandum, it is clear that no other resource 
can replace oil in the near future. Some thirty 
years or more might be needed to shape an 
energy economy based overwhelmingly on sour-
ces other than oil, and even this goal might be 
unattainable if the European peoples wish to 
sustain a sound rate of economic growth. A 
start should be made here and now and the 
only way to achieve self-sufficiency in energy is 
through the further development and increa-
singly widespread use of fast-breeder reactors to 
cover Europe's electricity requirements. 
72. As far as fusion is concerned your 
Rapporteur learned during the Committee's 
visit to the Max Planck Institute in Garching, 
near Munich, that it might be over-optimistic 
to think in terms of a fusion demonstration 
plant by the end of this century. Nevertheless, 
it was generally considered that research was 
taking the right direction, even if the generation 
of scientists now working in Munich and else-
where would not live to see the final results of 
the new technology. 
73. During the next three or four decades 
Europe will still depend largely on oil, 60% of 
which will have to be imported from the 
Persian Gulf. This area is, of course, exposed 
to geopolitical and internal revolutionary 
dangers, intraregional conflicts and even war. 
74. There is thus a clear and present danger 
that oil imports from the Gulf may be halted. 
This is a matter for urgent consideration by 
the governments of the Western European 
countries, the United States (which imports 
30 % of its oil consumption from the Gulf) and 
Japan (which imports 70% of its oil from that 
area). If the vital oil facilities of the three 
main ports are destroyed, Western Europe, 
Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States, 
will not be able to manage for very long 
without supplies from the Gulf. Will the indi-
vidual European countries then each go their 
own way to work out a special relationship 
with oil-producing countries? Will special 
conditions not lead to political favours, military 
hardware or nuclear information or supplies? 
75. How would this affect our relationship 
with the United States Government? 
76. Medium- and even longer-term prospects 
for the security and availability of oil and for 
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the economic and political stability and security 
of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance 
are indeed sombre. 
77. The western world should draw up 
contingency plans for keeping open all interna-
tional shipping lanes. 
78. The dangers of depending too much on 
eastern bloc countries for trade in supplies of 
energy or raw materials should be assessed in 
terms of the safety and security of West ern 
Europe. 
79. The decisions taken at Venice should not 
remain empty words but be given enough subs-
tance to withstand the thr~ats of the situation 
today. A co-ordinated approach to the OPEC 
countries should be agreed upon and each 
country should renounce individual action and 
any attempt to gain favours by ingratiating itself 
with OPEC countries in any way. 
80. During the CommitJtee's discussion on 
the report it was pointed out that all realistic 
sources of energy should be used to the full. It 
is not a question of using one source or another 
but of making full use of all sources. The 
world population now numbers some 4.5 
billion and this might be d~ubled by the end of 
the century. The developing countries will 
also claim their share of the world's energy 
resources. Therefore the Western European 
countries should agree forthwith to establish a 
firm, common and effective energy policy. 
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APPENDIX 
Declaration issued after the 
summit conference in Venice 
23rd June 1980 
I. Introduction 
1. In this, our first meeting of the 1980s, the 
economic issues that have dominated our 
thoughts are the price and supply of energy and 
the implications for inflation and the level of 
economic activity in our own countries and for 
the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with 
the problems of energy, we cannot cope with 
other problems. 
2. Successive large increases in the price of 
oil, bearing no relation to market conditions 
and culminating in the recent decisions by 
some members of the Organisation of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at Algiers, 
have produced the reality of even higher 
inflation and the imminent threat of severe 
recession and unemployment in the industrial-
ised countries. At the same time they under-
mined and in some cases virtually destroyed the 
prospects for growth in the developing coun-
tries. We believe that these consequences are 
increasingly coming to be appreciated by some 
of the oil-exporting countries. The fact is that 
the industrialised countries of the free world, 
the oil-producing countries, and the non-oil 
developing countries depend upon each other 
for the realisation of their potential for 
economic development and prosperity. Each 
can overcome the obstacles to that develop-
ment, but only if all work together, and with 
the interests of all in mind. 
3. In this spirit we have discussed the main 
problems that confront us in the coming 
decade. We are confident in the ability of our 
democratic societies, based on individual 
freedom and social solidarity, to meet these 
challenges. There are no quick or easy solu-
tions; sustained efforts are needed to achieve a 
better future. 
11. Inflation 
4. The reduction of inflation IS our imme-
diate top pnonty and will benefit all 
nations. Inflation retards growth and harms all 
sectors of our societies. Determined fiscal and 
monetary restraint is required to break infla-
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tionary expectations. Continuing dialogue 
among the social partners is also needed for this 
purpose. We must retain effective internatio-
nal co-ordination to carry out this policy of 
restraint, and also to guard against the threat 
of growing unemployment and world-wide 
recession. 
5. We are also committed to encouraging 
investment and innovation, so as to increase 
productivity, to fostering the movement of 
resources from declining into expanding sectors, 
so as to provide new job opportunities and to 
promoting the most effective use of r~sources 
within and among countries. This will require 
shifting resources from government spending to 
~he private sector and from consumption to 
mv~stment, and avoiding or carefully limiting 
actiOns that shelter particular industries or 
sectors from the rigours of adjustment. Mea-
sures of this kind may be economically and 
politically ?ifficult in the short term, but they 
are essential to sustained non-inflationary 
growth and to increasing employment which is 
our major goal. 
6. In shaping economic policy, we need a 
better understanding of the long-term effects of 
global population growth, industrial expansion 
and economic development generally. A study 
of trends in these areas is in hand and our 
representatives will keep these matters under 
review. 
Ill. Energy 
7. We must break the existing link between 
economic growth and consumption of oil, and 
we :rt;lean to do ~o in ~his decade. This strategy 
r~qmres cons~rvmg ml and substantially increa-
smg productiOn and use of alternative energy 
sources. To this end, maximum reliance 
should be placed on the price mechanism and 
domestic prices for oil should take into ac~ount 
representative world prices. Market forces 
shoul~ be supple_mente?, where appropriate, by 
effective fiscal mcentives and administrative 
measures. Energy investment will contribute 
substantially to economic growth and employ-
ment. 
APPENDIX 
8. We welcome the recent decisions of the 
European Community (EC), the International 
Energy Agency (lEA) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) regarding the need for long-term 
structural changes to reduce oil consumption, 
continuing procedures to monitor progress, the 
possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight 
market conditions, and co-ordination of stock 
policies to mitigate the effect of market 
disruption. We note that the member coun-
tries of the lEA have agreed that their energy 
policies should result in their collective 1985 
net oil imports being substantially less than 
their existing 198 5 group objective, and that 
they will quantify the reduction as part of their 
continuing monitoring efforts. The potential 
for reduction has been estimated by the lEA 
secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at 
around 4 million barrels a day (MBD). 
9. To conserve oil in our countries: 
- we are agreed that no new base-load, 
oil-fired generating capacity should be 
constructed, save in exceptional cir-
cumstances, and that the conversion of 
oil-fired capacity to other fuels should 
be accelerated; 
- we will increase efforts, including fiscal 
incentives where necessary, to accele-
rate the substitution of oil in industry; 
- we will encourage oil-saving invest-
ments in residential and commercial 
buildings, where necessary by financial 
incentives and by establishing insula-
tion standards. We look to the public 
sector to set an example; 
- in transportation, our objective is the 
introduction of increasing fuel-efficient 
vehicles. The demand of consumers 
and competition among manufacturers 
are already leading in this direction. 
We will accelerate this progress, where 
appropriate, by arrangements or stan-
dards for improved automobile fuel 
efficiency, by gasoline pricing and 
taxation decisions, by research and 
development, and by making public 
transport more attractive. 
10. We must rely on fuels other than oil to 
meet the energy needs of future economic 
growth. This will require early, resolute 
and wide-ranging actions. Our potential to 
increase the supply and use of energy sources 
other than oil over the next ten years is 
estimated at the equivalent of 15-20 MBD of 
oil. We intend to make a co-ordinated and 
vigorous effort to realise this potential. To this 
end, we will seek a large increase in the use of 
coal and enhanced use of nuclear power in the 
medium term, and a substantial increase in 
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production of synthetic fuels, in solar energy 
and other sources of renewable energy over the 
longer term. 
11. We shall encourage the exploration and 
development of our indigenous 'hydrocarbon 
resources in order to secure maximum produc-
tion on a long-term basis. 
12. Together we intend to double coal 
production and use by early 1990. We will 
encourage long-term commitments by coal 
producers and consumers. It will be necessary 
to improve infrastructures in both exporting 
and importing countries, as far as is economi-
cally justified, to ensure the required supply 
and use of coal. We look forward to the 
recommendations of the international coal 
industry advisory board. They will be consi-
dered promptly. We are conscious of the envi-
ronmental risk associated with increased coal 
production and combustion. We will do 
everything in our power to ensure that 
increased use of fossil fuels, especially coal, 
does not damage the environment. 
13. We underline the vital contribution of 
nuclear power to a more secure energy 
supply. The role of nuclear energy has to be 
increased if world energy needs are to be 
met. We shall therefore have to expand our 
nuclear generating capacity. We will continue 
to give the highest priority to ensuring the 
health and safety of the public and to perfecting 
methods for dealing with' spent fuels and 
disposal of nuclear waste. We reaffirm the 
importance of ensuring the reliable supply of 
nuclear fuel·and minimising the risk of nuclear 
proliferation. 
14. The studies made by the international 
nuclear fuel cycle evaluation group, launched at 
the London summit in 1977, are a significant 
contribution to the use of nuclear energy. We 
welcome their findings with respect to: increas-
ing predictable supplies; the most effective utili-
sation of uranium sources, including the deve-
lopment of advanced technologies; and the 
minimisation of proliferation risks, including 
support of International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards. We urge all countries to 
take these findings into account when develop-
ing policies and programmes for the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. 
15. We will actively support the recommen-
dations of the international energy technology 
group, proposed at the Tok)!o summit last year, 
for bringing new energy technologies into 
commercial use at the earliest feasible time. 
As far as national programmes are concerned, 
we will by mid-1981 adbpt a two-phased 
approach: first, listing the numbers and types of 
commercial scale plants to be constructed in 
each of our countries by the mid-1980s and, 
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second, indicating quantitative projections for 
expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000, 
as a basis for future actions. As far as inter-
national programmes are concerned, we will 
join others in creating an international team to 
promote collaboration among interested nations 
on specific projects. 
16. A high-level group of representatives of 
our countries and of the EC Commission will 
review periodically the results achieved in these 
fields. 
1 7. Our comprehensive energy strategy is 
designed to meet the requirements of the 
coming decade. We are convinced that it can 
reduce the demand for energy, particularly oil, 
without hampering economic growth. By 
carrying out this strategy we expect that, over 
the coming decade, the ratio between increases 
in collective energy consumption and economic 
growth of our countries will be reduced to 
about 0.6, that the share of oil in our total 
energy demand will be reduced from 53% now 
to about 40 % by 1990, and that our collective 
consumption of oil in 1990 will be significantly 
below present levels so as to permit a balance 
between supply and demand at tolerable prices. 
18. We continue to believe that international 
co-operation in energy is essential. All coun-
tries have a vital interest in a stable equilibrium 
between energy supply and demand. We 
would welcome a constructive dialogue on 
energy and related issues between energy 
producers and consumers in order to improve 
the coherence of their policies. 
IV. Relations with developing countries 
19. We are deeply concerned about the 
impact of the oil price increases on the deve-
loping countries that have to import oil. The 
increase in oil prices in the last two years has 
more than doubled the oil bill of these coun-
tries, which now amounts to over$ 50,000 mil-
lion. This will drive them into ever-increasing 
indebtedness and put at risk the whole basis of 
their economic growth and social progress, 
unless something can be done to help them. 
20. We approach in a positive spirit the 
prospect of global negotiations in the frame-
work of the United Nations and the formu-
lation of a new international development 
strategy. In particular, our object is to co-
operate with the developing countries in energy 
conservation and development, expansion of 
exports, enhancement of human skills, and the 
tackling of underlying food and population 
problems. 
21. A major international effort to help these 
countries increase their energy production is 
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required. We believe that this view is gaining 
ground among oil-exporting countries. We ask 
the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the 
resources and the mechanisms now in place for 
the exploration, development and production of 
conventional and renewable energy sources in 
oil-importing developing countries, to consider 
means, including the possibility of establishing 
a new affiliate or facility, by which it might 
improve and increase its lending programmes 
for energy assistance, and to explore its findings 
with both oil-exporting and industrial countries. 
22. We are deeply conscious that extreme 
poverty and chronic malnutrition affiict hun-
dreds of millions of people of developing 
countries. The first requirement in these 
countries is to improve their ability to feed 
themselves and reduce their dependence on 
food imports. 
We are ready to join with them and the 
international agencies concerned in their 
comprehensive, long-term strategies to increase 
food production, and to help improve national 
as well as international research services. We 
will support and, where appropriate, supple-
ment initiatives of the World Bank and of the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and 
to improve grain storage and food-handling 
facilities. We underline the importance of 
wider membership of the new food aid conven-
tion, so as to secure at least 10 million tons of 
food aid annually, and of an equitable reple-
nishment of the international fund for agricul-
tural development. 
23. High priority should be given to efforts to 
cope with population growth and to existing 
United Nations and other programmes for 
supporting these efforts. 
24. We strongly support the general capital 
increase of the World Bank, increases in the 
funding of the regional development banks, and 
the sixth replenishment of the international 
development association. We would welcome 
an increase in the rate of lending of these 
institutions, within the limits of their present 
replenishments, as needed to fulfil the pro-
grammes described above. It is essential that 
all members, especially the major donors, 
provide their full contributions on the agreed 
schedule. 
25. We welcome the report of the Brandt 
Commission. We shall carefully consider its 
recommendations. 
26. The democratic industrialised countries 
cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and 
other different contributions to developing 
countries: it must be equitably shared by the 
oil-exporting countries and the industrialised 
communist countries. The personal represen-
tatives are instructed to review aid policies and 
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procedures and other contributions to develop-
ing countries and to report back their conclu-
sions to the next summit. 
V. Monetary problems 
2 7. The situation created by large oil-
generated payments imbalances, in particular 
those of oil-importing developing countries, 
requires a combination of determined actions 
by all countries to promote external adjustment 
and effective mechanisms for balance-of-
payments financing. 
We look to the international capital 
market to continue to play the primary role in 
rechannelling the substantial oil-surplus funds 
on the basis of sound lending standards. We 
support the work in progress by our monetary 
authorities and the Bank for international 
settlements designed to improve the supervision 
and security of the international banking 
system. The private banks could usefully 
supplement these efforts. 
28. Private lending will need to be supple-
mented by an expanded role for international 
institutions, especially the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF). We are committed to 
implementing the agreed increase in the IMF 
quotas, and to supporting appropriate borrow-
ing by the fund, if needed to meet financing 
requirements of its members. We encourage 
the IMF to seek ways in which it could, within 
its guidelines on conditionality, make it more 
attractive for countries with financing problems 
to use its resources. In particular, we support 
the IMF's examination of possible ways to 
reduce charges on credits to low-income deve-
loping countries. The IMF and the World 
Bank should work closely together in respond-
ing to these problems. We welcome the Bank's 
innovative lending scheme for structural adjust-
ment. We urge oil-exporting countries to 
increase their direct lending to countries with 
financial problems, thus reducing the strain on 
other recycling mechanisms. 
29. We reaffirm our commitment to stability 
in the foreign exchange markets. We note that 
the European Monetary System (EMS) has 
contributed to this end. We will continue 
close co-operation in exchange market policies 
so as to avoid disorderly exchange rate fluctua-
tions. We will also co-operate with the IMF to 
achieve more effective surveillance. 
We support continuing examination by 
the IMF of arrangements to provide for a more 
balanced evolution of the world reserve system. 
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VI. Trade 
30. We are resolved further to strengthen the 
open world trading system. We will resist 
pressures for protectionist actions, which can 
only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation. 
31. We endorse the positive conclusion of 
the multilateral trade negotiations, and commit 
ourselves to early and effective implementa-
tion. We welcome the participation of some of 
our developing partners in the new non-tariff 
codes and call upon others to participate. We 
also call for the full participation of as many 
countries as possible in strengthening the 
system of the general agreement on tariffs and 
trade. We urge the more advanced of our 
developing partners gradually to open their 
markets over the coming decade. 
32. We reaffirm our determination to avoid a 
harmful export credit race. To this end we 
shall work with the other participants to 
strengthen the international arrangement on · 
export credits, with a view to reaching a 
mutually acceptable solll!tion covering all 
aspects of the arrangement by 1st December 
1980. In particular, we shfill seek to bring its 
terms closer to current market conditions and 
reduce distortions in export competition, 
recognising the differentiated treatment of 
developing countries in the arrangement. 
33. As a further step in strengthening the 
international trading system, we commit our 
governments to work in the United Nations 
toward an agreement to prohibit illicit payment 
to foreign government officials in international 
business transactions. If that effort falters, we 
will seek to conclude an agreement among our 
countries, but open to all, with the same 
objective. 
VII. Conclusions 
34. The economic message from this Venice 
summit is clear. The key to success in resol-
ving the major economic challenges which the 
world faces is to achieve and maintain a 
balance between energy supply and demand at 
reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The 
stability of the world economy, on which the 
prosperity of every individual country relies, 
depends upon all of the countries concerned 
recognising their mutual needs and accepting 
their mutual responsibilities. Those among us 
whose countries are members of the European 
Community intend to make their efforts within 
this framework. We, who represent seven large 
industrialised countries of the free world, are 
ready to tackle our own problems with determi-
nation and to work with others to meet the 
challenges of the coming decade, to our own 
advantage and to the benefit of the whole 
world. 
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Amendment 1 
Energy and security 
AMENDMENT 1 I 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
I. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1980 (Amendment negatived). 
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Signed: Hardy 
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Amendment 2 
Energy and security 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Fliimig 
1st December 1980 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "or thorium". 
1. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1980 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Report of the Bureau 
(submitted by the President of the Assembly) 
1. On 1st June 1980 I informed the Assem-
bly that the present Clerk, Mr. Francis 
Humblet, had asked to be discharged of his 
duties at the end of this year and I publicly 
announced the vacancy of the post on that day. 
2. The Bureau, as required by the Charter 
and Rules of Procedure, meeting on 20th June 
to make the initial arrangements for replacing 
the outgoing Clerk, decided: 
(I) to recommend to the Assembly the 
nomination of a full-time Clerk; 
(2) to follow the procedure adopted in 
1956 when the first Clerk of the 
Assembly was nominated, and to call 
for applications from candidates, at 
the same time informing the Presi-
dents of the parliaments of the WEU 
member countries, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe 
and the European Parliament of the 
vacancy; 
(3) to ask me to examine together with 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of WEU the level of 
the salary to be paid to a full-time 
Clerk. 
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3. At a meeting on 1st September in The 
Hague the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
intimated that it would be difficult to obtain an 
increase in credits to cover the salaries of both 
a full-time Clerk and a full-time Clerk 
Assistant. 
4. At its meeting on 18th September the 
Bureau agreed on the text of the letter to be 
sent to the Presidents of parliaments, indicating 
the salary of the Clerk which has in theory been 
agreed to by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council and the closing date for applications 
from candidates. 
5. On 23rd October the Bureau considered 
the thirteen applications which had been 
received and from which it seemed clear that 
the three candidates from the Office of the 
Clerk had far more experience than those from 
outside the organisation, some of whom had 
never been officials in a parliamentary assembly 
and others of whom had only acted for a short 
time in committee or other parliamentary 
services in their national parliaments. This 
judgment was confirmed by a large majority of 
the Bureau at their meeting on 7th November 
after reports of further enquiries had been 
received. 
6. Indeed, Mr. Moulias, Mr. Huigens and 
Mr. Whyte, the three senior officials from the 
Office of the Clerk, have either acted as Clerk 
Assistant or been responsible for the secretariat 
of two major Assembly committees for fifteen 
to twenty years, thus being fully acquainted 
with the workings of the organisation they have 
served so long. A majority of the Bureau, in 
consideration of Mr. Moulias' experience as 
Clerk Assistant and of his having acted when 
the Clerk was not available, expressed a prefer-
ence for his election as the new Clerk. 
7. Nevertheless, having invited applications 
from qualified persons in member countries, the 
Bureau felt it should also propose two candi-
dates from amongst those applications and add 
Mr. Nehring of Germany and Mr. Rogati of 
Italy to the three candidates from the Office of 
the Clerk (Mr. Moulias, Mr. Huigens and Mr. 
Whyte) for the consideration of the Assembly. 
The Bureau propose therefore that, as required 
by its Charter and Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly should elect a new Clerk, to be 
employed on a full-time basis, from the follow-
ing five candidates (in alphabetical order): 
Mr. Gerhard HUIGENS 
Mr. Georges MouuAs 
Mr. Jiirgen NEHRING 
Mr. Elio RooATI 
Mr. Stuart WHYTE 
8. Appendix I gives details of these candi-
dates as supplied by themselves; Appendix 11 
gives a summary of other candidates who are 
not presented by the Bureau for the Assembly's 
consideration. Appendix Ill gives relevant 
extracts from the Rules of Procedure concern-
ing the appointment of a Clerk. 
9. The appointment of a full-time Clerk, 
together with the loss to the Assembly of Mr. 
Humblet's long and outstanding experience, 
will require a reassessment of the organisation 
of the senior posts in the relatively small Office 
of the Clerk. The Bureau will undertake this 
task in conjunction with the new Clerk as a 
matter of urgency. In particular, there will be 
budgetary problems since it is clear that no 
member country is anxious to increase the 
Assembly's budget beyond a small amount for 
inflation and these questions will have to be 
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resolved with the Council of Ministers. In any 
event, the question arises as to whether a post 
of Assistant Clerk (without other duties) is 
necessary or desirable now that a full-time 
Clerk is to be appointed, although obviously 
arrangements will have to be made for responsi-
bilities to be undertaken in his absence. The 
Bureau are also aware that the Presidential 
Committee has recorded its opinion that a high 
priority for any additional funds that become 
available should be a bigger allocation to poli-
tical groups. 
10. Although the Clerk is required formally 
(Rule 47) to renounce any national considera-
tions in the exercise of his duties and to act 
always as a European civil servant, and indeed 
this tradition has been maintained by all 
members of his staff throughout the Assembly's 
history, the Bureau are conscious that some 
member nations have none I of their nationals 
among the senior appointments in the Office of 
the Clerk. If and when' vacancies occur, 
subject to their having the lilecessary qualifica-
tions and experience, thel Bureau will be 
inclined to give preference to nationals of 
countries not already represented. However, it 
should also be stated that in assessing the 
allocation of senior posts be~ween the nationals 
of member states within WED, regard must also 
be made to the other institutions, namely the 
Office of the Secretary-General, the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
11. I am grateful to all members of the 
Bureau for their participation in these meetings 
and for their assistance to me in reaching these 
recommendations. They are: 
Mr. Francis T ANGHE 
Mr. Rene MART 
Mr. Jean VALLEIX 
Mr. Gerhard R!EDDEMANN 
Mr. Pam CoRNELISSEN 
Mr. Fabio MARAVALLE 
Unfortunately, Mr. TALAMONA of Italy died 
tragically shortly after our first meeting and was 
replaced by Mr. MARAVALLE. 
Fred MULLEY 
President of the Assembly 
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Mr. G.M.A.M. HUIGENS 
Date and place of birth: 
Address: 
Career: 
18.12.1944 
1.9.1944 
1.5.1945-1.9.1948 
1.9.1948 
1.5.1950 
19.11.1952 
Since 1.1.1961 
Languages: 
Mr. George MouuAs 
Nationality: 
Date and place of birth: 
Family status: 
Studies: 
Career: 
July 1956 
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Curriculum vitae of the five candidates 
put forward by the Bureau 
(in alphabetical order) 
21.6.1921, Elst (Netherlands) 
14, avenue de Rueil, 92420 Vaucresson 
Tel: 741.14.50 
Master of Laws, University of Nijmegen 
Volunteer, Royal Netherlands Navy 
Original: French and English 
Naval lieutenant - served in England, India, Ceylon, Netherlands-
Indies 
Civil servant in the Netherlands-Indies, Head of department of justice 
and social affairs, State of Madura 
Secretary, Second Chamber of the States-General* 
Clerk-Assistant, Second Chamber of the States-General 
Assembly of Western European Union: 
- January 1961-December 1963, Committee Secretary (A.4) 
- Since January 1964, Counsellor (A.5) 
Dutch, English, French and German. 
French 
28th March 1928 in Algiers 
Married 
Bachelor's degree in arts 
Original: French and English 
Diploma of higher university studies in philosophy 
Former student of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), 
Diplomatic Section 
- Training course in administration in Germany (one year) 
- Training course in economics with Royal Dutch Shell (three 
months) 
Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
- 1956-1957 French Embassy in London 
(Private secretary to the Ambassador) 
- 19 57-19 58 Economic Affairs Directorate 
Economic Co-operation Department 
(European Economic Community) 
* Officer in the Order of Orange Nassau. 
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June 1965 
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- 1959 Archives and documentation 
- 1959-1961 Nuclear Affairs 
- 1961-1964 French Permanent Mission to the United Nations (New 
York): 
- responsible for the Special Political Committee, the 
Economic and Financial Committee and the Legal 
Committee 
- 1964-1965 Political Directorate (Europe) 
Joined the permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
as Clerk Assistant 
Other activities (1960-1961): 
Languages: 
Honours: 
Dr. Jiirgen NEHRING 
10.3.31 
23.2.1950 
1.4.50-30.10.50 
Winter 50-Summer 51 
Winter 51-beginning 55 
19.3.55 
1.5.55-4.9.59 
4.9.59 
1.10.59-30.9.60 
14.11.60 
28.6.62 
16.7.62 
6.5.64 
1.6.65 
22.12.66 
29.5.69 
3.7.74 
Dr. Elio RoGATI 
Lecturer on international relations at the Ecole Nationale d'Adminis-
tration (ENA) · 
Lecturer at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC): 
- Explanatory lectures on texts; , 
- Introductory lectures on solving economic probletPs (case studies) 
Mother tongue: French 
Very good knowledge of English and German 
Knowledge of Italian 
Chevalier de l'Ordre du Merite 
Original : German 
Born in Berlin 
Son of Joachim Nehring (editor) and his wife Wilhelmine, nee Heyn 
Passed final school-leaving examination at the Salzgitter College 
Commercial training at the firm Salzgitter Maschinen-AG 
Studied political economy at the Brunswick Technical High School (two 
terms) 
Studied law at Goettingen University 
Passed first-level state law examination 
Trainee official (Reforendar) in the Brunswick Higher Provincial Court 
Passed second-level state law examination 
Legal work with a firm of lawyers and solicitors (Binder) in Clausthal-
Zellerfeld, working in the Brunswick and Sichting courts 
Administrator under contract at the Bundestag 
Appointed to the grade of Regierungsassessor (civil servant) 
Transferred to the Federal customs administration 
Appointed to the grade of Regierungsrat, thus becoming a permanent civil 
servant 
Returned to the Bundestag 
Appointed to the grade of Oberregierungsrat 
Appointed to the grade of Regierungsdirektor 
Appointed to the grade of Ministerialrat 
Original: French 
- Counsellor at the Chamber of Deputies 
- Assistant Director of the International and Community Relations Department 
- Secretary (for the Chamber) of the Italian Parliamentary Delegation to the Assemblies of the 
Council of Europe and Western European Union 
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- Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee from 1972 to 1979 (senior adviser to the following 
Committee Chairmen: Mr. Aldo Moro, 1972-73; Mr. Giulio Andreotti, 1973-74; Mr. Carlo Russo, 
1974-79; Mr. Francesco Cossiga, summer 1979) 
- Joined the staff of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1965 after passing a national competitive 
examination for five permanent executive posts 
- Languages: (a) very good knowledge of English (proficiency certificate in English of the University 
of Michigan) 
(b) very good knowledge of French 
(c) some Spanish 
- Professional journalist from 1960 to 1965; subsequently, and to date, pubblicista journalist. From 
1962 to 1964, permanent correspondent of the ltalia press agency in Algiers; from 1963 to 1964, 
also deputy correspondent of RAI 
- Author of the book La seconda rivoluzione algerina, Rome, 1965 
- Born in Rome on 23rd November 1938. Married to an Englishwoman. Two daughters. 
Address: Viale Cortina d'Ampezzo 79, 00135 Rome 
- Italian nationality 
- Degree in law (Degree summa cum laude, University of Rome, March 1961). Tutor: Mr. Antonio 
Segni, former President of the Republic 
- Throughout his career, Dr. Rogati has continued to write on legal matters and parliamentary 
procedure but in particular on international politics for publications such as Relazioni Internazio-
nali, Affari Esteri, La Comunita Internazionale and Europa. 
- Dr. Rogati has visited all the continents for his studies and work and as a tourist 
List of his publications since 1965 
(No account is taken of publications during years as an active journalist) 
1. Libro: " La seconda rivoluzione algerina ", ed. Opere Nuove, Roma 1965 
2. "Relazioni Internazionali ", settimanale di politica estera dello Istituto per gli studi di politica 
internaziona1e (ISPI) di Milano - E' tra i collaboratori e redattori stabili. 
(a) Illavoro italiano all'estero- 2111973 
(b) L'emigrazione italiana stabilizzata- 22/1973 
(c) Emigrazione: smentire Nitti- 23/1973 
(d) La politica estera del Governo Rumor- 29/1973 
(e) L'emigrazione non si affronta con illibro dei sogni- 30/1973 
(!} La tragedia cilena a Montecitorio- 40/1973 
(g) Dissenso nell'URSS e distensione- 40/1973 
(h) L'Italia e il Medio Oriente- 43/1973 
(i) Pacifismo e ragion di Stato- 47/1973 
(/) La politica estera in Parlamento- 5011973 
(m) Relazione di Moro alla Camera- 1011974 
(n) Conferme e notiva nel programma di Rumor- 13/1974 
(o) Diritto interno e diritto comunitario- 14/1974 
(p) lmpegno preciso per la conferenza sull 'emigrazione - 17 I 197 4 
(q) Rinnovata polemica italo-jugoslava sulla zona B- 18/1974 
(r) Emigrazione e politica in America Latina- 2211974 
(s) La politicizzazione degli emigrati- 42/1974 
(t) Continuita in politica estera- 9/1976 
(u) L'emigrazione dopo la conferenza nazionale- 1011975 
(v) La ratifica del trattato nucleare- 18/1975 
(z) Trieste e zona B alla Camera- 42/1975 
(ab) CIA e Lockheed a Montecitorio- 10/1976 
(cd) Cooperazione dell'Italia con il terzo mondo- 32-33/1976 
(ejj La politica estera del Governo Andreotti- 34-35/1976 
(gh) Italia e Libano- 38/1976 
(il) Gli accordi di Osimo- 52/1976 
(mn) Dialogo euro-arabo- 18/1977 
(op) Missione italiana in Egitto- 28/1977 
(qr) ltalia e bomba N - 4311977 
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(st) 
(uv) 
(zz) 
(al) 
(a2) 
(a3) 
(a4) 
(a5) 
(a6) 
(a7) 
(a8) 
(a9) 
(alO) 
(all) 
Parlamentari italiani al Cremlino- 50/1977 
Italia e disarmo alle Nazioni Unite- 22/1978 
L'Italia e la cooperazione allo sviluppo- 42/1978 
Cuba: apertura all'occidente- 7/1979 
Il voto europeo degli emigrati - 15/1979 
Settima legislatura e politica estera - 2211979 
Esperti a convegno per l'energia- 28/1979 
Il dramma indocinese a Montecitorio - 30/1979 
Confronto Egitto-Israele a Strasburgo- 42/1979 
Difesa europea- 44/1979 
Italia e Afghanistan - 3/1980 
Il rapporto Europa-Usa dopo Kabul- 14/1980 
La strategia di Carter- 15/1980 
L'Italia e la crisi mondiale- 20/1980 
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3. RAI - Alcuni numeri della rubrica radiofonica "XXmo secolo ", quindicinale, storico e di 
attualita politica, della durata di 15 minuti - programma nazionale - 1968 
4. Saggio: "L'influenza dei federalisti sulla politica estera italiana ", pubblicato 111el secondo dei tre 
volumi " La politica estera della Repubblica italiana " - ed. di Comunita 1967 
5. "Situazione interna e politica estera dell'Algeria indipendente" nella rivista trimestrale della 
SIOI " La Comunita internazionale " vol. XX, n. 1 
6. Vari pezzi sui Parlamento e la politica internazionale apparsi sui quindicinale ~· L'Europa ". 
7. "I problemi dell'emigrazione e il Parlamento italiano"- "L'Europa" 5/1973 
8. "Legislazione italiana e comunitaria"- "L'Europa" suppl. al4/1973 
9. Rubica fissa "Parlamento" su tutti i numeri della riv. trim. "Affari Sociali internazionali" 
dal 1973 ad oggi 
10. "Pro e contro le Regioni "- riv. "Nord e sud" 111968 
11. "Le Commissioni parlamentari" riv. "Il Politico" dell'Universita di Pavia 1970 
12. "La Camera dei Deputati: struttura e funzioni"- nel vol. "La Camera dei Deputati" 
13. "La politica diplomatica italiana nel 1971 " in " L'ltalia nella politica internazionale " a cura 
dell 'Istituto Affari Internazionali 1972 
14. Servizi telefonici per la RAI dal Brasile (1973) e dall'Etiopia (1974) in occasione di convegni 
sull 'emigrazi one. 
15. "Affari Esteri": "La politica estera in Parlamento" 25/1975 
16. "Brevi considerazioni pratiche sui lavori parlamentari in periodo di crisi di Governo "- riv. " Il 
Politico " U niversita di Pavia 2/197 5 
Mr. Stuart WHYTE 
I. Personal details 
Full name: George Stuart Whyte 
Home address: 7, place de l'Eglise, 78810 Feucherolles, France 
(Tel.: (3) 056.46.21) 
Born: 3rd December 1922 
York, England, of British parents 
Age: 57 
Nationality: British 
Original: French and English 
Civil status: Married; 2 boys, born 1964, 1966, one girl born 1968. 
Wife and children, British nationality, are bilingual English-French, Daughter 
attends the Lycee International, St-Germain-en-Laye, France; two boys at 
Marlborough College, England. 
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11. Education 
State Council Schools - 1929-1934 
Leeds Grammar School- 1934-1941 
Cambridge University (Trinity College), 1947 
Read natural science (physics); Master of Arts 
Sorbonne, Paris, 19 50 
Diplome de Civilisation fran9aise 
Ill. Languages: 
Mother tongue English 
APPENDIX I 
Fluent French speaking and drafting, having worked in French-speaking office for twenty-five 
years 
Normally read routine correspondence in the other languages of WEU countries, but not 
practised to conversational standard 
Innsbruck University vacation course in German, 1951; slight knowledge Russian and Urdu 
(Hindi) 
IV. War Service (between school and university) 
Royal Artillery (Field) voluntary enlistment July 1941 
Demobilised 194 7. Final rank: Captain; 
Served North-West Europe 1944-1945; 
Seconded to Indian Army 1945-1947. 
V. Residence outside United Kingdom 
India 1945-194 7 (Army); 
France 1955-1966; 1968 to date; 
United States 1966-1968. 
VI. Employment record 
I. Schoolmaster (taught physics and mathematics), and temporary posts with Council of 
Europe 1951-1954. 
2. Appointed reviser oftechnical translation in NATO Secretariat 15th August 1955, Grade 11 
(now A2), promoted Grade 12 (A3) on 1st January 1957. 
3. Seconded to Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU, at the request of the Clerk, from 
1st December 1957, as Assistant Secretary to the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and translator, Grade A3 (period of secondment covered period of sabbatical 
leave taken by then Clerk-Assistant). 
4. Returned to NATO on conclusion of secondment 1st November 1958. Posted to Executive 
Secretariat as minute-writer, preparing records of meetings of North Atlantic Council and its 
committees, promoted Grade A3 step 6, on 5th November 1959. 
5. At the request of the Clerk accepted permanent appointment in the Office of the Clerk of 
WEU Assembly on I st March 1960 
Assistant Secretary to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Secretary to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Promoted A4 step 2 on 1st April 1963 
Appointed Counsellor in Charge of Defence Questions, promoted Grade AS on I st July 
1965, responsible chiefly for the secretariat of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments. 
6. At the request of Head of Personnel, UN Secretariat, seconded for two years to UN 
Secretariat as Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Security Council 
Affairs, based in New York and Geneva, 15th May 1966. 
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Duties while with UN Secretariat: 
- Analyse current developments concerning disarmament and related issues, in particular in 
UN organs and in the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament 
(ENDC, as it then was), Geneva. 
- Maintain contact with national delegations to these bodies. 
- Prepare briefs and recommendations for UN officials as required. 
- Assist Rapporteurs of the First Committee of the General Assembly. 
- Assist the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the ENDC (Geneva), providing 
the secretariat to the conference and preparing daily reports and periodical assessments for 
the Secretary General. 
- Supervise junior staff assigned to the foregoing. 
In particular while with UN: 
(i) Edited and supervised the wntmg of first edition of "The United Nations and 
Disarmament " - the official secretariat account of post-war disarmament negotiations; 
(ii) followed the concluding negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty flnd supervised the 
concordance of the treaty text in the official languages other than Englistand Russian. 
7. Returned to post of Counsellor in Charge of Defence Questions in the or;~ce of the Clerk of 
the WEU Assembly on completion of secondment to the UN Secretariat, 15th May 1968 
Present Grade A5, step 10. 
VII. Membership ofinstitutions 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
VIII. Publications 
- (Example of official writing): 
"The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-65 " (Editor-in-charge and part author) 
- Author of pamphlets and studies advocating British membership of Eurol)ean Coal and Steel 
Community; European Defence Community; etc.; published by European Movement, etc. 
1952-1954. 
IX. Demonstrated interest in European affairs 
Hon. Secretary, later Chairman, Cambridge University Federal Union 1947-1949. 
Member national Executive Committee of (United Kingdom) Federal Union (affiliated to 
European Movement) 1951-1954. 
Delegate to international conferences, etc. 
X. Referees 
Superiors in present and previous posts may be contacted. 
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Name 
BERNABEI 
CROCELLA 
DE SUTTER 
HocHBAUM 
]AGER 
KNuTH 
LOHMEIER 
REBHAN 
APPENDIX 11 
APPENDIX 11 
List of candidates not presented by the Bureau to the Assembly 
First name Date of birth 
Giannino 17.4.1945 
Carlo 
Guido 
In go 
Fran<;ois 
Harald 
Martin 
Axel 
13.5.1942 
June 1938 
February 1928 
May 1939 
24.7.1927 
11.8.1941 
February 1934 
Nationality 
Italian 
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Italian 
Belgian 
German 
French 
German 
German 
German 
Present function 
Responsible for international 
affairs in the General Confeder-
ation of Italian Industry 
Research Department m the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies 
Research Department m the 
Belgian Chamber of Deputies 
Representative of the Schleswig-
Holstein Land on Bundestag and 
Bundesrat Standing Committees 
Executive in French industry 
Committee Secretary in the 
Bundestag 
Official in the Sittings Office 
of the Bundestag 
Land parliamentary official 
APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Extracts from the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
concerning the appointment of a Clerk 
Rule 47 
1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on the proposal 
of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its Committees 
with such Secretariat and other assistance as they may require. 
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declar~tion 
before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete 
independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, tha~ he 
will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance 
of his duties from any Government or authority other than the As$em-
bly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his positiqn as 
a European civil servant. 
Rule 35 
The majorities required are the following: 
(c) for appointments, subject to the provisions of Rule 10 above 
[election of the Bureau]: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first 
ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot. 
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Document 858 17th November 1980 
~tate o~ European secur~ 
~ REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur 
~~ ~ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the state of European security 
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submitted by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. The balance of force in perspective 
(a) The flanks 
(b) Soviet perceptions of the balance 
Ill. The cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance 
IV. Defence outside the NATO area 
V. Arms control and disarmament 
(a) Confidence-building measures in the framework of CSCE 
(b) Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions 
(c) Committee on Disarmament 
(d) Chemical weapons ban 
(e) Comprehensive test ban 
VI. Conclusions 
VII. Opinion of the minority. 
APPENDICES : 
I. Balance of defence efforts and forces (other than strategic nuclear forces)-
A global comparison 1960-70-80 
II. Defence effort in NATO countries- A comparison 1959-79 
Ill. Relative United States/USSR standing in the twenty most important basic 
technology areas 
Relative United States/USSR technology level in deployed military 
systems 
IV. Military mana:uvres notified in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 
under the provisions of the Helsinki final act 
A. Allied mana:uvres 
B. Warsaw Pact countries' mana:uvres 
V. Final communique issued after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
26th June 1980 
VI. Final communique issued after the meeting of the Defence Planning 
Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 14th May 1980 
I. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 4 with I absten-
tion. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavalzere (Chair-
man); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Ahrens, Banks (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Bernini, 
Bizet, Bonnel, Boucheny, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards, Fosson 
(Alternate: De P01), Grant. Handlos, de Koster (Alternate: 
Mommersteeg), Lemmrich (Alternate: Kittelmann), Mara-
valle, Meintz, Menard, Onslow, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli (Alter-
nate: Martmo), Peronnet, Schmidt (Alternate: Vohrer), 
Scholten, Tanghe. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
2nd-4th July 1980- Disarmament Committee, Geneva 
H. E. Mr. David Summerhayes, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kil).gdom Delegation; 
Mr. Noel Marshall, Counsellor; · 
H. E. Mr. Fran<;ois de la Gorce, Ambassador, Leader of the French Delegatio~ ; 
H. E. Mr. Richard Fein, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation ; 
H. E. Dr. Marko Vrhunec, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Yugoslavia; Mr. Dragomir 
Djokic, Counsellor ; 
Mr. R. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, and Personal R~!presentative of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations; : 
H. E. Mr. V. L. Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR f Mr. Prokofiev ; 
H. E. Mr. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Alternate Leader of the Swedish Delegation ; 
Mr. Teodor Melescanu, First Secretary of the Delegation of Romania; · 
H. E. The Hon. Charles Floweree, Ambassador, United States Representatil,fe; Senator Charles 
Percy (Republican, Illinois). 
15th and 16th September 1979- NATO Headquarters, Brussels 
Admiral Robert H. Falls, CA CF, Chairman Military Committee; 
H. E. Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General; 
H. E. Sir Clive Rose, KCMG, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom; 
Dr. H.C. Lankes, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; 
H. E. Mr. Claude Arnaud, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France ; 
The Honorable Maynard W. Glitman, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United 
States. 
16th September 1979- SHAPE, Casteau 
General Sir Jack Harman, UK Army, Deputy SACEUR; 
Admiral Luther, German Navy, Deputy SACEUR; 
General William Y. Smith, US Air Force, Chief of Staff; 
Vice Admiral Ugo Masetti, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Armaments and 
Administration ; 
Lt. General L.P.G. Domrose, German Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. 
The Committee as a whole met in Paris on 17th September when it discussed an outline of this 
report. It next met in London on 22nd and 23rd October, and met finally in Rome on 17th Novem-
ber, when it was addressed by Mr. Pasquale Bandiera, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence, 
and adopted the report as a whole. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers 
and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the 
Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the state of European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Observing that the trend of the East-West military balance over the last two decades has been 
towards rough equivalence in many sectors following the disproportionately large Soviet allocation of 
technological resources to defence, but that the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and 
divisions on the central front still exists ; 
(ii) Noting that the nature of the Soviet challenge is no longer exclusively a military threat to 
Europe, but has become a world-wide search for influence, backed by the use of military force, either 
directly or by proxy ; 
(iii) Deploring the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, but noting with satisfaction that 
external powers have refrained from intervening ; 
(iv) Believing that despite the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure the 
cohesion of the Alliance has improved over the last two decades with more joint planning and better 
provision for consultation and collective decision-making, but regretting the weakness of allied 
consultation in particular cases ; 
(v) Noting that so far arms control agreements and current negotiations have not reduced levels of 
forces and armaments, but have contributed to better understanding of the military balance in certain 
areas; 
(vi) Believing that on balance European security has not diminished; that in present circumstances 
it can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; and that to maintain it continued 
and equal emphasis must be placed on allocating adequate resources to defence, on the one hand, and 
on pursuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament on the other, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge member governments to impress on the United States, at the highest level, the need for 
continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues and the overriding need for prior 
consultation in the North Atlantic Council ; 
2. Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution to allied defence, with 
particular provisions to enable certain United States resources to be devoted to defensive operations 
outside the Atlantic area from time to time ; 
3. Urge member governments to call in the North Atlantic Council for no less emphasis to be 
placed on arms control and disarmament negotiations with a view to improving security and reducing . 
forces and armaments. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The WEU Assembly was created only in 
the 19 54 modification of the original Brussels 
Treaty, which was then six years old. The 
Assembly met for the first time in July 1955, 
within two months of the entry into force of the 
modifying protocol, and moved quickly to 
examine European defence and security. Its 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments was established in October and 
the following year the first report on the state of 
European defence' was submitted to the Assem-
bly. The Committee there recognised that, as 
the Council has reported to the Assembly, the 
mutual defence functions briefly exercised 
under the Brussels Treaty in 1949 had been 
transferred to NATO when its military struc-
ture had been established in 1950, and this 
transfer had been confirmed in Article IV of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The Committee 
nevertheless stressed that the mutual defence 
obligations of Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty retained their full value, and asserted the 
right of the Assembly to discuss all aspects of 
European defence and security, whether 
exercised directly by member governments or, 
collectively, through NATO. The Council 
subsequently recognised this right of the 
Assembly and, although the Assembly has at 
times challenged its effectiveness, a dialogue 
with the Council on all aspects of defence, in 
particular in the form of Assembly recommen-
dations and the Council's replies thereto, and 
the Council's observations in its annual report, 
has been maintained since 1957. 
1.2. The Committee's first report on the state 
of European defence, having asserted the 
Assembly's right to discuss these matters, 
addressed itself to European defence and 
nuclear warfare, to the progress of West 
German rearmament, and to the maintenance 
of British forces on the mainland of Europe. 
The following year, the Committee produced its 
first report to be entitled state of European 
security2 in which it reported on its visit to 
Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe 
(then in Fontainebleau), and dealt broadly with 
the problems of defence on the central front. 
Thereafter, it produced regular reports on the 
1. Document 28, 3rd October 1956, Rapporteur 
Mr. Fens. 
2. Document 38, 27th March 1957, Rapporteur Mr. 
Fens. 
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state of European security, which dealt broadly 
with aspects of European defence other than 
those which the Committee covered in more 
detail in .specific reports such as those on 
the joint production of armaments or on arms 
control. 
1.3. Since 1967, however, the more broad-
ranging reports on European security have been 
the exception, while the more specific reports 
have been more numerous. On this occasion, 
however, the Committee returns to its earlier 
practice. In another report' the Committee 
deals with the nuclear forces of two member 
countries, the question of ~ong-range theatre 
nuclear forces and associated arms control 
negotiations. In the present report, the 
Committee looks at other aspects of European 
security, in particular at the trends which can 
be perceived over the more than twenty years 
which have now elapsed since the Committee's 
first reports were produced. 
11. The balance of force in perspective 
2.1. The table, at Appendix 11, giving a global 
comparison for the years 1960-70-80 of the 
balance of defence efforts and forces, other than 
strategic forces2, has been compiled largely from 
data given in successive annual editions of the 
IISS military balance, the first of which 
appeared in 1959, supplemented where neces-
sary from other sources. One feature of this 
comparison is that considerably more detailed 
information is available for recent years 
compared with 1960, both as far as allied forces 
are concerned as Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
forces. 
2.2. Two general reservations need to be 
borne in mind when studying the bare figures. 
The estimates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces 
and defence effort are contemporary estimates ; 
if past estimates of Warsaw Pact force levels 
have subsequently been scaled down by western 
intelligence, this fact will not be revealed in the 
figures ; in general it is to be anticipated that 
the more recent figures will be more relia-
ble. Secondly, the very broad global figures for 
1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Rap-
porteur Mr. Mommersteeg, Document 859. 
2. Strategic forces are discussed in another report from 
the Committee: SALT and the British and French nuclear 
forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mommersteeg, Document 859. 
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military hardware give no indication at all of 
the considerable changes in capability of 
different categories of equipment which 
are lumped together in the table under general 
headings. Thus the greater bulk of the 16,000 
combat aircraft shown for the Warsaw Pact in 
1960 were air defence fighters which could not 
have been used in offensive strikes against allied 
forces on the central front. A larger propor-
tion of the 7,000 odd shown in 1980 have a 
ground support or tactical bombing role. Simi-
larly, of the 260 NATO attack submarines in 
1960 only some 6 were nuclear-propelled, 
whereas the 221 shown in 1980 include 85 
which are nuclear-propelled. 
2.3. With these reservations in mind, some 
broad conclusions can be drawn about the trend 
in the forces and defence spending of the two 
alliances. Over the last twenty years, NATO 
countries have consistently outspent the War-
saw Pact on defence, but the margin of 
advantage has drastically shrunk. Too much 
importance should not perhaps be attached to 
the figures for 1960 showing NATO outspen-
ding the Warsaw Pact by a factor of more than 
3, because the basis of the 1960 figure for the 
Soviet defence budget is presumably based only 
on an estimated realistic rate of exchange for 
the rouble. In subsequent years CIA estima-
tes of the dollar cost of the Soviet defence effort 
have been available, and on this basis NATO 
countries spent 70% more than the Warsaw 
Pact on defence in 1970 but only 44% more in 
1979 - the latest year for which figures are 
available. While the Soviet Union has been 
devoting an increasing proportion of its GNP to 
defence, current estimates ranging between 11 
and 13 or even 14 %, that of its Warsaw Pact 
allies has been declining as has the proportion 
spent by all NATO countries. 
2.4. An intelligence review of Soviet defence 
expenditure which appears to have been 
released to the press in London in July! claims 
a 3 5 % increase in real terms in Soviet 
defence expenditure during the 1970s. This 
corresponds to a mean annual increase through-
out the 1970s of 3.05 %, but the estimate claims 
the increase to have been higher - 3.7% 
a year in the first part of the decade up to 1978 
after which it declined on the completion of ~ 
number of major equipment programmes. In 
contrast, the undertaking of the NATO 
countries to achieve a 3 % real increase in their 
defence expenditure each year only got under 
way in 1979, and reports in September 1980 
suggest that Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom will fail to meet that 
increase in 1980. France and Luxembourg 
I. The Times, 9th July 1980. 
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appear to be the only European countries 
which plan to meet the goal. 
2.5. As far as the regional balance on the 
central front is concerned, the crude figures for 
total numbers of battle tanks show the situation 
to have been stationary or to have evolved 
unfavourably to NATO over the last ten years, 
while those for combat aircraft show an 
essentially static situation as the following table, 
computed from three different sources, shows. 
These figures cannot, however, be taken to 
denote a deterioration in NA TO's defensive 
capability, because over the same decade the 
tank has ceased to be the single most effective 
anti-tank weapon with the entry into service 
with NATO forces on the central front of 
second generation anti-tank missiles. Figures 
for these deployments are not available, but 
NATO is reported to have superiority over the 
Soviet Union in this field in both numbers and 
capabilities. Nevertheless, the superior 
concentration of tanks and of divisions on the 
central front is a disturbing and unaltered 
feature over the last twenty years. 
2.6. As far as the combat aircraft are concer-
ned, the roughly static ratios conceal an 
increase in the proportion of Warsaw Pact 
fighter-bomber and ground-support aircraft 
compared with purely air defence aircraft, but 
again the effective combat radius of most 
NATO ground-support and fighter-bomber 
aircraft is greater than that of Warsaw Pact 
aircraft. 
Central front regional balance - ratios 
1970 
German Source IISS1 WP 
Tanks 1 : 2.5 1 : 2.5 
Combat 
aircraft 1 : 1.8 1 : 1.3 
I. Central and northern front. 
WP =Defence white paper. 
1979 
United 
Kingdom 
WP 
1 : 2.8 
1 : 2.2 
IISS1 
1 : 2.9 
1 : 1.8 
2.7. The defence efforts of the NATO 
countries in money and men over the last 
twenty years is compared in the table 
at Appendix 11. The salient conclusion from 
this table is the proportionate increase in the 
share of the total NATO defence burden that is 
borne by the European countries -from 21.7 % 
of total defence expenditure in 19 59, the share 
of the European NATO countries rose to 
43.4% in 1979, while the United States share 
declined correspondingly. The index of defence 
expenditure at constant prices (1970 = 100) for 
European NATO countries has risen stead-
ily from 79.5 in 1960 to 98.8 in 1969 to 129.6 
in 1979. Corresponding United States expendi-
ture increased proportionately less from 76.5 in 
1960 to 81.5 in 1979, having peaked at 110.8 
in 1969, corresponding to the period of the 
Vietnam war. In terms of total manpower in 
the armed forces, on the other hand, the share 
of the European NATO countries has remained 
almost exactly constant at 56.5% in 1959 and 
56.9% in 1979, having dipped in 1969 
to only 45.2 %, corresponding to the peak in 
United States military manpower of 3.45 
millions in 1969. Total NATO manpower has 
nevertheless declined over the twenty years 
from 5.9 million to 4.9 million, while Soviet 
manpower declined only from 3.9 million to 
3. 7 million over the same period. 
2.8. Thus, the last twenty years have seen a 
significant, absolute and relative increase in the 
material resources devoted by the European 
countries to the total NATO defence effort, 
while their manpower contribution has decli-
ned in absolute, but not in relative terms. 
Despite the reduction in total United States 
armed forces from 3.5 to 2.0 million over the 
last ten years, the number of United 
States army personnel stationed in Europe over 
the same time has remained constant at about 
206,000, but reorganisation to reduce the 
administrative tail has increased the number of 
United States combat formations in Europe by 
two brigades over the same time. Mansfield 
resolutions in the United States Senate for the 
reduction of United States forces in Europe 
have disappeared with the Vietnam war, 
but with increasing insecurity in the area of the 
Persian Gulf the trend now is for measures to 
release from Europe certain United States 
mobility forces - especially naval units. 
2.9. The most striking change in the relation-
ship between NATO and Soviet forces over the 
last twenty years has undoubtedly been the 
emergence of the Soviet navy as an 
ocean-going force capable of helping to exert 
Soviet influence in any part of the world. As 
the detailed analysis in the Committee's 
previous report showed however1, the superio-
rity of NATO naval forces with good sea-
keeping capabilities is not in doubt. In this 
area, European NATO countries contribute 
more than half of the destroyers, ocean-
going escorts, and attack submarines in the 
NATO navies, but relatively few cruisers or 
aircraft carriers compare with the United States. 
I. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel 
commands, Document 837, 29th April 1980, Rapporteur 
Mr. Ahrens - see explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
2.1. et seq. and Appendices I and 11 thereto. 
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2.1 0. On 3rd June 1980, the Assembly adopted 
Recommendation 348 on the report of the 
Committee, which recommFnded that the 
Council cancel all restrictions on German naval 
shipbuilding imposed by the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. On 21st July, the Council duly 
took that decision ; Germany would now be 
free to construct for example ocean-going 
escorts over and above thej eight originally 
authorised by the Council: in 1961. The 
Assembly, in the same recommendation, also 
called for the assignment of German naval 
forces to SACLANT with the aim of "ma-
king the best use of all available allied forces 
for the common defence". The Committee 
welcomes the decision of the 1 Security Council 
of the Federal Republic in Nne to remove the 
previous restriction on Geman naval opera-
tions . to 24 hours' steami?g 1 from the ~altic, 
enabhng German naval umts to operate m the 
Norwegian Sea and mid-Atlan~ic. 
I 
(a) Theflanks, 
2.11. This report does not deal in any detail 
with the situation on the flanks. The northern 
flank has been very recently reviewed by the 
Committee1 and the situation in the Mediterra-
nean will be reported on to the next part-
session of the Assembly. In reviewing the 
trend of the military balance over the last 
twenty years, however, it has to be noted that 
the defensive capability of Norway has improv-
ed in relative terms despite the very large Soviet 
strategic installations in the Kola peninsula, 
and the Committee welcomes in particular 
arrangements for reinforcing Norway, including 
the prepositioning of certain equipment for use 
by Netherlands, United Kingdom and United 
States marines. On the southern flank, while 
the varying state of relations between Greece 
and Turkey has been a long-term factor of 
uncertainty and weakness, the Committee 
strongly welcomes the decision taken by Greece 
in October 1980 to fully rejoin the integrated 
military structure of NATO and notes with 
satisfaction that this decision was supported by 
a vote in the Greek parliament on 24th October 
1980 of 183 votes to 20 against, although with 
94 members of the Pasok opposition party 
absenting themselves from the house. 
2.12. The question of Spanish membership of 
NATO has been referred to by governmental 
spokesmen of that country on a number of 
occasions and may be pursued more actively 
later in 1981 after the conclusion of the Madrid 
conference on CSCE. 
I. Document 837. 
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(b) Soviet perceptions of the balance 
2.13. The Committee has drawn attention on 
one occasion1 to likely Soviet perceptions of 
trends in the military balance. Over the last 
twenty years, the Soviet armed forces have 
much on which they can congratulate them-
selves. On two significant occasions in the 
past, the Soviet Union has surprised the West at 
the speed with which it has developed defence-
related technology. The first Soviet nuclear 
explosion in August 1949 came far sooner than 
the United States anticipated while the first 
Sputnik in October 19 57 beat the United States 
to earth orbit capability by four months. From 
a position of naval humiliation following the 
Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when the Soviet 
navy had no ocean-going naval forces capable 
of protecting convoys to Cuba, it now has ships 
capable of showing the Soviet flag in any part 
of the world. From a position of overwhelm-
ing United States superiority in strategic 
nuclear weapons systems in the mid-1960s, the 
Soviet Union has today reached broad parity, 
codified in the SALT agreements. But if the 
position of strategic nuclear stalemate has been 
reached, the Soviet naval capability is still very 
far short of a war-fighting capability at any dis-
tance from Soviet territory. There is no fixed-
wing aircraft (other than VTOL) capability 
from ships and the Soviet amphibious forces 
number 12,000 compared with 184,000 of the 
United States Marine Corps alone without 
counting the marines of other allied countries. 
Worldwide military bases and facilities avail-
able to the Soviet Union can still not compare 
with those available to the United States. Al-
though the relative position of the Soviet Union 
has improved with bases ranging from Vietnam 
to the Red Sea, it has at the same time lost its 
secure air and naval. bases in Egypt. In quali-
tative terms, United States assessments, basic 
defence technology and weapons systems in ser-
vice still favour NATO as the tables from the 
United States Department of Defence report in 
Appendix Ill show. 
2.14. By far the most significant change in the 
Soviet defence position since the early 1960s 
has been the quality of its relationship with the 
NATO countries on the one hand and China 
on the other. From being a nominal ally in 
1960, China has become an antagonistic power 
enjoying steadily-improving relations with the 
NATO countries and having concluded a recent 
friendship treaty with Japan, the long-term 
consequences of which must appear very omi-
nous to the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
the Japanese defence capability is improving 
somewhat and the country is under some pres-
I. See Appendix I to Document 809, 22nd May 1979, 
The balance of force, Rapporteur Mr. Pawelczyk. 
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sure from the United States to do much more 
in the field of defence. Both China and Japan 
have territorial disputes with the Soviet Union. 
2.15. Despite the invasion of Afghanistan, and 
the vagaries of the United States elections, 
however, the Soviet Union's relationship with 
the United States and NATO countries as a 
whole is more stable than in 1960 ; it is based 
on a number of agreements including the 
CSCE, a number of arms control agreements, 
and more extensive economic relations. 
Ill. The cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance 
3 .1. It has not proved easy, on the basis of the 
interviews conducted by your Rapporteur, to 
describe the development of collective defence 
planning in NATO - which, in accordance with 
the 19 50 decision of the Council of the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation, and Article IV of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, is the military struc-
ture on which WEU relies for collective defence 
planning. The individual memory of most 
persons in positions of authority within the 
Alliance today who have a detailed understand-
ing of the present situation in NATO does not 
extend to the period twenty or even ten years 
ago. It is, however, instructive to present a 
brief comparison on the basis of the historical 
record. 
3.2. Perhaps the most tangible and objective 
aspect of common defence arrangements is the 
NATO common infrastructure programme, 
which by 1970 had provided 220 airfields ; a 
fuel supply system with 10,000 km of pipeline 
and 2 million cubic metres of storage ; a signals 
network providing over 50,000 km of radio and 
land links ; the radar network known as the 
NATO air defence ground environment ; anti-
aircraft missile sites, storage sites for nuclear 
warheads, underground war headquarters, naval 
facilities and radio navigational aids to a total 
cost of nearly £ 3.5 billion spread over twenty 
years. 
3.3. The basic infrastructure once in place, 
the last decade has seen some change in orien-
tation of programmes towards the integrated 
communications system, which brings all 
communications links under one authority 
embracing satellite, radio and landlines, integra-
ted into a single, automatically switched system 
providing rapid and secure communications 
both for political consultation between the 
North Atlantic Council and national capitals 
and between military commanders. Following 
the lessons learnt in the 1967 Middle East 
conflict, aircraft shelters have been provided on 
most NATO airfields and the infrastructure 
required for the reception of reinforcements 
from the United States has been improved. 
The present needs in the common infrastruc-
ture field are for an improved assessment of 
command and control requirements in the age 
of the microchip - an increasingly complex 
field which holds the danger of drowning 
commanders with too much information -
speeding up the completion of the NATO inte-
grated communication system and better arran-
gements for prepositioning of equipment in 
Europe for reinforcement of forces, chiefly from 
the United States. The basic infrastructure 
provided in the earlier years is in permanent 
need of maintenance and in some cases up-
grading. 
3.4. In the field of joint planning and joint 
training, there has been outstanding progress in 
making NATO forces more cohesive and more 
responsive to jointly agreed NATO strategy. 
With the move to Brussels, which followed the 
1966 French decision to withdraw from the 
integrated military structure of the Alliance, an 
operations room was established in NATO 
headquarters making it possible to inject poli-
tical consultation directly into the conduct of 
NATO military exercises, with the participa-
tion of the national delegations to NATO. 
Over the last five years, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in NATO as opposed to purely 
national military exercises. It is interesting to 
note from the table at Appendix IV, showing 
notifications of exercises under the CSCE final 
act, that over the last six years there have been 
31 NATO exercises involving troops from seve-
ral NATO countries compared with only six 
such exercises by Warsaw Pact countries. 
Most Warsaw Pact exercises involve Soviet for-
ces only. This difference in the pattern of 
exercises by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
of course reflects also the difference in the 
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balance of contribution within the two alliances 
- whereas the Warsaw Pact is essentially a 
Soviet military institution with smaller, some-
times nominal, contributions· from the other 
Warsaw Pact countries, the majority of conven-
tional NATO defence resources within Europe 
are those provided by the European countries 
themselves. 
3.5. Another trend of the last twelve years has 
been a certain Europeanisation of the NATO 
military structure coinciding with the move to 
Brussels. Hitherto, overall Jllilitary direction 
of NATO had been in the hands of the Stand-
ing Group, comprising representatives of the 
chiefs of staff of France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, acting as a steering body 
for the Military Committee on which all mem-
ber countries were represented through their 
chiefs of staff. With the abolition of the Stand-
ing Group which, together with the Military 
Committee, had been housed in the Pentagon 
in Washington, the Military: Committee was 
moved to the same building as the political 
headquarters of NATO in Brussels. The 
Chairman of the Military Committee, the senior 
officer in the NATO military establishment, is 
usually a European, the post having rotated 
over the last ten years among Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada. 
3.6. The decision of France in 1966 to with-
draw from the integrated military structure of 
the Alliance and to require the removal of 
allied military installations from French terri-
tory was regretted by the Committee at the 
time. In a review of the evolution of NATO 
over the last ten years, it is appropriate to des-
cribe briefly the present status of France's rela-
tions with NATO. France did not of course 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
(numbers of multinational exercises compared) 
Major exercises (over 25,000 men, Minor exercises (fewer than 25,000 men, 
notification compulsory) notification optional) 
Year Multinational Single country Multinational Single country 
NATO WP NATO WP NATO WP NATO WP 
1975 2 - 0 - 2 - 1 -
1976 3 1 0 2 4 1 0 1 
1977 2 0 0 2 2 - 3 -
1978 4 0 0 3 2 - 0 -
1979 3 1 0 2 2 1 2 1 
1980 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 
Total 1975-80 17 3 0 10 14 3 7 2 
Source: Notifications of military manreuvres under the Helsinki final act (Appendix IV). 
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withdraw from NATO as such ; since 1966, it 
has retained its permanent representative on the 
North Atlantic Council and continued to parti-
cipate in consultation at that level. Discus-
sions involving the integrated military structure 
have since that date been conducted by the 
other NATO allies within the Defence Planning 
Committee, which, like the Council, can meet 
at ministerial or permanent representative 
level and is in fact quite simply the North 
Atlantic Council in the absence of the French 
representative. French nationals have conti-
nued to serve, chiefly in political and economic 
posts, in the NATO international staff, and in 
July 1980 a French national was appointed 
Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Aff-
airs - the most senior appointment to be held 
by France since 1966. 
3.7. France has continued to participate in 
NATO arrangements for the joint production of 
armaments, remaining a full member of the 
NATO Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) and the NATO Industrial 
Advisory Group (NIAG), while the NATO 
Hawk Management Office, concerned with the 
joint production of the surface-to-air missile, 
continues to be located near Paris. France still 
participates in certain NATO infrastructure 
projects, including the central pipeline system 
which runs across French territory and is opera-
ted by the NATO Central European Operating 
Agency in Versailles. The French air defence 
warning network has remained linked with the 
NATO NADGE, and France has recently 
announced its participation in the NATO inte-
grated communications system, but not for pur-
poses of the military command network. 
While French officers were withdrawn from all 
NATO integrated military headquarters in 
1966, France has since then maintained liaison 
officers at all of them so that some day to day 
contact is still maintained. 
3.8. French participation in NATO has in 
fact been described as a la carte - a fair descrip-
tion which depends on the acceptance of an 
integrated military structure by the other allies 
to provide the carte. While the Committee 
continues to regret the special position of 
France within NATO, which a majority of the 
Committee believes weakens the Alliance as a 
whole, the Committee makes no specific recom-
mendation in this connection as the French 
position is well understood and is supported by 
most French political parties. French defence 
strategy as described in the si_gnificant speeches 
to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense 
Nationale by President Giscard d'Estaing on 1st 
June 1976 and by the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Barre, on 11th September 1980, does not 
appear to diverge greatly from that of NATO, 
despite the rejection of the concept of inte-
grated defence. 
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3.9. If the overall picture that emerges is 
one of a more cohesive and better integrated 
Alliance than existed ten or fifteen years ago, 
this picture is essentially true of the European 
NATO countries around the central front and 
Italy, for whom the central focus of national 
defence planning and policy has become the 
national contribution to NATO. In peacetime, 
forces remain national, under purely national 
control (except for air defence, for which 
NATO commanders assume certain responsibi-
lities in peacetime). The role of NATO mili-
tary headquarters in peacetime is one of 
planning and the conduct of exercises, although 
there has been improvement in the earlier 
release of forces to NATO command at various 
stages of alert. On the south-eastern flank the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey over the 
last six years has been a major source of 
weakness and the practical implications of the 
decision now announced by Greece to return to 
the integrated military structure of the Alliance 
remain to be seen. The Committee intends to 
rep<?rt on this area to the first part of the next 
sesswn. 
IV. Defence outside the NATO area 
4.1. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty -
the mutual defence obligation - provides that 
" The parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North Ame-
rica shall be considered an attack against them 
all... ". Article VI prescribes the geographical 
limits to which that undertaking applies: 
" An armed attack on one or more of the 
parties is deemed to include an armed 
attack on the territory of any of the par-
ties in Europe or North America, ... on 
the occupation forces of any party in 
Europe, on the islands under the jurisdic-
tion of any party in the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on 
any of the vessels or aircraft in this area 
of any of the parties. " 
It is clear from collective defence and command 
arrangements subsequently made by NATO 
that the allies deem the areas covered by the 
treaty to include the Mediterranean and Black 
Seas and the Norwegian Sea as far east as the 
Norwegian-Soviet frontier. 
4.2. As the Committee has pointed out, Arti-
cle VI does not specifically preclude NATO 
staffs from planning defence arrangements 
covering areas further afield, but the Committee 
understands that NA TCLcomtn.ruld-.ers, acting in 
their NATO capacity, do not do so. The issue 
is politically sensitive, and proposals for exam-
ple for NATO defence planning to include 
contingency arrangements for areas where the 
vital interests of members of the Alliance may 
well be held to be threatened - such as the 
Middle East, the Persian Gulf or the South 
Atlantic - would be politically divisive because 
divergent views on the issue are held by diffe-
rent member countries. However, for the last 
ten or fifteen years, political consultation with-
in the North Atlantic Council has become more 
firmly established and much wider ranging, and 
in the Ottawa declaration of 1974 all NATO 
countries declared that they were: 
" firmly resolved to keep each other fully 
informed and to strengthen the practice 
of frank and timely consultations by all 
means which may be appropriate on mat-
ters relating to their common interests as 
members of the Alliance, bearing in mind 
that these interests can be affected by 
events in other areas of the world. " 
This arrangement is acepted by all NATO 
countries, including France, and indeed in reply 
to a question on 30th July, the French Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Fran<;ois-Poncet, specifically reaf-
firmed that: 
" This definition of Atlantic consultations 
given in 1974 has lost none of its value. 
We are therefore not opposed to the 
appropriate bodies of the Alliance being 
the framework for exchanges of views on 
problems outside the areas of its responsi-
bility, provided such exchanges of views 
are justified by exceptional events which 
themselves have repercussions on the 
tasks incumbent on the Alliance. " 
4.3. The invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union on Christmas Eve 1979 found 
NATO more or less closed for the Christmas 
holidays. Consultation within the North 
Atlantic Council at permanent level may well 
have taken a day or two longer to get underway 
than would normally have been the case. Cer-
tainly, the pressures of American political life, 
especially in an election year, with a built-in 
expectation of immediate presidential reaction, 
preferably on television, gave rise in January to 
an appearance of allied disunity over the appro-
priate response, with the media concentrating 
on the United States proposal for a boycott of 
the Olympic Games, but also with underlying 
disagreement on appropriate economic sanc-
tions if any. 
4.4. Later in January, in his State of the 
Union message on 23rd January 1980, Presi-
dent Carter made clear the " stiff economic 
penalties" the United States was imposing on 
the Soviet Union as a result of the invasion, 
and the supporting action it was requesting 
from its allies: 
" I will not issue any permits for Soviet 
ships to fish in the coastal waters of the 
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United States. I have cut Soviet access 
to high technology equipment and to 
agricultural products. I have limited 
other commerce with the Soviet Union 
and have asked our allies and friends to 
join with us in restraining their own trade 
with the Soviets and not to replace our 
own embargoed items. I have notified 
the Olympic Committee that with Soviet 
invading forces in Afghanistan, neither 
the American people nor I will support 
sending an Olympic team to Moscow." 
He then defined the strategic importance of the 
region and called for collective action to meet 
the new threat: 
" The region now threatened by Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic 
importance: it contains • more than two-
thirds of the world's expprtable oil. The 
Soviet effort to dominat~ Afghanistan has 
brought Soviet military I forces to within 
300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close 
to the Strait of Hormliz - a waterway 
through which much of the free world's 
oil must flow. The $oviet Union is 
attempting to consolidate a strategic posi-
tion that poses a grave threat to the free 
movement of Middle East oil. 
This situation... demands collective 
efforts to meet this new threat to security 
in the Persian Gulf and South-West 
Asia. It demands the participation of 
those who rely on oil from the Middle 
East and are concerned with global peace 
and stability. And it demands consulta-
tion and close co-operation with coun-
tries in the area which might be 
threatened. " 
and finally gave an unequivocal undertaking to 
use military force if necessary in the Persian 
Gulf: 
" Let our position be absolutely clear: an 
attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital inte-
rests of the United Stat~s. And such an 
assault will be repelled by use of any 
means necessary, including military 
force." 
4.5. See in perspective ten months after the 
event, allied disagreement on the Olympic boy-
cott can be dismissed as trivial, the apparent 
disarray being the consequence of too hasty 
public statements. The Committee's visit to 
the United States from 25th February to 5th 
March, as always most informative thanks to 
the unfailing openness and co-operation of the 
United States authorities, was noteworthy on 
this occasion for the defensive attitude of State 
Department officials briefing the Committee at 
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a time when the press was dwelling on the lack 
of allied consultation. Allied solidarity cannot 
be obtained without consultation, and consulta-
tion must always be paid for with time, 
precluding immediate public reaction to events. 
4.6. By the time of the June ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council, there 
had been time for more effective consultation, 
and the final communique of the meeting 
contained an unequivocal condemnation of the 
Soviet invasion': 
" Ministers... regard as unacceptable this 
armed intervention and the attempt to 
crush the national resistance of the 
Afghan people by massive military 
force... Ministers noted that the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan carried with it 
very serious implications for the general 
strategic situation... While recognising 
that the security of the region is primarily 
the concern of the countries there, Minis-
ters welcomed the fact that members of 
the Alliance are, by reason of their rela-
tions with those countries, in a position to 
make a contribution to peace and stabi-
lity in the region. Ministers agreed that 
the international crisis caused by the 
Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, 
constant and concerted response on the 
part of the allies ... " 
4. 7. More specific defence measures called for 
by the invasion of Afghanistan had earlier been 
spelled out by the ministerial meeting of the 
Defence Planning Committee (in which France 
does not participate) at its meeting on 13th and 
14th May 19802: 
" 5. Ministers further agreed that the 
stability of regions outside the NATO 
boundaries, particularly in the South-
West Asia area, and the secure supply of 
essential commodities from this area are 
of crucial importance. Therefore the 
current situation has serious implications 
for the security of member countries ... 
6. It is in the interests of members of 
the Alliance that countries which are in a 
position to do so should use their best 
efforts to help achieve peace and stability 
in South-West Asia, taking into consider-
ation the interests of the regional coun-
tries and the value of their political 
co-operation. The burden, particularly 
insofar as defence measures are concer-
ned, falls largely upon the United States, 
which has already taken steps to enhance 
its effectiveness. Ministers noted that 
this commitment, which in certain 
I. Full text of paragraph 3 of the communique at Appen-
dix V (Rapporteur's italics). 
2. Text at Appendix VI. 
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circumstances might substantially in-
crease, could place additional responsibi-
lities on all allies for maintaining levels 
and standards of forces necessary for 
defence and deterrence in the NATO 
area. Ministers agreed on the need for 
ensuring that at the same time as the 
United States carries out the efforts to 
strengthen defence capabilities for South-
West Asia described above, allied capabi-
lities to deter aggression and to defend 
NATO Europe are also maintained and 
strengthened. 
... They noted fhat the United States has 
no plans to withdraw any United States 
forces permanently stationed in Europe 
for use in South-West Asia. Ministers of 
other countries agreed to do their utmost 
to meet additional burdens for NATO 
security which could result from the 
increased United States responsibilities in 
South-West Asia." 
4.8. Thus the thrust of the NATO reaction to 
the invasion of Afghanistan is first in effect to 
underwrite President Carter's declaration in his 
State of the Union message, by asserting that 
the security of member countries can be detri-
mentally affected by events in the South-West 
Asia area ; secondly that defence measures in 
that area can most appropriately be taken by 
countries having established relations with 
countries of the region, and that the defence 
burden falls largely upon the United States; 
thirdly, while it is recognised that United States 
forces stationed permanently in Europe will not 
be affected by defence capabilities being built 
up by the United States for possible deploy-
ment in the South-West Asia area, the Euro-
pean NATO allies must be prepared to plug 
any gaps that may be left in Europe by the 
redeployment of mobile United States forces -
in particular, units of the Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean - or by the reallocation of 
reserves based in the continental United 
States. 
4.9. The question of concerting defence 
measures outside the NATO area is not one for 
the formal structures of NATO. France in 
particular, and also the United Kingdom, 
possess forces which can be used in the area, 
but any co-ordination of plans is a matter for 
bilateral consultations. But other frameworks 
have also played an important role. The 
Venice summit meeting of the heads of govern-
ment of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States on 22nd and 23rd June 1980, to have 
been devoted primarily to energy questions, 
opened with the agreed statement that: 
" The Soviet military occupation of 
Afghanistan in unacceptable now and we 
are determined not to accept it in the 
future. We have taken note of today's 
announcement of the withdrawal of some 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In 
order to make a useful contribution to 
the solution of the Afghanistan crisis, this 
withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be 
permanent and continue until the 
complete withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops." 
While the formal communique at the end of the 
meeting dealt with energy, subsequent state-
ments by participants made it clear that mutual 
security had been discussed in the light of the 
invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter, at 
the final joint press conference on 23rd June, 
said: 
" ... We have pledged to oppose the Soviet 
invasion with the means at our 
disposal... " 
4.10. Mrs. Thatcher, describing the summit to 
the House of Commons on 24th June, said: 
" We broke new ground by discussing the 
major international political issue of the 
day - the invasion and continued occupa-
tion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union. The meeting offered a timely 
opportunity for the seven heads of state 
and government to reaffirm their unity of 
purpose on the political and economic 
difficulties we face. That opportunity 
was taken. " 
Asked whether the arming of Afghanistan 
freedom fighters was discussed at the summit, 
Mrs. Thatcher said: 
" Only very much in the margins. That 
is a matter which, of course, we shall 
have to consider in the future. " 
4.11. Consultations between the major indus-
trial powers at meetings such as the Venice 
summit, outside the Alliance framework, have 
been a source of misgiving to some of the 
smaller NATO countries, but there is an 
inevitable conflict of interest in a situation 
where NATO itself cannot plan military 
measures beyond the NATO area, because of 
the reluctance mostly of the smaller countries 
which would not in any case have the resources 
to support any such plans. 
4.12. Interpretations of Soviet motives in 
invading Afghanistan do, of course, differ. 
Geographically, the occupation does not bring 
Soviet forces nearer to the oil-fields at the head 
of the Persian Gulf, although it does bring them 
nearer to the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Here 
again, however, the lines of communication 
across Afghanistan and southern Iran would 
not be the most attractive ones for military 
operations at the mouth of the Persian 
145 
DOCUMENT 858 
Gulf. But even if the Sqviet objective is 
merely to impose the friendly regime on a 
bordering country, the allied countries cannot 
afford to allow Soviet forces to invade a neutral 
country without both making it clear that such 
action is totally unacceptable to the West, and 
at the same time taking military precautions to 
remove any temptation that might subsequently 
arise for the Soviet Union to make further use 
of its armed forces. The area obviously holds 
great attraction for it - both because of its 
access to warm sea ports, and because of the 
petroleum supplies which will become increa-
singly attractive to the Soviet Union over the 
next decade as its own requirements are likely 
to outstrip its indigenous resources. 
4.13. In the month following the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the United StMes in particular 
moved rapidly to enhance its ability to inter-
vene in the area of the Per ian Gulf. It has 
negotiated base facilities in E ypt and in Oman 
and, more controversially, in Somalia where it 
will now have access to t e base originally 
constructed by the Soviet un· n at Berbera. In 
Oman in particular the ag eement signed in 
June 1980 provides United :States forces with 
the use of the island of Massirah, as well as port 
facilities in three ports and two airfields. In 
the southern Indian Ocean, in addition to the 
base at Diego Garcia, the United States has 
concluded an agreement with Kenya for the use 
of port facilities at Mombasa. 
4.14. Secondly, the United States, by reorgani-
sing existing military resources, is building up a 
rapid deployment force. There might be up to 
four divisions available from the United States 
and one or two marine amphibious forces - of 
about divisional size ; up to 31 fighter attack 
squadrons ; a contingency naval force which 
could easily call on up to three aircraft-
carriers; and a considerable airlift capability. 
Despite the considerable r~sources available, 
however, movement from c~mtinental United 
States to the area would be a slow process for 
anything more than token forces. One authori-
tative estimate puts ten to fifteen days on the 
time to deploy one airborne division and a total 
of two months before infantry divisions and 
marine amphibious forces could be fully 
deployed. Naval contributions by Britain and 
France in a situation where agreement was 
reached on the need for the operation would be 
invaluable for assisting to protect the sealanes, 
but would not be capable of making a signifi-
cant contribution to the United States assault 
and ground intervention capability. The sce-
nario for such operation in any case must 
assume an invitation from a friendly govern-
ment to intervene in a situation where it was 
threatened by Soviet invasion. The existence 
of these arrangements will have a powerful 
deterrent effect in making any further military 
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adventures by the Soviet Union in the area 
extremely unattractive. 
4.15. The situation in the area of the Persian 
Gulf deteriorated rapidly with the outbreak of 
hostilities between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi forces 
are equipped largely with Soviet weapons, 
including over 2,600 tanks; it has also 100 
French AMX-30 tanks, French helicopters and 
French fighter aircraft on order. Iran has 
1 700 British and American tanks and Ameri-c~n aircraft. This is only one example of the 
many potential sources of conflict in the 
complex multi-polar world, which do not arise 
from the antagonism of the main power blocs, 
although the intensity of hostilities when they 
break out are largely determined by the 
weapons supplied by bloc countries. That the 
conflict has remained limited so far demonstra-
tes the restraint of both superpowers in refrain-
ing from intervention in a situation which 
could otherwise lead to direct conflict between 
them. But the demands on military spares and 
ammunition by both sides involved in the 
fighting place their suppliers under great pres-
sure to continue to provide them, especially as 
Iran is using the United States hostages as a 
bargaining counter. 
V. Arms control and disarmament 
5.1. A retrospective survey of the state of 
European security covering the last twenty 
years finds a good deal of change in the area of 
arms control, although sadly no concrete 
progress on disarmament proper. Progress 
depends on the state of East-West relations and 
while these have continually fluctuated over the 
period, and can only be qualified as bad in the 
aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan or of 
Czechoslovakia, the long-term trend over the 
last twenty years has undoubtedly been towards 
greater stability in East-West relations with 
more contact between the countries of the two 
blocs and a greater degree of interdependence in 
their relations, not only in the field of trade. 
There are at present no fewer than six separate 
sets of arms control negotiations in progress 
with countries of the eastern bloc (which are 
described in the following paragraphs) ; while 
the occupation of Afghanistan has inevitably 
affected the atmosphere of these negotiations 
hnd therefore the prospects of early agreement, 
it is to be noted that neither side has chosen to 
link the events in Afghanistan with arms 
control negotiations directly, because the 
mutual advantages to be derived from properly 
verifiable measures of arms control are clearly 
perceived. 
5.2 If the 1963 partial test-ban treaty was a 
milestone in East-West relations as far as arms 
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control was concerned, the trend in the 
Alliance as a whole can be more easily dated 
from the Harmel plan leading to the report on 
the future tasks of the Alliance adopted by the 
North Atlantic Council in December 1967. It 
recognised the two main functions of the 
Alliance were to provide for military security 
and to seek a more stable relationship in 
Europe. It recognised that "military security 
and a policy of detente are not contradictory 
but complementary". In the period following 
that report, the periodical ministerial communi-
ques of the North Atlantic Council and of the 
Warsaw Pact came to constitute a dialogue 
which, after the signature of the German-Soviet 
treaty on 12th August 1970, paved the way 
both for the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe and the opening of the 
Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions. 
(a) Confidence-building measures 
in the framework of CSCE 
5.3. The final act of the Helsinki conference 
signed on 1st August 1975 included in the first 
basket " questions relating to the security of 
Europe", a section on confidence-building 
measures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament. Participating states undertook to 
give prior notification of major military 
manreuvres exceeding 25,000 troops taking 
place on their territory in Europe or - in the 
case of the Soviet Union- within 250 km of its 
European frontier. Notification has to be 
twenty-one days in advance or at the earliest 
opportunity for manreuvres arranged at short 
notice. Parties to the agreement " may also 
notify smaller-scale military manreuvres to 
other parties with special regard for those near 
the area of such manreuvres ". Furthermore, 
" the . participating states will invite other 
participating states, voluntarily and on a bila-
teral basis ... to send observers to attend military 
manreuvres ". 
5.4. The record of performance under these 
provisions as far as NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries are concerned is shown in the table at 
Appendix IV. The final act also makes the 
optional provision that participating states 
" recognise that they may, at their own 
discretion... notify their major military move-
ments ". Other measures referred to include 
exchanges of military personnel and visits by 
military delegations. Major military move-
ments do not appear to have been notified by 
either NATO or Warsaw Pact countries. 
5.5. The record of implementation of the 
confidence-building measures will be discussed . 
in the CSCE review conference opening 
formally in Madrid on 22nd November. As far 
as they go, the confidence-building provisions 
appear to have been respected by the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO countries, but there are several 
areas in which the provisions themselves should 
be improved. Notification of major manreu-
vres has been satisfactory, but the provision 
could be strengthened by reducing the numbers 
for compulsory notification to 10,000 for 
example. The optional invitation for observers 
to attend the manreuvres has been extended by 
NATO countries in respect of more than 80 % 
of the major manreuvres notified, compared 
with less than half for the Warsaw Pact 
countries. But more important than the pro-
portion of invitations are the facilities provided 
for observers. The final act is restrictive - in 
each case the inviting state is to determine in 
the invitation the number of observers, the pro-
cedures and the conditions of their participa-
tion, and it is to provide merely appropriate 
facilities and hospitality. Facilities provided 
for western observers at Warsaw Pact exercises 
have been uniformly disappointing. The 
exchange of observers would be far more effec-
tive as a confidence-building measure if 
minimum conditions were laid down, including, 
for example, sufficient mobility for observers to 
determine numbers taking part in an exercise 
and the type of equipment employed. 
5.6. Most important of course from a 
confidence-building standpoint is the geographi-
cal limitation - the measures apply on the terri-
tory of the Soviet Union itself only to a band of 
territory 250 km wide on its western frontier. 
Coupled with compulsory provisions for the 
notification of troop movements as well as 
manreuvres, and some permanent stationing of 
observers with adequate facilities, an extension 
of the territory covered as far as the U rals 
would make a major contribution to confidence 
and stability in Europe. The French proposal 
for a conference on disarmament in Europe, 
originally put forward at the special session on 
disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly, is now attracting growing support. 
Open to the participating states of the Helsinki 
final act (all European countries, as well as the 
United States, Canada, the Soviet Union), it is 
proposed that the conference, in a first phase, 
should discuss confidence-building measures 
concerning conventional forces only but over 
the geographical area extending from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. 
5.7. The Committee believes that if review of 
existing confidence-building measures at the 
Madrid conference is satisfactory, every effort 
should be made to convene a conference on 
disarmament shortly afterwards to discuss the 
strengthening of confidence-building measures 
on the foregoing lines. 
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(b) Negotiations on mutual and baltmced force reductions 
5.8. Starting in 1973, these talks, which 
resumed after the summer, recess on 25th 
September, are now in their twenty-second 
round. The agreed position of the NATO 
countries participating has from the outset been 
that initial troop reductions should relate to 
United States and Soviet forces only and that in 
general reductions should lead to mutually-
agreed, common collective ceilings on forces for 
each side, without imposing specific limits on 
individual countries. For reductions to be 
meaningful, agreement has first to be reached 
on numbers of forces presently deployed, and 
reductions will have to be coupled with associa-
ted measures - types of cpnfidence-building 
measures such as the permalnent stationing of 
observers to assure that any agreement on force 
reductions are respected. Reductions under 
discussion would relate to (orces stationed in 
the guidelines area, comprisipg the territory of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the NATO 
side and that of East Germany, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia on the Warsaw Pact side. The 
status of Hungary in this 'equation remains 
undefined. 
5.9. After two years without progress, the 
NATO countries in December 1975 put 
forward their Option 3 under which NATO 
would withdraw 1,000 United States nuclear 
warheads together with delivery systems - 54 
F-4 combat aircraft and 36 Pershing lA 
missiles. In return, common collective ceilings 
of 700,000 ground force personnel, and 900,000 
men on each side would have to be accepted 
and the Societ Union would have to withdraw a 
complete tank army including 1, 700 main 
battle tanks. As NATO in the context of the 
December 1979 decision on the modernisation 
of long-range theatre nuclear forces has 
announced the unilateral withdrawal of 1 ,000 
United States tactical nuclear warheads from 
;Europe, and as this issue is now being discussed 
pilaterally in Geneva between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the context of the 
LRTNF talks, Option 3, which was never 
flCCepted by the Warsaw Pact countries, is no 
longer directly relevant to the MBFR talks. 
i 
5.10. The most recent western proposals put 
forward in December 1979 were for a first 
phase interim agreement on United States and 
Soviet troops only to comprise the simulta-
neous reduction of 13,000 and 30,000 ground 
forces respectively, and then to proceed in a 
second phase to provide · mutual collective 
ceilings of 700,000 ground troops and a total of 
900,000 combined ground and air forces on 
each side. Unspecified associated measures to 
ensure respect to the agreement would be 
required at the same time. 
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5.11. Just before the talks rose for the summer 
recess in July, the Warsaw Pact countries put 
forward a new proposal for withdrawals of 
13,000 men and 20,000 men respectively by the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the first 
phase, in addition to the withdrawals of 20,000 
men and 1 ,000 tanks from Eastern Germany 
announced by Mr. Brezhnev in October 
1979. In accepting the concept of asymmetri-
cal reductions and waiving, at least in a first 
phase, the previous insistence on ceilings for 
the forces of each individual participating 
country, the new Warsaw Pact proposals appear 
to be a step forward but before even a phase 
one package could be acceptable to NATO 
countries, there would have to be simultaneous 
agreement on appropriate permanent associated 
measures to verify the withdrawals and conti-
nued respect of the reduced levels, together 
with agreement on numbers of forces at present 
within the area. NATO has claimed from the 
outset that Warsaw Pact ground forces number 
925,000 at present compared with 777,000 for 
NATO ground forces. The Warsaw Pact 
countries declined to reveal any figures at the 
outset of the talks, but in June 1976 claimed 
that they had only 805,000 ground forces and a 
total of 965,000 of ground and air forces 
combined. Discussions on the definitions of 
categories of forces included in the data prof-
fered by each side have not as yet made much 
progress, but there is some scope for detailed 
discussion of, for example, the larger number of 
civilians employed by NATO forces in the area 
concerned. 
5.12. In summary, there is now agreement 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries 
on: (i) the goal of parity and, at least in the first 
phase, common collective ceilings ; (ii) concen-
trating on reductions of manpower; and (iii) 
reductions of Soviet and United States forces in 
the first phase. The discrepancy between the 
Warsaw Pact figure for their ground forces of 
805,000, and the NATO claim of 925,000 
represents a disagreement of only 13 % on 
current levels, but of course would be a very 
much more serious discrepancy after reductions 
to a common collective ceiling of 700,000. 
5.13. Agreement on reductions in the MBFR 
framework would be the first and most signifi-
cant tangible disarmament agreement in 
Europe. The prospects are better than before, 
both sides clearly wish to continue the negotia-
tions, but agreement on the data base and on 
adequate associated measures remain a precon-
dition of any acceptable agreement. 
(c) Committee on Disarmament 
5.14. Following the United Nations General 
Assembly special session on disarmament in 
1978, the Conference of the Committee on 
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Disarmament· (CCD) - the Geneva Disarma-
ment Conference - was reorganised by enlarge-
ment to forty members and abolition of the 
original eo-chairmanship arrangement whereby 
the United States and the Soviet Union jointly 
had the right to determine the agenda and dates 
of sessions of the conference. France and 
China both joined the committee which they 
had previously shunned, chiefly because of the 
eo-chairmanship arrangement. In his discus-
sions with many delegates to the conference in 
July of this year, your Rapporteur was able to 
note that the work of the committee was 
proceeding in a satisfactory atmosphere, 
although the deterioration in East-West rela-
tions following the invasion of Afghanistan led 
to no expectation of specific agreements in 
1980. 
5.15. Although it was widely recognised that 
substantive discussion on the more important 
aspects of arms control was taking place outside 
the conference proper - in the trilateral discus-
sions on a comprehensive test ban, and the 
bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban 
- the Committee on Disarmament was discus-
sing aspects of these subjects as well as the 
nature of security assurances to be given to 
non-nuclear weapons countries (in the frame-
work of non-nuclear proliferation policy), a 
treaty to ban radiological weapons (hypothetical 
weapons that would use a conventional explo-
sion to spread radioactive material over a 
target), and on the more esoteric comprehensive 
programme on disarmament. 
5.16. With its increased size, including twenty-
one non-aligned countries, the Committee on 
Disarmament is inevitably more cumbrous as a 
negotiating body, the contributions of many of 
the non-aligned countries appearing largely 
irrelevant both to NATO and Warsaw Pact 
participants. It, nevertheless, remains an 
important framework where the final draft on a 
multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban and 
on a chemical weapons ban would have to be 
negotiated if and when the initial drafts emerge 
from the bi- and trilateral negotiations. 
(d) Chemical weapons ban 
5.17. Since 1974, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have been negotiating on a 
convention to ban chemical weapons. Your 
Rapporteur understands that these talks have 
now made more progress than in the previous 
two years. On 7th July, the United States and 
the Soviet Union made a joint report to the 
Committee on Disarmament on the progress of 
their talks which showed agreement on the 
scope of a convention which would ban the 
development, production or stockpiling of 
chemical weapons; they had agreed on the defi-
mtwn of three categories of chemicals to be 
covered - super-toxic lethal chemical; other 
lethal chemical ; other harmful chemical - with 
toxicity criteria attached to each which would 
facilitate verification procedures. It is agreed 
that declarations on stockpiles would be made 
within thirty days of a state acceding to a 
convention, together with plans for destruction 
of both weapons and production facilities which 
would have to be completed within ten years of 
accession. Agreement has also been reached 
on quantities of super-toxic lethal chemical that 
might be held for non-military purposes (not 
exceeding one metric ton). 
5.18. It was further agreed that adequate verifi-
cation measures must be included in a conven-
tion, including the right of on-site inspection by 
request but " the question of whether this type 
of on-site investigation, together with other 
verification measures, would constitute a verifi-
cation system capable of providing adequate 
assurance regarding the implementation of a 
convention remains unsolved. The two sides 
believe that it is necessary to develop procedu-
res for on-site inspection, including provisions 
regarding the rights and functions of the inspec-
tion personnel, and the rights and functions of 
the host side. Specific issues in this area are 
the subject of continuing negotiations". 
5.19. The Committee recalls that the United 
States has not manufactured chemical weapons 
since 1969, and understands that other NATO 
countries do not now produce them. No infor-
mation appears to be available on current pro-
duction of chemical weapons in the Soviet 
Union, but it is believed to have considerable 
stockpiles of chemical weapons, albeit unquan-
tified by United States intelligence sources 
which claim merely that they are sufficient for 
the purposes of the Soviet Union. United 
States stockpiles are very large as the 
Committee has reported1, but of declining uti-
lity as the weapons - delivery systems - for 
which they were designed become obsolescent. 
The Committee believes, however, that propo-
sals in certain quarters of the United 
States military establishment for the production 
of a new generation of binary chemical 
weapons should be held in abeyance for at least 
twelve more months to allow more time for 
agreement on a chemical weapons ban. 
(e) Comprehensive test ban 
5.20. Since 1977, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the United States have been 
negotiating in Geneva on a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban, which would ban all nuclear 
tests in all environments. This is undoubtedly 
the most important arms control agreement in 
I. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Docu-
ment 838, 29th April1980, Rapporteur Mr. Banks. 
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prospect, and up to July this year more progress 
has been made than on any other single arms 
control issue. In a joint report to the Commit-
tee on Disarmament on 30th July 1980, the 
three countries point out that: 
" The treaty directly affects vital national 
security concerns... in spite of these 
challenges, however, [they] have made 
considerable progress in negotiating the 
treaty. " 
It is agreed that the treaty; will prohibit any 
party from conducting any nuclear explosion 
and from assisting anyone else to do so. A 
separate protocol on nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes will be attached to the treaty 
under which there will be a moratorium on 
peaceful explosions until ai· eement is reached 
on arrangements for such ex losions that would 
be consistent with a corn rehensive test-ban 
treaty. Agreement has not et been reached on 
the duration of the treaty (which your Rappor-
teur understands may initially be for three 
years). 
5.21. It is agreed that verifiqation measures will 
include national means of v<erification ; interna-
tional exchange ·of seismic dj:tta; on-site inspec-
tion by request (not by right) ; and additional 
verification measures to be agreed between the 
three parties. These will include detailed pro-
cedures for on-site inspection with a definition 
of the role of the host party during an inspec-
tion, and " the installation and use by the three 
parties of high quality national seismic stations 
of agreed characteristics ". It is understood 
that agreement in principle has been reached 
on the installation of ten seismic stations by the 
United States and the Soviet Union has also 
demanded the right to install ten stations on 
British territory. It is believed that agreement 
may be reached on a total of some twenty-one 
stations. The tripartite report notes however 
that " despite significant accomplishments there 
are important areas where substantial work is 
still to be done ". 
5.22. Your Rapporteur, after detailed discus-
sions in Geneva, left with the impression that 
the technical difficulties in the way of final 
agreement on a draft treaty to be submitted to 
the Committee on Disarmament could be over-
come in a few months of negotiation if a politi-
cal decision were taken by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to conclude such a treaty. 
VI. Conclusions 
6.1. Any .survey of the state of European 
security over the last ten or twenty years inevi-
tably reveals patches of light and shade, but on 
balance, by any objective standards, the mili-
tary strength of the Alliance has increased and 
its cohesion improved. The proportionate 
share of the total allied defence effort provided 
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by the European countries has doubled in the 
last ten years and allied consultation has 
increased in scope. The military strength of 
the Soviet Union, however, has been increasing 
more rapidly, especially in nuclear weapons 
and naval forces, and it has retained its superio-
rity in numbers of tanks. 
6.2. Yet while the Soviet Union today may 
perceive a state of rough parity and balance in 
nuclear weapons, and be aware of a new-found 
ability to project its influence around the world, 
there is no conceivable objective basis on which 
Soviet military planners today could assume 
anything but inferiority in the face . of the 
countries and alliances that surround 1t from 
China to Norway, whose territory obstructs 
Soviet naval access to the oceans, and four of 
which possess their own nuclear weapons. 
Idealogically threatened by Muslim fund~men­
talism in the South and by consumer-onented 
societies in the West -which, despite a severe 
recession are still far more successful than the 
Soviet U~ion in the quality of the living stan-
dards that they achieve - the aging Soviet 
leadership, still with vivid memories of Soviet 
territory laid waste in World War 11, have 
sought in their defence policy to line . the 
lengthy frontiers with military forces and chent 
states and to do this have devoted an extrava-
gantly large proportion of national wealth, 
especially industrial and scientific resources, to 
defence. 
6.3. In an increasingly complex, multi-polar 
world of 160 sovereign states, when industrial-
ised western countries are vulnerably depen-
dent on external supplies of energy, there is a 
dangerous tendency in the Uni~ed. Sta~e.s and 
Europe alike frustrated at theu mab1hty to 
control exte~al events, to blame their failure 
on military weakness, when in reality it springs 
from the declining relevance of military power, 
especially nuclear weapons, to the daily pro-
blems of foreign relations. There is no 
evidence that the Soviet Union has been any 
more successful than the West in arranging the 
rest of the world to its liking, or that it shares 
some western perceptions of allied weakness. 
The evidence points the other way. 
6.4. In an unpredictable world, the Alliance 
will continue to need a strong defence effort to 
match the Soviet Union, sufficient to ensure 
that military expansion will never appear an 
attractive option to that country. At a time of 
severe economic recession on the one hand, and 
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external danger and frustration on the other, 
the countries of the Alliance must avoid the 
twin dangers of military over-reaction - which 
could lead the Soviet V nion to react in turn 
leading to an ever-increasing arms spiral - or of 
allowing their defences to decline through 
apathy or the competing demands of social 
expenditure. The Committee believes that 
until there is firm evidence of a reduction in 
the Soviet defence effort, an annual increase in 
real terms in allied defence expenditure 
will be needed ; that consolidating conventional 
defence in Europe must have priority. At the 
same time the continued search for detente 
must be the counterpart of the defence effort, 
and all arms control and disarmament nego-
tiations must be pursued. 
6.5. The Committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation. The 
preamble first refers to the trend of the military 
balance which is described in Chapter 11 of th1s 
explanatory memorandum and in Appendices I 
to Ill. Paragraph (ii) refers to the nature of the 
Soviet challenge today, outlined in paragraphs 
2.13. and 2.14. above. Paragraph (iii) mentions 
the conflict between Iraq and Iran described in 
paragraph 4.15. above. The cohesion of the 
Alliance mentioned in paragraph (iv) is discus-
sed in Chapter Ill, while arms control negotia-
tions (paragraph (v) are described in Chapter V. 
6.6. In the operative text, paragraph 1 deals 
with the imperative need for allied consulta-
tion, described in paragraphs 4.1. et seq. of this 
explanatory memorandum. Paragraph 2 deals 
with improvements in defence efforts called for 
by the present situation, described in paragraph 
4.8. above. Paragraph 3 of the recommenda-
tion reiterates the need for no less emphasis to 
be placed on arms control and disarmament -
current negotiations are described in Chapter V. 
VII. Opinion of the minority 
7.1 The report as a whole was adopted by 13 
votes to 4 with 1 abstention. In the draft 
recommendation, the minority would have 
inserted the words " moving towards Soviet 
superiority " after the words " rough equi-
valence " in paragraph (i) of the preamble ; 
would have deleted paragraph (iv) and would 
have reworded the first line of paragraph (vi) as 
follows: " Believing that the threat to European 
security has not diminished ... " 
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Defence budget 
1960 
Soviet Union 17,000 
Other Warsaw Pact n.a. 
Total Warsaw Pact 19,500• 
United States 46,545 
Other NATO 15,862 
Total NATO 62,407 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
e = estimate. 
($m) 
1970 1979 
53,900 165,000 
7,515 16,670 
61,415 181,670 
77,827 122,261 
26,459 139,110 
104,286 261,371 
Defence budget 
(as %of GNP) 
1960 1970 1979 
n.a. 11.0 12 
n.a. 4.9 3 
n.a. 9.6 9.4 
10.1 8.6 5.7 
5.6 4.1 4.0 
8.6 6.7 4.6 
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Balance of defence efforts and forces 
A global comparison 
Numbers 
in armed forces Numbers of tanks 
(thousands) 
1960 1970 1980 1963 1970 1980 
3,623 3,305 3,568 35,000 23,150 50,000 
811 971 1,101 3,000 12,530 15,000 
4,434 4,276 4,669 38,000 35,680 65,000 
2,489 3,161 2,050 n.a. n.a. 11,500 
3,475 2,993 2,847 n.a. n.a. 15,000 
5,964 6,154 4,897 16,000 n.a. 26,500 
I 
(other than strategic nuclear forces) 
1960-70-80 
Combat aircraft Aircraft (other than 
strategic bombers) carriers 
1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 
14,000 7,175 5,000 - -
2,000 2,150 2,226 - -
16,000 9,325 7,226 - -
3,750 6,500 3,700 31 20 
2,630 4,000 3,466 9 8 
6,400 10,500 7,166 40 28 
Battleships 
and cruisers 
1980 1960 1970 
2 25 26 
- - -
2 25 26 
14 55 10 
5 14 9 
19 69 19 
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Destroyers and Submarines 
ocean-going (other than 
escorts strategic missile) 
1980 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 
39 230 200 269 430 320 250 
- n.a. 8 11 n.a. 7 8 
39 n.a. 208 280 430 327 258 
25 630 224 122 174 103 81 
5 316 238 275 86 111 140 
30 946 462 397 260 214 221 
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Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Total WEU 
Denmark 
Greece 
Norway 
Portugal 
Turkey 
Total all European NATO 
countries 
Canada 
United States 
Total NATO 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
f.c. = factor cost. 
e = estimate. 
• 1978 figures. 
1959 
374 
3,659 
2,640 
1,067 
8 
396 
4,461 
12,605 
143 
158 
150 
98 
240 
13,394 
1,642 
46,614 
61,650 
$m 
current prices 
1969 1979 
630 3,636 
6,124 18,776 
5,584 24,391 
2,259 7,089 
8 42 
1,017 4,767 
5,497 17,572 
21,119 76,273 
352 1,559 
425 1,600 
350 1,421 
371 587 
599 2,591 
23,216 84,031 
1,757 3,751 
81,444 114,503 
106,416 202,285 
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Defence effort 
A comparison 
Defence expenditure 
at constant prices 
as % of GNP (f.c.) index, 1970 = 100 
1960 1969 1979 1955 1959 1969 1979 
72.5 94.0 152.3 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.3 
85.7 101.1 132.8 7.7 8.2 5.0 3.9 
70.2 99.2 126.9 4.9 5.2 4.1 3.3 
67.0 94.8 126.2 4.6 4.2 3.0 2.4 
81.5 98.3 165.8 3.6 1.9 1.0 1.0 
65.6 96.1 133.4 6.2 4.3 4.0 3.4 
100.6 100.2 123.8 9.3 7.5 5.9 4.9 
81.8 99.2 128.8 6.9 6.3 4.5 3.6 
71.4 102.0 135.9 3.6 2.9 3.0 2.0 
44.2 92.6 153.3* 6.4 5.9 5.9 n.a. 
59.2 99.8 130.3 4.4 4.1 4.0 3.1 
37.3 91.0 68.6 4.6 4.9 7.2 4.0 
68.4 92.6 182.3* 5.6 5.1 5.2 n.a. 
79.5 98.8 129.~ n.a. 6.1 4.5 3.6 
105.3 95.2 116.8 7.6 5.3 2.8 1.7 
76.5 110.8 81.5 11.1 10.5 9.4 5.2 
77.7 107.7 93.5 9.6 8.9 7.4 4.3 
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in NATO countries 
1959-1979 
per capita 
us$ 
1959 1969 1979 
-------
41 65 378 
81 122 417 
51 95 417 
22 42 129 
26 23 117 
35 79 355 
85 99 245 
---- --
57 88 330 
------
31 72 297 
19 48 n.a. 
44 91 358 
11 39 78 
9 17 n.a. 
------
49 77 310 
------
94 83 173 
262 402 555 
132 202 414 
% of total 
of NATO countries 
1959 1969 1979 
------
0.6 0.6 1.7 
5.9 5.8 10.3 
4.3 5.2 11.4 
1.7 2.1 3.4 
0.01 0.01 0.02 
0.6 1.0 2.3 
7.2 5.2 8.9 
--
----
20.4 19.8 38.1 
------
0.2 0.3 0.7 
0.3 0.4 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.4 
0.4 0.6 1.2 
------
21.7 21.8 43.4 
--
----
2.7 1.7 1.9 
75.6 76.5 56.4 
lOO 100 100 
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Numbers in armed forces 
thousands % of total 
of NATO countries 
1959 1969 1979 1959 1969 1979 
------------
120 102.4 86.8 2.0 1.6 1.8 Belgium 
1,026 503 509.3 17.5 7.8 10.4 France 
206 465 495.5 3.5 7.2 10.1 Germany 
400 420 365.0 6.8 6.5 7.5 Italy 
3.2 0.6 0.7 0.05 0.01 0.01 Luxembourg 
130 124 114.8 2.2 1.9 2.4 Netherlands 
614.2 405 322.9 10.5 6.3 6.6 United ,Kingdom 
--------------
2,499 2,020 1,895 42.5 31.2 38.8 TOtal WEU 
--------------
45 45.5 34.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 Denmark 
157.9 159.0 184.6 2.7 2.5 3.8 G%ece 40 38.0 39.0 0.7 0.6 0.8 N rway 
79 182.0 60.5 1.3 2.8 1.2 Po tugal 
500 483.0 566.0 8.5 7.5 11.6 Turkey 
--------
----
To~al all European NATO 
3,321.3 2,927.5 2,779.8 56.5 45.2 56.9 countries 
--------- --
120 98.3 80.0 2.0 1.5 1.6 Canada 
2,435 ,3,454 2,022 41.4 53.3 41.4 United States 
5,876 6,480 4,882 100 100 100 Total NATO 
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APPENDIX III 
Relative United States I USSR standing 
in the twenty most important basic technology areas 
Basic technologies us US/USSR USSR 
superior equal superior 
I. Aerodynamics /Fluid dyna-
mics X 
2. Automated control X 
3. Computer ~x 
4. Military instrumentation X 
5. Directed energy X 
6. Electro-optical sensor (in-
eluding IR) X 
7. Guidance and navigation X-+ 
8. Hydro-acoustic X 
9. Intelligence sensor X 
10. Manufacturing X 
11. Materials (light weight and 
high strength) X-+ 
12. Microelectronic materials 
and integrated circuit 
manufacture ~x 
13. Non-acoustic submarine 
detection X 
14. Nuclear warhead X 
15. Optics X-+ 
16. Propulsion (Aerospace) X-+ 
17. Radar sensor X 
18. Signal processing X 
19. Software X 
I 20. Telecommunications X 
I. The list in aggregate \\<as selected with the objective of providing a valid base 
for comparing overall US and USSR basic technology. The technologies were 
specifically not chosen to compare technology level in currently deployed military 
systems. The list is in alphabetical order. 
2. The technologies selected have the potential for significantly changing the 
military balance in the next ten to twenty years. The technologies are not static; 
they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements. 
3. The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly 
in the direction indicated. 
4. The judgments represent averages withm each basic technology area. 
Source: United States Department of Defence FY 1981 programme for research, 
development and acquisition, statement by the Under-Secretary of Defence Wm. J. 
Perry, 1st February 1980. 
156 
APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Relative United States I USSR technology level 
in deployed military systems* 
Deployed system us US/USSR superior equal 
USSR 
superior 
------
STRATEGIC 
ICBM X 
SSBN/SLBM X-+ 
Bomber X 
SAMs X 
Ballistic missile defence X 
Anti-satellite X 
TACTICAL 
Land forces 
SAMs (including naval) X 
Tanks +-- X** 
Artillery X-+ 
Infantry combat vehicles X 
Anti-tank guided missiles X 
Attack helicopters X-+ 
Chemical warfare X 
Theatre ballistic missiles X 
Air Forces 
Fighter /attack aircraft X 
Air-to-air missiles X 
PGM X 
Air lift X 
Naval forces 
SSNs X 
Anti-submarine warfare X-+ 
Sea-based air X-+ 
Surface combatants X 
Cruise missile X 
Mine warfare X 
Amphibious assault X-+ 
c31 
Communications X-+ 
Command and control X 
Electronic countermeasure X 
Surveillance and reconnais-
sance X-+ 
Early warning X-+ 
* These are comparisons of system technology level only, and are not necessarily 
a measure of effectiveness. The comparisons are not dependent on scenario, tactics, 
quantity, training, or other operational factors. Systems farther than one year 
from IOC are not considered. 
** The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly 
in the direction indicated. 
157 
DOCUMENT 858 
I 
DOCUMENT 858 
Sponsoring 
country 
1975 
A. Major 
mantzuvres 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 
United States 
B. Smaller scale 
mantzuvres 
Turkey 
Norway 
Netherlands 
1976 
A. Major 
mantzuvres 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 
United States 
United States 
B. Smaller scale 
mantzuvres 
Norway 
Norway 
Denmark/GE 
United Kingdom 
APPENDIX IV 
Military manoeuvres notified in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 
under the provisions of the Helsinki final act 
A. Allied ltlllnoeuPres 
Name Type Participating 
of the of the Area Size forces 
manreuvre manreuvre 
Grosse Ground/air Bavaria 68,000 GE-CA-FR-US 
Rochade 
Certain Trek1 Ground/air NW Bavaria 57,000 GE-CA-FR-US 
Deep Joint Aegean Sea and 18,000 TU-US-UK-GE 
Express Turkish Thrace BE-IT-NL 
Batten Joint Oestfold (NO) 8,000 NO-UK-DE-NL 
Bolt 75 
Pantsersprong Ground/air Western part of 10,000 NL 
Germany 
Grosser Ground/air North-West 50,000 GE-NL-UK-US 
Baer Germany 
Gordian Ground/air Hesse (GE) 34,000 US-GE 
Shield 
Lares Team Ground/air Southern 44,000 US-CA-GE 
Germany 
APPENDIX IV 
Period lnvita-tion to 
of the obser-
manreuvre vers 
--
15th-19th -
September 
14th-23rd Yes 
October 
12th-28th -
September 
3rd-7th -
October 
28th October- -
6th November 
--
6th-10th Yes 
September 
7th-11th -
September 
13th-17th Yes 
September 
Atlas Express Joint South West 17,000 CA-GE-IT-NL 24th February- -
Troms NO-UK-US 23rd March 
Teamwork 76 Joint Trendelag (NO) 13,500 NO-NL-UK-US 10th-24th Yes 
September 
Bonded Joint Jutland & 11,000 DE-GE-US 11th-21st -
Item Schleswig- October 
Holstein 
Spear-point Ground North-West 18,000 UK-DE-US 2nd-11th Yes 
Germany November 
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Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring 
of the of the Area Size Participating of the tion to country forces obser-manreuvre manreuvre manreuvre 
vers 
--
1977 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
United States Carbon Edge Ground/air Germany 58,700 US-BE-CA 13th-23rd Yes 
GE-NL-UK September 
Fed. Rep. of Standhafte Ground/air Germany 38,000 GE-US 12th-15th Yes 
Germany Chatten September 
B. Smaller scale 
manreuvres 
United States Certain Ground/air Germany 24,000 us 1st-8th May -
Fighter 
Denmark Arrow Express Ground/air Denmark 16,000 BE-CA-DE-GE 19th-23rd Yes 
IT-LU-NL- September 
UK-US 
Belgium Blue Fox Ground Germany 24,500 BE-GE-US 12th-23rd -
September 
Netherlands Interaction Ground/air Germany 12,000 NL 24th September- Yes 
1st October 
Turkey Tayfun 77 Ground /air I Turkey 15,000 TU 13th-14th Yes 
naval October 
--- --
1978 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
Fed. Rep. of Blaue Donau Ground/air Nurnberg 46,000 CA-GE-US 17th-21st Yes 
Germany Regensburg September 
Augsburg 
Uhlm 
United States Certain Ground/air Bad Hessfeld 56,000 BE-GE-LU 18th-28th Yes 
Shield Schweinfurt UK-US September 
Darmstadt 
Monburg 
I Ground /air 
Limburg 
Netherlands Saxon Drive Luneburg 32,500 GE-NL-US 18th-29th Yes 
Wafsburg September 
Hannover 
Bremen 
Fed. Rep. of Bold Guard Ground/air Schleswig- 65,000 DE-GE-UK-US 19th-22nd -
Germany Holstein September 
Baltic 
Command Area 
B. Smaller scale 
I 
manreuvres 
Norway Artic Express Ground/air Troms 15,300 CA-GE-IT-NL 1st-6th Yes 
I 
NO-UK-US March 
Black Bear Ground/air East Agder 8,200 NL-NO-UK-US 22nd-26th -
September 
I 
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Name Type Period lnvita-Sponsoring Participating tion to 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the obser-
mana:uvre mana:uvre mana:uvre vers 
--
1979 
A. Major 
man(J!uvres 
United States Certain Ground N. Baden 66,000. CA-GE-LU-NL 30th January- Yes 
Sentinel Wiirtenburg UK-US 6th February 
W. Bavaria 
United States Constant Ground Wissen /Sieg 29,000 BE-CA-GE-US 10th-21st Yes 
Enforcer with air Frankenberg September 
support Kassel 
Eschwege - Bad 
Hersfeld 
Giessen 
Diez/Lahn 
Fed. Rep. of Harte Faust Ground Oldenburg 60,000 GE-NL-US-DE 17th-21st Yes 
Germany with air Osnabriick September 
support MUnster 
Nordhorn 
B. Smaller scale 
man(J!uvres 
Norway Cold Ground/air County of 10,000 CA-NL-NO 17th-22nd -
Winter 79 Troms UK-US March 
Turkey Display Joint Aegean Sea 18,000 IT-TU-UK-US 28th September- -
Determination and Turkish 14th October 
79 Thrace 
France Saone 79 Ground Haute-Marne 16,000 FR 1st-7th Yes 
Haute-Saone October 
Doubs- Jura 
Cote d'Or 
United Kingdom Keystone Ground Hameln 18,000 UK 15th-27th -
Hildesheim October 
Salzgitter 
--
1980 
A. Major 
manfPuvres 
Fed. Rep. of St. Georg Ground Dillenburg 44,000 GE-US 15th-19th Yes 
Germany with air Eschwege September 
support Bamberg 
Heilbronn 
United States Certain Ground Southwest of 40,000 CA-GE-US 15th-24th Yes 
Ramparts Niirnberg September 
United Kingdom Spearpoint Ground Osnabriick 90,000 GE-UK-US 15th-25th Yes 
Minden September 
Nienburg 
Wolfsburg 
Braunhage 
Unna 
B. Smaller scale 
manfPuvres 
Norway Anorak Joint Troms area 18,200 CA-GE-IT-NL 14th-19th -
Express 80 NO-UK-US March 
Norway Teamwork 80 Joint North McfJre 16,800 NL-NO-UK-US 18th-24th Yes 
South September 
Trcfmdelag 
France Marne 80 Ground Aube- Marne 17,000 FR 6th-10th -
with air et Meuse October 
support 
Note: " Major mana:uvres" are those involving more than 25,000 men. 
I. Within Certain Trek the United States notified Reforger 75 a ground /air manoeuvre of 10,000 troops. 
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B. Warsaw Pact countries' manoeurres 
I I 
Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring 
of the of the Area Size Participating of the tion to 
country 
manreuvre manreuvre 
forces 
manreuvre 
obser-
vers 
--
1975 
None 
---, 
-------- --
1976 
A. Major 
manll'uvres 
USSR Caucasus Ground/air Kutaisi-Tbilisi About Soviet 25th January- Yes 
Yerevan 25,000 6th February 
USSR Sever Ground/air Leningrad About Soviet 14th-18th Yes 
Military 25,000 June 
District 
Poland Shield 76 Ground/air Bydgoszcz 35,000 POL-USSR 9th-16th Yes 
Szczecin CZ-GDR September 
Wroclaw 
B. Smaller scale 
man!l'uvres 
Hungary - Alert/ Denafolovar About Hungarian 6th April -
tactical (Central Hungary) 10,000 
exercise 
Hungary - Ground/air Tisza /Danube and 15,0001 Hungarian 18th-23rd -
Danatul Soviet I October 
----
1977 
A. Major 
man!l'uvres 
USSR - Ground/air Kiohinev 25,000 Soviet 31st March- -
Odes sa 5th April 
Nikolayev 
USSR Carpathia Ground/air Lutsk, Lvov 27,000 Soviet 11th-16th Yes 
Rovno July 
-------
--
1978 
A. Major 
man!l'uvres 
USSR Berezina Ground/air Minsk-Orsha 25,000 Soviet 6th-10th Yes 
Polotsk February 
USSR Tarcza 78 Ground/air GDR 30,000 Soviet 3rd-8th -
July 
USSR Kavraz II Ground Kutaisi 25,000 Soviet 5th-20th -
Batumi and September 
Kirovabad (notified 
(Trans- 5th-12th 
Caucasus MD) September) 
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Name Type Period lnvita-Sponsoring 
of the of the Area Size Participating of the tion to country 
manreuvre manreuvre 
forces 
manreuvre 
obser-
vers 
--
1979 
A. Major 
manlPuvres 
USSR/ Druzhba Ground /air Western 26,000 Soviet 2nd-7th -
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak February 
USSR Ground/air Rovno-Ivano About Soviet 2nd-7th -
Frankovsk 25,000 April 
USSR Neman Ground/air Panevejis 25,000 Soviet 23rd-27th Yes 
Taurage-Aiitus July 
B. Smaller scale 
manlPuvres 
Hungary Shield 79 Ground Area between less than BU-CZ-HU-RO mid-May -
Lake Balaton 25,000 USSR 
and Tisza River 
--
1980 
A. Major 
manlPuvres 
USSR - Ground/air Stendal 30,000 Soviet 10th-16th -
Magdeburg July 
Cottbus 
r Brandenburg 
German Brother- Ground /air I GDR-Balti~: 40,000 WP countries First half of -
Democratic hood in Amphibious Sea Coast September 
Republic arms 80 
B. Smaller scale 
manlPuvres 
Hungary Dyna 80 18,000 HU /Soviet 23rd-30th -
August 
I. Including certain staffs and units of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. 
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APPENDIX V 
Final communique issued after the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council 
26th June 1980 
I 
1. The North Atlantic Council met in 
Ministerial Session at Ankara on the 25th and 
26th June 1980. 
2. In reviewing the international situation, 
Ministers noted with concern that the past six 
months have been overshadowed by develop-
ments which challenge the foundations of stabi-
lity in the world. The rules which govern rela-
tions between states are defined in the United 
Nations Charter: the violations of these rules 
have led to tensions which are prejudicial to the 
understanding and trust which ought to govern 
relations between states. Ministers underlined 
the opposition of their governments to threat or 
use of force and they reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. They considered it particularly im-
portant in present circumstances to reaffirm 
their determination to work together for the 
achievement of the fundamental ideals and 
aims of the Atlantic Alliance: national indepen-
dence, security, human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. In this connection they under-
lined the importance of close political consulta-
tion within the Alliance. 
3. Ministers expressed their deep concern at 
the continued occupation of Afghanistan by 
Soviet armed forces. This occupation of a tra-
ditionally neutral and non-aligned country of 
the third world has aroused the resistance of the 
Afghan people, led to the flight of about a mil-
lion refugees and has been condemned by the 
overwhelming majority of the international 
community in resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly, the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission, the Islamic Confe-
rence and other bodies. They regard as unac-
ceptable this armed intervention and the 
attempt to crush the national resistance of the 
Afghan people by massive military force, and 
they note that the arguments used by the Soviet 
Government to justify its actions are totally 
unconvincing. Reaffirming the words of the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
of 14th January 1980, adopted by 104 votes, 
Ministers stressed the need for " immediate, 
unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Afghanistan " and urged the Soviet 
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Government to respect the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of that country and the rights 
of the Afghan people freely to determine their 
future. 
Ministers noted that the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan carried with it very serious 
implications for the genenal strategic situa-
tion. By using its own miUtary forces directly 
to impose its will, this tim~ on a non-aligned 
country, the Soviet Government has clearly 
demonstrated its readiness to exploit opportuni-
ties to shift the balance of forces in its 
favour. It has thus given rise to grave concerns 
about its future intentions and is threatening 
the security of a region whiah is vital for world 
peace and stability. While recognising that the 
security of the region is primarily the concern 
of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the 
fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason 
of their relations with those countries, in a posi-
tion to make a contribution to peace and stabi-
lity in the region. 
Ministers agreed that the international 
crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for 
a resolute, constant and concerted response on 
the part of the allies. It is vital that the Soviet 
Government should be left in no doubt as to 
the extremely grave view which the allies take 
of this situation which jeop*dises world peace. 
Ministers reaffirmed that there could be no 
question of accepting a fait accompli resulting 
from the use of force. Afghanistan should be 
neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. They 
stressed the need for a political settlement 
which must necessarily provide for the total 
and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as 
to enable the Afghan people to decide on its 
future peacefully with complete freedom and 
without any outside pressure. The recent 
announcement that some Soviet troops are 
being withdrawn from Afghanistan would only 
be of interest if it were the beginning of a total 
withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the impor-
tant role which the Islamic Conference and the 
Non-Aligned Movement have assumed in the 
search for a political solution. Ministers noted 
that while there had been various proposals 
formulated or inspired by the Soviet Union, 
including the ideas advanced in the declaration 
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of the Warsaw Pact states of 15th May 1980, 
none of them had addressed the basic issues and 
all would subject the national independence 
and right of self-determination of the Afghan 
people to restrictions unacceptable in interna-
tional law. 
Ministers noted that the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan had done serious damage to 
detente, to which they reaffirmed their attach-
ment. They restated their willingness to work 
for the improvement of East-West relations and 
their wish to keep open the channels of com-
munication between the countries of East and 
West, so as to make their views clear, to pre-
vent misunderstanding, to facilitate a resolution 
of the present crisis, and to foster constructive 
co-operation, as circumstances permit. They 
reaffirmed, however, that detente cannot be 
pursued in one region of the world regardless of 
developments in another. Moreover, they 
agreed that restoration of a co-operative rela-
tionship must be based on a foundation of 
mutual confidence, and this has been shaken by 
recent Soviet actions. It will need to be rebuilt 
by positive action on the part of the Soviet 
Government to live up to the peaceful inten-
tions which it professes. 
4. In addition to the concern created by the 
invasion of Afghanistan, Ministers noted that, 
despite Warsaw Pact statements that they did 
not seek military superiority, there was no sign 
of any slackening of the substantial rate of 
growth in the quality, readiness and strength of 
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces which 
threaten to increase the present military 
disparities, particularly in Europe. Ministers, 
therefore, re-emphasised their governments' 
resolve to take all necessary steps individually 
or collectively to maintain an adequate level of 
deterrence and defence across the full spectrum. 
They reaffirmed that more effective use 
of resources through co-operative equipment 
programmes and increased standardisation and 
interoperability of weapons systems was a key 
element in conventional force modernisation 
and they noted with satisfaction further progress 
in this respect. They reaffirmed too that they 
would continue to work through the trans-
atlantic dialogue toward more balanced rela-
tions among the European and North American 
allies in armaments development and produc-
tion and toward heightened availability and 
quality of new defence equipment. In this 
connection Ministers welcomed the work of the 
Conference of National Armaments Directors. 
They also commented on the importance of 
the work of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group and the progress they expected 
of it. They re-emphasised the need to bear in 
mind the interests of the less industrialised 
members of the Alliance in the course of 
improving armaments co-operation. Ministers 
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also stressed the significance of maintaining the 
technological advantages which NATO mem-
bers possess. 
5. In parallel with the efforts of their 
governments to maintain and strengthen their 
defence capabilities, Ministers reaffirmed their 
commitment to the pursuit of effective, balan-
ced and verifiable measures of disarmament and 
arms control. They nonetheless noted that the 
prospects for success will depend on the resto-
ration of international confidence and stability. 
Ministers emphasised that their governments 
wished to avoid a competitive arms race, but 
the substantial reductions in the level of forces 
which they seek will only be possible if negotia-
tions are based on a genuine willingness to 
achieve undiminished security for all partici-
pants and if the Warsaw Pact countries are 
convinced of the determination of the allies to 
maintain an adequate level of defence capabili-
ties. They devoted particular attention to the 
various initiatives of members of the Alliance 
in the area of arms control. They noted that 
these proposals had not met with a positive 
response. Ministers reaffirmed the determina-
tion of their governments to play their full part 
in the current disarmament work of the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as well 
as of the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission and other United Nations bodies. 
They underlined the importance they attach 
to the frequent and active consultations which 
take place on arms control and disarmament 
questions within the context of the permanent 
machinery of the Alliance. 
6. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the 
SALT 11 treaty which represents a significant 
contribution towards curbing the arms race and 
to ensuring the security of the Alliance and the 
stability of East-West relations. They expres-
sed regret that the current international crisis 
had delayed until now the process of ratifica-
tion of the treaty. Ministers expressed the 
hope that circumstances would make possible 
its ratification by both sides at the earliest 
opportunity. They hoped that the continua-
tion of the SALT process on the basis of further 
close consultations within the Alliance would 
make possible further reductions and qualitative 
limitations in the nuclear field between the 
United States and the USSR and create a favou-
rable climate for progress in other fields of arms 
control. 
7. The Ministers of the countries partici-
pating in the negotiations on mutual and balan-
ced force reductions affirmed the continued 
importance of progress in those negotiations as 
a means of achieving a more stable force rela-
tionship in Central Europe on the basis of 
genuine parity in military manpower in the 
form of a common collective ceiling on ground 
force manpower and a combined common col-
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lective ceiling on ground and air force man-
power for each side. The determination of 
western participants in those talks to achieve 
progress and to come to early results was 
demonstrated by their presentation in Vienna in 
December 1979 of important new proposals for 
an interim phase I agreement and associated 
measures as part of the programme of arms 
control initiatives approved by those Ministers 
earlier in December 1979. These proposals, 
which thus far remain unanswered by the East, 
are the most recent substantive proposals 
advanced in the Vienna talks. They provide a 
realistic framework for achieving a first nego-
tiated result, including the reduction and 
limitation of United States and Soviet ground 
force manpower in the area on the basis of 
agreed data on these personnel, and associated 
measures which would aid verification of reduc-
tions and limitations, increase military stability, 
enhance mutual understanding of the military 
posture and activities of the other side, and 
diminish the risk of misunderstanding and 
miscalculation. 
These Ministers noted the expression in 
the recent declaration of the Warsaw Pact 
states, of a desire for more rapid progress in the 
Vienna talks. They called on the Warsaw Pact 
states to give concrete expression to this state-
ment through practical movement on the data 
issue and through an early, constructive and 
substantive eastern response to the western pro-
posals of December 1979. 
8. Turning to the process initiated by the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe, Ministers noted that, in this field also, 
the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 
had seriously affected the confidence necessary 
for progress. They recalled that in the CSCE 
final act, the participating states had declared 
their intention to conduct their relations with 
all other states in the spirit of the principles 
guiding relations between themselves. It was 
therefore a matter of particular concern that the 
Soviet Union had acted and was still acting in 
Afghanistan in a manner violating the princi-
ples to which it had committed itself at 
Helsinki at the highest level. Ministers also 
deplored the increased suppression in certain 
countries of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the harassment, imprisonment, 
internal exile and banishment of those who 
strive for implementation of the final act. 
They expressed their concern that despite some 
positive developments, implementation in the 
field of human contacts remained uneven. 
They also noted with regret the lack of progress 
towards the freer flow of information. 
Against this background Ministers consi-
dered the approach to the forthcoming CSCE 
follow-up meeting at Madrid. They stressed 
the importance of maintaining the integrity of 
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the final act. They agreed that the emphasis 
must be placed on full implementation of its 
principles and provisions. Therefore, allied 
representatives at Madrid will engage in a 
thorough, frank and measured review of imple-
mentation with a view to stimulating improve-
ment. 
Ministers noted that the prospects for 
progress at Madrid and in particular for the 
consideration of new proposals, would be 
influenced by the course of this review and 
would depend on the international situation at 
that time. With this in mind, and recognising 
the importance of the CSCE process for pro-
moting contacts and negotiations between parti-
cipating states, Ministers agreed to continue to 
develop a balanced group of proposals and 
remain prepared to discuss and to take account 
of concrete proposals for balanced and signi-
ficant progress in all fields of the final act 
which may be advanced by other participants. 
Ministers reviewed the various proposals 
that have been developed so far in the field of 
CBMs and of certain aspects of security and 
disarmament. In this connection, Ministers 
recalled their agreement at the North Atlantic 
Council meeting of December 1979, to work 
toward the adoption during the Madrid CSCE 
meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a 
mandate for further negotiations under the aegis 
of the CSCE, as proposed by the Government 
of France, on militarily significant and veri-
fiable CBMs, applicable to the entire continent 
of Europe, this means including the whole of 
the European part of the Soviet Union. They 
expressed the hope that circumstances noted 
above would permit concrete results in this 
regard at the Madrid meeting. They noted 
that work was continuing in the Alliance on 
CBMs related to military activities which 
would accord with these prerequisites. They 
agreed to continue their common efforts in 
this area, while recognising that present 
circumstances required the Council in Per-
manent Session to evaluate developments 
on a constant basis. 
9. Ministers examined developments with 
regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole since 
their last meeting in December 1979. They 
expressed satisfaction with the working of the 
quadripartite agreement of 3rd September 
1971 and agreed that the situation in and 
around Berlin has continued relatively quiet. 
They underlined the fundamental importance 
of an undisturbed climate in Berlin and on the 
access routes for the main~enance of security 
and stability in Europe. 
Ministers noted with satisfaction the 
conclusion of the agreements and arrangements 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic on 30th 
April 1980. They welcomed the favourable 
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effects which these will have, particularly for 
Berlin. 
In connection with the 25th anniversary 
of the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris 
Conventions, Ministers recalled that these 
conventions enabled the Federal Republic of 
Germany to become an equal member of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, laid the foundations 
for its close co-operation, based on mutual 
trust, with the partners in the Alliance and 
contributed thereby to the strength of the 
Alliance and to the preservation of peace and 
security in Europe. They took this opportu-
nity to recall also the importance for the impro-
vement of the situation in Europe of the treaties 
of the Federal Republic of Germany with the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia as well 
as with the German Democratic Republic. 
Recalling that these treaties did not affect the 
rights and responsibilities of the four powers 
relating to Berlin ~nd Germany as a whole, 
they reaffirmed their support for the political 
objective of the Federal Republic of Germany 
to ~ork towards a state of peace in Europe in 
which the German people regains its unity 
through free self-determination. 
10. Ministers noted the report on the situa-
tion in the Mediterranean prepared on their 
instructions and underlined again the necessity 
of maintaining the balance of forces in the 
whole area. They requested the Council in 
Permanent Session to continue its consultations 
on this subject and report to them at their next 
meeting. 
Ministers noted that the recent develop-
ments in South-West Asia have brought even 
more sharply into focus the great strategic 
importance of the south-eastern flank for the 
security of the Alliance and for the overall 
balance of power in the region, the main-
tenance of which is essential for international 
stability. Ministers therefore stated that the 
urgency of strengthening the economic and 
defence postures of these member countries has 
further increased. In addition Ministers stressed 
in the interests of the Alliance's collectiv~ 
defence, the importance of the initiatives under-
taken to strengthen the cohesion of the south-
eastern flank. In this connection, Ministers 
also stressed that in the interests of the 
Alliance's collective defence, the restoration of 
full and undiminished solidarity between the 
member countries concerned takes on a special 
significance. 
11. The Ministers welcomed the continuation 
of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and 
~xpressed the hope that they would pursue their 
JOmt efforts for a peaceful solution to the diffe-
rences between the two countries. 
12. Ministers reviewed the particular prob-
lems faced by the economically less advanced 
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member countries in the light of a report by the 
S~cretary-General. Noting that in the present 
circumstances the need for a clear demonstra-
tion of allied solidarity is even more important 
Ministers reaffirmed their attachment to th~ 
spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and their continued political support for the 
process of enhancing the economies of those 
countries. In this context they reiterated the 
urgent need for an increase in financial assis-
tance and economic co-operation from the 
allies which are in a position to do so, through 
the appropriate bilateral and multilateral chan-
nels. They welcomed the efforts being made to 
find a solution to Turkey's economic problems 
recognising time was necessary for the current 
efforts to become fully effective and that they 
would need to continue over a number of years. 
13. Ministers recalled the welcome they gave 
at their spring session in 1979 to the intensified 
consideration being given by the Science Com-
mittee to the possibilities of reducing scientific 
and technological disparities between member 
countries through co-operative activities. They 
endorsed the establishment of a special five-
year programme, " Science for stability ", pro-
posed by the Science Committee, to strengthen 
the scientific and technological capabilities of 
Greece, Portugal and Turkey by means of co-
operation with scientific institutions in other 
countries of the Alliance and thereby contribute 
to the economic development of these three 
countries. The modalities of implementation 
of this programme will be decided by the Coun-
cil in Permanent Session. 
14. With respect to the Middle East, Minis-
ters reaffirmed the importance of a just, lasting 
and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. They reviewed the situation in 
the area including the progress achieved by 
Egypt and Israel in developing their mutual 
relations. Ministers believed that such a settle-
ment should ensure the right of all states in the 
area, including Israel, to live within secure 
recognised .and guaranteed boundaries, as well 
as the achievement of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. Ministers affirmed that 
all the concerned, including representatives of 
the Palestinian people, should participate in a 
negotiated settlement. Ministers considered 
that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 
together with the principles stated above, 
should form the framework for such a settle-
ment. They deemed it essential that this frame-
work should be accepted by all the parties 
concerned. 
15. Within the context of their discussion of 
the need for enhancing global stability and 
security, Ministers called upon all countries to 
assu~e their. share of the responsibility for 
seekmg solutwns to world economic problems 
and for contributing to the economic and social 
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progress of the developing countries in order 
to bring about a more equitable international 
economic system. They observed that positive 
results from the proposed global round of nego-
tiations within the United Nations concerning 
raw materials, energy, trade, development and 
monetary and financial questions would serve 
the interests of developing as well as deve-
loped countries. 
11 
16. Ministers of countries who participated 
in the decision of 12th December 1979, to pur-
sue the two parallel and complementary 
approaches on long-range theatre nuclear forces 
(LR TNF) modernisation and on arms control 
involving TNF, having received a report on 
progress in TNF arms control discussions, wel-
comed the repeated efforts of the United States, 
based on full consultations among the allies 
concerned, to engage the Soviet Union in 
serious negotiations in the SALT Ill framework 
aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on 
Soviet and United States land-based LR TNF 
consistent with the principle of equality bet-
ween the sides. In particular, these Ministers 
supported the United States readiness to engage 
in preliminary exchanges on such limitations 
without precondition or delay, as a useful star-
ting point for negotiating on TNF in the SALT 
Ill framework. These Ministers regretted that 
the Soviet responses do not contain anything 
which would constitute practical measures 
designed to restore a balanced situation. 
Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown any 
willingness to enter into serious negotiations or 
even to engage in preliminary exchanges. 
They noted that although there have been some 
indications that the Soviet Union recognises 
that SALT Ill could be the appropriate forum 
for negotiations involving TNF, the Soviet 
Union continues to repeat, most recently in the 
Warsaw Pact declaration, unrealistic and unac-
ceptable preconditions which would perpetuate 
inequality. 
These Ministers therefore once again 
called on the Soviet Union to respond promptly 
and positively to the United States offers to 
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negotiate and to enter into preliminary exchan-
ges without any preconditions before the ratifi-
cation of the SALT 11 treaty. 
These Ministers expressed their concern 
about Soviet preponderance in LR TNF systems 
deployed to date, and noted that the systems 
deployed have already reached a dangerously 
high level. In addition to its existing force of 
450 SS-4 and SS-5 LRTNF, the Soviet Union 
has at present deployed approximately 450 war-
heads on 150 SS-20 launchers. The SS-20 
deployments are continuing at a rapid pace. 
The Soviet Union is in the process of deploying 
for its SS-20 force alone more warheads than 
are planned for the entire modernisation pro-
gramme agreed to in December 1979. By 
contrast, deployments in allied countries will 
not begin until late in 1983. 
These Ministers pointed out that it was 
the need to preserve the Alliance's deterrent 
capability against the background of existing 
disparity in LR TNF in favour of the Soviet 
Union which gave rise to the decision of their 
governments to modernise LRTNF, and that 
the continuing Soviet deployments of new 
SS-20 missiles will further increase that dispa-
rity. 
These Ministers further noted that the 
modernisation programme was deliberately 
restrained as compared with the qualitative and 
quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabi-
lities. In this regard, they also noted that the 
withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear 
warheads from Europe as an integral part of the 
LRTNF modernisation and arms control deci-
sion has begun ; they recalled that the new 
LRTNF warheads decided upon on 12th 
December 1979 would be accommodated 
within the reduced level. 
These Ministers recalled their statement 
of 12th December 1979, that arms control, by 
constraining the Soviet build-up, can enhance 
Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's 
long-range TNF requirements, and promote 
stability and detente in Europe in consonance 
with NA TO's basic policy of deterrence, 
defence and detente. Ministers reiterated that 
the scale of NA TO's long-range TNF require-
ments will be examined in the light of concrete 
results achieved through negotiations. 
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Final communique issued after the meeting of the 
Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation 
14th May 1980 
1. The Defence Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in 
Ministerial Session in Brussels on 13th and 
14th May 1980. Foreign Ministers of coun-
tries participating in the integrated military 
structure of the Alliance took part in the ses-
sion of 14th May. In appreciation of the 
important contribution made by the Federal 
Republic of Germany to allied defence and co-
operation, Ministers drew attention to the 25th 
anniversary of its accession to NATO on 6th 
May 1955. 
2. Ministers carried out their discussions 
against a background of the major strategic 
issues facing the Alliance in the light of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implica-
tions of that action for stability in South-West 
Asia. Foreign Ministers looked forward to a 
full discussion of the political aspects of these 
developments at the forthcoming ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Ankara. 
3. Ministers expressed their concern that for 
the first time in the post-war era the Soviet 
Union had used military force to impose its will 
on a non-aligned country of the third world and 
in a way which affected the overall strategic 
situation. Ministers denounced this use of 
force which jeopardises international peace and 
stability and strikes at the principles of the 
United Nations' Charter, and called for the 
total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan. The people of 
Afghanistan must be free to shape their future 
without outside interference. 
4. Ministers expressed the hope that the 
Soviet Union would re-establish the conditions 
for more positive and productive East-West 
relations. They stressed their readiness to 
continue the search for progress in the field of 
arms control and disarmament on the basis of 
realistic balanced and verifiable measures. 
They reaffirmed their support for the SALT 11 
treaty as a major contribution to detente and to 
security and looked forward to its early ratifica-
tion. Ministers recalled the wide range of ini-
tiatives particularly in the field of confidence 
building and arms control contained in the 
communiques of 12th and 14th December 1979 
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and designed to improve mutual security and 
co-operation in Europe. They appealed to the 
members of the Warsaw Pact to make their 
contribution towards this goal and to respond 
positively to these western proposals. At the 
same time, in the present circumstances, Minis-
ters underlined the continuing need to maintain 
and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in 
the interests of deterrence. 
5. Ministers further agreed that the stability 
of regions outside NATO boundaries, particu-
larly in the South-West Asia area, and the 
secure supply of essential commodities from 
this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, 
the current situation has serious implications 
for the security of member countries. The 
altered strategic situation in South-West Asia 
warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of 
allied cohesion as a response to the new 
challenges. Ministers recognised that mainte-
nance of the special relationships of allies with 
the regional countries are in the interests of the 
West as well as of the countries of the region. 
6. It is in the interests of members of the 
Alliance that countries which are in a position 
to do so should use their best efforts to help 
achieve peace and stability in South-West Asia, 
taking into consideration the interests of the re-
gional countries and the value of their political 
co-operation. The burden, particularly insofar 
as defence measures are concerned, falls largely 
upon the United States, which has already 
taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Minis-
ters noted that this commitment, which in cer-
tain circumstances might substantially increase, 
could place additional responsibilities on all 
allies for maintaining levels and standards of 
forces necessary for defence and deterrence in 
the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need 
for ensuring that at the same time as the United 
States carries out the efforts to strengthen 
defence capabilities for South-West Asia des-
cribed above, allied capabilities to deter aggres-
sion and to defend NATO Europe are also 
maintained and strengthened. 
7. In discussing the effect of recent events 
on the NATO area, Ministers agreed that there 
was no sign of any relaxation in the efforts 
being undertaken by the Warsaw Pact and, in 
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particular, the Soviet Union to increase sub-
stantially the quality and readiness of their for-
ces. Despite a slowdown in economic growth 
and increasing difficulties in the energy sec-
tor, Soviet defence expenditure still amounted 
to 11 to 13% of its GDP, and continued to 
receive top priority despite the needs of the 
civil economy. 
8. Ministers pledged themselves to increase 
their efforts to improve the capabilities of the 
full spectrum of forces committed to the Alli-
ance. They received the assurance of the 
United States Secretaries of State and Defence 
that the security of the NATO area remains 
central to United States policy, and they noted 
that the United States has no plans to withdraw 
any United States forces permanently stationed 
in Europe for use in South-West Asia. Minis-
ters of other countries agreed to do their utmost 
to meet additional burdens for NATO security 
which could result from the increased United 
States responsibilities in South-West Asia. 
9. As an expression of their willingness to 
respond to the needs of the present situation, 
Ministers agreed upon a number of near-term 
defence measures to be undertaken by indivi-
dual countries. Action would represent earlier 
or augmented implementation of urgently 
required defence measures designed to improve 
force capabilities in the NATO area. These 
measures are derived largely from existing 
national plans and based on comprehensive 
Alliance defence planning. 
10. Ministers also called for a report, for the 
December 1980 Defence Planning Committee 
meeting, establishing again on a country-by-
country basis further specific measures for 
prompt or accelerated implementation. In the 
main, these would also be selected from current 
defence programmes; they would take account 
of the evolution of the international situation in 
general and of the situation in South-West Asia 
in particular, and of the possible effects of this 
situation on the reinforcements available for the 
defence of the NATO area. Areas suitable for 
consideration would include readiness, reserve 
mobilisation, war reserve munitions and mate-
riel, maritime defence, airlift enhancement, 
support by nations of reinforcing forces, milit-
ary assistance to Portugal and Turkey and the 
NATO infrastructure programme. 
11. Ministers agreed that the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and its implications for interna-
tional stability including in South-West Asia 
made it more than ever necessary to maintain 
solidarity, cohesion and undiminished strength 
throughout the Alliance. These developments 
also brought more sharply into focus the 
strategic importance of the Mediterranean 
area and the pressing need for strengthening the 
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economic and defence postures of member 
countries on the southern flank. 
12. Ministers also discussed a number of 
issues related principally to the continuation 
and implementation of current NATO defence 
plans designed to maintain the credibility of the 
Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. 
13. They discussed the status of the long-
term defence programme and approved recom-
mendations designed to ensure steady progress 
in a number of key areas. These areas inclu-
ded certain readiness and reserve mobilisation 
measures, a number of maritime equipment 
projects, the provision of electronic warfare 
units and war reserve stocks. 
14. Ministers once more reviewed the se-
rious economic difficulties of Portugal and 
Turkey. Their effect on the defence capabili-
ties of both nations, but in particular of Tur-
key, continues to give grave concern. Prob-
lems and possible remedies were identified and 
highlighted. Noting that satisfactory progress 
has not been made up to now, Ministers agreed 
that allied military assistance needs to be inten-
sified and accelerated to meet the critical requi-
rements in a timely way. In this respect they 
welcomed the decision of Germany further to 
increase its already substantial aid programme 
for Turkey. To strengthen the Alliance's mari-
time posture, particularly in the field of anti-
submarine warfare, Ministers also supported the 
Portugueuse Government in its plans to acquire 
three modem frigates and agreed to consider the 
best ways to provide assistance for them. 
15. Ministers welcomed the evidence of 
closer collaboration amongst member nations in 
defence equipment matters as reported by the 
Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors. They noted with satisfaction that the 
NATO armaments planning' review is already 
providing a useful means of identifying oppor-
tunities for co-operation development and pro-
duction of equipment and for improving inter-
operability, and that the trial of the periodic 
armaments planning system is proceeding 
well. They welcomed the progress being made 
towards ammunition interchangeability and the 
establishment of several new project groups for 
future equipment, including air-delivered missi-
les and a frigate replacement. 
16. Ministers noted with interest the greater 
emphasis being placed on transatlantic co-
operation in the development of families of 
weapons. In this respect they welcomed the 
progress being made in the field of third-
generation anti-tank weapons and air-to-air 
missiles and the prospects for a family of mari-
time mines. They encouraged the search for 
greater use of new technology, including that 
now available in the commercial sphere, for 
DOCUMENT 8 58 
application to systems which will enhance the 
effectiveness of NATO defence including that 
of members of the Alliance which are less 
industrialised. To safeguard the military ad-
vantages accruing to NATO from the applica-
tion of advanced technology, Ministers consi-
dered that close attention should be given to the 
implementation of trade control provisions, so 
that Soviet forces cannot benefit from the trans-
fer of any technology which would enable them 
to modernise their forces more quickly and at 
lower cost. 
17. Ministers received a statement by Dr. 
Hans Apel, German Defence Minister and 
Chairman of the Eurogroup. They reaffirmed 
their support for the continuing work of the 
Eurogroup aimed at strengthening the cohesion 
of the Alliance and at making the European 
contributions to collective security as effective 
as possible. They welcomed the determination 
of Eurogroup members to continue steady and 
sustained force modernisation; and to ensure 
that resources available for defence are used to 
maximum advantage through co-operation and 
collaboration in practical fields of activity. In 
this connection they noted the continuing pro-
gress in the fields of logistics, training, 
communications, equipment co-operation, force 
structures and medical co-operation. 
18. Ministers noted that the NATO military 
commanders had presented a case for an aug-
mentation and acceleration of the current five-
year 1980-1984 NATO infrastructure pro-
gramme and agreed to consider a more substan-
tive report at their December 1980 meeting. 
19. Ministers endorsed a new procedure to 
extend NA TO's defence planning progressively 
into a longer timeframe, with the goal of 
achieving closer co-ordination at both the 
national and international level in setting 
Alliance objectives and in allocating resources 
for defence. 
20. Ministers recalled their decision of 12th 
December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and 
complementary approaches on long-range thea-
tre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation and on 
arms control involving TNF, and took note of 
the progress report on the proceedings of the 
Special Consultative Group on arms control 
involving TNF. Ministers expressed support 
for the repeated efforts of the United States to 
engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations 
aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on 
Soviet and United States land-based long-range 
TNF consistent with the principle of equality 
between the sides. This offer was first made 
following the December TNF decision and was 
repeated by the United States Secretary of State 
on 4th April 1980. Ministers regretted that the 
Soviet Union has in response reiterated its 
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rejection of the offer to conduct serious negotia-
tions and is instead advancing conditions which 
would perpetuate inequality. The Soviet 
Union has until now posed unacceptable pre-
conditions for negotiations, and is continuing 
the process of deploying SS-20 missiles at a 
rapid pace. Ministers therefore called on the 
Soviet Union to respond positively and to 
accept without delay the United States offer to 
negotiate. 
21. Ministers expressed their concern about 
the Soviet superiority in long-range TNF sys-
tems. They recognised that the continuing 
deployment of new Soviet long-range TNF sys-
tems, particularly of the SS-20 missile, further 
increased the already existing disparity in long-
range TNF in favour of the Soviet Union. 
They noted that the Alliance's long-range TNF 
modernisation programme in which an initial 
operational capability for modem long-range 
TNF in Europe is anticipated towards the end 
of 1983, is a deliberately restrained one compa-
red with the qualitative and quantitative growth 
in Soviet nuclear capabilities facing the Alli-
ance which has already taken place and is con-
tinuing. The Soviet Union is already in the 
process of deploying for its SS-20s alone more 
warheads than will be involved in the entire 
Alliance modernisation programme. Ministers 
reiterated that the scale of NA TO's long-range 
TNF requirements will be examined in the light 
of concrete results achieved through negotia-
tions. 
22. Ministers recalled that it was decided at 
the December 1979 meeting that 1,000 United 
States nuclear warheads should be withdrawn 
from Europe as an integral part of the decision 
to modernise TNF without increasing NA TO's 
reliance on nuclear weapons, and to pursue 
arms control involving TNF. They noted that 
this withdrawal has begun, as has implementa-
tion of other parts of the December decision. 
23. Ministers took note of the present state of 
negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions. They urged eastern participants to 
make a positive response to the recent western 
proposals for an interim phase I agreement, and 
for a package of associated measures which 
forms an integral part of the interim agreement 
proposal. 
24. Ministers concluded their meeting by 
endorsing NATO force goals for the period 
1981-1986 established on their behalf by the 
Defence Planning Committee in Permanent 
Session. There was full recognition that in 
view of the current imbalance between NATO 
and Warsaw Pact forces, implementation of 
these force goals would represent a major factor 
in the maintenance of adequate Alliance 
defence. 
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25. Accordingly Ministers pledged themselves 
to preserve and strengthen the military capabili-
ties of the Alliance. They reaffirmed the 
importance of member countries achieving and 
sustaining the aim, endorsed by heads of state 
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and government, of increases in annual defence 
expenditures in real terms in the region of 
3%. They expressed their confidence that 
those countries who have not yet been able to 
meet this goal will make every effort to do so. 
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Amendment 1 
State of European security 
AMENDMENT 1 ' 
1st December 1980 
tabled by MM. Onslow, Grant and Kittelmann 
1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "on balance" and 
"has not diminished; that in present circumstances it". 
1. See IIth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Onslow, Grant, Kittelmann 
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Amendments 2, 3 and 4 
State of European security 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by MM. Valleix and Bozzi 
2nd December 1980 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "despite" and insert 
" since ". 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular 
provisions " to the end of the paragraph. 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows: 
"4. In the framework of the Madrid meeting, negotiate the terms of a conference on 
disarmament in Europe." 
Signed: Valleix, Bozzi 
I. See IIth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendments 2 and 4 amended and agreed to; Amendment 3 negatived). 
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SALT and the British and French nuclear forces 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr Mommersteeg, Rapporteur 
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1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 3 with 3 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); 
MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, 
Banks (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Bermni, Bizet, 
Bonne1, Boucheny, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards, Fosson (Alter-
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valle, Meintz, Menard, Onslow, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli (Alter-
nate: Martmo), Peronnet, Schmidt, Scholten, Tanghe. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
15th and 16th September 1980- NATO Headquarters, Brussels 
Admiral Robert H. Falls, CA CF, Chairman Military Committee; 
H.E. Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General; 
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H. E. Sir Clive Rose, KCMG, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom; 
Baron Seeger J.J. van Voorst tot Voorst, Minister, Netherlands Deputy Permanent Represen-
tative; 
Dr. H.C. Lankes, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; 
H.E. Mr. Claude Arnaud, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France; 
The Honourable Maynard W. Glitman, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the 
United States. 
16th September 1980- SHAPE, Casteau 
General Sir Jack Harman, UK Army, Deputy SACEUR; 
Admiral Luther, German Navy, Deputy SACEUR; 
General William Y. Smith, US Air Force, Chief of Staff; 
Vice-Admiral Ugo Masetti, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Armaments and 
Administration; 
Lt. General L.P.G. Domrose, German Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. 
6th October 1980- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Paris 
Mrs. Renouard, Head of Strategic Affairs and Disarmament Service; 
Mr. Jacques Louveau. 
16th October 1980 - Bonn 
Ministry of Defence: 
Dr. Stiitzle, Director of Planning Staff; 
Dr. Weise; 
Colonel von der Hagen. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Dr. F. Ruth, Ambassador, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control; 
Dr. Wilfried Bolewski; 
Dr. von Wagner. 
21st and 22nd October 1980- London 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Mr. Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; 
Mr. David Logan; 
Mr. Patrick Moberley, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. 
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Royal United Services Institute: 
Rear Admiral E.F. Gueritz, Director; 
Group Captain David Bolton, Deputy Director; 
Dr. Lawrence Freedman, Head of Policy Studies, RIIA. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director. 
Ministry of Defence: 
Lord Strathcona, Minister of State for Defence; 
Mr. Michael Quinlan, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Defence (with special responsibility 
for the nuclear force and SALT). 
28th October 1980 - Bonn 
Mr. Berndt von Staden, Head of the Foreign Policy and Security Section, Office of the 
Chancellor. 
On 17th September 1980 at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, the Committee as a whole discussed 
the theme of the report with the following members of the French parliamentary defence committees: 
Defence and Armed Forces Committee 
of the French National Assembly: 
General Bigeard (Chairman) 
MM. Bozzi1 
Mrs. 
MM. 
Cabanel 
d'Harcourt 
Lancien 
Mauger 
Tourrain 
Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces Committee 
of the -French Senate: 
MM. d'Aillieres (representing the Chairman) 
Boucheny1 
Bourgine 
Pontillon 
The Committee next met in London on 22nd and 23rd October when it discussed the theme of 
the report with the following members of the House of Commons Defence Committee: 
Sir John Langford-Holt, Chairman 
Mr. Bruce George 
Mr. J.W. Gilbert 
and their adviser Dr. Lawrence Freedman. 
The Committee was then addressed by Colonel Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director of the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, and discussed a first draft of this report. 
The Committee met finally in Rome on 17th November, when it was addressed by Mr. Pasquale 
Bandiera, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence, and adopted the report as a whole. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the members of the British and 
French parliamentary committees who met with it to discuss the theme of the report, and to the 
Ministers, officials and senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the 
Committee and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the 
Committee. 
1. Also members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security; 
(ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to :follow closely the 
SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject; 
(iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence 
Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range 
theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union; 
(iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated 
within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting ftom the unilateral 
reduction of I ,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would 
provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981; 
(v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that 
they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic 
nuclear balance; 
(vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent 
and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part; 
(vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear 
forces were " capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening 
of the deterrence of the Alliance ", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional 
defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncer-
tainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence; 
(viii) Believing SALT 11 to be to the mutual advantage ofboth NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control 
negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are 
to the mutual advantage of the parties; 
(x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit 
annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment 
programmes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To call for the observance of the SALT 11 limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT 
process, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations; 
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not 
lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence; 
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parlia-
ments, to study the possibility: 
(a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both 
armaments and arms control with security planning; 
(b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential 
basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms 
control negotiations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The Committee originally considered 
preparing a report on the future of the British 
and French nuclear forces in June 1979 when it 
was expected that modernisation plans for both 
would shortly be made known. It decided 
early in December 1979, when ratification of 
SALT 11 was expected to lead to the opening of 
negotiations on SALT Ill, to study the future of 
the forces in the context of those negotiations. 
1.2. When your Rapporteur came to prepare 
the first draft of this report, the situation had 
however changed. With the invasion of Afghan-
istan the prospects of early ratification of 
SALT 11 had receded, and now with a new 
administration about to take over in the United 
States an attempt may be made to renegotiate 
parts of it. The two-part NATO decision of 
12th December 1979 to deploy new United 
States long-range theatre nuclear forces in 
Europe, while limitations on such United States 
and Soviet systems are negotiated bilaterally in 
the SALT Ill framework, is another factor to be 
taken into account. 
1.3. Accordingly, this report first places the 
French and British forces in the context of the 
global nuclear balance between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and, after describ-
ing the two national forces, turns to the pros-
pects of arms control. 
11. The global strategic nuclear balance 
2.1. This report first describes the global stra-
tegic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union 
and the NATO allies so that the British and 
French nuclear forces may be seen in perspec-
tive. Although they are numerically small, 
comprising about 300 independent warheads 
carried by long-range missiles and aircraft, 
compared with the 9,200 independent warheads 
of the United States or 6,500 of the Soviet 
Union, the British and French forces are still a 
powerful deterrent in the eyes of Soviet plan-
ners because of the large uncertainty introduced 
by two additional independent centres of deci-
sion, and because these thermonuclear war-
heads in any case are some tens of times as 
powerful as the nuclear weapons dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
2.2. The numbers of strategic missiles and air-
craft in service appear to be reported with some 
reliability both in respect of the Soviet Union 
and of allied countries. When estimates of the 
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total number of bombs or independent war-
heads are made, the situation has been impossi-
bly complicated with the introduction in the 
early 1970s of multiPle, independently.=target~­
able re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) first by the 
United States and some five years later, inevita-
bly, by the Soviet Union. The number of 
MlR Vs on a missile cannot be determined by 
" national means of verification " - i.e. observa-
tion systems such as satellites operating outside 
the territory of the country concerned. They 
can be detected only in the course of test flights 
of a missile, when the number of independent 
re-entry bodies can be detected at a distance. 
But there is no means of knowing what propor-
tion of missiles so tested are fitted with the 
maximum number of MIRVs observed, nor 
how many of the re-entry vehicles are warheads 
and how many decoys or other penetration 
aids. Indeed, for the purposes of the SALT 11 
agreement, the assumption is made that any 
missile known to have been tested in a MlR V ed 
mode is thereafter counted as if all such mis-
siles were MIRV ed. Some uncertainty also 
arises concerning the number of bombs or 
standoff missiles likely to be carried by strategic 
aircraft. 
2.3. With these reservations, the table at 
Appendix I estimates force loadings for the 
strategic nuclear balance at mid-1980. It 
shows first the United States and Soviet systems 
covered by SALT - those systems based on the 
territory of one superpower, or in submarines, 
which are capable of reaching the territory of 
the other superpower. This table gives the 
Soviet Union a total of some 2,300 missiles and 
156 heavy bombers compared with some 1, 700 
and 350 respectively for the United States. 
Total numbers of warheads, calculated on the 
assumptions shown in the table, amount to 
some 6,500 for the Soviet Union and 9,200 for 
the United States. 
2.4. The table at Appendix I shows secondly 
other strategic nuclear systems of the Soviet 
Union and of allied countries. These are. taken 
as allied systems capable of reaching the terri-
tory of the Soviet Union, and comparable 
Soviet systems - with a range exceeding 1 ,000 
km. This table shows a total of 660 missiles 
and 1,065 aircraft for the Soviet Union com-
pared with 162 missiles and 490 aircraft for the 
allies (including French and British systems). 
It shows some 2,800 warheads for the Soviet 
Union compared with little more than 1,200 for 
the allies. It must be recognised, moreover, 
that due to geographical differences the Soviet 
Union can reach most targets in Western Eur-
ope with other weapons also - systems of a 
range of about 600 km if they were deployed in 
East Germany or Czechoslovakia - whereas 
western weapons systems capable of reaching 
the territory of the Soviet Union must have a 
range exceeding 1 ,000 km. 
2.5. If both these categories of weapons sys-
tems (which can be fairly termed strategic by 
the countries whose territory they can reach) 
are totalled, the figures in the table provide 
9,300 warheads for the Soviet Union compared 
with 10,430 for the United States and its allies. 
2.6. The advent of nuclear capable China 
complicates the picture with a further 300 
warheads if it is assumed that China has produ-
ced sufficient nuclear bombs to equip all its 
TU -16 " Badger " aircraft. As the Committee 
has previously pointed out1, about one-third of 
the Soviet SS-20 missiles are usually reported as 
being deployed against China as are between 
one-tenth and one-quarter of the SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles2• The position of China is important 
to the Soviet perception of a nuclear balance, 
because the Soviet Union alone among the 
nuclear powers perceives itself as surrounded by 
four potentially hostile and independently-
controlled nuclear forces. A longer-range 
Chinese ICBM was successfully test-fired on 
18th May 1980 over a range of 10,000 km into 
a previously designated impact area of 70 nauti-
cal miles radius, where the splashdown was 
independently monitored by Australian war-
ships and aircraft. Designated in the western 
reference system the CSS-X-4, there are reports 
that it may have a maximum range of 13,000 
km and be fitted with a 3-4 megaton warhead. 
2.7. Against these very large totals of war-
heads, the 300 contributed by the British and 
French strategic systems are seen in true pers-
pective. 
2.8. The totals of paragraph 2.5. take no 
account of the medium-range, battlefield and 
defensive (SAM, ADM) weapons systems, many 
dual-capable, having a range of less than 1,000 
km. The NATO stockpile in Europe is tradi-
tionally reported to be 7,000 warheads, of 
which NATO has unilaterally undertaken to 
withdraw 1 ,000, while the Soviet stockpile, pre-
viously taken to be 3,500, is now assumed by 
the United States to exceed that of NAT03• 
Numbers of French and British tactical nuclear 
warheads have not been specified, but are 
I. Document 827. 
2. There is now doubt as to the numbers of the obsoles-
cent SS-4 and SS-5 still deployed, especially against China. 
3. Committee on Appropriations, Sub-Committee on 
Department of Defence Hearings, Part 3 Research and 
Development and Acquisition, prepared statement by Dr. 
Wm. Perry, Under-Secretary of Defence, 5th February 
1980. 
179 
DOCUMENT 8 59 
obviously much smaller (see paragraphs 3.10. 
and 4.13.). 
(a) Future trends 
2.9. The nuclear balance is not static. Both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, as well 
as the smaller nuclear powers, continue to 
improve their nuclear forces. The submarine-
launched ballistic missile force remains un-
doubtedly the least vulnerable leg of the nuclear 
trend of both powers, and is likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future. Soviet anti-sub-
marine warfare capability is less advanced than 
that of the United States. Moreover Soviet 
submarines, in travelling from the open ocean 
from Soviet naval ports, must always pass 
through " choke points " wqere the territory of 
allied countries provides bas~s for the advanced 
United States SOSUS bottom-mounted sub-
marine detection system, but geography pro-
vides the Soviet Union with no similar advant-
age against allied submarines. However, Soviet 
submarines with SSN-8 and SSN-18 missiles 
can deploy in the Norwegi11n Sea and Sea of 
Okhotsk without crossing tqe SOSUS line, and 
still be in range of the United States. 
2.10. The new, longer-range Trident C-4 mis-
sile is being fitted progressively into 12 of the 
31 Poseidon-class strategic submarines; 48 mis-
siles are currently operational. A larger Ohio-
class Trident submarine carrying 24 missiles is 
under construction; the first will enter service 
in 1981, the construction of 7 more is currently 
planned with an option to exceed this number. 
A larger Trident D-5 missile, with a 6,000 
nautical miles range, capable of carrying 14 
MIRVs (the largest number permitted on 
SLBMs under SALT 11), is under development. 
2.11. The United States ICBM force, although 
now held to be vulnerable to the latest and 
more accurate Soviet ICBMs, remains an 
important part of the deterrent because the 
inherent accuracy, flexibility and responsiveness 
of this force make it possible to use it in a 
limited " warning " initial &trike against a pre-
cise military target. 300 Of the 550 Minute-
man Ill ICBMs are being progressively fitted 
with the higher yield Mark 12A re-entry vehi-
cle: " ... because of accuracy and yield improve-
ments, the Minuteman Ill will, by the 1980s, 
give us a considerable counter-silo potential... 1• 
Full-scale development of the MX missile is 
now being undertaken to provide an initial 
operational capability in 1986, and an eventual 
total of 200 mobile missiles 1which it is intended 
should move over 200 separate " race tracks " 
each some 30 km long, so as to distribute the 
I. United States Department of Defence annual report, 
fiscal year 1981, page 90 - 29th January 1980. 
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missiles at random among a total of 4,600 
concrete silos. With 10 MIRVs, the system 
would provide an additional 2,000 highly 
accurate, independently targetable warheads. 
This project, which will require some 18,000 
sq. km. of land in Utah and Nevada, is proving 
to be controversial. 
2.12. President Carter cancelled a programme 
for a new B-1 penetrating bomber (the proto-
type of which was inspected by the Committee 
in 1977) on the grounds of its vulnerability to 
improving Soviet air defences, and instead has 
selected the Boeing version of an air-launched 
cruise missile to equip the present fleet of B-52 
bombers. The contract, signed on 2nd May 
1980, provides for the production of 3,148 
ALCMs by 1987, at a cost of$ 4 billion, inclu-
ding subcontracts. Deliveries are due to begin 
in November 1981. The range of the ALCM 
will obviate the need for B-52s to penetrate 
Soviet air space. A new B-61 air-droppable 
nuclear bomb is also being developed for the 
B-52. 
2.13. At a press conference on 22nd August 
1980, the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, 
announced that the air force had developed a 
new " stealth " aircraft that was nearly unde-
tectable by radar, and would " alter the military 
balance ". Although the FY 1981 Department 
of Defence report on research, development and 
acquisition contains some hints of this develop-
ment: " Study efforts for the next generation of 
penetrating bomber will concentrate on designs 
which achieve very low observables " (page 
VI-9) and also reports research on radar absor-
bing materials, the precise status of this new 
development remains unclear. The announce-
ment may have owed more to the presidential 
election than to the imminent entry into service 
of a radar-invisible aircraft. 
2.14. These new nuclear weapons programmes, 
and the programmes for long-range theatre 
nuclear force deployment in Europe, will place 
a heavy strain on the United States production 
capacity for fissile material for making the 
corresponding nuclear warheads. The press 
reports doubling of expenditure in this area to 
$ 25 billion over the next five years1• 
2.15. The three plutonium production reactors 
at Savannah River in Southern Carolina are 
scheduled to expand production and a fourth 
reactor is to be reopened. These reactors are 
all some 26 years old and a joint Department of 
Defence/Department of Energy committee had 
recommended in May 198U the construction of 
a new plutonium production reactor at a cost of 
$ 3 billion to ensure production capability until 
the year 2000. The study covered a range of 
possibilities from a cutback on the present 
1. International Herald Tribune, 9th October 1980. 
180 
stockpile of about 25,000 tactical and strategic 
warheads, to a programme of a steady increase 
in production if SALT 11 were not ratified. 
2.16. Details of future Soviet plans for weapons 
development are not, of course, available; what 
is observed is the trend in weapons currently 
entering service which reflect Soviet policy 
decisions taken up to ten years earlier. The 
spur to the large increase in United States 
nuclear weapons production has been partly the 
introduction of the SS-20 medium-range missile 
referred to below and the new fourth generation 
of large ICBMs, SS-17, 18 and 19, which all 
first entered service in 197 5, with a large throw-
weight (7 -9,000 kg for the SS-18) which could 
theoretically offer the possibility of carrying up 
to 40 MIRVs each, and several different modifi-
cations of which are now operational. 
(b) Targeting policy 
2.17. In August 1980, the press reported the 
recent signature by President Carter of presi-
dential directive 59 which, in a speech at the 
Naval War College on 20th August, Secretary 
of Defence Harold Brown described thus: 
"Operationally, our countervailing stra-
tegy requires that our plans and capabili-
ties be structured to put more stress on 
being able to employ strategic nuclear 
forces selectively, as well as by all-out 
retaliation in response to massive attacks 
on the United States. It is our policy 
that - and we have increasingly the 
means and the detailed plans to carry out 
this policy - to ensure that the Soviet 
leadership knows that if they chose some 
intermediate level of aggression, we 
could, by selective, large (but still less 
than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an 
unacceptably high price in the things the 
Soviet leaders appear to value most -
political and military control, military 
force both nuclear and conventional, and 
the industrial capability to sustain war. 
In our planning we have not ignored 
the problem of ending the war, nor could 
we ignore it in the event of a war. And, 
of course, we have, and we will keep, a 
survivable and enduring capability to 
attack the full range of targets, including 
the Soviet economic base, if that is the 
appropriate response to a Soviet strike. " 
2.18. Earlier press reports suggested a com-
pletely new development in President Carter's 
association with this targeting policy, it repre-
sents the fruition of improvements to Minute-
man put in hand by the then Secretary of 
Defence James Schlesinger in 1976, and now 
provides the ability described in the annual 
report of the Secretary of Defence for FY 1981: 
" We have recognised for many years that 
our strategic nuclear capabilities could 
deter only a small number of contingen-
cies. But there can be no doubt that 
these capabilities still provide the founda-
tion on which our security rests. 
Without them, the Soviet Union could 
threaten the extinction of the United 
States and its allies. With them, our 
other forces become meaningful instru-
ments of military and political power. 
'Yi.t~ the growth of Soviet strategic capa-
bihttes, we have concluded that credible 
deterrence depends on our ability: 
- first, to maintain the second-strike 
forces necessary to attack a comprehen-
sive set of targets, including targets of 
political and military as well as of 
economic value; 
- second, to withhold retaliation against 
selected targets; 
- third, to cover at all times a sizable 
percentage of the Soviet economic 
base, so that these targets could be 
destroyed, if necessary; and 
- fourth, to hold the elements of a 
reserve force for a substantial period 
after a strategic exchange. " 
The co_ncept of providing a United States presi-
den~ with .a range ~f options in any circumstan-
ces m which he might be called upon to consi-
der using nuclear weapons had originated eight-
een years earlier. An earlier Secretary of 
Defence, Mr. McNamara, speaking at Michigan 
University on 16th June 1962 had called for 
the option of striking military t~rgets: " That is 
to say, principle military objectives in the event 
of a nuclea~ war stemming from a major attack 
on the Alhance, should be the destruction of 
the enemy's military forces, not of its civilian 
population", and the annual report of the 
Department of Defence under Secretary of 
Defence Schlesinger for fiscal year 1976 pointed 
out that: 
" The ICBM force, the heart of which is 
the Minuteman series, continues to give 
the accuracy, flexibility, and control 
nec~ssary to deal with and thereby deter 
a Wide range of attacks on military tar-
gets. It provides the most reliable source 
of limited response options so essential to 
nuclear deterrence under conditions of 
nuclear parity. " 
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(c) Long-range theatre n11clear forces 
2.19. The Committee reported in detail at this 
time last year1 on the problem of what, since 
1977, had become known as the lorig-range 
theatre . nuclear forces. These are essentially 
the Soviet SS-4, 5 and 20 missiles, which have 
no counterpart at all in NA 10 inventories and 
the Backfire bomber. They 'are included i~ the 
table at Appendix I under " Other strategic 
systems". The Assembly adopted without 
~mendment the accompanying recommenda-
tton2: 
"That the Council call on the North 
Atlantic Council: To seek to redress the 
military balance, now threatened in parti-
cular by the deployment of new Soviet 
nuclear weapons systems: 
(a) by taking the decisions necessary to 
ensure that the growing imbalance bet-
ween the Warsaw Pact and NATO long-
range theatre nuclear forces is corrected 
in due course; 
(b) by accompanying these decisions by a 
firm offer to enter jnto arms control 
negotiations with a view to limiting long-
range theatre nuclear force deployment 
on both sides; 
(c) by continuing to seek agreement on 
significant reductions in present numbers 
of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons; 
(d) by relying meanwhile on the whole 
range of existing weapons systems based 
in Europe, at sea, and in the United 
States to counter the threat posed by 
present levels of Soviet weapons; ... " 
2.20. At a special meeting of foreign and 
defence ministers of NATO countries (except 
France) in Brussels on 12th December 1979 a 
decision was taken: ' 
"To modernise NATO's LRTNF by the 
deployment in Europe of United States 
ground-launched systems comprising 108 
Pershing 11 launchers which would 
replace existing United States Pershing 
lA and 464 GLCMs all with single 
warheads. All the nations currently parti-
cipating in the integrated defence struc-
ture will participate 
1
in the programme: 
the missiles will be stationed in selected 
countries and certain support costs will 
I. Docum_ent 827, New weapons and defence strategy, a 
report submitted on behalf of the Committee by Mr. Roper, 
Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van den Bergh, 
Rapporteur, 3rd December 1979. 
2. Recommendation 345 (text at Appendix II) adopted by 
the Assembly on 2nd June 1980, by 41 votes to 9 with 
6 abstentions. The Assembly had been unable to vote on 
the draft recommendation at its December 1979 session 
through lack of a quorum. 
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be met through NA TO's existing com-
mon funding arrangements. The pro-
gramme will not increase NA TO's 
reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this 
connection, ministers agreed that, as an 
integral part of TNF modernisation, 
I ,000 United States nuclear warheads 
will be withdrawn from Europe as soon 
as feasible. Further, ministers decided 
that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be 
accommodated within that reduced level, 
which necessarily implies a numerical 
shift of emphasis away from warheads for 
delivery systems of other types and 
shorter ranges ".1 
The Netherlands expressed the reservation to 
the effect that it would take a decision on sta-
tioning of GLCM on its territory in December 
1981 " on the basis of the criterion whether or 
not arms control negotiations have by then 
achieved success in the form of concrete re-
sults". Belgium, stressing its solidarity with 
the allies, suspended application of the decision 
on its territory for six months with a view to 
taking account of any progress in the corres-
ponding arms control negotiations. On 19th 
September 1980, a Belgian Government state-
ment said that Belgium would accept the 
conclusions of the negotiations " and execute 
the share that fell to it in the framework of the 
Alliance "; if the negotiations did not succeed 
Belgium would take " all measures to have been 
agreed between the NATO partners "; the pro-
gress of the negotiations would be reviewed 
every six months. On 23rd September, the 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Nothomb, clarified the position: 
" That means in practice 
- that if our ideal objective is achieved, 
that is the complete abolition by both 
sides of all medium-range missiles, we 
will not have to station any in 
Belgium; 
- that if the final agreement establishes 
only certain limits, certain ceilings for 
the deployment of these missiles by 
both sides, we will. agree to take pro-
portionally our share of the missiles to 
be deployed; 
- that if the negotiations do not succeed 
we would agree, in solidarity with our 
allies, to the complete implementation 
in Belgium of our share of the mea-
sures agreed between NATO part-
ners. " 
2.21. Since the Committee adopted its earlier 
report, the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles has 
increased from 120 to 160, of which some 80 
I. Text of communique at Appendix IlL 
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and 110 respectively are assumed to be 
deployed against European targets. 
2.22. Development of the new NATO weapons 
systems continues in engineering development 
in the United States with funding approved for 
procurement of the GLCM in FY 1981. The 
GLCM is now expected to begin deployment in 
Italy and the United Kingdom at the end of 
1983, and pases for it in the United Kingdom 
have been designated at Greenham Common, 
Berkshire, and Molesworth, Cambridgeshire. 
Deployment will not be complete until 
19881• It is understood that reported delays in 
the test programme will not affect initial opera-
tional capability. 
Ill. British nuclear forces 
(a) Relations with the United States 
3 .1. At the conclusion of the second world 
war, the United States authorities took a sur-
prise decision to suspend the collaborative 
arrangements which had led to the successful 
Manhattan project and the first use of nuclear 
weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on 
which many allied scientists from Britain, 
France and Italy had worked. The decision 
was subsequently enshrined in the 1946 
McMahon Act. Britain that year initiated a 
nuclear weapons programme which remained 
purely national, leading to a first (fission) 
nuclear explosion in October 1952 and an 
experimental thermonuclear (fusion) explosion 
in May 1957. 
3.2. Both Britain and the Soviet Union (which 
had conducted its first fission explosion in 
August 1949, and a thermonuclear explosion in 
August 1953, only nine and a half months after 
the United States) had made much faster 
progress in the development of nuclear weapons 
than originally anticipated in the United States, 
which progressively revised its policy on the 
communication of information2• The 1946 
McMahon Act was replaced by the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 which permitted informa-
tion to be communicated to allied countries for 
training in the use of nuclear weapons, and 
bilateral agreements were concluded with nine 
NATO countries: Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom. In 1958 the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 underwent signifi-
cant amendment, and thenceforth permitted 
information and fissile material for the produc-
I. The Times, 14th October 1980. 
_ 2. For military purposes. This report does not discuss 
United States policy concerning co-operation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy initiated in President Eisenhower's 
" Atoms for Peace " programme. 
tion of nuclear weapons to be transferred to an 
allied country that " has made substantial 
progress in the development of atomic wea-
pons". It further permitted information, plant 
and fissile material to be transferred for the 
production of nuclear propulsion plants for 
naval vessels (particularly relevant to submari-
nes). Exchanges under the act were to be 
covered by bilateral agreements with a country 
concerned, subject to ratification by the United 
States Senate. 
3.3. Within a day of the 1958 amendment to 
the Atomic Energy Act, an agreement was 
concluded with the United Kingdom providing 
for the mutual exchange of information on the 
construction of nuclear warheads and propul-
sion reactors; providing for the transfer to the 
United Kingdom of one complete submarine 
propulsion plant, and the supply of replace-
ment cores and nuclear fuel to operate it. The 
agreement was extended in 1959 to provide for 
the exchange of fissile and other nuclear 
material for the operation of propulsion 
reactors and for the construction of nuclear 
warheads. The exchange of information on the 
construction of propulsion reactors and war-
heads is subject to termination on one year's 
notice to take effect on 31st December 1968 
and every five years thereafter - so that it 
cannot currently be terminated before 31st 
December 1983. The provlSlons for the 
exchange of fissile material for propulsion 
plants and for nuclear warheads have been 
variously extended from time to time, most 
recently on 5th December 1979, to keep them 
in force until 31st December 1984. The other 
provisions of the 1958 agreement are of 
indefinite ouration, and it naturally precludes 
either party communicating information or 
material exchanged under the agreement to 
third parties without the permission of the 
second - which in the case of the United States 
would presumably involve action by the Senate. 
3.4. The British programme for research, 
development and production of nuclear war-
heads since 19 58 has been on the basis of 
exchange of information and materials with the 
United States, but construction of the warheads 
has remained in Britain. The provisions of the 
1968 non-proliferation treaty in fact preclude 
the transfer of nuclear explosive devices from 
one nuclear weapons power to another, 
although they do not preclude the provision of 
assistance or materials for the construction of 
nuclear explosive devices to other nuclear 
weapons powers as defined by that treaty. The 
United Kingdom closed down its military grade 
uranium enrichment plant, finding it more 
economical to exchange plutonium, which the 
United Kingdom continues to produce, for 
uranium 235 from the United States. In 1976, 
the United Kingdom undertook construction of 
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a tntmm production plant on the grounds of 
convenience and a saving in dollar costs, but 
the decision clearly enhanced British auto-
nomy. Tritium is an ingnedient of current 
designs of thermonuclear warheads, but with a 
half-life of twelve and a half years requires to 
be renewed more frequently than the fissile 
material of the warhead; it qad originally been 
obtained from the United States. 
3.5. British production of nuclear propulsion 
reactors for submarines appears to be based on 
continually improved Briti~h designs derived 
from the original United Statles Skipjack reactor 
transferred to the United Kingdom under the 
1958 agreement. It is not clear to what extent 
information on improved propulsion plants has 
been exchanged between the two countries 
since the transfer of the Skipjack reactor, 
although the United States continues to supply 
the highly-enriched uranium for fuelling the 
British propulsion reactors. 
3.6. While Britain retains a national capacity 
for the production of nuclear warheads, aircraft 
and submarines, it abandoned national produc-
tion of strategic missiles in 1960 (when the Blue 
Streak liquid-fuelled missile was cancelled, 
largely on the grounds that liquid fuels had 
become obsolete) in favour of procurement 
from the United States of an air-to-surface 
ballistic missile, Skybolt, bul the United States 
abandoned development of this missile in 
December 1962. Agreement was then reached 
between Mr. Macmillan, the then British Prime 
Minister, and President Kennedy of the United 
States in the Nassau agreement of December 
1962 for the supply to Britain of the Polaris 
submarine-launched ballistic missile instead of 
Skybolt, on the understandjng that the British 
Polaris force would be assigned to NATO 
"except where Her Majesty's Government may 
decide that supreme national interests are at 
stake ... ". 
3. 7. The British strategic nuclear force today 
consists of four Polaris nuclear-propelled sub-
marines, each equipped with 16 Polaris A-3 
missiles with a range of 4,000 km. This 
missile is fitted with three separate thermonu-
clear warheads, each of 200 KT yield, designed 
to fall in a pattern around a target (MR V) -
they are not independently targetable (MlR V). 
3.8. It was announced in Jlanuary 1980 that a 
warhead improvement programme, Chevaline, 
had been undertaken, which included advanced 
penetration aids and the ability to manoeuvre a 
payload in space. The original 3 X 200 KT 
warheads are understood tol have been " hard-
ened " against nuclear ABMs, but it does not 
amount to a MIRVed system1• The total cost 
1. Britain and nuclear weapons, L. Freedman, 1980, page 
49. 
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was said to be £1 billion, and was designed 
chiefly to preserve the credibility of the Polaris 
force at a time when it was thought that Soviet 
anti-ballistic missile defences around Moscow 
were being improved - retaining the " Moscow 
option " was thought to be essential for deter-
rence. The Soviet Union has since informed 
the bilateral Soviet-American Standing Consul-
tative Commission established under SALT I 
(anti-ballistic missile treaty) that it was dis-
mantling 32 of its permitted 64 anti-ballistic 
missile launchers around Moscow. It is not 
known if these deactivated missiles will be 
replaced by more advanced weapons systems. 
3.9. In addition to the submarine force, 
Britain retains in service some 56 Vulcan 
bombers (of which perhaps 48 are operational) 
with a combat radius of 2,800 km, each 
believed to carry two nuclear bombs. These 
aircraft have been in service since 1960. 
However, their ability to penetrate Soviet air 
defences is diminishing, and they are due to be 
phased out of service in 1981. 
3.10. Few details have been made public about 
the precise position concerning British nuclear 
warheads for shorter-range weapons systems. 
There are 60 Buccaneer strike aircraft (9 50 km 
combat radius) and 72 Jaguar strike aircraft 
(720 km combat radius) of which it is assumed 
that 40 are nuclear capable, and the British 
white paper1 states that British thermonuclear 
weapons are available for its strike aircraft. In 
addition, there are British-made nuclear depth 
bombs for naval helicopters. 
3 .11. Britain relies on United States warheads, 
retained in United States custody, for its Lance 
battlefield missile and for anti-submarine depth 
bombs for the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft. 
(b) Future British strategic nuclear force 
3.12. The Secretary of State for Defence, 
Mr. Pym, announced in the House of Com-
mons on 15th July 1980 that the present Bri-
tish Polaris force would be replaced by the 
Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile 
system developed by the United States. Mr. 
Pym said: 
" The agreement that we have reached is 
on the same lines as the 1962 Nassau 
agreement, under which we acquired 
Polaris. We shall design and build our 
own submarines and nuclear warheads 
here in the United Kingdom, and buy the 
Trident missile system, complete with its 
MIRV capability, from the United 
States. Once bought, it will be entirely 
1. Statement on the defence estimates 1980, Volume I, 
paragraph 220 (April 1980). 
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in our ownership and operational control, 
but we shall commit the whole force to 
NATO in the same way as the Polaris 
force is committed today. The new 
force will enter service in the early 1990s 
and will comprise four or five boats. We 
need not decide about a fifth boat for 
another two or three years, and we are 
leaving the option open meanwhile ... 
We estimate the capital cost of a four-
boat force, at today's prices, as up to £5 
billion, spread over fifteen years. We 
expect rather over half of the expenditure 
to fall in the 1980s. We intend to 
accommodate this within the defence 
budget in the normal way, alongside our 
other major force improvements. We 
remain determined to uphold and, where 
necessary, strengthen our all-round defen-
ce capability, and that applies to our 
conventional forces no less than to our 
nuclear forces. 
I intend that as much work as possible 
should go to British industry. At least 
70% of the total cost will be spent in this 
country, and that will be reflected in a 
substantial amount of employment. " 
3.13. An exchange of letters between Mrs. 
Thatcher and President Carter dated 1Oth and 
14th July respectively was published. Mrs. 
Thatcher's letter reproduced in part the 
language of the earlier Nassau agreement: 
" 3. The successor to the Polaris force 
will be assigned to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, like the Polaris 
force; and except where the United 
Kingdom Government may decide that 
supreme national interests are at stake, 
the successor force will be used for the 
purposes of international defence of the 
Western Alliance in all circumstances. " 
Mr. Carter in his reply wrote: 
"2. I view as important your statements 
that the Polaris successor force will 
be assigned to NATO and that your 
objectives take advantage of the econo-
mies made possible by our co-operation 
to reinforce your efforts to upgrade 
the United Kingdom's conventional 
forces ... " 
3.14. The accompanying letter from the United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. 
Pym, dated 14th July makes it clear that: 
" 1. The Polaris sales agreement of 
1963 and its implementing agreements 
will be the general pattern for the sale of 
the Trident (C-4) system. " 
In particular, the United Kingdom pays only a 
5 % surcharge on the cost of missiles and equip-
ment as a contribution to the research and 
development costs of Trident, but acknowledges 
that the waiver of further charges by the United 
States " will fully satisfy the requirement that 
the United States Government give defence 
assistance of corresponding value to the United 
Kingdom defence budget in return for the 
manning by the United Kingdom of rapier air 
defence of United States air force bases in the 
United Kingdom". 
3.15. An informative memorandum on "The 
future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deter-
rent force " was published by the Secretary of 
State1• It examines the alternatives to Trident 
and explains the advantages of this system. 
The cost of the Trident force is estimated at 
£4.5-5 billion at current prices spread over 
fifteen years; the additional cost of a fifth 
submarine would be about £0.6 billion at 
current prices. The programme is estimated to 
absorb an ave~age of 3% of the total defence 
budget between 1980 and 1995. The equip-
ment portion is unlikely to absorb more than 
5 % of the equipment component of the defence 
budget. Broken down over the different 
periods, the total cost is expected to amount to 
1.5 % of the total defence budget up to 1884; 
about 5% (or 8% of the equipment compo-
nent) from 1985-1990; and then 1-2% between 
1990 and 199 5. These figures assume a 3 % 
growth in real terms in the defence budget over 
the next three years. It is pointed out that the 
build-up of the original strategic bomber force 
in the 1950s accounted for a larger proportion 
of the defence budget, and that the current 
Tornado aircraft procurement programme 
accounts for 7 % of the total defence budget. 
The Trident force is expected to be as econo-
mic in manpower as the present Polaris force, 
taking only 2,500 personnel - less than 1 % of 
the total armed forces. 
3.16. The Trident missile, with a range of 
4,000 nautical miles (full payload) to 6,000 
nautical miles (reduced payload), will undoubt-
edly provide a highly survivable strategic 
nuclear force, offering up to ten times the ocean 
area in which the strategic submarines can 
patrol within range of their targets, compared 
with the existing Polaris force (2,500 nautical 
miles range). The ability to carry up to eight 
independently targetable warheads would pro-
vide up to an eightfold increase over the 
present number of Polaris warheads, or a 
tenfold increase if the fifth submarine is 
constructed. The Defence Council memoran-
dum points out, however, that this number of 
warheads will actually be a smaller proportion 
I. Defence Council memorandum circulated, together 
with the other documents communicated to the Committee 
by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, as 
A/WEU/DA (80) 11. 
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of the number of Soviet watrheads anticipated 
under the terms of SALT 11, than were the 
existing Polaris warheads c<)>mpared with the 
total number of Soviet warheads in existence (in 
pre-MIRV days) when the Polaris force first 
entered service. 
3.17. While a submarine force is highly survi-
vable, and hence particularly suited to a second 
strike role, there are two inherent limitations -
limitations which stil~ lead the United States 
and France to devote a large part of their 
strategic nuclear effort to land-based ICBMs. 
In the first place, the· accuracy of the sub-
marine-launched missile is inherently less than 
that of an ICBM because both submarine and 
missile rely on inertial nav~gation systems, so 
that the error in the estimate of the submarine's 
position at the time of launch has to be added 
to the error of the missiltt itself. Secondly, 
communication with a submerged submarine is 
slow and unlikely to be continuous. The chief 
communication system, very low frequency 
radio, can penetrate at most a very few metres 
of water, so that to receive instructions the 
submarine must rise nearer to the surface than 
its optimum depth for coincealment. More-
qver, transmitters operating at very low 
frequencies require antennae several kilometres 
in length; the British transmitter at Rugby 
would be highly vulnerable to an initial strike 
by the Soviet Union. It is possible, however, 
that alternative arrangements have been made 
through the United States airborne strategic 
communications system, T ACAMO. 
3.18. All British nuclear f<1>rces, strategic and 
tactical, are assigned to NATO. The targeting 
of the present and future submarine force, 
together with the 400 United States Poseidon 
warheads assigned to SACEUR, is undertaken 
by NATO officers (at present drawn from 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) assigned by SACEUR to the 
United States Joint Strategic Target Planning 
Staff in Omaha, Nebraska. In the course of its 
visit in March of this year, 1the Committee was 
fully briefed by NATO officers on the intricate 
arrangements made through the JSTPS compu-
ters to ensure the optim~m coverage of all 
targets designated by the European comman-
ders, together with co-ordination of firing times 
to prevent mutual interference of warheads. 
IV. French nuclear forces 
(a) History 
4.1. In the immediate post-war years, France 
found itself in much the same position as the 
United Kingdom following the surprise United 
States decision to suspend co-operation on 
nuclear energy. It was not, however, until July 
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1952 that a first French five-year nuclear 
energy plan was drawn up. As this provided 
for the construction of the G 1 plutonium 
producing reactor at; Marcoule, the option to 
produce nuclear weapons was inherent in the 
programme, although not explicitly stated at 
the time1. 
4.2. Successive governments under the Fourth 
Republic had ambiguous attitudes to nuclear 
weapons programmes and indeed Mr. Edgar 
Faure in April 1955 declared that military 
applications of atomic energy would not be 
pursued in France. The following month, 
however, the first protocol was signed between 
the French Atomic Energy Commissariat and 
the armed forces which formally initiated the 
development of nuclear weapons. The first 
plutonium producing reactor G 1, constructed 
under the pre-existing programme, started up 
only eight months later in January 19 56; the 
first experimental fission explosion was con-
ducted in the Sahara on 13th February 1960, 
and the first thermonuclear explosion in the 
Pacific on 26th August 1968. 
4.3. The pattern of the delivery systems 
equipping the present French nuclear forces 
was first laid down in the programme law 
adopted by the National Assembly on 6th 
December 1960, at a time when United States 
atomic energy legislation has been modified to 
permit co-operation on the production of 
nuclear weapons with an allied country that 
had made " substantial progress in the develop-
ment of atomic weapons". This appears to 
have been interpreted as a country having 
conducted a· thermpnuclear explosion, and 
France, under the Fifth Republic, was commit-
ted to purely national production of its nuclear 
forces. 
4.4. Following the Kennedy-Macmillan agree-
ment on the supply of Polaris missiles to the 
United Kingdom in December 1962, however, 
President Kennedy wrote to President de 
Gaulle offering to supply Polaris missiles to 
France on the terms outlined in the Nassau 
agreement. Following a meeting of the French 
Council of Ministers on 3rd January, the Minis-
ter of Information, Mr. Peyrefitte, said that 
" France at present has neither the submarines 
required for the Polaris missiles nor the 
warheads " and that " one cannot therefore see 
how the offer could have any immediacy ... 
France is busy with her own efforts and there is 
no reason why she should give them up. She 
1.· "The 1952 five-year plan made no reference to the 
possible military use of plutonium, as such a decision did 
not have to be taken for several years, but it is certain that 
this aspect of the atomic problem was ·in the mind, no 
doubt predominantly, of the initiators and of those respon-
sible for the plan", Bertrand Goldschmidt (then Director of 
External Relations and Programmes of the French Commis-
sariat a l'Energie Atomique), "L'Aventure atomique ", page 
98 (Fayard, 1962). 
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intends to pursue them by her own means. 
There is obviously no question of closing the 
door to anything... but France adheres to the 
principles of her own defence and the indepen-
dence of her own defence ". France appears to 
have given consideration to the option of 
co-operation with the United States at that 
time, but at a press conference on 14th January 
1963 President de Gaulle finally rejected the 
option of participation in the Nassau agree-
ment1. 
4.5. The French strategic nuclear force today 
comprises eighteen ICBMs in silos in the 
Plateau d' Albion in Provence. Since May 
1980, nine of these have been the improved S-3 
missile, fitted with a thermonuclear warhead 
and nine the older S-2 missile to be replaced by 
the S-3 in 1982. As well as having a thermo-
nuclear warhead, the S-3 provides a greater 
range of some 3,400 km compared with 3,000 
for the S-2. 
4.6. With the entry into service of the 
Tonnant in May 1980, the strategic submarine 
force now comprises five submarines, each 
equipped with sixteen missiles. The improved 
M-20 missile has replaced the earlier M-2 on 
all submarines, giving a range of 4,800 km and 
the same thermonuclear warhead as the 
S-3. The airborne component is based on 50 
Mirage IV aircraft (thirty-three are reported 
operational) each carrying one AN-22 nuclear 
bomb, and having an un-refuelled combat 
radius of some 1,600 km. This range is consi-
derably extended by air refuelling from the 
eleven KC-13 5 F tanker aircraft. 
4. 7. Thus, while the French force has been 
produced entirely from national resources, it 
does owe something to United States assis-
tance. In addition to the KC-135F tanker 
aircraft, the first enriched uranium fuel for the 
land prototype of the submarine propulsion 
reactor was also supplied by the United States, 
enabling the development of this reactor to be 
completed much earlier than would have been 
possible if deliveries of French-produced ura-
nium from the Pierrelatte enrichment plant had 
been awaited. 
4.8. There are continual plans for the impro-
vement of the French nuclear force, more on a 
" rolling " basis than the complete replacement 
of the force as planned by the United King-
dom. In September 1978, it was announced 
that construction of the sixth of the current 
series of strategic submarines was being aban-
doned in favour of one of improved design 
" Inflexible "; in particular, the new submarine 
will be designed to be quieter than the existing 
five, which are said to generate more under-
water noise than comparable submarines in 
I. Paragraph 6.5. below. 
service in other countries. It is due to enter 
service in 1985, and from then to 1991 some of 
the other submarines currently in service are 
scheduled to undergo conversion to the 
improved design. Beyond that, design studies 
are now under way for completely new third-
generation strategic submarines. 
4.9. In 1985 a new missile- the M-4- for the 
submarines will enter service which will have 
six miniaturised thermonuclear warheads, 
understood to be an MRV system like Polaris 
A-3, but not a MIRVed warhead capable of 
striking separate targets. · 
4.1 0. In September 1979, a decision was taken 
to develop a medium-range air-to-surface 
missile (ASMP) designed to extend the life of 
fifteen Mirage IV bombers up to 1985, after 
which that missile will still equip the new 
Mirage 2000 aircraft for tactical strikes. There 
is to be no replacement for the Mirage IV as 
such. 
4.11. In June 1980, a study was initiated on 
the replacement for the ICBM force which may 
take the form of a mobile missile system; the 
study is not due for completion until 1982. 
4.12. Mr. Bourges, the retiring Minister of 
Defence, on 30th July 1980 gave the following 
figures of expenditure on French nuclear forces. 
Expenditure on French strategic nuclear forces 
million francs 
1959-69 1970-74 1975-80 
Research and deve-
lopment and testing 20,976 11,056 26,846 
Industrial investment 8,100 835 51 
Military infrastructure 984 1,244 2,146 
Production of delivery 
vehicles and wea-
pons 6,048 8,188 13,015 
Total 36,108 21,323 42,058 
4.13. Shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons 
systems produced by France are the 32 Pluton 
battlefield missiles with a range of 120 km and 
a 15-25 kiloton warhead, the tactical aircraft, 
801 Jaguar (produced jointly with the United 
Kingdom), and 30 Mirage Ill with a combat 
radius of 720 km and 600 km respectively; and 
the 36 carrier-borne Super Etandard with a 
combat radius of 560 km. 
1. Forty-five are nuclear-capable (IISS Military Balance 
1980-81, page 119). 
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(b) Enhanced radiation weapon 
4.14. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Bourges, in 
a statement on 7th May 1980 discussed the 
enhanced radiation weapon (or neutron bomb) 
adding " we have not decided to deprive our-
selves of it". It has been confirmed that 
France is continuing research and development 
on this weapon which the Chief of Staff, 
General Mery, on 24th April 1980, claimed 
could reduce blast and heat effects by a factor 
of 10 compared with current tactical nuclear 
weapons. A decision on production will not 
be taken for some years but the weapon could 
be in service by 1985. 
V. Contribution of French and British 
nuclear forces to allied defence 
5.1. Eighteen years ago, the Committee drew 
attention to the scepticism with which the then 
United States Secretary of Defence viewed 
independent nuclear forces1• Mr. McNamara 
said in a speech at Michigan University, Ann 
Arbor, on 16th June 1962: 
" In short then limited nuclear capabili-
ties, operating independently, are dange-
rous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, 
and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. 
At the same time, the general strategy I 
have summarised magnifies the import-
ance of unity of planning, concentration 
of executive authority and central direc-
tion. There must not 'be competing bad 
conflicting strategies to meet the contin-
gency of nuclear war. " 
5.2. At that time, the United States was 
already co-operating with the United Kingdom 
on the production of nuclear warheads, under 
the terms of the 1958 agreement referred to in 
paragraph 3.3. above, and within six months 
was to conclude the Nassau agreement on the 
sale of the Polaris missile s~stem. If that was 
not seen as a reversal of United States policy, 
that was because, under the Nassau agreement 
of 21st December 1962, tqe existing British 
nuclear forces "6. ...would be assigned as part 
of the NATO nuclear force and targeted in 
accordance with NATO plans " while the 
Polaris missile force, to be · constituted under 
the agreement, " will be assigned and targeted 
in the same way as the forces described in 
paragraph 6 ". 
5.3. Official recognition by NATO of the 
contribution made by the British and French 
nuclear forces to the defence of the Alliance 
1. Document 251, State of European security - a NATO 
nuclear force, Rapporteur Mr. Duynstee, 16th October 
1962, see paragraph 3.15. of the explanatory memorandum. 
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came twelve years later in the declaration 
published by the North Atlantic Council in 
Ottawa on 19th June and subsequently signed 
by the fifteen heads of governments in Brussels 
on 26th June 1974: 
" The European members who provide 
three-quarters of the conventional 
strength of the Alliance in Europe, and 
two of whom possess nuclear forces 
capable of playing a deterrent rOle of 
their own contributing to the overall 
strengthening of the deterrence of the 
Alliance, undertake to make the neces-
sary contribution to maintain the 
common defence at a level capable of 
deterring and if necessary repelling all 
actions directed against the independence 
and territorial integrity of the members of 
the Alliance. " 
5.4. The position of the present United States 
administration was made clear in the statement 
issued by the White House on 15th July 1980 
together with the exchange of letters between 
President Carter and Mrs. Thatcher confirming 
the sale of Trident missiles to the United 
Kingdom. The accompanying statement reads 
in part: 
" The administration believes the inde-
pendent British strategic nuclear force 
which is assigned to NATO makes an 
important contribution to the ability of 
the North Atlantic Alliance to deter 
Soviet aggression. For this reason the 
President decided to assist the United 
Kingdom in the maintenance of a moder-
nised independent British deterrent force 
into the twenty-first century ... " 
5.5. In political circles, among the non-
nuclear European members of NATO, the view 
has been expressed that the smaller nuclear 
forces represent a wasteful diversion of limited 
resources away from conventional forces neces-
sary to maintain the military balance in 
Europe, or that the existence of these smaller 
national forces might reduce the credibility of 
United States nuclear forces being used in the 
defence of Europe. An illustration of this view 
is the memorandum submitted (as personal 
views) by two Labour members of the Nether-
lands Parliament, Mr. Klaas de Vries and Mr. 
Harry van den Bergh (Vice-Chairman of the 
Committee), to the United Kingdom Defence 
and External Affairs Sub-Committee of the 
House of Commons Expenditure Committee in 
March 1979. The sub-committee had been 
enquiring into the future of the United 
Kingdom's nuclear weapons policy, and had 
circulated a list of questions including: 
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"3. In what way does the United 
Kingdom Polaris force make a contribu-
tion to NA TO's strategic deterrent? " 
"4. Does the existence of a United 
Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent 
decrease the probability, however small, 
that the United States could dissociate 
itself from a war between East and West 
in Europe? " 
The de Vries-van den Bergh memorandum in 
its general remarks stated in part: 
" The same factors of uncertainty 
concerning the United States guarantee 
which requires the United Kingdom to 
retain a degree of independent decision 
over its nuclear forces, would also oper-
ate for European countries vis-a-vis the 
United Kingdom's nuclear deterrenr. In 
other words, the United Kingdom's 
nuclear forces as currently structured 
would contribute little to the credibility 
of a European defence... From the 
Alliance perspective, the United King-
dom's nuclear force cannot be said to be 
the most rational way for the United 
Kingdom to spend its defence resources. 
In an era where the term rationalisa-
tion represents a concerted effort to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of military effort 
the force of the United Kingdom is a 
clear example of duplication. " 
Specifically in reply to question 4, the memo-
randum states: 
"If the United Kingdom were to substan-
tially increase the potential of its strategic 
forces, the danger of ' decoupling ' the 
United States from the events in Europe 
seems more likely1." 
5.6. In his discussions with the various 
NATO civilian and military authorities, your 
Rapporteur put similar questions to those of the 
Defence and External Affairs Committee 
quoted above. Without exception, he has 
encountered the view that the factor of uncer-
tainty facing Soviet military planners and 
· political authorities, arising from the ability of 
Paris and London to decide quite independently 
on the use of their nuclear forces, adds to the 
deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces as a 
whole. Opinion is divided as to whether these 
forces deter attacks on British and French 
territory only, or whether they deter attacks on 
NATO as a whole. It is difficult to envisage a 
scenario in which Britain or France would 
alone initiate the use of its nuclear forces 
against the Soviet Union in circumstances in 
which no other nuclear forces would be 
I. Sixth report from the Expenditure Committee, pages 
264,266, House of Commons, 3rd April1979. 
employed; it is even more difficult to envisage a 
situation in which the Soviet authorities would 
believe that they were faced with the nuclear 
forces of a single country and act accordingly in 
concentrating their own nuclear forces against 
it. It is indeed more likely that in the confu-
sion of nuclear war it would never be possible 
to determine with sufficient certainty the source 
from which a particular nuclear strike had 
originated, and the devastation which even the 
small French and British nuclear forces can 
inflict is already several thousand times that of 
the first nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 
5.7. The Committee will conclude that the 
French and British forces contribute to the 
effectiveness of the allied nuclear deterrent, but 
to an extent that cannot be defined. The effec-
tiveness is enhanced when the forces are 
assigned to NATO, and especially when target-
ing is co-ordinated with those of all other 
allied nuclear forces. 
5.8. French policy as is well known lays parti-
cular emphasis on the national control of 
French nuclear forces, but it has also been· 
made clear that the vital interests which they 
would be used to defend are not limited to 
French soil. The Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, 
speaking at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de 
Defense Nationale on 11th September 1980, 
said: 
" The aim of this defence policy is to 
avoid war by stopping the process of 
violence at its origins. Our military 
structure... through the flexibility with 
which its resources can be employed 
should enable the head of state to 
influence the will of the leaders of the 
adversary throughout the development of 
a crisis, even if this at the beginning is in 
the nature of an armed confrontation 
which either concerns us directly from 
the outset, or were initially to affect only 
our neighbours and allies before reaching 
us ... , 
and further 
" .. .I remind you that in Europe we are 
directly concerned by the security of our 
immediate neighbours; we could not 
therefore remain indifferent to any action 
that affected their freedom. " 
VI. Allied co-operation on nuclear weapons 
6.1. It has been noted in paragraph 3.2. above 
that since 19 54 bilateral agreements have exis-
ted between the United States and nine NATO 
countries covering training in the use of nuclear 
weapons. These countries - Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, 
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Turkey and the United Kingdom- have acquir-
ed battlefield delivery systems such as the 
Honest John or, now, the Lance missile system, 
or nuclear capable tactical aircraft, for which 
the United States provides nuclear warheads, 
retained under United States custody prior to 
nuclear release. The United States warheads 
for the French Honest John missiles ceased to 
be available when French forces were with-
drawn from the integrated military structure of 
NATO in 1966. These arrangements all 
concern forces assigned to NATO. 
6.2. This chapter of the report examines in 
particular arrangements or prospects for co-
operation on the production of nuclear 
weapons systems and on the operation of 
strategic nuclear systems. 
6.3. Co-operation on the production of 
nuclear weapons systems can be subdivided 
into co-operation on the production of nuclear 
warheads themselves - an area of co-operation 
which is subject to certain restrictions under the 
non-proliferation treaty - and co-operation in 
the production of delivery vehicles which, 
strictly, should be taken to include missiles, 
strategic submarines and aircraft. As, however, 
nuclear capable aircraft are all dual purpose, 
capable of delivering either conventional or 
nuclear bombs, joint production arrangements 
in this area are commonplace - they include 
the Anglo-French Jaguar; the F-104 aircraft 
produced under licence in several European 
countries; and the Tornado aircraft produced 
jointly by Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom - they are not further considered in 
this report. 
(a) Co-operation on the production of nuclear warheads 
6.4. As noted in paragraphs 3.2. and 3.3. 
above, United States legislation did not permit 
co-operation on the production of nuclear 
weapons until after the 1958 amendment to the 
Atomic Energy Act, and then restricted it to 
co-operation with countries that had made 
" substantial progress in the development of 
atomic weapons". In practice, this appears to 
have been interpreted as meaning allied coun-
tries that have exploded a thermonuclear 
device. The time-scale of the national nuclear 
programmes meant that that option was avail-
able as far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned from May 1957, and as far as France 
was wncerned only from August 1968. Since 
1958, there has been a continuous exchange of 
information and of fissile material between 
Britain and the United States on warhead 
design, but Britain has still maintained an 
independent design and production capability 
at Aldermaston and produces its own nuclear 
warheads for the weapons systems described in 
the previous chapter. 
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6.5. While there is some co-operation .bet-
ween the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the design of nuclear propulsion 
reactors for submarines, it appears on the basis 
of published information that this co-operation 
and exchange of design information is less 
extensive, and dates essentially from the first 
transfer of the Skipjack design in 1958. The 
difference in the time-scale of the national 
nuclear weapons programmes of Britain and 
France, coupled with greater United States 
reticence concerning co-operation on nuclear 
propulsion reactors, goes some way to explain 
the decision of France, in early 1963, to reject 
President Kennedy's offer of the sale of Polaris 
missiles on the same terms as they had been 
offered to the United Kingdom under the 
Nassau agreement. In his press conference of 
14th January 1963, President de Gaulle said in 
part: 
" Then in the Bahamas America and 
Britain concluded an agreement to which 
we also were asked to adhere... The 
British have the benefit of American 
assistance for building these submarines 
and projectiles1• I might add in this 
respect that such assistance has never 
been offered to us and in spite of what 
has been said, it must be stated that we 
have never requested it... It would really 
be no use for us to buy Polaris missiles 
when we have neither the submarines to 
launch them nor the thermonuclear 
warheads to arm them ... " 
6.6. It has not been French policy, at least 
under the Fifth Republic, actively to seek 
co-operation with the United States on the 
production of nuclear weapons although there 
were negotiations concerning nuclear propul-
sion reactors which as noted above led finally 
to the supply of enriched uranium fuel 
elements for the land prototype of the French 
propulsion reactor. The present status of the 
French nuclear programme would clearly 
entitle France to claim the same co-operation 
as had been offered to Britain. Britain cer-
tainly derives considerable financial advantage 
from nuclear co-operation with the United 
States, partly through avoiding duplication of 
research, and partly through the exchange of 
fissile material whereby Britain exchanges 
plutonium for uranium 235 for which produc-
tion costs are higher in Britain. Thanks to this 
co-operation, the state of the art in Britain is 
ahead of that in France, perhaps most notice-
ably in the field of miniaturisation of thermo-
nuclear warheads. Three separate (MR V but 
not MIRV) warheads have been in service with 
1. In the context this reference to projectiles must have 
referred to thermonuclear warheads, not the Polaris missiles 
which Britain was purchasing from the United States and 
not receiving assistance to build. 
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the A-3 Polaris missile since 1967, whereas 
France is not expected to deploy similar 
technology until the future M-4 missile 
becomes operational in 1985. There is thus no 
military or financial incentive at the present 
time for Britain to seek co-operation with 
France in the field of the production of nuclear 
warheads. Because the exchange of informa-
tion under the 1958 agreement has been 
mutual, Britain or the United States would have 
to seek permission of the other partner if they 
were to undertake co-operation with France in 
this field. 
6. 7. As far as France is concerned, there 
would be obvious technological advantages in 
an exchange of information and production 
assistance in the field particularly of the minia-
turisation of thermonuclear warheads, but for 
political reasons, in the light of the frequently 
reiterated attitude of successive French govern-
ments, and indeed of most political parties in 
France today, there would appear to be no 
prospect of such co-operation being sought. 
(b) Production of missiles 
6.8. The British choice of the Trident C-4 
SLBM for the 1990s rules out the option of 
co-operation with France on the French M-4 
missile due to enter service in 1985. The 
Committee does not therefore pursue this 
hypothetical option, as the Trident is already 
operational in United States submarines and is 
judged in the United Kingdom to provide an 
independent force with better performance at 
lower cost: 
" 48. Another' possibility, considered at 
an early stage, was a European solution. 
Collaboration in the European context 
could have been of considerable political 
significance. But it was soon apparent 
that this option had a number of disad-
vantages, in particular related to cost. 
There is no likelihood that the United 
Kingdom could have acquired by this 
route an effective deterrent force at a 
cost, either in initial investment or in 
subsequent support, which could com-
pare with that for the proven Trident 
system, especially when account is taken 
of the economic advantages of our long-
established arrangements for collabora-
tion with the United States in nuclear 
forces. The government therefore sees 
no adequate basis on which such an 
option could now have been pursued. " 1 
I. The future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent 
force, UJ?-ited Kingdom Defence Council paper, July 1980, 
commumcated to the Committee by the Secretary of State 
for Defence. 
This ·_view is supported by Vice-Admiral Paul 
Delahousse, former French Defence Attache in 
London1: 
" The assignment of this force to NATO 
- more precisely to SACEUR - should 
not conceal the reality... The Trident 
will be under British control as is the 
Polaris today... There were two choices 
for Britain in renewing its Polaris force ... 
buy from the United States, or co-operate 
with France... In choosing American is 
Britain turning its back on Europe? 
Whatever may be the contribution of 
insular calculations on the part of our 
cross-Channel neighbours, the determin-
ing factor lies elsewhere. The French 
choice was in any case difficult. Like it 
or not, we have to understand that a 
British admiral, professionally concerned 
with operational efficiency, is naturally in 
favour of the most powerful missile with 
the highest performance immediately 
available, and no doubt the least 
expensive. " 
(c) Construction of strategic submarines 
6.9. As far as the next generation of strategic 
nuclear submarine is concerned, French and 
British requirements are more nearly in phase, 
both countries within the last few months 
having announced their decision to design and 
produce an entirely new generation of these 
boats - for the Trident missile system in the 
case of the United Kingdom, and the third 
generation of boats in the case of France - both 
to enter service in the 1990s. Because the 
~uclear propulsion . reactor is virtually an 
mtegral part of these boats, no doubt permis-
sion of the United States would be required for 
such Franco-British co-operation, but there is 
no overriding reason to imagine that it would 
not be forthcoming. But expert opinion rules 
out this option partly because of British prefe-
rence for its own design of nuclear-propelled 
hunter-killer submarines (SSN) now operatio-
nal, on which the new boats will be based 
partly because of the shortage of time (eo~ 
operation always imposes delay), and partly 
because in shipbuilding design costs (which 
alone might be reduced through co-operation) 
are a small proportion of construction costs. 
(d) Operational co-operation 
6.10. If the fundamental political and technolo-
gical position of the French arid British Govern-= 
ments with respect to their nucfear forces are 
accepted, there still remains the prospect of 
operational co-operation in areas which need 
I. Le Monde, 14th October 1980. 
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not affect either the issue of assignment or non-
assignment to NATO; the independent control 
of nuclear forces; or classified technological 
information. The Committee has suggested on 
a number of occasions in the past that the 
patrol programme of French and British stra-
tegic submarines should be co-ordinated in such 
a way as to ensure that major refits of French 
and British submarines do not coincide. This 
co-operation would not even require agreement 
on the routes or areas in which the submarines 
patrol. At present, out of the force of five 
French submarines that country is able to 
maintain a maximum of two, or sometimes 
three, submarines on patrol simultaneously. 
The British force of four submarines permits 
one, or sometimes two, to be permanently on 
station. Co-ordinated refit programmes could 
ensure that out of the combined fleet of nine 
there would never be fewer than four vessels on 
station. At the moment if programmes are out 
of phase the number on station can fall to 
three. 
6.11. The targeting of the present British 
submarine force is closely co-ordinated with 
other nuclear forces assigned to NATO in the 
JSTPS as described in paraQraph 3.18. above. 
There presumably exists a separate pro-
gramme of targets which the British force would 
engage if ever the supreme interest clause of the 
Nassau agreement were to be invoked by 
Britain; missiles can very readily be re-targeted 
while submarines are actually on patroL-
There need be no interference with stated 
Fren'Ch defence policy if a separate co-ordinated 
set of targets for all French strategic forces were 
to be agreed through French liaison officers to 
be attached to the JSTPS, for use in situations 
in which the French force m•ght be used in co-
operation with that of its allies. 
(e) Recent attitudes to eo-operation 
6.12. The prospects of Franco-British co-
operation in the nuclear field are frequently 
discussed in political circles, but not often with 
reference to the hard facts olf existing arrange-
ments. On 27th1 January Mr. Poniatowski, 
former French Minister· of the Interior, and a 
close c~mfidant of President Giscard d'Estaing, 
spoke m general terms of the creation of a 
European nuclear force: 
"We should constitute a sufficient 
nuclear force, and we will have it within 
three or four years. All the French sub-
marines, and the sixth as well, will be 
armed with multiple warheads, 500 
altogether, and if we reach agreement 
with England there is a genuine deterrent 
force. " 1 
1. Le Monde, 29th January 1980. 
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Mr. Poniatowski envisaged such a policy 
leading towards what he called "de-NATO-
isation " - a development which would not be 
welcomed by the United Kingdom or by other 
WEU countries. A spokesman for the British 
Ministry of Defence on 29th January con-
firmed: 
" There can be no question of creating a 
Franco-British nuclear force outside 
NATO." 
6.13. More recently, however, Mrs. Thatcher, 
addressing the Franco-British Council in Bor-
deaux on 19th September said: 
" And for nearly eighty years, Britain has 
devoted all its efforts to joint action with 
France for the defence of our two coun-
tries and of Western Europe... These 
last few years, some aspects of our 
co-operation in the military field have 
marked time. But let me say clearly this 
evening that Britain is ready at any time 
to develop with France fuller and closer 
co-operation in defence. Meanwhile let 
us continue to build on the success of our 
joint production of military equipment. 
The cost of weapons systems will 
continue to increase and effective colla-
boration is a far from negligible means of 
reducing the cost. It is a field where 
Britain and France have led the way in 
Europe and they must continue to do 
so. " 
Sir Reginald Hibbert, the British Ambassador in 
France, speaking to the French Association for 
European Union on 29th September, is repor-
ted as saying in reply to a question that he 
hoped that co-operation would develop in the 
field of conventional defence, and possibly in 
the deployment (mise en a?uvre) of nuclear 
defence, but excluded any co-operation in the 
production of nuclear weapons because the 
French and British systems were " based on 
secrets which cannot be shared ".i 
6.14. The Committee draws particular atten-
tion to its proposals for operational co-opera-
tion outlined above, and to the scope for 
co-operation in the construction of the next 
generation of strategic nuclear submarines. 
VII. Arms control 
7 .1. Two eminent allied defence experts have 
recently thrown doubt on the wisdom of 
allocating such large resources to strategic 
nuclear weapons as the West, the United States 
in particular, is currently doing. General 
Maxwell Taylor, now retired, Chairman of the 
1. Le Monde, 1st October 1980. 
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United States Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 
presidency of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson, 
has recently pointed out1: 
" For an administration seeking military 
funds from Congress, [weapons of stra-
tegic warfare] have the advantage of 
bearing familiar names like MX missile, 
the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, 
the new cruise missiles and once aban-
doned anti-ballistic missile. Since their 
manpower needs are small, they have the 
further advantage of not raising the 
embarrassing manpower questions regard-
ing the need to return to some form of 
conscription... This big weapon bias 
implicit in an arms race is ample ground 
for rejecting it as a substitute for a sound 
military policy. By giving top priority to 
strategic weapons and thereby to prepara-
tions to forestall the least probable of our 
major military threats, it will lead us to 
expend much of our resources on the 
wrong things or in wrong order of prio-
rity. It will confirm us in the neglect of 
our conventional forces... yet these are 
the forces needed right now to discourage 
any further Soviet advance toward 
Middle East oilfields ... " 
7.2. Lord Zuckerman, formerly chief scientific 
adviser to the British Ministry of Defence and 
successively chief scientific adviser to the 
government, has called for a drastic reduction 
in the levels of strategic nuclear weapons. In 
particular, he has drawn attention to the self-
perpetuating mechanisms of the arms race: 
" When we move into the nuclear world, 
I would go further and submit that mili-
tary chiefs... merely serve as a channel 
through which the men in the laborato-
ries transmit their views... It is he the 
technician, not the commander in the 
field, who starts the process of formulat-
ing the so-called military need. It is he 
who has succeeded over the years in 
equating, and so confusing, nuclear 
destructive power with military strength, 
as though the former were the single and 
a sufficient condition of military success. 
The men in the nuclear weapons labo-
ratories of both sides have succeeded in 
creating a world with an irrational foun-
dation on which a new set of political 
realities has in turn had to be built... " 
Lord Zuckerman draws attention to the views 
of Dr. York, the designer of the first thermo-
nuclear weapon, that " much more important 
than money as a motivating force are the indi-
vidual's own psychic and spiritual needs; the 
majority of the key individual promoters of the 
I. The Guardian, 22nd September 1980. 
arms race derive a very large part of their self-
esteem from their participation in what they 
believe to be an essential - even a holy cause. 
They are inspired... to match or exceed 
technological progress by the other side or even 
by a rival military service here at home, and 
victimised by rumours and phoney intelli-
gence... If one were to leave out the matter of 
financial gain, I imagine that the same words 
could equally be applied to the Russians. " 1 
7.3. The Committee can agree with these 
sentiments as far as they go - but they comple-
tely ignore the existence of two mutually suspi-
cious political systems which make any agree-
ment difficult, and they ignore the important 
step taken by both sides in SALT I in 1972 in 
accepting the concept of nuclear parity, instead 
of a continuous drive for superiority. Arms 
control is the process of regulating forces and 
armaments by mutual agreement so as to 
enhance international stability, and make inter-
national relations more predictable - it is not 
the same as disarmament. The two terms have 
been defined by the German Government for 
example thus: 
" Arms control is the totality of co-
operative efforts designed, in an armed 
world and in spite of continuing conflicts, 
to limit the use of military power, 
promote stability and transparency in the 
military sphere and thus improve the 
prospects of crisis management and 
prevention of war. 
Arms control means in particular arms 
limitation and arms reduction oriented to 
the goal of achieving a stable balance. 
Disarmament is the long-term aspiration 
in the sense of complete and general 
disarmament under effective international 
control and a worldwide process aimed at 
the progressive elimination of arma-
ments. "2 
7 .4. Negotiations to control strategic arma-
ments - SALT and the earlier partial test-ban 
and non-proliferation treaty - have not (except 
for the ABM treaty in SALT I) succeeded in 
reducing levels of these armaments. They may 
have prevented even greater increases through 
codifying contemporary levels\ SALT 11, if it 
enters force, will require a slight reduction in 
Soviet totals. Article 6 of the non-proliferation 
treaty provides that each signatory " undertakes 
1. Science advisers, scientific advisers and nuclear wea-
pons, Menard Press, October 1980. 
2. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage 
der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP (8/2195); Antwort der 
Bundesregzerung auf die Grosse An/rage der Fraktionen der 
CDUICSU (8/2312), February 1979, paragraph 7. 
3. The chronology of SALT agreements and the missile 
and warhead balance is at Appendix IV. 
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to pursue negotiations in goQd faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament... " Yet the levels of United 
States and Soviet warheads are now four times 
the levels at the time of signature in 
1968. SALT I came too late to prevent the 
deployment of MlR Vs. Partly in response to 
allied viewi the SALT process so far has deliber-
ately excluded forward-based systems - which 
would have had to includ~ the Soviet long-
range theatre nuclear forces - and thus made no 
attempt to regulate them in SALT I and 11. 
(The Soviet Union had sought to define strate-
gic weapons as " weapons of one party so 
deployed as to reach the territory of the 
other". This would have tjxcluded Soviet but 
included United States FBS - hence the allied 
decision at that time to exclude all FBS.) 
7.5. The future SALT Ill negotiations, the 
framework for which was laid down in the 
SALT 11 agreement, are intended both to seek 
lower levels of United States and Soviet central 
nuclear systems, and to include certain theatre 
systems, although the small British and French 
nuclear forces, as these countries have made 
clear, will be excluded from the talks. The 
decision on deployment of LR TNF taken at the 
special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence 
Ministers on 12th December 1979 specifically 
included an offer to negotiate limitations on 
LR TNF bilaterally in SALT Ill. 
7.6. Events since the signature of SALT 11 in 
June 1979, and since the NATO decision of 
12th December 1979, have delayed the pro-
gramme - both the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan and the pressures of a presidential 
election year in the United States have imposed 
a postponement of SALT 11 ratification 
(although so far both the United States and the 
Soviet Union continue to respect the provisions 
of SALT 11). The Soviet Union responded to 
the 12th December decision by withdrawing the 
Brezhnev offer of October 1979 (analysed in 
paragraphs 14 et seq. of Document 827) to 
reduce numbers of medium-range weapons 
deployed in the western parts of the Soviet 
Union if none were deployed in western 
Europe, and demanded cancellation of the 
NATO decision as a precondition of negotia-
tions on LR TNF. 
7. 7. It took the meeting between Chancellor 
Schmidt and Mr. Brezhnev for the Soviet 
precondition to be withdrawn, and permit the 
bilateral preliminary talks between the Soviet 
Union and the United States in Geneva on 16th 
October. NATO insists that these talks are 
bilateral, and preliminary, and that LR TNF 
limitations will be negotiated in SALT Ill once 
SALT 11 has been ratified. 
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7.8. The Committee believes that the mutual 
fourfold increase in the number of United 
States and Soviet Union warheads that has 
occurred over the last ten years while maintain-
ing parity, has not increased European secur-
ity. It believes that every effort must be made 
in negotiations to provide for security at lower 
force levels, with a view to returning to stabi-
lity with relatively few, but highly survivable 
weapons, sufficient to inflict unacceptable 
damage on an adversary; it believes that theatre 
nuclear weapons must never be considered in 
isolation from the global nuclear balance. It 
recognises that until the global balance is based 
on lower numbers of Soviet and United States 
nuclear weapons, the numbers in the British 
and French nuclear forces cannot enter into 
account for arms control purposes, but that 
account will have to be taken of them in the 
longer term. 
7.9. On a report from the Committee1, the 
Assembly on 6th December 1979 adopted 
Resolution 64: 
" Concluding therefore that the SALT 11 
agreements should enhance the security 
of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance and 
will not in any way diminish the credibi-
lity of the United States strategic deter-
rent... Expresses the hope that the 
Senate of the United States will approve 
the ratification without amendment of 
the treaty on the limitation of strategic 
arms signed in Vienna on 18th June 
1979." 
The Committee continues to believe SALT 11 
to be in the mutual interest of the whole Wes-
tern Alliance and of the Soviet Union, so that 
its entry into force should not be linked to 
other aspects of East-West relations. There is 
a network of East-West negotiations in many 
fora. Even if specific agreements are not for-
mally linked to Soviet actions in other fields, 
there is an inevitable interaction between Soviet 
actions and the course of negotiations. 
7 .I 0. President elect Reagan, however, in the 
course of his election campaign, first opposed 
SALT 11 but later committed himself to the 
continuation of the SALT process. It is too 
early to know what the definitive attitude of the 
new United States administration to the present 
SALT 11 will be. In his first interview after the 
election, Mr. Reagan, asked how he would 
open the SALT dialogue, said: 
"We could open it by telling them that we 
have to renegotiate SALT 11. We could 
take what is usable out of SALT 11 and 
then tell them that we are not going to 
1. SALT 11 and its implications for European security, 
Document 816 and Addendum, Rapporteur Mr. Cook. 
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ratify the treaty the way it is and then 
make it plain that we are ready to sit down 
to legitimate negotiations ... " 
Mr. Reagan agreed that the United States 
should seek an interim agreement while a 
longer-term SALT Ill was marked out, and that 
" there has to be linkage between arms control 
and other areas of difference ... ", but declined 
to make specific commitments such as a pull-
out from Afghanistan as a price of serious arms 
control negotiations1• Should it prove impossi-
ble to secure the early ratification of SALT 11 
in its present form by the new United States 
administration, the Committee would then call 
for the earliest possible resumption of SALT 
negotiations, which must incorporate the 
LRTNF talks referred to in paragraph 7.7., with 
a view to the rapid conclusion of an interim 
agreement pending later negotiations on SALT 
Ill. It calls for the provisions of SALT 11 to be 
continued to be respected by both sides, 
pending ratification or an alternative agree-
ment, as they have been so far. 
7 .11. The Soviet leadership has been careful to 
hold open prospects of agreement on arms 
control. Commenting on the results of the 
United States election, Mr. Tikhonov, the new 
Soviet Prime Minister, said: 
" The Soviet Union is prepared to reach 
an understanding on the reduction or ban 
of any weapon, above all nuclear, and the 
prevention of the manufacture of new 
types and systems of weapons of mass 
destruction2• " 
But if certain clauses of SALT 11 are renego-
tiated, the Soviet Union can be expected to 
have its own demands as well. 
7.12. The Committee finally stresses the need 
for the closest allied consultation in the arms 
control process, and notes with satisfaction that 
it has been effective in the case of the LRTNF 
decision and its arms control aspects. 
VIII. Conclusions 
8.1. The Committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation. The 
preamble first states in other terms the well-
known position of NATO laid down thirteen 
years ago in the report on future tasks - that 
the Atlantic Alliance has two main functions; 
"military security and a policy of detente are 
not contradictory but complementary". Para-
graphs (iii) and (iv) concern the LR TNF 
decision described in paragraphs 2.19. et seq. of 
I. Sunday Times, 9th November 1980. 
2. International Herald Tribune, 7th November 1980. 
this explanatory memorandum. The opening 
of the preliminary bilateral talks referred to in 
paragraph ( v) is described in paragraph 7. 7. 
above. Paragraph (vi) is necessary in a report 
devoted chiefly to nuclear weapons in order to 
recall that conventional forces are an essential 
part of a deterrent. Paragraph (vii) describes 
the contribution which British and French 
nuclear forces make to the overall defence of 
the Alliance - an issue discussed in Chapter V 
above. Paragraphs (viii) and (ix) stress the 
advantages of SALT II (an opinion already 
expressed by the Assembly) and refer to the 
problem of linkage - described in paragraph 
7.9. above. 
8.2. In the operative text, the Committee in 
paragraph 1 first calls for the SALT II limits to 
be respected and for the earliest resumption of 
the SALT process. This position is elaborated 
in paragraphs 7.8. to 7.10. 
8.3. In operative paragraph 2, following the 
emphasis placed on conventional forces in 
paragraph (v) of the preamble, it is stressed that 
modernisation plans for British and French 
nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion 
of resources from conventional defence - these 
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modernisation plans are described in para-
graphs 3.12. et seq. and 4.8. et seq. respectively. 
8.4. Operative paragraph 3 of the recommen-
dation stresses the need for the requirements of 
arms control to be taken into account in all 
aspects of defence planning and for parliament 
to be fully consulted. Th~se are matters which 
the Committee has stre$sed in a previous 
report1• 
IX. Opinion of the minority 
9 .1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
11 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions. In the draft 
recommendation, some members of the mino-
rity would have deleted paragraph (iii) of the 
preamble on the grounds that negotiations 
should have preceded the decision of 12th 
December 1979. Others would have deleted 
paragraph (vii), claiming that the British and 
French nuclear forces did not contribute to 
overall deterrence in the Alliance. Yet others 
would have referred in paragraph (viii) to "a 
renegotiated " SALT 11, on the grounds that the 
present SALT 11 was not to the advantage of 
NATO. 
l. New weapons and defence strategy, Document 827. 
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APPENDIX I 
Strategic nuclear balance at mid-1980 
(estimated force loadings) 
APPENDIX I 
1. Systems covered by SALT (i.e. systems based on the territory of one superpower, or in sub-
marines, capable of reaching the territory of the other superpower): 
(a) Soviet Union 
Maximum No. Assumed 
Type range No. of independent total Notes 
km warheads No. 
each of warheads 
ICBMs 
SS-9 12,000 (believed 
withdrawn) 
SS-11 10,500 520 1 or 3 1,150 assumed 
2/3 MIRVed 
SS-13 10,000 60 1 60 
SS-17 10,000 150 1 or 4 1,100 assumed 
2/3 MIRVed 
SS-18 9-10,500 248 1 or 8-10 1,390 assumed 
2/3 MIRVed 
SS-19 11,000 300 6 or 1 1,300 assumed 
2/3 MIRVED 
Sub-total 1,278 5,000 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 1,120 21 1 21 
SSN-6 2,400-3,000 469 1 479 
SSN-8 8,000 302 1 300 
SSN-17 5,000 12 1 12 
SSN-18 8,000 160 3 400 
Sub-total 1,003 1,200 
Combat 
radius 
km 
AIRCRAFT 
Bear 
Tu-95 5-6,000 113 2-4 250 
Bison 
Mya-4 4-6,000 43 1 1-2 50 
Sub-total 156 300 
TOTAL 6,500 
(Assumptions on numbers of bombs and MIRVs adjusted to produce total of 6,500 warheads 
quoted by Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16th June 1980.) 
Other so Other sources: United States Department of Defence Annual Report FY 1981 ; 
IISS Military Balance 1980-81. 
I. Assuming half the Bison fleet to be converted to tankers. 
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(b) United States 
Maximum No. Assumed 
Type range No. of independent total Notes 
km warheads No. 
each of warheads 
ICBMs 
Titan 11 15,000 53 1 53 One destroyed 
in accident 
September 
1980 
Minuteman 11 11,300 450 1 450 
Minuteman Ill 13,000 550 3 1,650 
Sub-total 1,053 2,153 
SLBMs 
Polaris 4,600 160 1 160 
Poseidon 
C-3 4,600 448 10-14 4,200 
Trident 
C-4 7,400 48 8 384 
Sub-total 656 4,744 
AIRCRAFT 
B-52 5701 4 2,280 
TOTAL 9,177 
I. 570 reported in SALT II data base includes 220 in" deep storage". 
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2. Other strategic systems (i.e. all other allied systems capable of reaching the territory of the 
Soviet Union, and comparable Soviet systems- range > 1,000 km): 
(a) Soviet Union 
Maximum range Assumed No. Assumed 
Type (combat radius No. of independent total for aircraft) warheads No. 
km each of warheads 
ICBM, MRBM and 
SLBM 
SS-4 1,900 380 1 380 
SS-5 4,100 60 1 60 
SS-20 5,000 160 3 480 
SSN-5 1,100 39 1 39 
Sub-total 660 960 
AIRCRAFT 
Backfire 
Tu 22M/26 4,000 75 3 225 
Tu 16 Badger 2,800 465 2 636 
Tu 26 Blinder 3,100 155 2 250 
Su-24 Fencer 1,600 370 2 740 
Sub-total 1,065 1,850 
TOTAL 2,810 
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(b) Allied countries 
Maximum range Assumed No. Assumed 
Type (combat radius No. of independent total No. for aircraft) warheads of warheads km each 
(i) France (missiles and aircraft) 
IRBM S-2/S-3 3,000 18 1 18 
SLBM M-20 3,000 80 1 80 
Aircraft 
Mirage IV 1,600 33 1 83 
Sub-total 98 (missiles) 131 
33 (aircraft) 
(ii) United Kingdom 
SLBM Polaris A3 4,600 64 1 64 
Aircraft 
Vulcan 2,800 57 2 114 
Sub-total 64 (missiles) 178 
57 (aircraft) 
iil) United States (aircraft with combat radius > 1,000 km, not covered by SAL 111) 
FB-111A 4,000 65 4 or 6 260 
F-111 1,900 282 2 564 
A-6 1,000 501 2 100 
Sub-total 397 924 
TOTAL 1,233 
I. Assuming five aircraft-carriers out of seven in the United States Second and Sixth Fleets within range. 
(c) China 
Maximum range ~~sumed No. Assymed Type (cgmb~t rawus No. o mdependent fota No. or ~fiira ) warneads o warheads each I 
ICBM CSS-3 6-7,000 4 1 4 
IRBM CSS-2 2,500 65-85 1 75 
MRBM CSS-1 1,800 50 1 50 
Avions 
Tu-16 2,800 90 2 180 
ToTAL 309 
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APPENDIX 11 
RECOMMENDATION 345 1 
on new weapons and defence strategy - modernisation of theatre nuclear forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels 
of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by 
the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons- the SS-20 missile and 
Backfire bomber- and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons; 
(ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete 
range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conven-
tional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through 
a capacity for flexible response is based; 
(iii) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by 
all countries of the Alliance, in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through 
readiness to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its 
implementation; 
(iv) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously 
weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be 
countered by the Alliance's overall strategic capabilities; 
(v) Recalling moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek security through detente as well as 
deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contri-
bute as much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems; 
(vi) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a 
sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the 
SS-20 a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range 
nuclear weapons in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on the North Atlantic Council: 
To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new 
Soviet nuclear weapons systems: 
(a) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw 
Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course; 
(b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations 
with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides; 
(c) by continuing to ~eek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet 
medium-range nuclear weapons; 
(d) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at 
sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet 
weapons; 
(e) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central 
and theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons. 
t. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 during the First Part ofthe Twenty-Stxth Ordinary Sess10n (1st Sittmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr Roper on behalf of the Commtttee on Defence Questwns and 
Armaments (Document 827. Part 1). 
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Communique issued after the special meeting of NATO 
Foreign and Defence Ministers 
12th December 1979 
1. At a special meeting of Foreign and 
Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th Decem-
ber 1979: 
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 summit 
where governments expressed the political 
resolve to meet the challenges to their security 
posed by the continuing momentum of the 
Warsaw Pact military build-up. 
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years 
developed a large and growing capability in 
nuclear systems that directly threaten Western 
Europe and have a strategic significance for the 
Alliance in Europe. This situation has been 
especially aggravated over the last few years by 
Soviet decisions to implement programmes 
modernising and expanding their long-range 
nuclear capability substantially. In particular, 
they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which 
offers significant improvements over previous 
systems in providing greater accuracy, more 
mobility, and greater range, as well as having 
multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, 
which has a much better performance than 
other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a 
theatre role. During this period, while the 
Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superio-
rity in long-range theatre nuclear forces 
(LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
western LR TNF capabilities have remained 
static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age 
and vulnerability and do not include land-
based, long-range theatre nuclear missile sys-
tems. 
4. At the same time, the Soviets have also 
undertaken a modernisation and expansion of 
their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved 
the overall quality of their conventional for-
ces. These developments took place against 
the background of increasing Soviet interconti-
nental capabilities and achievement of parity in 
intercontinental capability with the United 
States. 
5. These trends have prompted serious 
concern within the Alliance, because, if they 
were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre 
nuclear systems could undermine the stability 
achieved in intercontinental systems and cast 
doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deter-
rent strategy by highlighting the gap in the 
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spectrum of NA TO's available nuclear response 
to aggression. 
6. Ministers noted that these recent deve-
lopments require concrete a<rtions on the part of 
the Alliance if NA TO's strategy of flexible res-
ponse is to remain credible. After intensive 
consideration, including the merits of alterna-
tive approaches, and after taking note of the 
positions of certain members, Ministers 
concluded that the overall interest of the 
Alliance would best be served by pursuing two 
parallel and complementary approaches of 
TNF modernisation and arms control. 
7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to 
modernise NATO's LRTNF by the deployment 
in Europe of United States ground-launched 
systems comprising 108 Pershing 11 launchers, 
which would replace existing United States 
Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched cruise 
missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All 
the nations currently participating in the inte-
grated defence structure will participate in the 
programme: the missiles will be stationed in 
selected countries and certain support costs will 
be met through NA TO's existing common 
funding arrangements. The programme will 
not increase NA TO's reliance upon nuclear 
weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed 
that as an integral part of TNF modernisation, 
1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be 
withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. 
Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF 
warheads should be accominodated within that 
reduced level, which necessarily implies a 
numerical shift of emphasis away from war-
heads for delivery systems of other types and 
shorter ranges. In addition they noted with 
satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is 
undertaking an examination of the precise 
nature, scope and basis of the adjustments 
resulting from the LR TNF deployment and 
their possible implications for the balance of 
roles and systems in NA TO's nuclear armoury 
as a whole. This examination will form the 
basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers 
in the autumn of 1980. 
8. Ministers attach great importance to the 
role of arms control in contributing to a more 
stable military relationship between East and 
West and in advancing the process of detente 
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This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives 
being examined within the Alliance to further 
the course of arms control and detente in the 
1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an 
integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure 
the undiminished security of its member states 
and to make the strategic situation between 
East and West more stable, more predictable, 
and more manageable at lower levels of arma-
ments on both sides. In this regard they wel-
come the contribution which the SALT 11 
treaty makes towards achieving these objectives. 
9. Ministers consider that, building on this 
accomplishment and taking account of the 
expansion of Soviet LR TNF capabilities of 
concern to NATO, arms control efforts to 
achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at 
lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides 
should therefore now include certain United 
States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear 
systems. This would reflect previous western 
suggestions to include such Soviet and United 
States systems in arms control negotiations and 
more recent expressions by Soviet President 
Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers 
fully support the decision taken by the United 
States following consultations within the 
Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on 
LR TNF and to propose to the USSR to begin 
negotiations as soon as possible along the 
following lines which have been elaborated in 
intensive consultations within the Alliance: 
A. Any future limitations on United States 
systems principally designed for theatre 
missions should be accompanied by appro-
priate limitations on Soviet theatre systems. 
B. Limitations on United States and Soviet 
long-range theatre nuclear systems should be 
negotiated bilaterally in the SALT Ill frame-
work in a step-by-step approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these negotia-
tions should be the establishment of agreed 
limitations on United States and Soviet land-
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based long-range theatre nuclear missile 
systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these systems 
must be consistent with the principle of equal-
ity between the sides. Therefore, the limita-
tions should take the form of de jure equality 
both in ceilings and in rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be adequa-
tely verifiable. 
10. Given the special importance of these 
negotiations for the overall security of the 
Alliance, a special consultative body at a high 
level will be constituted within the Alliance to 
support the United States' negotiating effort. 
This body will follow the negotiations on a 
continuous basis and report to the Foreign and 
Defence Ministers who will examine develop-
ments in these negotiations as well as in other 
arms control negotiations at their semi-annual 
meetings. 
11. The Ministers have decided to pursue 
these two parallel and complementary approa-
ches in order to avert an arms race in Europe 
caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet pre-
serve the viability of NA TO's strategy of 
deterrence and defence and thus maintain the 
security of its member states. 
A. A modernisation decision, including a 
commitment to deployments, is necessary to 
meet NA TO's deterrence and defence needs, to 
provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet 
TNF deployments, and to provide the founda-
tion for the pursuit of serious negotiations on 
TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in constraining 
the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance 
security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF 
requirements, and promote stability and detente 
in Europe in consonance with NA TO's basic 
policy of deterrence, defence and detente as 
enunciated in the Harmel report. NA TO's TNF 
requirements will be examined in the light of 
concrete results reached though negotiations. 
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APPENDIX IV 
SALT and MlR Vs chronology 
' 
an 7~ istic mzssi e a ance IC d SL b ll . I b I 
Total missiles I Total missile 
I warheads 
United Soviet I United Soviet States Union States Union 
I 
1960 (probable date) United States MIRV development pro-
gramme initiated 
1967 (probable date) Soviet Union MlR V development pro- I 
gramme initiated 1,710 590 1,710 590 
1970 First United States ICBM MIRV operational 1,710 1,604' 1,730 1,604 
1971 First United States SLBM MIRV operational 1,710 1,975 2,486 1,975 
1972 SALT I signed 1,710 2,027 3,550 2,027 
1975 United States ICBM MIRV programme complete; first 
Soviet Union SS-18 operational 1,710 2,311 6,410 2,311 
1976 United States MIRV programme complete 1,710 2,322 7,274 2,322 
1977 First Soviet Union ICBM MIRV operational 1,710 2,259 7,274 3,079 
1978 First Soviet Union SLBM MlR V operational 1,710 2,428 7,274 4,oooe 
1979 SALT 11 signed 1,710 2,426 7,274 5,oooe 
1980 1,709 2,426 7,273 6,200 
e =interpolated estimate. 
SALT I was signed in 1972 when the balance in IC and SL ballistic missiles was 1, 710 to 2,02"l in favour of the Soviet 
Union, and in warheads 3,550 to 2,027 in favour of the United States. The foregoing tables place this event in chronological 
perspective. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
SALT and the British and French nuClear forces 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
2nd December 1980 
1. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Believing" insert "a 
revised". 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "process" to the end of 
the paragraph. 
Signed: Bennett 
I. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment I negatived; Amendment 2 agreed to). 
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Amendment 3 
SALT and the British and French nuclear forces 
AMENDMENT 3 I 
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson 
3. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
I. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment negatived). 
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3rd December 1980 
S(-gned: Wilkinson 
Document 860 21st November 1980 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 345 to 354 
REC0\1\1END.\TIO:\ 345 1 
on new weapons and defence strategy - modernisation of theatre nuclear forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels 
of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by 
the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons- the SS-20 missile and 
Backfire bomber- and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons: 
(ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete 
range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conven-
tional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through 
a capacity for flexible response is based: 
(iii) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by 
all countries of the Alliance. in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through 
readiness to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its 
implementation: 
(iv) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously 
weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be 
countered by the Alliance's overall strategic capabilities: 
(v) Recalling moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek secunty through detente as well as 
deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contri-
bute as much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems: 
(ri) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlm on 6th October 1979 may be a 
sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the 
SS-20 a serious threat. and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range 
nuclear weapons in Europe, although many pomts still have to be clarified, 
RECOMME~DS TH<\11HE Cot'( ll 
Call on the North Atlantic Council: 
To seek to redress the military balance. now threatened in particular by the deployment of new 
Soviet nuclear weapons systems: 
(a) by taking the decisiOns necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw 
Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course: 
(h) by accompanying these decisions by a firm otTer to enter mto arms control negotiations 
with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides: 
(c) by continuing to ~eek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet 
medium-range nuclear weapons: 
(d) by relymg meanwhile on the whole range of existmg weapom systems based in Europe, at 
sea. and m the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet 
weapons: 
(£-') by seeking any opportunit) for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central 
and theatre nuclear weapon~ and of conventiOnal forces and weapons. 
I. Adopted b~ the Asscmhl~ on ~nd June 19W dunng the hN P.trt of the TIH~nt~-St\th Ordmar~ Sc"10n (ht Stttmg). 
~ Explanator~ Memorandum 'cc the Report t.thkd h~ \I! Ropet on hch.tlf of the Commtttcc on Defence Quc>ttons dnd 
<\rmamcnts (Document S~7. Part I) 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 345 
The Council agree that it is essential for the Alliance to maintain sufficient forces to ensure 
adequate deterrence in the face of the steady build-up of Soviet military forces across the board. In 
particular in the age of strategic parity the need is felt for a capability to deter the Russians from 
calculating - however incorrectly - that they could use or threaten to use their nu(;lear forces against 
Europe without putting Soviet territory at risk because the Americans would· be deterred from 
responding with their central systems. The present systems of the Alliance capable of providing this 
long-range capability are aging, increasingly vulnerable to the new and highly accurate Soviet 
weapons, particularly the Backfire and the SS-20, and do not include land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear systems. 
It was against this background that ministers participating in the special meeting of foreign and 
defence ministers on 12th December 1979 agreed to modernise the long-range th~atre nuclear forces 
stationed in Europe by the deployment of United States ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 
11 ballistic missiles from the end of 1983. Those members of the Council whose governments were 
parties to the decisions of 12th December 1979 believe that this step taken along with other measures 
in the defence field represents a measured and realistic response to the Soviet military programmes. 
! 
In parallel, the ministers of the governments concerned also agreed to support an American offer 
to the Russians to negotiate limitations on United States and Soviet long-range th~atre nuclear forces 
in the context of SALT. After initially rejecting this offer on the grounds that they were not 
prepared to negotiate until NA TO's TNF modernisation decision had been revoktJd or suspended, the 
Russians have indicated a certain willingness to negotiate. The Council note with interest that in 
accordance with a previously reached understanding the heads of the United S~ates and the USSR 
Delegations met on 17th October 1980 to begin discussions of questions related to the limitation of 
certain United States and Soviet nuclear forces. 
The TNF arms control offer was part of a wider package of arms control measures put forward 
last December including: 
- the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the 
decision on TNF modernisation, and the decision to withdraw other warheads on a one-for-
one basis as new systems are introduced; 
- a proposal for an interim Phase I agreement designed to facilitate progress in the MBFR 
negotiations; 
- a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to ensure compliance with an agreement 
and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence; 
- in furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence-
building measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe. 
I 
These proposals represent a serious effort to stimulate the arms control prodess in Europe. The 
programme of action which they envisage offers a major new opportunitJ. for creating more 
constructive relations between East and West. i 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1980. 
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RECOMMENDATION 346 1 
on new weapons and defence strategy - the impact of technology 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting with approval that NATO strategy has placed progressively greater emphasis on the 
role of conventional weapons in recent years and that new precision-guided conventional weapons 
have replaced nuclear weapons in certain specific military applications; 
(ii) Recognising that the application of new technologies to defence purposes may have unexpected 
repercussions on the military balance and on arms control arrangements, and calling therefore for 
continued proper political control to be exercised over such application. 
RECOMMENDS TH<\T THE COL'"'CIL 
A. Call on the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To take into account the implications of the application of new defence technologies on arms 
control negotiations such as SALT Ill and MBFR; 
2. To continue actively the present policy of replacing nuclear weapons systems by conventional 
systems where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value; 
B. Urge member governments: 
I. To establish machinery to ensure that the application of new technologies to defence purposes 
continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision; 
2. To submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new 
defence equipment programmes. 
I. Adopted by the Assembl~ on 2nd June 1980 dunng the F1rst Part of the Twenty-S1xth Ordinary Session (1st S1ttmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum. see the Report tabled by Mr. \an den Bergh on behalf of the Comm1ttee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 827. Part 11). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL' 
to Recommendation 346 
A. I. Allies involved in arms control negotiations have always taken into account pew developments 
in defence technologies when defining their negotiating aims and negotiating strategy, and surely 
continue to do so in the context of current arms control negotiations. 
A.2. In May 1978, heads of state and governments of the member countries of the integrated mili-
tary structure agreed to improve the Alliance's defence capability by modernising, and strengthening 
its conventional weapons component. They have, thereby, reacted adequately to changes in the stra-
tegic situation and have contributed to the maintenance of a credible deterrence capability. 
I 
In addition to that commitment to strengthen conventional systems, it c;ontinues to be of 
crucial importance to maintain the coupling of the three elements of the triadr i.e. conventional 
forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces. The evolutionary adjustment of the 
nuclear capability as concluded in the twofold decision of 12th December 1979 constitutes one of the 
consequences of this philosophy. 
NATO will continue to explore the capabilities of modem conventional technology and its 
possible use - in line with the demands of the strategy of" flexibility in response " - for improving its 
capacity for collective defence. 
B.l. The Council wish to confirm that appropriate and efficient machinery alteady exists within 
CNAD, Eurogroup and IEPG and that member governments have undertaken 'to ensure through 
CNAD and its defence research group in particular that the application of new technologies to 
defence purposes continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed govemmental decision. 
For more than one year CNAD has been engaged in drawing up guidelines adopted by national 
armament directors at their autumn 1980 meeting in Brussels. These guidelines provide for the 
screening of existing armament technologies for any specific inherent capabilities to improve defence-
effective weapons systems. The North Atlantic Council welcomed this initiative and endorsed the 
CNAD activities. 
Thus the Council are of the opinion that at present there is no need to m<!>dify or expand the 
existing machinery. 
B.2. The decision whether to submit annually to their respective parliaments reports on the arms 
control implications of new defence programmes is a matter to be discussed and decided by indivi-
dual governments of the member states concerned. 
In each of the member states, the adoption of defence programmes has been subject not only to 
military but also to arms control considerations, both aspects being extensively 'discussed in parlia-
ment as well as in public. 
It will suffice to cite, as a recent example, the parliamentary and public 'debates in various 
member states on the subject of NA TO's LR TNF modernisation programme adopted, together with 
an arms control negotiating offer, on 12th December 1979. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980. 
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RECOMMENDATION 347 1 
on political developments in Europe-
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
Remembering that the year 1980 marks the beginning of the second half of the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty and welcoming the fact that the relationship between 
the WEU Council and the Assembly rests on a sound basis; 
Noting with appreciation that the Council has again shown its intention to continue 
the dialogue with the Assembly on the various questions relating to the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and also the flexible and effective manner in which it has generally 
provided information, particularly concerning the results of the study being carried out by 
the Standing Armaments Committee; 
Considering that while Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty is opposed to duplica-
tion of work, it also advocates affording the most effective assistance to " the work of other 
economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented "; 
Welcoming the fact that at its joint meetings with Assembly Committees the Council 
proposes to incorporate an informal ·procedure "so that each member of the Council can 
give his government's views" along with the expression of its collective views; 
Anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to part1c1pate in a wider frame-
work of European co-operation and that the General Affairs Committee should 'examine 
any consequential changes in the organisation of WEU; 
Aware that Europe, in order to be master of its destiny, would have to be politically 
organised, based on genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Continue its effort to keep the Assembly regularly informed, by all appropriate means, about: 
(a) the progress of work in the Independent European Programme Group, particularly in the 
Assembly's specific fields of interest; 
(b) those parts of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee which have 
been completed and which are not covered by military secrecy; 
(c) matters important to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when they are 
dealt with by the member governments within other organisations; 
2. Should not omit, in informing the Assembly of the results of political co-operation between 
member states, to report also on subjects on which satisfactory results have not been obtained or even 
sought; 
3. To this end, seek better liaison both between governments and between NATO and other rele-
vant organisations, so that questions not dealt with in these organisations may be the subject of 
exchanges of views within the framework of the WEU Council; 
4. Examine, with the President of the Assembly, the ways in which questions to be raised in joint 
meetings by members of relevant Committees may receive " collective " answers; 
5. Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may 
be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation. 
I. <\dopted b~ the A''cmbi} on 2nd June I 980 dunng the Fmt Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordmary Session (2nd S1tting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Page on behall of the General Affa1rs Committee (Document 
834). 
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1. As in the past, the Council endeavour to maintain with the parliamentary f.'\ssembly of WEU 
good relations which will enable the parliamentarians of the member countries 1 to be informed of 
their government's activities in the fields of security and defence. 1 
2. The Council recall that the WEU Assembly, with the responsibility vested i~ it by the modified 
Brussels Treaty, constitutes the only European parliamentary institution empowered to deal with 
defence questions. In this capacity, it provides the forum where parliamentarians.and ministers from 
Western European countries discuss politico-military questions. In this respect, in the place which it 
occupies beside the various European institutions, the WEU Assembly retains an importance which 
was reaffirmed during the recent commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the signature of the 
Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty. ' 
3. Each of the governments represented in the Independent European Programme Group remains 
responsible for informing the parliamentarians who are members of the WEU Assembly, on a 
national basis. 
4. The Standing Armaments Committee, in accordance with the mandate which it received in 
1977, has completed the second, economic, part of its work which was submitted to the Council 
during the spring. A document to be sent to the Assembly is at present being prepared. 
' 
5. The Council regularly employ the procedures laid down for informing the1 Assembly on those 
questions which are within its competence. Replies to Assembly recommendations and questions, 
the Council's annual report and statements by government spokesmen from member states at plenary 
sessions of the Assembly and at informal joint meetings, are all used to reply to 1the questions of the 
Assembly, some of which may concern the results of consultations in other tora where political 
co-operation takes place on matters relating to the application of the terms of t~e modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
6. In accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, member states ensure that the 
WEU bodies co-operate with the N-orth Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They are keeping in mind the 
possibility of using WEU as a forum for exchanging views on defence problem~ not dealt with else-
where. 
7. Regarding the Assembly's wish for "collective" replies to questions pu~ by members of the 
Assembly, it is customary for the Chairman-in-Office to inform the parliamentarians of the result of 
discussions at meetings of the Council at ministerial level. 
8. Finally, the Council note the Assembly's wish that organisational measures be considered for 
possible future tasks of the organisation. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 348 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
following the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviet Union 2 
(i) Considering that at a time when the forces of the Soviet Union have just invaded a non-
member country of the Warsaw Pact it is essential to reaffirm the mutual defence obligations of 
Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(ii) Recalling the recommendations in the report on strategic mobility prepared by the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments*; 
(iii) Considering that no provision of the modified Brussels Treaty should jeopardise the security of 
the Alliance and noting that the Council applies only partially the controls provided for in Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(iv) Anxious to clarify the state of commitments entered into in the framework of the treaty, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, 
those provided for in Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus reaffirming the proper 
responsibilities of each of the seven member countries and the respective provisions of the Brussels 
and North Atlantic Treaties; 
2. Call for the strengthening of the defence of all member states through the urgent implementa-
tion by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme to take account in 
particular of the situation in the Middle East; 
3. Approve, in the appropriate NATO bodies, the assignment of German naval forces to 
SACLANT and to SACEUR with the sole aim of making the best use of all available allied forces for 
the common defence; ' 
4. Delete paragraph V of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
5. Make use of the procedure whereby NATO may provide material for replies to appropriate 
Assembly recommendations; 
6. Amplify, in future annual reports, the present reference to United Kingdom land forces 
stationed on the mainland of Europe by a corresponding reference to the United Kingdom's Second 
Tactical Air Force and any redeployment of such forces liable to affect the accuracy of the figures 
given; 
7. Clarify, in its twenty-sixth annual report, the present situation as regards stocks of chemical 
weapons held by member countries and publish in it the list approved by the Council, currently in 
force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency. 
* Document 758. 
I. Adopted by the Assembl) on 3rd June 1980 during the Ftrst Part of the Twenty-Stxth Ordinary Sess10n (3rd Sittmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 836). 
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1. The Council note with interest the view of the Assembly as stated in their IR.ecommendation 
348, Article 1, that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, 
those provided for in Article VIII, 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
I 
Furthermore, the Council wish to emphasise that member states at all times have been aware 
of their obligations as set out in the modified Brussels Treaty and, acting accordingly1 have discharged 
themselves of the full range of their responsibilities both as member states of Western European 
Union and as partner within the Atlantic Alliance. 
2. At their joint meeting on 14th May 1980, the Defence and Foreign Minister$ of the countries 
participating in the integrated military structure approved two programmes designed, in view of the 
changed international situation, 
I 
- to strengthen the Alliance's defence capability in Europe through short- and medium-term 
measures and thus to safeguard the policy of detente; 
- to mitigate, through division of labour and increased efforts on the part of the countries 
concerned, any military weaknesses arising from the possible deployment in South-West Asia 
of United States reinforcement forces originally intended for Europe. 
At the DPC meeting due in December 1980, the Ministers intend to decide on individual mea-
sures in certain sectors such as mobilisation of reserves; build-up of war reserves; i1provement of air 
transport capacity; maritime defence planning; host nation support; defence aid for ortugal and Tur-
key; infrastructure. 
i 
3. The German Federal Security Council decided on 19th June 1980 that 
1 
• 
- the Federal Republic of Germany will declare to the North Atlantic Treat"~' Organisation its 
willingness to let German naval and naval air forces henceforth be deployej:i also outside the 
area limits at present existing for the German navy in the northern flank command; 
- this measure does not imply the intention to reinforce the German naval aqd naval air forces 
beyond the present level or beyond the level at present projected; 
- this offer shall affect neither the German navy's present chain of commaqq nor the limits of 
the NATO command area as applying at present; 
- the German Government will make this offer to the competent NATO bod~es. 
4. In response to Recommendation 348, Article 4, of the Assembly the Countil should like to 
communicate that the Federal Republic of Germany, in accordance with the proqedure foreseen in 
Article 11, Part I, Protocol No. Ill, of the revised Brussels Treaty, on 18th June 1980, introduced into 
the WEU Council a formal request for the cancellation of the provisions concerning limitations on 
the construction of naval ships as contained in Article V, Annex Ill, Protocol No. Ill, of the said 
treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe fully supported this request and rtecommended that 
it be approved by the Council, thus enabling the Council on 21st July 1980 to take their unanimous 
decision to cancel the provisions mentioned above. 
5. As to NATO material and background information the Council have always made use of such 
information in their replies to appropriate Assembly recommendations where necessary and in 
conformity with the respective regulations, and will continue to do so. · 
6. The Council have been informed by the Government of the United King-
dom that they will in future provide an annual statement of the strength of the United Kingdom's 
Second Tactical Air Force and a reference to any redeployment affecting this strength. This infor-
mation will be published in future annual reports. 
7. The Council recall that in their last report to the Assembly they specified that the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments had asked all member States, as it did every year, to indicate whether they 
held stocks of chemical weapons and they all replied in the negative. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1980. 
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RECOMMENDATION 349 1 
on the impact of the evolving situation 
in the Near and Middle East on Western European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the fundamental princi-
ples of international law and is a serious threat to the balance and peace in an area which is vital for 
the security of the western world; 
Believing that this intervention makes it essential to take urgent measures to guarantee the 
maintenance of peace in the Middle East; 
Considering furthermore that democratic countries must make use of all the peaceful means at 
their disposal to demonstrate their non-acceptance of the fait accompli; 
Considering also that the holding of United States diplomats as hostages in Tehran is an intol-
erable violation of international law and a threat to peace in Asia and prevents the improvement of 
relations with Iran; 
Believing that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan makes it essential to strengthen without 
delay the defence means of the members of the Atlantic Alliance and considering that in this 
context the establishment of just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the area; 
Recalling that in their declaration of 29th June 1977 the Nine said that fair and lasting peace 
could only be established in the Middle East in an overall context. Such a settlement must be based 
on relevant resolutions of the Security Council and establish the right of the Palestinian people to 
a homeland, through self-determination, without prejudicing the existence of Israel as an independent 
state within internationally secure and recognised boundaries; 
Recalling that the Nine deplored the policy of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government 
in the occupied territories, which is illegal from the point of view of international law and contrary to 
decisions of the Security Council in its most recent resolution; 
Noting that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only body recognised as representing 
the Palestinian people by the Arab states as early as in 1974; 
Noting that an increasing number of western countries, including several WEU member states, 
have acknowledged that a solution of the Palestine problem is difficult, if not impossible, to attain 
without the participation of the PLO; 
Considering that Europe, when it manages to speak with a single voice, could be in a position 
to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace with justice in the Near and Middle 
East; 
Recalling and reiterating all the as yet unfulfilled and still relevant recommendations in 
Recommendation 341, approved by the Assembly of WEU in December 1979 ; 
Noting with approval the declaration on the international situation adopted by the Nine on 
28th April 1980 affecting the matters raised in the present document, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Intensify consultations between its members on all questions concerning the balance and 
security in areas not covered by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to 
agreeing on joint action whenever and wherever possible; 
2. Develop forthwith the means of defence at Europe's disposal and reinforce, on the most appro-
priate basis, the capacity of Pakistan and other threatened countries in the region to defend their 
territorial integrity; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1980 dunng the F1rst Part of the l'wenty-S1xth Ordinary SessiOn (4th S1tting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by S1r Fredenc Bennett on behalf of the General Affa1rs Committee 
(Document 844). 
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3. Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military measures 
to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the fait accompli by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; 
4. Demonstrate their solidarity in requiring Iran to free the United States dipl~mats now being 
held hostage; 
5. Supply Turkey with economic support to assist in overcoming the difficulties ~t is encountering 
and for associating that country as closely as possible with the economy of Westernl Jf:urope; 
6. Initiate, after 26th May 1980, new steps necessary to contribute to the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in Palestine; 
i 
7. Urge the Security Council either to review arid supplement Resolution 242 tb express beyond 
argument the original fundamental purposes and scope of that resolution; or else to consider and 
declare a new composite resolution on the one hand designed to provide adequate security for the 
integrity of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised boundaries whilst o~ the other hand 
assuring Palestinians of an inherent right of self-determination on the West Bank i and in the Gaza 
Strip to establish their own homeland; 
8. Propose, thereafter, the preparation of a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab 
countries, a delegation truly representative of the Palestinian people, the United S~ates and Western 
European countries in a position to contribute to its success; 
9. To this end, endeavour to secure before that conference unequivocal declarations by the Arab 
participants in this settlement recognising Israel's right to exist and by Israel re<;Qgnising the right 
of the Palestinian people to self-determination. I 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 349 
1. The Council recall that already in December 1967 NATO stated that it favoured consultation 
among its members when crises and conflicts arose outside the North Atlantic Treaty area which 
might affect the security of the Alliance, either directly or by altering world balance. 
In the declaration approved by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa on 19th June 1974, 
consultation between the member states of NATO is envisaged within the Atlantic Alliance for 
" matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance. bearing in mind that these 
interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world ". 
The present situation, particularly in Afghanistan, underlines the importance of such consul-
tation. In their communique of 26th June 1980, Alliance ministers " agreed that the international 
crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the 
part of the allies ". 
2. Confirming the position regarding Afghanistan which they had expressed on 19th February 1980 
through the Presidency, the Nine, at the European Council of 27th and 28th April 1980, reaffirmed 
the need to find a solution through th.e formulation of the concept of a neutral and non-aligned 
Afghanistan. 
In its statement on Afghanistan, the European Council held in Venice on 12th and 13th June 
recalled the proposal it made in Luxembourg on 28th April that the great powers and neighbouring 
states should undertake the necessary commitments to allow Afghanistan to remain outside the 
competition among the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned 
state. 
The Council also repeated its readiness to support any meaningful initiative designed to promote 
a solution of the Afghan crisis. 
3. Expressing their solidarity in efforts to obtain from Iran the freeing of the American diplomats 
held hostage, the Nine, through their Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg on 
22nd April 1980, noted the results of the demarche of their Ambassadors to Tehran, decided upon by 
them at their previous meeting in Lisbon on I Oth April, and decided: · 
(I) to put into effect without delay measures relating to: reduction of the staffs of diplomatic 
missions exchanged between member countries and Iran; reintroduction of controls regarding 
the movements of Iranians travelling to the member states; and suspension of the supply of 
arms or defence-related equipment to Iran by the member countries; 
(2) to provide for the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran in accordance with the 
Security Council Resolution on Iran of lOth January 1980 which was vetoed, and in accor-
dance with the rules of international law. 
The European Council of 28th April 1980 in Luxembourg confirmed this decision and the 
Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in Naples on 17th and 18th May 1980, concluding 
that there had been no significant progress towards the release of the hostages since their declaration 
of 22nd April, decided to apply the sanctions provided for, with the sole object of hastening the 
release of the hostages. 
The Ministers also confirmed their support of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and 
their intention to remain in constant contact with him so that the measures taken with regard to Iran 
could be suspended rapidly if the United Nations mission made satisfactory progress. 
When they met in Ankara on 26th June, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries published 
a fresh appeal to the Iranian Government to release the American hostages, alive and well, 
immediately. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th November 1980. 
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4. In the OECD, member states gave broad support to the programme for Turkey adopted on 
15th April 1980 and to the agreement of 23rd July 1980 on the consolidation of a substantial part of 
Turkey's debt. They also co-operated fully in working out the three-year standby agreement arrived 
at by the International Monetary Fund on 18th June 1980. 
Finally, as regards the close association of Turkey with the economy of Western Europe, a major 
step was taken at the session of the EEC-Turkey Association Council of 30th June 1980. 
However, at their meeting in Brussels on 15th September last, the Ministers fo1:1 foreign Affairs of 
the Nine discussed the Turkish situation and took note with~econcern of political developments in 
Turkey. They noted the assurances given by the military authorities regarding the speedy 
re-establishment of democratic institutions, respect for human rights and guarante~s concerning the 
treatment of persons in public life under house arrest. They entertain the firm hope that these 
declarations will soon be put into effect in full. It is in this spirit that the Community will continue 
its co-operation with Turkey. 
5. In their declaration on the situation in the Middle East at the European Council held in Venice 
on 12th and 13th June 1980, the Nine agreed that growing tensions affecting this tegion rendered a 
comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and more pressing than ever. 
Considering that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe 
1
tp the Middle East 
oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards 
peace, the Nine decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. 
The making of these contacts was entrusted to the Presidency of the Nine, witlh the objective of 
ascertaining the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in the Venice 
declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process, to en~ble the Nine to 
determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take. 
The Venice declaration also provided the Nine with the opportunity to ~et out the basic 
principles governing the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, with special 
emphasis on: 
- the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel; 
- justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people, who must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process ~efined within the 
framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-
determination. 
In his speech on 24th July 1980 to the Special General Assembly of the United Nations on 
Palestine, the Foreign Minister holding the Presidency of the Council of Minister~ of the European 
Community recalled these principles and confirmed the will of the Nine to promote a peace settle-
ment. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 350 1 
on co-operation between WEU member countries on 
video communication systems 2 
Having become acquainted with recent developments in the United Kingdom with the Prestel 
view-data system, in France with the Antiope videotex system and in other member countries in this 
field; 
Aware that in the absence of appropriate American developments in this area the United States 
Federal Communications Committee is studying the abovementioned and similar systems and is 
considering their adaptability for the American market; 
Recalling that current developments are sponsored jointly by government departments and 
private enterprises; 
Convinced that these new communications systems will also have a significant impact on 
military communications systems; 
Seeking to promote co-operation among European countries so as to foster the possibility of 
gaining access to American and world markets, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 
I. To concert their efforts to establish European standards for video communication systems 
applicable to world markets through the CEPT and, to this end, to approach the bodies or firms 
concerned; 
2. To urge all authorities and industries concerned to promote co-operation with each other in 
these matters. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 dunng the F1rst Part of the Twenty-S1xth Ordmary Sesswn (5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr Valle1x on behalf of the Committee on Scienufic, Technological 
and Aerospace Quest1ons (Document 839) 
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1. On the basis of recent developments in the field of video communications s)'stems in certain 
member countries, the Council will seek to promote, insofar as is compatible with the principles of 
fair and equitable competition, co-operation among European countries with a riew to fostering 
access for their technologies to outside markets. . 
2. To this end, the Council will call on the governments of member countt1es to encourage 
consideration of a harmonisation of standards through existing standards bodies which could lead 
ultimately to co-operation in the matter of video communications. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980. 
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RECOMMENDATION 351 1 
on the international situation and European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is a pure violation of the law 
of nations as defined inter alia in the Charter of the United Nations and the final act signed in 
Helsinki; 
Considering that Soviet expansion in the Middle East is a threat to stability in that area which 
is of vital interest to the West; 
Considering that the deployment of new weapons in Eastern Europe is also liable to upset the 
balance on which peace depends; 
Considering that consultations between members of the Atlantic Alliance were not held quickly 
enough or in sufficient detail to allow a joint policy to be drawn up in face of these threats; 
Deploring in particular that these countries were not in a position to define jointly the 
measures made necessary by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; 
Recognising nevertheless the need for the decision taken by the members of NATO to increase 
progressively the proportion of their expenditure allocated to joint defence; 
Endorsing the proposal by the Nine to seek the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a 
-,tatus of neutrality and non-alignment being conferred on that country by agreement between the 
parties; 
Considering that the search for· a balance of forces and armaments in Europe at the lowest 
possible level, even if this_ cannot be achieved in the short term, is still in conformity with the 
interests of the West; 
Considering that it is in the interest of all to develop contacts and exchanges of all kinds 
between Eastern and Western Europe; 
Considering that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all countries is 
still one of the West's major objectives, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Ensure that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance concert regularly and efficiently 
the policies they pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
2. Ensure that the members of the Atlantic Alliance agree on effective measures to be taken to 
convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan; 
3. Ensure that its members pursue their efforts to sustain the defensive capacity of the Atlantic 
Alliance in face of new Soviet weapons; 
4. Ensure the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies to achieve a limitation 
and reduction of forces and armaments to establish a true balance in forces and in conventional 
weapons and continental-range nuclear missiles at the lowest possible level; 
5. Ensure that the application of the final act signed in Helsinki is the subject of strict and 
exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 dunng the Ftrst Part of the Twent~-Stxth Ordmary Sess10n (5th Sittmg). 
2 Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Yohrer on behalf of the General Affairs Commtttee (Document 
845). 
220 
DOCUMENT 860 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL' 
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The Council share in general terms the concern expressed by the Assembly in 
1
its recommenda-
tion with regard to the international situation and security in Europe and wish to r~ffr in this connec-
tion to the communique issued after the ministerial session of the North Atl~ntic Council on 
25th and 26th June last. 
I 
The Council recall the grave concern that was expressed by the Ministers flt the continued 
occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces. They agreed that the international crisis thus 
caused called for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the allies. 
In line with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14th January 1980, 
which appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and 
non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of 
that country, the Ministers at the Ankara meeting stressed the need for an immediate, unconditional 
and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. While recognising that the security of the 
region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fa~~ that members of 
the Alliance are by reason of their relations with those countries in a position to ma,ke a contribution 
to peace and stability in the region. 
The Council recall equally the ministerial session of the Defence Planning Committee of NATO 
on 14th May 1980. Against the background of the Soviet military intervention in a non-aligned 
country, in a way which affects the overall strategic situation and which upsets stability in 
South-West Asia, the member countries of the Alliance, both individually and c~llectively, under-
lined at this meeting the need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in the 
interests of deterrence. At the same time they pledged to increase their efforts to improve the 
capability of the full spectrum of forces committed to the Alliance. 
In the face of growing Soviet military strength, particularly in the field of theatre nuclear 
weapons, the Council recall the decision of the member countries of the integrated' military structure 
to undertake a modernisation programme on long-range theatre nuclear forces, 1at the same time 
offering a wide range of arms control initiatives, including an offer to negotiate limitations on 
LR TNF in the SALT Ill framework, which ran parallel and was complementary to the modernisa-
tion decision. In this connection, the Council note with interest that exchanges on this subject 
between the United States of America and the Soviet Union are being held in Geneva. 
The member states of Western European Union participating in the Vienna tel!lks on mutual and 
balanced force reductions continue to attach great importance to these talks as a means of seeking a 
more stable force relationship in Central Europe. A first reaction, recently given by the East to the 
western proposal for an interim phase I agreement for MBFR of December 1979; is being carefully 
studied by the members of the Alliance concerned. The Council may finally reiterate the firm 
determinatioq of the member states to enter at the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid 
into a thorough and frank discussion on the implementation of the principles and provisions as laid 
down in the t\hal act of Helsinki and to work towards the adoption, as part of a balanced outcome, of 
a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on militarily significant and verifiable 
confidence-building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980. 
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RECOMMENDATION 352 1 
on defence-related information technology 2 
The Assembly, 
Conscious that in the crucial sector of microelectronic components Europe imports more than 
80 % of its requirements in integrated circuits; 
Aware that European computer firms supply only 16 % of the world market and that Japan has 
made remarkable progress in this field; 
Regretting that Europe has not so far exploited the fact that it itself constitutes a continental-
size market and has not followed Japan in pursuing a coherent policy and commercial strategy to 
capture part of the world market; 
Considering the link between telecommunications equipment for civil and military purposes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
I. To promote European collaboration at governmental level and between European industries 
concerned with microelectronics, communications and telematics, computers and software, and the 
production of interface equipment with users so as to ensure the establishment of a sound European 
industrial base in this field to c;ounter American and Japanese activities in European and world 
markets; 
2. To establish a truly homogenous European market for telematic equipment and services for 
both civil and military uses; 
3. To make an effort to co-ordinate orders from both civil and military public authorities so as 
inter alia to allow interoperability of equipment when justified. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 dunng the Ftrst Part of the Twenty-Stxth Ordtnary Sesston (6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Sctenttfic. Techno-
logtcal and Aerospace Questions (Document 840). 
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I. The Council share the concern expressed by the Assembly that European firms have so far 
failed to capture a satisfactory share of the European and world markets for microelectronic and asso-
ciated equipment. The Council favour practical international action which offers the prospect of 
assisting European firms to win a larger share of the international market. They ~!so welcome the 
recent initiatives of the European Commission but take the view that, while the main impetus for 
change must come from the industries in question themselves, new initiatives wiU be necessary in 
order to co-ordinate national action to support these industries in achieving a competitive position in 
the world market. 
2. In the defence field considerable progress has been made in bringing together national require-
ments ensuring compatibility of national systems. The defence world, indeed, has a particularly 
acute awareness of the benefits of common standards. Considerable effort in CNAD and in 
Eurogroup is being devoted to agreeing common parameters for systems intended 1<!> be brought into 
service. As the volume of such equipment destined for introduction with allied s~rvices grows the 
need to work to agreed standards - which might also apply to the civil sphere - inGreases in propor-
tion. It should be noted however that the standards which will best contribute to the efficiency of 
the Alliance and those which will help European industry in the worldwide market are world 
standards rather than exclusively European standards. For this reason Eurogroup's work is being 
channelled through scheme-wide institutions. The Assembly has rightly drawn attention to these 
matters, which it can be assured the WEU governments intend to take into account. 
3. Defence accounts for a large share of the public purchasing of information equipment. Inter-
operability of the equipment - especially communications equipment- with that used by allied forces 
is a high priority for all WEU governments. A large proportion of the Alliance's spending on 
communications equipment is indeed funded through the NATO infrastructure bu<ifget and provided 
as a facility which more than one nation can use. It should not be assumed that there is advantage 
in ensuring interoperability of equipment for civil and military use. Whilst this may be the case in 
most circumstances, it does not follow as a general rule. 
I. Communicated to the Assembl) on 24th October 1980. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 353 1 
on a European earth resources detection satellite 
programme 2 
Aware of the success of the United States Landsat, Seasat, Nimbus and Goes satellite pro-
grammes in the earth resources, oceanographic and meteorological fields respectively; 
Conscious of the important infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of remote-
sensing satellite data which exists in a number of European countries under the ESA Earthnet and 
Meteosat programmes and the success of a number of ESA-sponsored space projects to date; 
Believing that European experience through the first Meteosat meteorological satellite points to 
the positive benefits derived from further European remote-sensing satellite programmes; 
Considering that current developments within Europe through the Spacelab and French Spot 
programmes should be regarded as the foundation for further endeavours on a European collaborative 
basis in the realm of earth resources satellite programmes; 
Confident that the studies so far undertaken within and on behalf of the European Space 
Agency, especially regarding land applications satellite systems (LASS) and coastal ocean monitoring 
satellite systems (COMSS), indicate both technical feasibility within the resources potentially 
available to Europe and worthwhile returns for these projects; 
Mindful of the military surveillance and reconnaissance implications which in addition to the 
long-term commercial desirability of a European remote-sensing satellite programme enhance its 
strategic importance to European nations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge the member states: 
1. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth 
resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme; 
2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space Agency, 
for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction 
of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Office of the 
ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish 
that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes; 
3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed 
effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of 
compatible earth resources satellite launches; 
4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme 
through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development 
so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substan-
tial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme; 
5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-
sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems; 
6. To encourage within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) the concerted study 
of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any 
resulting satellite projects and their economic and efficient procurement; 
7. To urge the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe to co-ordinate 
the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European 
overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world. 
I. Adopted by the Assembl) on 5th June 1980 dunng the Ftrst Part of the Twenty-Stxth Ordinary Sesston (7th Sttting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled b) Mr. Wtlkmson on behalf of the Committee on Sctentific. Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions (Document 842). 
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1. The Council are fully aware of the importance of extending the application of space techniques 
as a means of increasing knowledge of member countries' natural resources and puttipg them to fuller 
use. They recognise that orbital observation offers a wide variety of applications of practical and 
economic value for the satisfaction of social needs and the development of natural resources. 
2. In this context, therefore, the political will exists for the development of a Eruropean remote-
sensing programme to be implemented through the European Space Agency. The !first stage of this 
programme provides for the improvement of data-processing techniques at ground s~ations where the 
Agency will operate through Earthnet and the ESRIN data bank at Frascati and through the laun-
ching of appropriate satellites developed within ESA. 
3. Furthermore, the governments of the majority of ESA member countries f1:1vour the conti-
nuation of the Meteosat programme and plan to improve arrangements for the distribution of 
meteorological data, possibly including the use of a special relay satellite (Sirio 11). 
4. It is obvious - and from a correct scientific point of view, it could not be otherwise - that the 
European remote-sensing programme will have to be suitably co-ordinated with 'NASA's existing 
Landsat satellite system and with the French Spot system now being developeP on a national 
basis. It is to be hoped that an agreement can be reached by the member states of ESA on a Euro-
pean remote-sensing satellite programme as well as on the possible use of experimepts on Spacelab. 
5. The governments of the member countries will do their best to provide adequate funds for the 
European Space Agency's programme. 1 
6. The land and coastal observation programmes worked out in ESA should 1 provide member 
countries with a large amount of data on a wide variety of subjects which will help in reaching 
decisions on the use of resources, environmental planning and the prevention of ponution. Applica-
tions of particular interest for the ESA countries concern agriculture and forestry, fisheries, mineral 
resources, oceanography, the environment, town and country planning and the mariagement of water 
resources. 
In this respect, the European remote-sensing programme is an important vehicle for European 
scientific and economic co-operation and seems likely to become one of ESA's major applications 
programmes in the years to come. 
7. The European governments believe that ESA's remote-sensing programme ~nd the Meteosat 
programme can contribute substantially to resolving some of the third world's 1 problems. Space 
techniques, with the wide range of services which they involve, among others in the field of commu-
nications, are in some cases suited to deal with development problems associated ~th the large-scale 
promotion of natural and human resources. The importance of space techniques for the develop-
ing countries lies inter alia in the fact that they provide access to a whole set of leconomically and 
socially valuable services without the need to install costly infrastructure systems on the ground. 
The Council fully share the view that "co-operation is the key to Europe's success", expressed 
by the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe on 6th Jutle 1980. In order 
to be effective, this co-operation need not be limited to the European Community. 
8. Finally, as regards prospects for military collaboration in the field of remote-sensing satellites, 
none of the projects under consideration in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), for 
possible joint implementation, is concerned with such satellites. Indeed it should be noted that there 
is no link between the activities of ESA and those of the IEPG. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980. 
225 
DOCL'MENT 860 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 354 1 
on the state of European aerospace activities -
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Counci/ 2 
Considering that the ESA convention has been in existence since 30th May 197 5 and that 
France, although playing an important role in the Agency which has its seat in Paris, has still not yet 
ratified the convention; 
Considering the separate development of French and German national direct broadcasting 
spacecraft and ESA's large satellite; 
Agreeing with the Council on the European industry's need to receive a fair share of orders for 
military application satellites; 
Aware of the deteriorating situation with regard to Western Europe's energy supplies and the 
consequent threat to Europe's political and military posture; 
Gratified that several member countries are nearing agreement on a development plan for a 
tactical fighter aircraft - the European combat aircraft - for the 1990s; 
Welcoming the establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft, but regretting that the 
Fokker-29 development programme is not yet associated with the Airbus programme, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Urge the French Government to ratify the ESA convention in 1980; 
2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate 
steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broad-
casting spacecraft and the ESA L-sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided 
on the world scene and in the world market; 
3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of 
space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at 
an appropriate political level; 
4. In view of the threat to Europe's security, urge member governments to decide on the necessary 
practical application measures further to the resolution adopted in Dublin in November 1979 to 
develop a more effective energy policy for the European Community and to elaborate a common 
European energy plan up to 1990; 
5. Invite 
(a) the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to 
ensure the implementation of the industrial feasibility study which has been carried out on 
the European combat aircraft; and 
(b) the other member countries to be associated with this important European venture and to 
participate in the production of this aircraft; 
6. Invite the Netherlands Government to use its political and financial influence to promote a 
European solution associating the Fokker-29 programme with the Airbus programme. 
I Adopted b) the Assemhl) on 5th June 1980 dunng the F1rst Part of the Twent)-SJxth Ordmar} Sess10n (7th Slltmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum. see the Report tabled h\ Mr Sche!Ter on behalf of the Committee on Sc1enlific. Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions (Document 841) 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 354 
1. Since the procedure of French parliamentary approval has been concluded, it can be expected 
that, before long, France will deposit the instrument of ratification. The ESA c;qnvention will then 
enter into force 
2. As the recommendation recognises there is already an encouraging degr~e of co-operation 
underway on a number of projects. The Council welcome this, but recognise that basic differences 
in approach and timing led to the separate ESA L-Sat and Franco-German prQjects being set up. 
There is no doubt that the successful demonstration of European industrial capabilities in the con-
struction of direct broadcasting satellites should open up access to the world market. 
The Franco-German project envisages the development, production and geostationary place-
ment of two satellites of largely similar construction. The development stage is now starting fol-
lowing the signing of the intergovernmental agreement on 29th April 1980. Both satellites conform 
to the W ARC 77 rules and they are designed for national use in Germany and Fr"nce. 
Negotiations on the implementation and financing of the L-Sat project have yet to be 
completed. The satellite is planned for launch some six months after the first of the Franco-German 
satellites, and its ambit is rather wider than just direct broadcasting. It will carry a variety of broad-
casting and telecommunications experiments. 
It is hoped that co-operation, particularly in the provision of mutual comPI<ments, will develop 
as the projects approach the marketing stage. Both systems are capable of being launched on the 
European Ariane rocket and will therefore help to consolidate European dollaboration in the 
Arianespace company. 
3. The member states of ESA are aware of the Agency's outstanding role in space co-operation in 
Europe. The ESA Council, which is the competent body to deal with this matter, is engaged in deli-
berations on ESA's future terms of reference and new programmes, for instance with regard to 
remote-sensing and terrestrial research, and will take the necessary decisions in d\le course. 
Future activities in the field of space travel and outer space research will, however, be deter-
mined not only by scientifically and technologically feasible and desirable obje9tives but also by the 
financial resources available. . 
4. Following the meeting of the European Council in Dublin on 29th and 30th November 1979, a 
number of decisions have been taken within the EEC in order to promote t~e development of a 
common energy policy: 
(a) The EEC Council of Ministers on 4th December 1979 agreed on a bre<lkdown of overall oil 
import targets 1980 and 1985 into individual targets of member countries. A regular monitoring of 
oil import targets has also been decided upon. 
(b) At the meeting on 27th and 28th April 1980 in Luxembourg the European Council pointed 
out that a policy of structural changes should be developed in order to achieve a gradual reduction 
in the dependence on oil and a replacement of oil by alternative sources of energy. 
(c) The EEC Council of Ministers subsequently on 13th May 1980 adopted two resolutions on 
energy objectives for 1990 and the reduction of energy consumption. In the first resolution the 
following guidelines for 1990 have been agreed upon: 
- The ratio between the rate of growth of energy consumption and the' rate of growth of the 
' gross domestic product should be reduced to 0. 7 or less. 
- The oil consumption in the Community should be reduced to about 40 % of the gross 
consumption of primary energy. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980. 
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Other points of this resolution refer to the increased use of solid fuels and nuclear energy for 
generating electricity, to the promotion of renewable sources of energy and the energy price policy . 
• 
In the light of these decisions the Community will keep under review the energy programmes 
of member states directed to achieve the medium- and long-term targets agreed upon. 
5. The industries of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were 
requested on 12th February 1980, through the respective national armaments directors, to continue 
the studie~ ~tarted in the autumn of 1979 regarding a European combat aircraft. 
On 3rd April 1980, the firms of A vions Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation (AMD), British 
Aerospace (BAe), and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Biohm (MBB) submitted to the respective national 
authorities a European combat aircraft report containing the results of the studies. 
The results of the assessment, including a recommendation, and a joint report by the national 
armaments directors of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were 
submitted to the governments concerned for their approval. 
6. The Council are of the opinion that a viable civil aircraft industry is of utmost importance for 
a strong and expanding industrial capability in Europe. 
The Council therefore welcome the idea of well-balanced European aircraft development 
programmes in which all the available capabilities in the various European companies are taken into 
account and exploited to the maximum extent possible in economically viable programmes. These 
programmes should therefore be pursued, both for commercial purposes and for the maintenance of 
an advanced European technological capacity. The current co-operation programmes in the aero-
engine sector with the United States and Japan are also endorsed m this context. The Council 
welcome all efforts by member governments concerning joint programming among major aircraft 
manufacturers. 
Questions regarding specific co-operative programmes will be considered by the governments 
concerned in the light of the general approach as outlined above. 
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Written Questions 205 to 223 and the replies of the Council 
QUESTION 205 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett 
on 17th January 1980 
205. The Nine have already held consulta-
tions on the problems arising from develop-
ments in Iran and Afghanistan. When will 
the WEU Council meet according to Article 
VIII of the revised Brussels Treaty with a view 
to concerting their approach to define a 
common position ? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 22nd February 1980 
205. The Council's position on the points 
raised in Written Questions 205 and 207 to 214 
will be stated in their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 341 on the impact of the 
evolving situation in the Near and Middle East 
on Western European security, which is now 
under consideration. 
QUESTION 206 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett 
on 17th January 1980 
206. What guarantees are the WEU member 
countries prepared to grant for the security and 
integrity of Pakistan and Iran against external 
aggression? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 23rd April1980 
206. The governments of the member coun-
tries of WEU are considering in consultation 
with other governments how to respond to the 
severe threat posed by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan for the stability of an area of vital 
geopolitical importance. They have called for 
the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. At their meeting on 19th 
February 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the 
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Nine expressed the desire to seek out ways 
and means of restoring a situation in line with 
the resolution of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations of 14th January, which appeals 
to all states to respect the' sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, political independence and non-
aligned character of Afghani~tan and to refrain 
from any interference in th~ internal affairs of 
that country. They took the view that, in this 
spirit, the crisis could lJe overcome con-
structively through an arrangement which 
allowed a neutral and noq-aligned Afghanis-
tan to be outside competition among the 
powers. The governments of the member coun-
tries of WEU are committed to pursuing their 
efforts to work for peace and security in the 
region. They have registered favourable 
reactions to their endeavburs from several 
third-world countries and 1in particular from 
those belonging to ASEAN, who, like the Nine, 
consider that the crisis could be overcome by 
the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned 
Afghanistan. The governJillents of member 
countries of WEU are cons~dering how best to 
help individual countries of the region. They 
will be watching with great concern future 
Soviet intentions in this area and will continue 
to concert their position f.Vith all allied and 
friendly countries and with all countries having 
an interest in the equilibrium and stability of 
the region. 
QUESTIONS 207 to 214 
put by Sir Fredefic Bennett 
on 17th Janud,ry 1980 
207. Are the WEU member countries unani-
mous in imposing a moratOrium on the sale of 
arms to Iran? 
208. What steps are the WEU member coun-
tries collectively prepared to take by joint 
agreement to obtain the r~lease, by the Iranian 
Government, of the hostages held in the United 
States Embassy? 
209. Do the WEU member countries agree on 
the limits of the secure ctnd recognised boun-
daries mentioned for Israel in Security Council 
Resolution 242? Are they prepared to spell 
out their views on this point and defend them 
in the Security Council? 
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210. Are the WEU member countries unani-
mous in asking Israel to renounce its policy of 
settlements on the West Bank and to allow self-
determination for the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip? 
211. Do the WEU member countries agree to 
urge the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist 
and to be secure within the borders mentioned 
in Resolution 242? 
212. In the light of the continuing failure of 
Israel and Egypt to make any progress in regard 
to the constitutional future of the inhabitants of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is the Coun-
cil prepared to promote a conference, grouping 
all the countries directly involved in the Pales-
tinian problem, with a view to achieving a 
general final agreement on this question? 
213. Is the Council now prepared collectively 
to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of 
all acts of violence, which call into question the 
validity of any such declarations, in order to 
help to create the necessary climate for a per-
manent settlement of the Palestinian question? 
214. Does the Council agree that the Camp 
David agreement, while serving a useful 
purpose in securing a peace treaty between 
Israel and Egypt, is unlikely to contribute to a 
settlement of the Palestinian problem insofar as 
the status and rights of the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip are concerned? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 22nd February 1980 
207 to 214. The Council's position on the 
points raised in Written Questions 205 and 207 
to 214 will be stated in their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 341 on the impact of the 
evolving situation in the Near and Middle East 
on Western European security, which is now 
under consideration. 
QUESTION 215 
put by Mr. Wilkinson on 8th April1980 
215. Whether in view of the reluctance of the 
British Government to accept for the British 
army the adoption of the common specifica-
tion for a new battle tank jointly agreed by the 
French and German Governments, the Council 
will ask the Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU to investigate the possibility of standard-
ising ammunition between the new British 
and Franco-German main battle tanks? 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 25th July 1980 
215. Franco-German design studies on a new 
main battle tank are proceeding on the basis of 
common military specifications. At the pre-
sent stage of these studies, the United Kingdom 
cannot come to any final conclusion as to 
whether the vehicle could meet the require-
ments of the British army and national work 
is continuing. 
The new concepts covered by the 
Franco-German studies include a smooth-bore 
gun whereas the United Kingdom continues to 
favour a rifled-bore gun. 
In these circumstances, the standar-
disation of ammunition would unfortunately 
not be possible and the Council can see no 
advantage in asking the Standing Armaments 
Committee to investigate the matter. The 
Council however wish to seize this opportunity 
to reiterate the great importance that member 
countries attach to increasing their co-operation 
in armaments production. 
QUESTION 216 
put by Mr. Valleix on 18th April1980 
216. It is to be feared from the attacks in 
Toulouse in April 1980 on software, telematic 
and electronic equipment belonging to Philips 
and Honeywell-Bull-CII that the international 
terrorist organisation which perpetrated them 
was trying to undermine the position of France 
and Europe in the economic, industrial and 
perhaps military fields. 
Does the Council not consider that 
similar threats are hanging over the whole of 
Europe's advanced industry and that WEU 
member governments should take co-ordinated 
steps to protect themselves against such attacks? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th November 1980 
216. In the Council's opinion, there is no 
systematic threat to European advanced 
industry as a whole at the present moment. 
It should be recalled that industrial security 
is the responsibility of industrial concerns 
themselves and that the protection of both 
property and persons already forms part of 
the general duties of the security forces in each 
country within the context of existing 
legislation. 
In recent years much work has been done 
at international level on measures to combat 
terrorism in all its forms and a number of 
agreements on the subject have either been 
drawn up or are being drafted. Their scope is 
universal in some cases (The Hague Convention 
of 16th December 1970 and Montreal Conven-
tion of 23rd September 1971 on the suppression 
of unlawful seizure of aircraft, New York 
Convention of 14th December 1973 on the pro-
tection of diplomats, New York Convention of 
1979 on the taking of hostages) and regional in 
others (Council of Europe Convention of 27th 
January 1977 on the repression of terrorism, 
Agreement between the Nine of 4th December 
1979 concerning the application of the Euro-
pean Convention on the repression of terrorism, 
work now in progress between the member 
states of the European Communities on a Euro-
pean judicial area). 
In view of the extent and diversity of this 
work on measures to combat terrorism, it 
would appear neither useful nor desirable for 
Western European Union to take any fresh 
initiative in the matter. 
QUESTION 217 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980 
217. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the 
Council recalls that " the governments of 
member states have supported all moves... to 
secure the immediate and unconditional 
release " of the American diplomats being held 
as hostages in Iran. In what manner did these 
governments associate themselves with the 
American operation of 25th April 1980 which 
sought to free these hostages? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th September 1980 
217. The member governments of Western 
European Union were in no way involved in 
the United States' attempted rescue bid. 
QUESTION 218 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett 
on 25th June 1980 
218. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the 
Council recognises " that a just and lasting 
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peace can be established only on the basis of a 
comprehensive settlement " of the Middle East 
conflict, account being taken " of the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians, including their right 
to a homeland". Does it consider this inclu-
des the right to self-determin11tion for the Pales-
tinians living in the territories occupied by the 
state of Israel since 1967? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to thf! Assembly 
on 26th Septem~r 1980 
218. As to the right to self-determination of 
the Palestinian people, the Council recall 
Article 6 of the V en ice declaration of the Euro-
pean Council (13th June 1980) which states in 
the second sentence: 
" The Palestinian people, which is 
conscious of existing as such, must be 
placed in a position, by an appropriate 
process defined with~in the framework of 
the comprehensive l?eace settlement, to 
exercise fully its. right to self-
determination. " 
QUESTION 219 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980 
219. In its reply to Reco1nmendation 341 the 
Council recall " the tefll!ls of the statement 
issued by the Nine on 18th June 1979 deplor-
ing... Israel's claim to eventual sovereignty 
over the occupied territories". Would the 
Council specify whether this feeling also 
extends to the measures taken by Israel to 
annex the Arab part of Jerpsalem? 
REPLY OF TH~ COUNCIL 
communicated to 1 the Assembly 
on 26th September 1980 
219. The Council regard East Jerusalem as 
part of the territories opcupied in 1967 and 
therefore as subj~ct to th~ p~ovision of S~cu~ity 
Council Resolution 242 qalhng for Israeh With-
drawal. The Council cap.not accept the acqui-
sition of territory by force of arms. The status 
and future of Jerusalem. remain undetermined 
and should be negotiated between the parties 
concerned as part of a 1 comprehensive settle-
ment. The Council d<i> not accept Israel's 
moves to determine Jerusalem's status unilate-
rally. 
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QUESTION 220 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980 
220. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the 
Council notes " that the member states are 
determined to continue their efforts to further 
the search for an overall settlement of the 
Middle East conflict ". Does the Council 
consider that the Camp David agreements, 
under present or easily foreseeable circum-
stances, truly contribute to the search for such a 
settlement? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th September 1980 
220. The Camp David agreements led to the 
establishment of peace between Egypt and 
Israel, which the Council believe to be an 
important step forward in the search for a 
comprehensive settlement. However this 
achievement must be built on. The negotia-
tions on the future of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip have so far been inconclusive and future 
prospects are not encouraging. Nevertheless 
the Council continue to believe that agreement 
on full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, 
capable of being accepted and worked by the 
Palestinians, could be a useful interim stage 
towards full self-determination for the Pales-
tinians in the framework of a comprehensive 
settlement. 
QUESTION 221 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980 
221. In the view of the Council, who are " all 
the parties involved " who " should be called 
on to participate in working out and imple-
menting " a comprehensive settlement of the 
Middle East conflict, referred to in paragraph 3 
of the reply to Recommendation 341? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 24th October 1980 
221. All the parties involved are those whose 
participation in negotiations designed to lead to 
a comprehensive settlement is considered essen-
tial. These parties are naturally those directly 
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involved in the conflict, including the Pales-
tinian people, which implies the association of 
the PLO with the negotiations. 
QUESTION 222 
put by Mr. Boucheny on 21st July 1980 
222. In accordance with Article IV of the 
Brussels Treaty, which specifies that the 
Council of Ministers must give their opinion on 
military matters, Mr. Boucheny, Paris Senator, 
asks the WEU Council of Ministers what action 
it intends to take on the statements by Mr. Sean 
MacBride, former Irish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. At a press conference in Geneva, Mr. 
MacBride spoke of a meeting held in Zurich in 
1976 between Mr. John Vorster and Mr. Henry 
Kissinger in the presence of General Alexander 
Haig, former NATO Supreme Allied Comman-
der. In the course of this meeting it was 
decided to help the racist government of South 
Africa to acquire atomic weapons. The former 
Irish Minister said in particular that the Federal 
Republic of Germany had played a very active 
role in providing the technology and part of the 
necessary equipment to allow South Africa to 
acquire a nuclear capability, and mentioned 
also the assistance afforded by the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom. Mr. 
Boucheny wishes to know how the policy of 
support for the racist regime of South Africa is 
compatible with United Nations resolutions 
asking states to boycott this inhuman 
regime. This adventurist policy of the member 
countries of WEU is liable to increase tension 
in southern Africa. Does the Council of 
Ministers intend to work for peace and detente 
in the demilitarisation of southern Africa and 
for the respect of human rights in South Africa? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th November 1980 
222. The Council are not of the opinion that 
the purported statements of Mr. Sean MacBride 
solicit any action on their part. 
As to the alleged meeting between Mr. 
Vorster, Mr. Kissinger and General Haig, they 
are not in a position to comment as none of the 
member governments participated at such a 
meeting. 
However, it is well known that none of 
the member governments of WEU pursues a 
policy of support for the apartheid system in 
South Africa. On the contrary, all of them 
vigorously condemn apartheid in all its forms 
and endeavour with all peaceful means at their 
disposal to influence the South African Govern-
ment to bring about those fundamental changes 
which are inevitable in order to achieve in 
South Africa a society that is based on equality, 
justice, and respect of human rights irrespective 
of colour or race. It would be totally inconsis-
tent with this policy if the member govern-
ments of WEU were to assist South Africa in 
the military field or in acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability. Furthermore, such assis-
tance would also be in contradiction of the 
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa 
of the United Nations Security Council of 4th 
November 1977 (Resolution 418) to which all 
the member countries of WEU strictly adhere. 
This resolution was actively supported by the 
western members of the United Nations 
Security Council at that time. 
QUESTION 223 
put by Mr. Valleix on lOth October 1980 
223. Can the Council indicate the reasons 
why the social security agreement between 
WEU and the Government of the French 
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Republic signed on 21st June 1979 has not yet 
been ratified by the two parties? 
' 
In view of the fact that the agreement 
was to become effective on 1st January 1979, is 
the Council not afraid that certain permanent 
officials in service on 31st ~cember 1978 will 
thus be deprived of the possibility of joining the 
French scheme before retiring? 
! 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the1 Assembly 
on 26th Novemb~ 1980 
223. Like other similar agreements, the social 
security agreement between France and WEU 
signed on 21st June 1979 has, until now, been 
subject to certain verifications, as a result of 
recent developments in French social security 
legislation. This review is almost complete 
and approval of the agref1ment is expected 
shortly. Moreover, appropriate action has 
been taken to ensure that the position of benefi-
ciaries under that agreement shall not be 
jeopardised as a result of this 
1
long delay. 
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Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1980 
The Assembly, 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter, 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Adriaensens (Chair-
man); MM. Jager, Kittelmann (Alternate for. M~. Alber) 
(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Alber, Dep1etn, Evers, 
Fletcher, Lord Hughes, MM. Jeambrun (Alternate: Pignion), 
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Krieps, Martino, Orione, Peeters, Petrilli, Schleiter, Smith 
(Alternate: Kershaw), Stainton, Tripodi, Tummers, Vohrer, 
Mrs. van der W erf-Terpstra. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated 
organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved; 
Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340; 
Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply tb this recommen-
dation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters, 
REQUESTS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisatibns, to study the 
desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions a~ a natural follow-
on from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals; 
2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pensions in the light of 
experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various 
co-ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations; 
3. Transl\1it any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the 
problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue 
their studies and to report without avoidable delay; 
4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee 
of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the 
positive decisions which resulted; 
11. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades 
arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur) 
I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
(i) Approval 
1. I have studied the budget of the mims-
terial organs of WEU for the financial year 
1980 and have no comment to make for the 
time being. I therefore submit the attached 
draft opinion and draft recommendation to the 
Committee for approval. 
(ii) The budget 
2. The total budget of WEU for 1980 as 
compared to 1979 is as follows: 
1979 budget 1980 budget qJ increase 
£ F £ F 
Secretariat-General ..... . 786,660 895,600 13.85 
Standing Armaments 
Committee ........... . 5,299,865 5,975,945 12.75 
Agency for the 
Control of Armaments . 11,928,930 13,013,155 9.09 
Office of the Clerk ...... . 8,517,000 9,632,000 13.09 
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU 786,660 25,745,795 895,600 28,621,100 
(iii) WEU establishment 
3. The total establishment of WEU for 1980 
is as follows: 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Standing Armaments Committee . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
128 
Office of the Clerk ... ·. . .. . . . . . . . 28 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 
1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 
11. Pension scheme 
4. The overall increase in the WEU budget 
for 1980 as compared with 1979 figures in the 
above table and would appear reasonable in 
view of the present inflationary situation in 
both France and the United Kingdom. How-
ever, it should be noted that appropriations for 
pensions now represent an important element 
in the budgets of all the co-ordinated organisa-
tions. This fact is largely illustrated in Table 1 
hereafter, which shows the percentage increase 
for the various organs of WEU between 1978 
and 1980. 
5. The number of pensions paid out ~y 
WEU over the same period is shown m 
Table 2. 
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6. Governments should not use the ever-
increasing cost of pensions over the years as an 
excuse for reducing the remainder of the budget 
in order to keep it within certain limits. It will 
be noted that the percentage of the Assembly's 
budget devoted to pensions is at present only 
0.94 %. This is accounted for by the fact that 
recruitment policy in the Assembly has been 
such that virtually all staff members will have 
completed at least twenty-five years of service 
with the organisation before qualifying for a 
pension. It is obvious that, on the whole, this 
recruitment policy has not been pursued else-
where in WEU. 
Joint pensions administrative section 
7. A progress report on the work of this 
section will be found at Appendix. The unit is 
now fully operational and the co-ordinated 
organisations rely entirely upon it for pension 
calculations. 
8. The Assembly has previously drawn 
attention to the desirability of creating an 
independent body to administer staff pensions 
and continues to believe that a study to this 
effect should be started as soon as possible. 
While the Assembly does not in any way wish 
to criticise the work or functioning of the joint 
pensions administrative section, it does feel that 
to guard against the possibility of an organisa-
tion being wound up or of a member country 
withdrawing from an organisation, the only 
-Budget 
total 
£ 
Secretariat-General 666,705 
F 
Standing Armaments Committee 4,747·,625 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 10,207,655 
Office of the Clerk 
Pensions 
SG 
Retirement 4 
Survivors' I 
Orphans' 3* 
Invalidity l 
Totals 9 
-- -
Total establishment** 45 
SG = Secretariat-General. 
ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
SAC = Standing Armaments Committee. 
0 of C = Office of the Clerk. 
• Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension. 
•• Excluding hors cadre officials. 
7,778,000 
ACA 
I6 
5 
21 
-
-
54 
Table 1 
1978 
Appropria- Pension/ Budget tions for budget ratio total pensions (%) 
£ £ 
27,425 4.II 786,660 
F F 
365,000 7.68 5,299,865 
704,300 6.89 ~ ll ,928,930 
62,000 0.79 8,517,000 
Table 2 
1978 
SAC 0 ofC Total SG ACA 
8 I 29 5 I7 
I l 8 I 7 
l 4 3* l* 
l I 
9 3 42 10 25 
- -- -
27 26 I49 45 54 
1979 1980 
Appropria- Pension/ Budget Appropria- Pension/ tions for budget ratio total tions for budget ratio pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ 
66,420 8.44 895,600 81,500 9.10 
F F F 
42I,200 7.94 5,975,945 602,000 10.07 
2,007,400 I6.82 13,013,155 1,905,000 I4.63 
83,000 0.97 9,632,000 9I,OOO 0.94 
1979 1980 
SAC 0 ofC Total SG ACA SAC 0 ofC Total 
8 I 3I 7 t9 8 I 35 
2 I Il l 8 3 I 13 
I 5 I* 2* l 4 
I I I 
IO 3 48 10 29 II 3 53 
--- - --
- -
27 26 I49 45 54 27 26 I49 
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guarantee for the payment of staff pensions is 
the creation of a truly independent body for 
this purpose. 
9. In the interim period, the joint pensions 
administrative section might be entrusted with 
related tasks, such as the recuperation from 
each co-ordinated organisation of the validation 
papers in respect of all staff members having 
opted for the pension scheme, up-to-date infor-
mation concerning changes in grade and family 
status, together with details of new recruitments 
(automatically affiliated to the pension scheme) 
being communicated to the section at regular 
intervals by the organisation concerned. Such 
information would enable the unit to make 
relatively accurate forecasts in respect of staff 
going onto a retirement pension at any given 
time. Sight should not be lost of the fact that 
organisations are holding· validation files for 
staff members who may only be retiring in 
approximately twenty years' time and it would 
therefore seem logical for as much information 
as possible to be centralised. Additionally, the 
unit might effectively forecast the financial 
implications of pensions in the budgets of each 
of the co-ordinated organisations on a year-to-
year basis. 
Single appeals board for pensions 
10. In its reply to Recommendation 340 the 
Council reject the idea of establishing a single 
appeals board at this juncture on the grounds 
that it would be premature. The Assembly 
cannot share the Council's view that a system 
of mutual information and concertation among 
appeals boards of the various organisations 
would be the right way to deal with an appeal 
since, by their very nature, boards set up for 
this purpose only meet when a specific case 
arises. Such a system would be both cumber-
some and time-wasting and, in view of the 
widely differing composition of each board, 
would in no way preclude the possibility of 
divergent conclusions being reached, with 
possible ensuing prejudice to a staff member. 
Finally, while accepting the point put forward 
by the Council that the Secretary /Director 
General is responsible for the administration 
of his organisation, it must be borne in mind 
that the financial responsibility is that of 
governments. 
Auditing of pensions 
11. At present audit systems differ in each of 
the co-ordinated organisations, to wit: 
WEU - The Assembly has a single 
parliamentary auditor who is also the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of the 
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United Kingdom; the other organs of 
WEU have a board of auditors which 
rotates every three years and which is 
drawn from three member countries; 
OECD has a board of auditors which 
rotates every four years. It is drawn 
from three member countries and, in 
addition, is headed by a Chairman nomi-
nated by the French Cour des Comptes; 
The Council of Europe has a board of 
auditors which holds a six-year mandate, 
non-renewable, and which is drawn from 
three member countries; 
ESA has a board of auditors drawn from 
three member countries, rotating every 
three years; 
NATO has a board of auditors drawn 
from five member countries, rotating 
every three years. 
It is obvious that with time a unified system of 
auditing should be adopted for all the co-
ordinated organisations to ensure that different 
interpretations are not given for the payment of 
pensions. 
Ill. Careers and conditions of employment 
12. As the Assembly pointed out in its last 
report (Document 824), it has put forward 
many recommendations in respect of career 
problems affecting staff in the co-ordinated 
organisations. We are told that such matters are 
under consideration and the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 340 tttstifies to this: 
"3. The Council have considered the 
possibility of setting up a committee of 
senior experts, but have come to the 
conclusion that the problems which such 
a group of experts would be qualified to 
consider should be discussed beforehand 
between the co-ordinated organisations 
themselves and, in the framework of the 
Co-ordinating Committee, with experts 
from the member governments. 
Certain co-ordinating agencies are look-
ing at the problem and any conclusions 
which may emerge from this consultation 
should be awaited. 
In these circumstances, the Council 
recognise that the specific problems listed 
by the Assembly in point 1.3. of its 
recommendation should receive the 
attention of the organisation and, in 
particular, of its Secretary-General: 
(a) With regard to the grading system 
and the introduction of a dual grading 
system the problems are still under consi-
deration at the administrative level. 
(b) The staff rules of each of the organi-
sations contain many provisions, in parti-
cular regarding types and duration of 
contracts, which all have to take into 
account the specific circumstances of 
each organisation; nevertheless, those 
responsible within the organisation make 
every effort to harmonise these provisions 
wherever possible. 
(c) The Council consider that the 
indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily 
dealt with by the staff rules, particularly 
for staff members with long service in the 
organisation. 
(d) The methods of transferring an offi-
cial from one co-ordinated organisation 
to another are governed by both the staff 
rules and the pension scheme rules of 
each of the organisations concerned; as 
far as the Council are aware, this 
problem has given rise to little difficulty; 
only experience will show whether it will 
be possible in the future to consider 
simplifying these rules. " 
13. As is clear from the above, little progress 
is being made. The Council have considered 
the possibility of setting up a committee of 
senior experts but state that such a committee 
could only eventually come into existence after 
the co-ordinated organisations themselves had 
examined all the problems. We are led to 
believe that discussions in this connection are 
currently in progress in some of the organisa-
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tions and that their conclusions should be 
awaited. The Assembly is anxious to know 
how much longer these discussions are likely to 
continue since it has been waiting for twelve 
years already. 
14. At the December 1979 session of the 
Assembly, Mr. Warren and Mr. Adriaensens 
drew attention to the cumbersl!>me machinery of 
the Co-ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts and called in question the 
usefulness of this body, partiqularly in view of 
its cost to the taxpayer. When all our member 
governments are having to look closer than 
ever before at their national budgets, one is led 
to question whether some I reform of this 
committee is not called for. 
15. The Assembly therefor~ wishes to know 
how many times the Co-ordinating Committee 
of Government Budget Experts has met in 
1980, for how many days, whi~h problems have 
been under discussion and wHat decisions have 
resulted. 
IV. Staff vacaneies 
in the co-ordinated organisations 
16. The Assembly welcomes the fact that 
staff vacancies arising in WEU are now circu-
lated within the organisatio!ll but would be 
happy if the Secretary-General could ensure 
that the Director/Secretaries-General of the 
other co-ordinated organisations circulate 
notice of vacancies in these · organisations to 
their colleagues, thus permitting some mobility 
of staff. 
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WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1980 
Proposed expenditure and income 
A* B* C* TOTAL B+C 
£ Francs Francs Francs 
Salaries and allowances ............... I ,001,217 7,814,300 16,223,000 24,037,300 
Pensions ............................ 81,500 602,000 1,905,000 2,507,000 
Travel ••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 0. 0 0 •••••• 0 36,885 93,700 380,900 474,600 
Other operating costs ................. 155,575 427,620 613,520 1,041,140 
Purchase of furniture, etc ••••••• 0 ••••• 10,465 13,075 28,935 42,010 
Buildings ••••• 0 •••••••••• 0 •••••••••• - 68,000 123,000 191,000 
Total expenditure .................... 1,285,642 9,018,695 19,274,355 28,293,050 
WEU tax •••• 0 •• 0 •••••••• 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 350,322 2,712,800 5,562,400 8,275,200 
Other receipts •••••• 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0 ••••• 15,590 55,950 95,800 151,750 
Pension receipts •••• 0 •••• 0 0 •••••••••• 24,130 274,000 603,000 877,000 
Total income ........................ 390,042 3,042,750 6,261,200 9,303,950 
NET TOTAL ••••• 0 0 0. 0. 0 0 ••••• 0 ••••••• 895,600 5,975,945 13,013,155 18,989, lOO 
National contributions 
A* B* C* Office of the Clerk 
600ths 
£ Francs Francs 
Belgium 0 ••••••• 0 •••• 0 •••••• 59 88,100 1,867,300 947,150 
France ...................... 120 179,110 3,797,800 1,926,400 
Federal Republic of Germany . 120 179,110 3,797,800 1,926,400 
Italy ........................ 120 179,110 3,797,800 I ,926,400 
Luxembourg • 0 •••• 0 •••••• 0 •• 2 2,960 63,300 32,100 
Netherlands ................. 59 88,100 I ,867,300 947,150 
United Kingdom ............. 120 179,110 3,797,800 1,926,400 
600 895,600 18,989,100 9,632,000 
£ 895,600 
Total WEU budget 
* A - Secretariat General. Francs 28,621,100 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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Table of establishment 
WESTERN EuROPEAN UNION 
AI 81 Cl 
Secretary-General I - -
Deputy Secretary-General I - -
Director of the Agency - - I 
Assistant Secretary-
General I I -
A7 - - I 
A6 I - 3 
AS 2 I 6 
A4 - 4 8 
A3 3 - I 
A2 2 - 2 
L5 I - -
L4 I I -
L3 I 3 2 
L2 I - -
86 - - -
85 - - -
84 8 4 8 
83 7 7 8 
82 5 - 2 
81 2 - -
C6 - - -
CS - - I 
C4 I 4 -
C3 8 3 9 
C2 2 - -
48 28 52 
I. A - Secretariat-General. 
8 - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications. 
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Total 
A. B. C 
I 
I 
I 
2 
I 
4 
9 
12 
4 
4 
I 
2 
6 
I 
-
-
20 
22 
7 
2 
-
I 
5 
20 
2 
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Office of the Clerk 
Clerk I 
I 
-
-
Clerk Assistant I 
-
-
5 
22 
I I 
3 2 
-
' 
' 
-
-
-
'' I 
-
4 
I 7 
-
-
I 
-
-
2 
-
28 
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RECOMMENDATION 340 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversion-
ary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff; 
Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to 
the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions; 
Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set 
up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
RECoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*: 
1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible; 
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-
ordinated organisations; 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy 
and in particular: 
- to review the structure of grades; 
- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy; 
- to study the type and length of contracts; 
- to co-ordinate staff rules; 
- to review the indemnity for loss of job; 
- to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another; 
- to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals; 
11. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may 
take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation. 
• OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session 
(IIth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 824). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 340 
Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied 
with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations. 
I. I and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specifically to deal with matters 
concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be 
given the power to take decisions. 
As it is, this body which started its operational work on I st January 1980 and was set up with 
a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an 
advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility 
for the unifo.rm application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions rests with each organi-
sation and its Secretary/Director-General. 
Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each Secretary-General and each autono-
mous organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsi-
bilities covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules. 
The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and even more, the 
establishment of a joint body for the administration of pensions as a legal entity coufd, in the interests 
of the staff, only be considered and gone into after an adequate running-in periqd - the length of 
which cannot be assessed at this stage - and in the light of experience. 
Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by ~he Assembly, the 
Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be 
premature. In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 149th 
report, recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established 
among the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching ditTerent 
decisions regarding similar cases. 1 
3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but 
have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to 
consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in 
the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments. 
Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may 
emerge from this consultation should be awaited. 1 
In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems liste~ by the Assembly 
in point 1.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, 
of its Secretary-General: 
1 
(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems 
are still under consideration at the administrative level. 
(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding 
types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account "the specific circumstances of 
each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to 
harmonise these provisions wherever possible. 
(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff 
rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation. : 
(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisatipn to another are 
governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; 
as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will 
show whether it will be possible in the future to consider s'implifying these rules. ! 
II. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary 
measures to ensure that all members of staff are informed of vacancies within tHe organisation. It 
should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for 
promotion within the organisation, before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and, 
finally, to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as 
vacancies are filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although 
this rule is not applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation. 
I. Commumcated to the Assembly on 14th May 19!!0 
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Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations 1 
Work done 
7. The section carries out its duties in 
accordance with the directives given it by the 
Standing Committee of Secretaries-General of 
the co-ordinated organisations (OECD, NATO, 
WEU, the Council of Europe and the European 
Space Agency). The staff of the section is split 
up among three units : the pension study unit 
pension computation unit I, located at OECD, 
and pension computation unit 11, located at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 
8. The activities of the joint pensions admi-
nistrative section during the financial year 
1980 may be summarised as follows: 
A. Pension study unit 
- With the recruitment of an administra-
tor during the first half of 1980, all 
posts allocated in the budget to this 
sector are now filled; 
- the pension study unit has provided the 
Secretariat for PACCO and prepared 
the agenda and minutes of the meet-
mgs; 
- it has produced a set of studies and 
research papers on specific points with 
a view to clarifying the interpretations 
of several provisions in the instructions 
and bringing out any practical difficul-
ties encountered in the implementation 
of the pension scheme rules in a uni-
form manner; 
- in accordance with the role assigned to 
it, the unit has examined all provi-
sional assessments of pension entitle-
ment to ensure that these are in confor-
mity with the pension scheme rules 
and that all beneficiaries receive uni-
form treatment. It has transmitted 
reports to PACCO setting out its 
conclusions and has supplied any addi-
tional information needed by that com-
mittee to make recommendations on 
the subject; 
- the unit has drawn up a draft co-
ordinated formal procedure for approv-
ing recommendations concerning 
I. Regulations for the joint pensions administrative 
section of the co-ordinated organisations were given in 
Appendix VI of Document 783, 26th September 1978. 
244 
amendments to the rules and instruc-
tions. It has designed and implemen-
ted a communications network and a 
procedure for exchanging information 
(a) between the section and the service 
managing pension affairs in each of the 
co-ordinated organisations and (b) bet-
ween PACCO and the various bodies 
with responsibility for pensions; 
- the unit has started to collect detailed 
documentation for updating the rules, 
in the light of the discussions and 
recommendations of the committees. 
These files' will provide each organi-
sation with clear and precise informa-
tion regarding the implementation of 
the various provisions of the scheme in 
a uniform manner. They will also be 
useful in producing the basic data to be 
taken into account when calculating 
pension rights; 
- it is also endeavouring to settle tax 
adjustment problems through contact, 
as and when necessary, with the natio-
nal tax authorities concerned; 
- next, the pension study unit is trying to 
collect all the information it needs to 
begin negotiations for reciprocal agree-
ments with national bodies on the 
transfer of pension rights in application 
of Article 12 of the rules; 
- finally, the head of the section has 
made special efforts to harmonise pro-
gress in the activities of the two com-
putation units. Exchanges of technical 
information have been held. Never-
theless, a system of cross-testing and 
comparative analysis of two software 
systems will have to be designed and 
used to ensure that the two computa-
tion units produce identical and correct 
results. 
9. Having caught up, in the course of 1980, 
the backlog in the checking of all provisional 
assessments of pension entitlement for the pen-
sioned staff of the five co-ordinated organisa-
tions from 1973 to 1979, the unit will tackle 
the following tasks over and above its usual 
administration and management duties during 
the next financial year: 
- improving its management services to 
the co-ordinated organisations particu-
larly as regards the budget and 
accounts; 
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- extending and diversifying its studies 
on the provisions of the rules; 
- keeping a close watch on developments 
concerning rights to tax adjustments 
and conditions and procedures for 
applying them; 
- extending negotiations with outside 
bodies; 
- ensuring that the conversion of compu-
ter programmes for use on new types of 
computer is carried out in conditions 
of total security; 
- designing a new integrated computer 
programme so that fuller use may be 
made of the extra capabilities provided 
by the new computer to be installed 
during the second half of 1980; 
- establishing full compatibility between 
the two computation units and check-
ing at regular intervals any improve-
ments or amendments to the two com-
puter programmes. 
B. Pension computation unit I 
I 0. Unit I began to operate in October 
1979. Its first task was to assess how adminis-
trative procedures and software design stood at 
that date. The first survey revealed a number 
of defects and resulted in the unit taking imme-
diate action with the object of: 
- improving procedures for the input of 
data relating to pensioned staff, and 
also other data for the system; 
- establishing a formal procedure for 
requesting changes or improvements to 
the system and for reporting problems 
encountered during trials and normal 
operations; 
- specifying the improvements needing to 
be made to the documentation relating 
to the system; 
- implementing a rational plan with the 
object of testing and operating the sys-
tem; 
- designing and producing all the outputs 
needed by the co-ordinated organisa-
tions. 
11. The object of all these measures was to 
make full use of the limited software resources 
available so that the quality of the system might 
be gradually improved. 
12. During the first six months, the unit 
checked and acquired data and verified calcula-
tions concerning more than 550 pensioned staff 
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of four of the co-ordinated organisations be-
longing to the pension scheme. The complete 
series of trials carried out brought to light some 
hundred extensions, changes and corrections 
needed in order to bring the software up to the 
required level for the initial phase of operation 
of the pension system. 
13. With the improved and more powerful 
IBM 4331 computer, it will be possible in the 
long term to produce programmes designed to 
allow a more integrated s)lstem of pension 
computation. 
14. The tasks that will· tie continued and 
undertaken in 1981 consist, in particular, of: 
I 
- converting and testing the data files 
and existing prograTmes (with refer-
ence to the IBM 4331 system), 
- continuing the develQpment and main-
tenance of the system, in particular the 
integration of the computer terminals, 
automatising the calculation of social 
security deductions, and improving the 
system's logic and ol)ltputs with regard 
to the processing of tax adjustments, 
I 
- designing new specifications which, 
when introduced, witll overcome some 
of the present systeht's main defects, 
and implementing a more integrated 
system capable of using the capacity of 
the new equipment to the full. 
C. Pensions computation unit ll (NATO) 
19. The responsibilities o~ this unit, and par-
ticularly those which involve collecting and 
centralising basic data concerning pensioned 
staff from the various agencies of the organisa-
tion, and also managing th~ software for pen-
sion computation and payment, were devised as 
as one of the various elements comprising a 
more comprehensive system !of personnel mana-
gement (Personnel management information 
system - PMIS). 
20. The implementation ~fa specific compu-
terised programme for computing and managing 
pensions progressed during ~he year concurren-
tly with the preparation of the integrated global 
system, the object being to qerive the maximum 
advantage from the centralisation of data. 
21. Computation unit 11 ftlso drew up a plan 
of work involving completion of the following 
four objectives: 
(i) computation of annuities and the 
rate of pension; 
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(ii) monthly computation of pensions 
and family allowances; 
(iii) computation of arrears; 
(iv) computation of tax adjustments. 
22. Thanks to the data stored for each pen-
sioner, the unit is now in a position to proceed 
with the final trials of the computation pro-
gramme based on staff members' situations at 
I st January 1980. 
23. In the short term, and during the course 
of the 1981 financial year, the unit intends: 
- to complete the computation pro-
gramme; 
- to finalise the data collection system 
(PMIS) so as to be able at regular 
intervals to update the data bank 
with the help of information from all 
the NATO agencies; 
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- to study and carry out new program-
mes whereby to produce listings adap-
ted to the needs of these different cen-
tres; 
- to consider, in conjunction with com-
putation unit I, how to achieve maxi-
mum compatibility between the two 
computerised systems in operation. 
Pensions paid by the co-ordinated organisations 
at 30th June 1980 
Nu m her Numher 
of f!0\1\ o(pemioner.\ 
OECD 1,699 304 
Council of Europe 824 133 
WEU 149 51 
ESA I ,428 66 
NATO 4,946 350 
ToTAL 9,046 904 
APPENDIX V 
Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1979 by countries 
Co-ord~nated Organosatmns 
Countries OECO Councrl NATO+ SHAPE 
of Europe 
A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Germany 189 180 369 
Belgium 1 1 2 647 1 188 1 835 
Canada -
Denmark 5 21 26 
Spain 
United States 2 - 2 27 3 30 
France 656 1 062 1 718 281 522 803 98 192 290 
Italy 149 394 543 
Japan 2 - 2 
Luxembourg 164 608 772 
Norway 20 53 73 
Netherlands 278 382 660 
Portugal 4 3 7 
United Kingdom - 1-2 7 19 
Turkey and Greece 46 72 118 
Grand total 660 1 062 1 722 282 523 805 1 639 3 103 4 742 
I. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Co-ordinated organisations 
Member countries 
OECD Council NATO 
of Europe 
EuROPE 
Germany ......... X X X 
Austria ........... X X 
Belgium .......... X X X 
Cyprus ........... X 
Denmark ......... X X X 
Spain • 0. 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 0 X X 
Finland • 0 0 0 •••• 0. X 
France 0 ••• 0. 0 ••• 0 X X X 
Greece • 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 0. X X X 
Ireland ........... X X 
Iceland ........... X X X 
Italy • 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
Liechtenstein •• 0 0 0 X 
Luxembourg ...... X X X 
Malta ............ X 
Monaco .......... 
Norway •• 0. 0 0. 0. 0 X X X 
Netherlands 0 0 •• 0 0 X X X 
Portugal .......... X X X 
United Kingdom .. X X X 
Sweden 0. 0 0. 0 •••• X X 
Switzerland ....... X X 
Turkey ........... X X X 
Yugoslavia • 0 •• 0 •• 
AMERICA 
Canada • 0 0 •••••• 0 X X 
United States ••• 0 0 X X 
ASIA 
Japan ••••••••• 0 0 0 X 
AusTRALASIA 
Australia • 0 0 •• 0 ••• X 
New Zealand 0 0 ••• X 
TOTAL 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0. 24 21 15 
I. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
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Amendment 1 
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs 
lst December 1980 
of Western European Union for the financial year 1980 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by MM. Stainton and Smith 
1. At the end of the last paragraph of the draft opinion, add " except to draw atjtention to the fact 
that the terms of reference of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are restricted 
to expenditure incurred by the Office of the Clerk (F 8,517,000 in 1979; F 9,632,000 for 1980) or 
some 34 % only of the total budget. The cost effectiveness of the other 66 % has not been examined 
by or reported on to this Assembly." 
1. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment negatived). 
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Signed: Stainton, Smith 
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Document 863 
~~ . 1·d ·1 . nternattona m ustrta consortia 
and collaborative arrangements for the 
production of high technology military equipment 
submitted on behalf of the 
1st December 1980 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
-::::-
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Introductory note 
In preparing this report your Rapporteur has taken evidence from the Aircraft and Dynamics 
Groups of British Aerospace, from Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, from Dornier GmbH, 
from Panavia Aircraft GmbH, from General Dynamics Corporation, from Westland Helicopters 
Limited, from The Boeing Company, and from McDonnell Aircraft Company. He wishes to express 
his grateful thanks to the representatives of the above industrial companies for the time they 
generously gave for his interviews and researches. He finally acknowledges his gratitude to the Clerk 
of the Committee who accompanied him on study visits throughout Europe and recorded the minutes 
of evidence. 
I. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with I 
abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Va/leix (Chairman); 
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaen-
sens (Alternate: Brasseur), Amadei, Antoni, Cornelissen, 
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Fiandrotti, Forma, Garrett, Hawkins, Konings, McGuire, 
Malvy, Muller, Peronnet, Scheffler, Talon (Alternate: Petit), 
Ueberhorst (Alternate: Fllimig), van Waterschoot. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on international industrial consortUI 
and collaborative arrangements for the 
production of high technology military equipment 
I I 
1 DOCUMENT 863 
Aware that in spite of repeated political recommendations and constant eff<1>rts at an official 
level progress towards the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment within the 
western Alliance remains inadequate ; 
Conscious that as economic recession and the growth in the price of petroleum products limit 
resources for defence and place additional constraints upon national defence budgets, improved cost-
effectiveness in weapon procurement will become even more necessary ; 
Believing that collaborative definition, development and production of high technology defence 
equipment can bring substantial benefits of commonality between the procuring serVices in Europe as 
well as important savings in development costs, and a larger assured market fon the participating 
ind~strial companies ; 
Understanding the need to preserve as widely as possible within the Eunt>pean armaments 
industry an independent capability to design, develop and build high technology we~pons systems ; 
Realising that the impetus towards collaborative defence equipment pnojects should be 
commercial and industrial as well as military and logistic ; 
Considering that differences in operational requirements and procurement time-scales continue 
to be an unnecessarily major obstacle to effective international collaboration in the field of military 
equipment in Europe ; 
Convinced that progress towards more effective collaboration in the high technology military 
equipment sector lies not through the evolution of new bureaucratic structures but by a practical and 
pragmatic approach at an industrial level, allied to the closest co-operation betweert national military 
staffs and above all a common political will shared at the highest level in Europe. to see joint colla-
borative solutions to the individual requirements of Alliance nations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards 
achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance, and 
encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives; 
2. Persuade the governments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link 
whereby the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed Of the work of the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the onl)l European parlia-
mentary assembly with a locus standi established by treaty on defence matters, ~nd has invaluable 
connections with national parliaments and ministers ; 
3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European ~trategic summit at 
the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative 
definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European 
combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and to replace the 
Phantom in the German air force ; 
4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the develop-
ment of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment within 
the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly 
equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on' an increasing scale 
co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of 
equipment " off the shelf" ; 
5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue reguests for proposals 
(RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to 
existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms ; 
6. Continue to press member countries working through the Independent European Programme 
Group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their atmed forces and the 
joint phasing of their re-equipment plans. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Resolution 
on a colloquy on 
international aeronautical consortia 
Considering that the promotion of European co-operation in aeronautical consortia is one of its 
main concerns ; 
Believing the development of a concerted policy to be in the best interests of Europe's aero-
nautical industries and defence posture ; 
Considering the positive results of former colloquies held in Paris and Toulouse, 
INSTRUCTS its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a 
colloquy on aeronautical consortia in 1981 or early 1982 on the same basis as earlier colloquies. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions has always 
played a leading role in the encouragement of 
collaboration and co-operation in the field of 
high technology defence equipment and has 
organised two colloquies on European aeronau-
tical policy. The reports of Mr. Valleix, Mr. 
Warren, Mr. Richter and Mr. Scheffier were 
noteworthy in this respect. 
2. Furthermore, in its reply to Recommen-
dation 325 on a European armaments policy 1 
the Council of Ministers of W estem European 
Union stated that: 
" The Council consider that efforts to 
organise European co-operation in the 
field of armaments production are essen-
tial and should be vigorously pursued. " 
3. This ministerial response to the Critchley 
report received wholehearted endorsement in 
the Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Martens' 
speech at the opening of the WEU symposium 
on a European armaments policy in Brussels on 
Monday, 15th October 1979: 
" In the present circumstances, all 
elements speak in favour of renewed 
efforts in order that the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance jointly 
organise their armaments production. " 2 
4. These are but two of countless political 
injunctions in favour of European co-operation 
and joint production in the field of armaments. 
If political exhortation alone were sufficient 
to induce a collaborative approach to European 
development, manufacture and procurement of 
high technology defence equipment, common-
ality of weapons would long since have charac-
terised the inventories at least of the European 
members of the Alliance. 
5. The reality is very different and the 
causes for the disappointing progress towards 
European co-operation were again well summa-
rised by Mr. Martens in his Brussels speech 2: 
~ -- -~ . -
(a) the failure to reach an agreement on 
the norms which the various types of 
material must answer, in accordance 
with the nature of the missions and 
1. Document 786. 
2. Official record, page 20, column 2. 
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the manner m which they are 
accomplished; 
(b) time differentials between the natio-
nal schedules for . replacement of 
material; · 
(c) the conflicts betwee~ national econo-
mic and industrial irlterests. 
6. Nevertheless it woul9 be wrong to 
conclude that progress towarcts achieving Euro-
pean co-operation in high technology defence 
equipment was insignificant. A large number 
of sophisticated weapon systems have either 
already been produced or are currently under 
development on a collaborat~ve basis - mostly 
in the field of aerospace projects, both military 
aircraft and guided weapons. 
7. This study will concentrate on the aero-
space sector of high technoldgy defence equip-
ment seeking to record som~ of the judgments 
and views of manufacturers M such equipment 
and to analyse the lessons of their experience of 
European and transatlantic cqllaboration. 
I 
11. Historical bac.ground 
8. Two of the first collaqorative projects of 
major military importance r.vere the Atlantic 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the 
Transall transport aircraft .. 
1
Both were opera-
tionally successful and indeed continue in ser-
vice today. Although the mechanisms of colla-
boration since the Atlantic and Transall 
programmes of the 1960s have evolved from 
agreements between separate national compa-
nies, through the establishment of small joint 
" nameplate " companies, like Sepecat for the 
Jaguar, with the manageme~t delegated to the 
constituent national companies, to the estab-
lishment of a common development and 
management company like, Panavia for the 
T omado, the rationale ! for collaboration 
remains basically unchanged. 
9. This rationale can be I easily summarised 
as follows 1: 
(a) sharing of develop~ent costs; 
(b) sharing of development risks; 
(c) broadening of b~ckground: experi-
ence, capacity; · 
1. Cf. Document 738, A European armaments policy 
(Dankert report), page 9, column 2. 
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(d) reduction of procurement cost: larger 
quantity and cadence; 
(e) advantages in logistics and readiness 
to act. 
I 0. As the effects of economic recession, the 
escalating cost of energy and budgetary con-
straints have restricted governmental funding 
available for weapon procurement in Europe 
and as the costs of high technology defence 
equipment have tended to exceed the rate of 
inflation, financial and economic factors in 
favour of collaboration have powerfully re-
inforced the military arguments of interoperabi-
lity and standardisation, so that now most of 
the major European equipment programmes are 
being pursued on a co-operative or collabora-
tive basis. Furthermore, the necessity to main-
tain a high technology base in Western Europe 
has been an additional impetus towards Euro-
pean co-operation in the field of defence 
equipment and the preservation of European 
design and development expertise. The alter-
native would be an excessive dependence on 
American arms imports which would be indus-
trially and strategically damaging to Western 
European interests. 
11. Nevertheless the inventories of the West 
European armed forces still display remarkable 
disparities of equipment. To take the three 
largest North European countries of France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom as an 
example, their armies operate the AMX, 
Leopard I and Chieftain main battle tanks 
respectively, and although the new Franco-
German tank agreement will standardise the 
principal equipment of the French and German 
armoured forces in the 1990s, there is no 
prospect of standardisation in this decade. The 
French are ordering more AMX-30 medium 
tanks, the Germans the Leopard 11 and the 
British the improved Chieftain, designated 
Challenger. 
12. In the air forces, for which the need for 
interoperability and preferably standardisation 
is greatest in view of the rapidity and range of 
air operations and the potential destruction of 
bases and consequent need to disperse and 
divert aircraft in time of war, the lack of 
commonality is even more striking at present. 
13. The Royal Air Force operates some 
Lightning F-6 and mostly Phantom FGR-2 
interceptors in the air defence role. The 
French air defence force is comprised of some 
Mirage 111-C fighters and mostly of Mirage F-1 
fighters. The Luftwaffe flies Phantom F-4F 
interceptor fighters. 
14. Immediate re-equipment plans for these 
three air forces will not rectify the situation. 
The Royal Air Force is due to re-equip its air 
defence squadrons with the air defence variant 
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(F-2) of the Tornado from about the middle of 
the decade. The French air force is to re-equip 
its interceptor force with the Mirage 2000 a 
little earlier. The Luftwaffe, however, is 
retaining the Phantom F-4F aircraft in front 
line service until the 1990s. 
15. In the development of helicopters in 
support of land operations by France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom there are striking 
examples of the improved commonality which 
collaboration can bring, together with equally 
striking examples of failure to standardise both 
in terms of aircraft and their related weapons. 
16. The Anglo-French helicopter agreement 
between Aerospatiale and W estland Helicopters 
Ltd. was the first example of the " family of 
projects " concept put into practice on a colla-
borative basis. Others are Airbus Industrie's 
A-300 airliner and derivatives, and the new 
anti-tank guided weapons being developed by 
Euromissile Dynamics Group. At least the 
British and the French both fly the Puma and 
the Gazelle in support of ground operations, 
although the British army air corps are convert-
ing to the multi-role Lynx which will operate 
the American-built Tow anti-tank guided 
missile whereas French army aviation flies the 
Gazelle with the Euromissile Hot missile in the 
anti-tank role. 
17. German army aviation operates a mix-
ture of American, French and German heli-
copters, although the Euromissile anti-tank 
missile Hot is standard anti-armour equipment 
for its units. Such an arrangement is not as 
illogical as might appear at first sight since a 
good degree of commonality is achieved with 
the helicopter formations of the American and 
French divisions in Southern Germany. Also 
the procurement of the B0-1 05 has under-
pinned the helicopter division of the principal 
German aerospace manufacturing company 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). 
18. Finally, in the field of advanced flying 
training aeroplanes there is little commonality 
in Western Europe. This category of aero-
plane is relatively cheap to develop and 
produce. Its low development and production 
costs can be amortised over relatively short 
production runs and the export market is large 
enough to sustain penetration by several 
advanced training aeroplanes. 
19. As a result the French and Belgian air 
forces operate the Marcel-Dassault-Dornier 
Alpha-Jet for advanced flying training, the 
Italian air force the Aermacchi 326 and 329 
and the Royal Air Force the British Aerospace 
Hawk. As for the Luftwaffe, it trains its pilots 
in the United States of America on the 
Northrop T -38 Talon. There is at present 
very little evidence of progress towards stand-
ardised flying trammg in Western Europe on 
common training aeroplanes, although one 
significant step forward has been. take~ wh~ch 
stems directly from collaboration m high 
technology defence equipment. The Trinatio-
nal Tornado Training Establishment (TTTE) 
has just opened at Royal Air Force, . Cottes-
more in the United Kingdom, where air crews 
of th~ three countries are due to begin conver-
sion training on the aeroplane next year. 
Ill. Some current examples of collaboration 
Jaguar 
21. The Anglo-French Jaguar programiT,le 
was initiated by government agreement m 
1965. It differed from a number of subsequent 
projects in that project definition for the French 
Ecole de Combat et Appui Tactique (ECA T) 
aircraft was almost complete before the Anglo-
French ministerial agreement was signed. 
Also the industrial collaboration was based on 
adapting an existing Breg~et design ~ather than 
on designing and developmg the proJect totally 
ab initio. The ministerial decision to proceed 
with the project was taken on the basis of 
common operational requirements agreed by 
the two air staffs. 
21. Unlike the previous examples of the 
Atlantic and the Transall, it was decided to 
form joint companies: Sepecat between Breguet 
Aviation (latterly A vions Marcel Dassa~lt­
Breguet) and British Aircraft Corporation 
(latterly British Aerospace) for the develop~~nt 
and production of the airframe, and a JOint 
company between Rolls-Royce Ltd. and Turbo-
meca SA for the development and production 
of the engine. 
22. The ministerial agreement was that costs 
and work on the aeroplane would be equally 
shared between the French and British. The 
management and contractual arrangement _was 
that the Direction Technique des Constructzons 
Aeronautiques (DTCA) of the French Ministere 
des Armees placed contracts on behalf of both 
governments upon Sepeca~. Like~i~~ the Min-
istry of Technology (Mmtech) mitlally, and 
then the Procurement Executive of the British 
Ministry of Defence (MOD-PE), placed 
-contracts on behalf of both governments upon 
Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca. 
23. The management of the projec~ has been 
supervised from the government side by a 
small management committee of official experts 
in technical, financial and air force matters. 
Chairmanship of the official management 
committee alternated between the French and 
the British as did the chairmanship of Sepecat, 
which wa~ responsible for ensuring that the 
industrial workload was shared equally between 
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AMDBA and BAe. Four !hundred aircraft 
were ordered: two hundred fur the Armee de 
/'Air, two hundred for the RAF. 
24. The Jaguar was produted in four basic 
variants originally: " A " (Appui) single-seat 
offensive su~port for the Frenf· h ~ir force, :: B :: 
two-seat tramer for the ·Roya Au Force, E 
two-seat trainer for the French air force, and 
" S " single-seat strike variant ,f~r the Royal ~ir 
Force. The airframes and engmes were basic-
ally identical although the a":ionics and 
navigation and attack systems vaned between 
the French and British aeroplanes. 
25. In addition, international variants of the 
aircraft were developed for overseas markets, 
and the aeroplane is now also in service wi~h 
the air forces of the Sultanate of Oman, India 
and Ecuador. Nevertheless ! the Jaguar has 
never realised its full overseas sales potential, 
perhaps because one of the manufacturing 
partners had in the Mirage range of figh~ers a 
series of well-proven, high pdrformance ~Ir~raft 
of considerable versatility alithough optlmised 
for air defence. In those circumstances it was 
hardly surprising that A vi on$ Marcel Dassault 
have tended to promote more . wholeheartedly 
the sale of Mirages overseas, which they build 
alone, than of Jaguars, in wh~ch they have only 
a 50 % share. I 
26. The marketing overseas of the Jaguar has 
been one of the principal . weaknesses of the 
programme. It has relied on the e~orts ~nd 
co-operation of the partner compames which 
have been less than totaUr committed. By 
contrast the Airbus Industrie and Panavia consorti~ have their own sales forces which are 
separate from those of the Participating compa-
nies in the project. 
2 7. The Sepecat/Rolls-Royce-Turbomeca . ap-
proach to collaboration h~s, in conclusiOn, 
proved successful. The Jagu~r programme was 
effectively managed and no horrendous cost 
overrun occurred. Furthel1lllore, . the syste~ of 
project management prov~d Itself flexible 
enough to adapt to the cancellation ?f the 
French maritime " M " valjiant early m the 
programme, to the production of intern~tio~al 
variants of the aeroplane, and a contmumg 
process of performance enhancement. The 
management has been unbuireaucratic and no 
elaborate management structures at either an 
official or an industrial level have been 
superimposed on the project !to create un~e~es­
sary overheads or to slow qown the declSlon-
making process. In short, the Sepecat model 
has proved practical. 
Alpha-Jet 
28. Collaboration betweeJil Avions Mar?el 
Dassault SA (initially Breguet) and Dornier 
GmbH on the Alpha-Jet advanced jet trainer 
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and light attack aircraft has also worked 
well. Although a Dornier design was adopted 
for the Alpha-Jet project, leadership has in 
effect been vested in A vions Marcel Dassault, 
and AMDBA has acted as prime contractor, so 
the industrial organisation involved has in 
essence been similar to that for a purely 
national programme. 
29. Cost control has been most effective and, 
according to a paper submitted by the Federal 
German Defence Department to the Defence 
Committee of the Bundestag, the cost of the 
Alpha-Jet now is as envisaged at the beginning 
of the project. The only cost increase has been 
caused directly by inflation and is at the rate of 
6% for West Germany and 12% for France. 
30. The incorporation of two operational 
requirements for a light attack aircraft to 
replace the Fiat G-91 in service with the 
Luftwaffe, and for an intermediate/advanced jet 
trainer to replace the Fouga Magister in service 
with the Armee de /'Air, in a single project has 
endowed the Alpha-Jet with considerable versa-
tility and sales potential. Furthermore, be-
cause a German manufacturer has married its 
industrial efforts to a French company whose 
record in the field of military sales is unsur-
passed in Europe, any political inhibitions to 
vigorous export promotion of the Alpha-Jet 
have not been apparent. The aeroplane has 
been sold to nine air forces and an agreement 
has been reached with the Lockheed Corpora-
tion to promote the aircraft for the United 
States navy advanced trainer requirement, just 
as British Aerospace has teamed up with the 
Douglas Aircraft Division of the McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation to market the Hawk jet 
trainer and attack aircraft for the same 
requirement. 
31. The Alpha-Jet has just completed a 
demonstration tour of 100 hours' flying in the 
United States which was extremely success-
ful. The aeroplane is one of six short-listed 
by the United States navy; two of the others 
being existing aeroplanes and the other three 
new projects. 
Tornado 
32. The Tornado is by far the biggest single 
collaborative project in Europe, and a total of 
805 aircraft have been ordered for the West 
German navy and Luftwaffe, the Italian air 
force and the Royal Air Force. The project's 
management structure was well documented in 
the Critchley report (Document 786, para-
graphs 47-59). 
33. On the industrial side it is vested in two 
joint companies. One is Panavia, based on a 
core of permanently seconded personnel at a 
working level from the three participating 
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companies, Aeritalia, British Aerospace and 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm, with a board of 
management drawn from these companies and 
chairmanship alternating between them. The 
other joint company is Turbo Union, the joint 
engine manufacturing company consisting of 
representatives of Motor Turbinen Union 
(MTU), Fiat and Rolls-Royce, which is oper-
ated and managed in a similar way to Panavia. 
34. The governmental organisation estab-
lished to control the project is interesting and 
important. There is a supervisory board of 
directors with technical, financial and military 
representatives of the three governments 
(NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Manage-
ment Organisation - NAMMO). The chair-
man is a senior official of the British Ministry 
of Defence. 
35. The detailed supervision and manage-
ment of the project is the responsibility of a 
permanent body of British, German and Italian 
experts co-locat~d in the same office building as 
the Tornado industrial management company 
Panavia. This official agency (NAMMA) is 
headed by a German officer with a British and 
an Italian deputy. This body is responsible for 
placing all contracts and supervising the pro-
gramme of the project under the general direc-
tion of the board of directors. 
36. Criticism has often been levelled at the 
Tornado programme on grounds of excessive 
cost escalation. In fact the basic flyaway cost 
of the Tornado "has remained constant 
(excluding official corrections for inflation and 
fluctuations in exchange rates) since 1976, 
when the series production contract was signed 
with industry commitment to a maximum price 
for 805 Tornados and including a specific 
maximum price for the first batch ", according 
to Minister Dirigent Hans Ambos, Director, 
Tornado Weapon Systems, Ministry of Defence, 
Bonn 1• 
3 7. " The final fixed price of the first batch 
was in fact 7 % below the maximum price 
agreed at that time between customer and 
industry. Trinational programme cost increase 
in real terms between 1970 and 1980 was 
17.8 % which was accounted for by additional 
and subsequent customer requirements with 
regard to equipment, e.g. electronic counter-
measures (ECM). " 1 There have of course 
been higher wages and material costs which 
have not been contained within the original 
estimates. 
38. Mr. Ambos gave the flyaway cost of the 
Tornado, at the economic conditions at the end 
1. See Panavia News, No. ·28, August 1980, for Mr. 
Ambos' speech on 8th August 1980 at the German Defence 
Ministry, Bonn. 
of 1979 based on a production run of 805 
aircraft, as DM 35.26 million. Flyaway cost 
includes airframe, engines, avionics, general 
equipment and guns. 
39. Ninety-five per cent of modifications 
either necessitated by the experience of deve-
lopment flying or stipulated by the customers 
have been incorporated into the aircraft. Fifty 
per cent of the weapons development has been 
carried out and 25 % of the ECM development 
completed. The first British and German GRI 
interdictor-strike aircraft are in service at the 
Trinational Tornado Training Establishment at 
RAF Cottesmore where instructor training has 
begun in preparation for the first pupil 
conversion courses next year. Furthermore, 
the British air defence variant (F-2) is under-
going development at the prototype stage and 
performance of the aeroplane appears to be 
good, although the integration with the airborne 
radar system has yet to come. 
40. All in all the Tornado programme is 
proving technically reaso_nably successfu!, 
although as with the Jaguar It would have faci-
litated the aircraft's development if a proven 
power plant had been used. However, the 
RB-199 should have considerable development 
potential during the service life of the 
aircraft. Standardisation in weapons has not 
been fully achieved owing in part to the need 
to utilise existing stocks in British, German 
and Italian inventories, which is regrettable. 
Nevertheless, a major step forward in standardi-
sation and interoperability is being achieved as 
a result of the Tornado. 
41. Panavia is now dealing with logistic 
support of the aircraft in the fields of equip-
ment and spares provisioning, the procureme~t 
of tools and other aspects. Although Panavia 
is undertaking these additional tasks, and 
although the third produc.tion batch of t~e 
aircraft has been authonsed, the Panavia 
management staff remains at 200 people, ~he 
same as it was at the outset of the production 
phase. 
42. A future European collaborative military 
aircraft project could well benefit from the 
procedures developed by Panavia. For exam-
ple Panavia has evolved a common standards 
system as well as a successful comprehensh:e 
system for equipment procure~ent. Panavia 
should be invited to tender If requests for 
proposals (RFPs) were issued for future Euro-
pean combat aircraft. It would be wrong to 
allow such a wealth of expertise in European 
collaboration not to be fully utilised and even if 
Panavia were not awarded another military 
aircraft contract after Tornado, the official 
management agency, NAMMA, has expertise 
also which could be utilised to control another 
project. 
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43. The.re is no doubt that the mechanis~ of 
collaboratiOn for the Tornado and commuhica-
tion between partner companij::s requires special 
effort. But the additional burden due to part-
nership arrangements is to sdme extent inevit-
able, as any major project I involves literally 
hundreds of suppliers and if a comparable 
project were being undertaken in the United 
States, distances between tQe makers of the 
major components would tie probably even 
greater. Nevertheless, th~ influence of 
NAMMA does not speed decision-making and 
its approval is required before relatively minor 
modifications or programm(l changes can be 
initiated. It is bureaucratic but that is the 
price of detailed official cos~ control and it is 
not an essential feature of the Tornado manage-
ment arrangement which is trlue partnership. 
General Dynamics F-16 "Fighting Falcon " 
44. A form of collaboration which should not 
be lightly dismissed and which co~ld have 
considerable potential for tqe f~ture Is exem-
plified by the General Dybamics F-16 pro-
gramme whereby the B.elgiatt, D~nish, ~ether­
lands and Norwegian air fovces, m addition to 
the United States air force, are procuring the 
aircraft. Each of these Eunopean countries is 
involved in F-16 construction on a sub-
contractor basis. 
45. Belgium has ordered 1 116 of the aero-
planes, Denmark 58, the Netherlands 102 and 
Norway 72, making the total procurement ?f 
the European participating countries (EPCs) m 
the F-16 programme 348. By the time that t~e 
production of F-16s for thei four European air 
forces is concluded at the tmd of 1984, a total 
of 1 233 F-16s should have been built for all cust~mers and it is expected that the United 
States air force will have taken delivery of 
1 388 F-16s by the end df the decade 1• In 
addition, it is expected that the United States 
air force will operate between 240 and 35.0 
F-16s in Europe. There wiH be a total on their 
projections of eleven F-16 qtain operating bases 
(MOBs) and seventeen eo-located and dual 
operating bases. : 
46. The United States A.ir Forces Europe 
main operating bases for the F-16 will be in 
West Germany and Spain. · These aircraft may 
be augmented by F-16 squ~drons of tactical air 
command, and latterly the Air National Guard 
and United States Air Force Reserve. All F-16 
main operating bases will be capable of provid-
ing first and second linb se~icing on the 
aircraft. Third line serviqing Will be done at 
maintenance depots with specialise~ . de~ot 
repair facilities in each European particlpatmg 
country. 
1. See Appendix. 
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4 7. The logistic support for the F -16 is one 
of the most impressive aspects of this important 
re-equipment programme for North European 
air forces. To date nine European locations 
have been identified for depot support with 
some locations providing support for more than 
one category of equipment. In particular there 
will be three F-16 engine depot facilities -
Fabrique Nationale in Belgium, W oensdrecht in 
Holland, and Royal Norwegian Air Force 
Material Command in Norway. 
48. In the avionics field each European 
participating country has responsibility for test 
and repair of specific categories of avionic 
components that are not repairable at base 
level. Depot repair and calibration of support 
equipment will be available at two locations in 
Europe - Royal Norwegian Air Force Material 
Command in Norway and Rhenen in Holland. 
49. Last but not least, other potential sources 
for depot repair capabilities are the European 
F-16 coproducers, principally SABCA and 
SONACA in Belgium, Per Udsen in Denmar~, 
and Fokker in the Netherlands. These copro-
ducers provide a potential source of spare parts 
and an important source of technical expertise. 
50. There are two principal merits in the 
F-16 programme. One is military and involves 
a degree of interoperability and standardisation 
hitherto not achieved in Europe. The Euro-
pean air forces flying the F-16 will benefit from 
the technical data on the aircraft collated at 
USAF Systems Command Headquarters at 
Dayton, Ohio, from the experience of all user 
air forces. Secondly, European instructor 
pilots converted to the aeroplane at Hill Air 
Force Base, Utah, before the four national 
conversion units were opened in Europe. The 
interchange of experience between the Euro-
pean air forces and USAF is valuable and 
reports on the flying qualities of the F -16 from 
European pilots are enthusiastic although as yet 
the radar's performance is disappointing. 
51. In conclusion, the industrial aspect of the 
F-16 collaboration has lessons. With General 
Dynamics as prime contractor the management 
structure is direct. It was agreed that 58 % of 
the value of the F-16s bought by the European 
participating countries would be placed in 
orders on suppliers in these countries. About 
53% has been achieved to date. The shortfall 
is due to the relative lack of high technology 
industries in Norway and Denmark. This 
factor has made balanced offset between the 
European participating countries hard to 
achieve and evidence of the divergence of 
industrial capabilities lies in the location of the 
two final assembly lines and flight operations 
centres with SABCA at Gosselies, Belgium, and 
Fokker at Schiphol in Holland. 
258 
52. The F-16 procurement system has proved 
flexible enough to permit the development of 
special features for individual European 
nations such as a brake parachute for the 
Norwegians, an Orpheus reconnaissance pod for 
the Dutch and the Rapport Ill internal 
electronic counter-measures system for the 
Belgians. Up to July 1980 the European 
production programme was proceeding on 
schedule with 62 aircraft delivered as against 
61 scheduled in the original 197 5 plan when 
the order was placed. The cost of the aircraft 
is apparently within the "not to exceed" 
figure quoted, and the Europeans are also 
building 15 % of the F-16s being procured by 
other air forces. 
Helicopters 
53. To a considerable extent the helicopter 
industry in Europe developed from the licence 
construction of American machines - princi-
pally Bell and Sikorsky designs. In a number 
of instances this proved lucrative business for 
European manufacturers, particularly in the 
case of the Westland/Sikorsky SH3D Sea King 
anti-submarine helicopter following the grant-
ing to Westland Helicopters of sales rights of 
the aircraft in a number of territories overseas. 
54. The transformation of the European heli-
copter industry came with the Anglo-French 
helicopter agreement whereby Westland Heli-
copters and Aerospatiale agreed jointly to 
develop a family of three helicopters, the 
Gazelle, Puma and Lynx, on the " Alpha-Jet 
principle "; that is, in each case one of the two 
partners became prime contractor. For the 
Gazelle and Puma it was Aerospatiale, for the 
Lynx Westland Helicopters. Commercially the 
arrangement was extremely satisfactory for the 
companies although Westland Helicopters, who 
had not developed a new design before, encoun-
tered problems in the early stages of the Lynx 
programme and overran their cost estimates 
with temporarily alarming financial implica-
tions. Nevertheless the Anglo-French helicop-
ter agreement for the Gazelle, Puma and Lynx 
provided a " home market " of some 900 air-
craft for the French and British armed forces 
alone, with hundreds more ordered for nume-
rous export customers. 
55. If the Anglo-French helicopter agreement 
was the second stage of the development of the 
European helicopter industry, the signature of 
the industrial memorandum of understanding 
between the four principal European manufac-
turers, Aerospatiale, Agusta, Messerschmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm and Westland in 1975 was the 
third. The companies which compete vigo-
rously both in European and export markets 
met to lay down a joint strategy for the 
future. It is noteworthy that the impetus was 
not the result of some institutional inspiration 
or governmental directive but an industrial 
initiative, and the results were considerable. 
56. It was agreed to hold regular meetings of 
the principals of the four companies - called 
the Inter-Company Co-operation Committee 
(ICCC). Reviews were to be instituted of the 
likely future needs of the European market and 
the prospects for collaboration to meet these 
requirements evaluated. Rules were established 
to govern participation and non-participation in 
collaborative projects, together with rules to 
govern disclosure of information for collabor-
ative pprposes and for the protection of new 
technology jointly developed. 
57. In 1978 this industrial initiative was 
followed up by the signature on the part of the 
British, French, West German and Italian 
Governments of a declaration of principles for 
collaboration in helicopter programmes and the 
establishment by the governments of a steering 
committee for European collaboration which 
meets regularly in each country in turn and at 
the same time meets with the Inter-Company 
Co-operation Committee to review policy and 
progress. 
58. The declaration of principles signed by 
the Ministers of Defence of the four countries 
states that: 
(a) the Governments of France, Italy, the 
Federal Republic and the United 
Kingdom seek to work together to 
develop and produce new helicopters, 
including their engines and equip-
ment; 
(b) the four governments will: 
(i) make every effort to reconcile 
their future requirements by 
agreeing common technical defi-
nitions and time-scales so that 
their requirements can be met on 
a collaborative basis; 
(ii) define a management structure 
for each collaborative project and 
seek to achieve an equitable 
sharing of responsibilities bet-
ween the four countries over the 
whole field of helicopter co-
operation; 
(iii) seek to develop by this method a 
family of products suitable for 
sale to other countries; 
(iv) pursue a common policy with 
industry to promote closer indus-
trial collaboration, in particular 
by encouraging the creation of a 
working group composed of 
delegates from SNIAS, MBB, 
Agusta and WHL; 
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(v) inform each other and consult 
together befor~ selecting new 
equipment and to make every 
effort to meet their needs with 
helicopters devbloped jointly in 
Europe; 
(vi) endeavour to obtain the same 
commitment from the other 
IEPG countries. 
59. At present two third-ge~erat~on European 
helicopter programmes are envisaged on a 
collaborative basis. They are for a specialist 
two-seat anti-tank helicopterYgunship designa-
ted PAH-2 to be developed jointly by MBB and 
SNIAS for the French and West German 
armies, and for a Sea King anti-submarine 
helicopter replacement desiglllated EH-1 01 for 
the Italian and Royal navies to be developed 
jointly by Agusta and WHL. , 
60. Although the requirements appear clear 
enough, official endorsement of these projects 
as conceived by the manufacturers is less than 
speedy. Debate continues wpether a specialist 
anti-tank helicopter is preferable to a multi-role 
helicopter such as the Lynx equipped with Hot 
or Tow anti-tank guided weapons. 
61. On the naval side, de~ate persists about 
the optimum all-up weight of the ideal future 
Sea King replacement in vie'Y of the uncertai~­
ties about the precise nature of the anti-
submarine weapon systems to be carried in the 
late 1980s. In these circumstances industry 
has taken the initiative in advance of a decision 
by the governments to lauhch full develop-
ment of the projected ASW helicopter EH-101 
by forming a joint compan)1 E.H. Helicopters 
Limited, registered in London and owned on a 
50:50 basis by Agusta and Westland. Staff are 
already being recruited for it and as a result the 
industrial partners have ensured that if any 
delay occurs with the projectl it cannot be attri-
buted to any failure on industry's part to 
provide in good time the nectlssary management 
structures. Furthermore, delay could inhibit 
other potentially important ,collaborative pro-
grammes such as the Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca 
321 engine, which should also be officially 
supported. 
Guided weapons 
62. The first generation of 1guided weapons in 
Europe were purely national programmes. 
The second generation were 1both national pro-
grammes, like the British Rapier, Sea Wolf, Sea 
Skua, Sea Dart, Blowpipe and so on, and colla-
borative like the family of Euromissile guided 
weapons, Hot for the air-t~-ground anti-tank 
role, Milan for the infantry anti-tank role and 
Roland for surface-to-air use. Euromissile is a 
joint company between MBB and SNIAS with 
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an official management committee super-
imposed. 
63. As with helicopters, the three Govern-
ments of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom agreed a 
memorandum of understanding to collaborate 
on third-generation guided weapons. A new 
joint company, Euromissile Dynamics Group 
(EMDG), was formed on 1st January 1980, 
registered in Paris with equal shares between 
SNIAS, MBB and the Dynamics Group of Bri-
tish Aerospace. BAe Dynamics Group had 
already been involved in the licence manufac-
ture of Milan and this is now a trinational 
arrangement under the EMDG umbrella with 
the United Kingdom enjoying a third share in 
future export sales. 
64. Following the memorandum of under-
standing, a trinational feasibility study has been 
placed with EMDG which should last two years 
for future anti-tank guided weapons, both long-
and medium-range, to replace Swingfire, Hot 
and Milan. There is also a quadripartite 
memorandum of understanding with the United 
States which allows for information exchanges 
in this field. 
65. Under a quadripartite letter of intent 
EMDG and the Hughes Corporation are 
teaming up to respond to a quadripartite 
request for proposals for multi-launch rocket 
system (MLRS) ammunition. 
66. Under a trinational agreement a feasibi-
lity study is being funded for a new medium-
range surface-to-air missile system (MSAMS) to 
replace the Bloodhound and Hawk in the 
1990s. The partners are BAe Dynamics 
Group, MBB and Thomson-CSF of France. 
The feasibility study is due to begin next 
year. A joint industrial company is under 
discussion. The competition is the American 
system Patriot already adopted as the Nike 
replacement in the United States and promoted 
in NATO to replace Hawk also. 
67. BAe Dynamics Group is the prime 
contractor for the NATO 6S programme for the 
new naval point defence missile system for 
defence against missile attack in the 1990s (Sea 
Wolf replacement). The other countries invol-
ved are France, Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, Denmark. The project has just com-
pleted the feasibility stage. A large number of 
companies are involved and industrial arrange-
ments have not been finalised. 
68. A trinational project entitled ASSM for a 
family of anti-ship missile systems for the 1990s 
is at the project definition stage. These 
missiles are to replace Exocet and Harpoon. 
The participating countries are France, West 
Germany and the United Kingdom. SNIAS, 
MBB and BAe Dynamics Group are the lead 
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companies and have formed a joint company, 
Anti-Ship Euromissile (ASEM). If the pro-
gramme goes ahead, ASEM will be merged into 
EMDG. 
69. Lastly and perhaps most interestingly, 
under a recent quadripartite memorandum of 
understanding signed by the United States, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, it was 
agreed that the United States should develop 
the next generation of advanced medium-range 
air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) to replace the 
AIM-7 Sparrow and Skyflash, and that the 
Europeans should develop the next generation 
of advanced short-range air-to-air missiles 
(ASRAAM) to replace the AIM-9 Sidewinder 
and Magic missiles currently in service. 
France is a signatory government with the 
option of becoming a full participant in the 
programme if the missiles meet its require-
ments. For ASRAAM, BAe Dynamics and 
Bodenseewerk Geratetechnik (BGT) are colla-
borating on the development. The in-service 
dates may present conflicting requirements and 
there is a danger that longer production lines 
for ASRAAM, made under licence in America, 
could enable them to dominate the export 
market to third countries. 
70. The Governments of Germany, Norway, 
Italy and the United Kingdom have recently 
agreed a joint programme to manufacture the 
AIM-9L Sidewinder under licence with BGT as 
the prime contractor. 
IV. Conclusion 
71. In spite of the apparent lack of progress 
towards interoperability and standardisation as 
evidenced by current European inventories of 
high technology defence equipment, the reality 
is that important progress was made first with 
the Transall and Atlantic co-operative pro-
grammes and the licence manufacture of hun-
dreds of F-104 Starfighters. Then the second 
generation of collaborative equipment carried 
the process further with the Jaguar, Tornado 
and Alpha-Jet, the Anglo-French family of 
Gazelle, Puma and Lynx helicopters and the 
Milan and Roland guided weapons. 
72. Now the third generation of equipments 
is either entering service, or is in the develop-
ment, project definition or conceptual stages. 
In the missile and helicopter sectors govern-
mental memoranda of understanding together 
with joint industrial companies underpin the 
common political determination to proceed on 
a collaborative basis in Europe. This is impor-
tant evidence that a strategy of collaboration is 
evolving jointly to develop and manufacture 
whole families of weapon systems. 
73. This process is taken further in the case 
of the AMRAAM and ASRAAM missiles. 
The Americans view the memorandum of 
understanding on these as confirmation that the 
Europeans have embraced the United States 
Administration's family of weapons concept 
whereby coproduction of each missile system 
would take place on both sides of the Atlantic 
on the basis of unified research and develop-
ment; on the American side in the case of 
AMRAAM and on the European in the case of 
ASRAAM. 
74. The family of weapons concept is part of 
the " triad of co-operative actions " recently 
initiated by the Alliance along with general and 
reciprocal memoranda of understanding and 
dual production. In early 1978 the United 
States proposed a list of seventeen candidate 
weapon systems for European dual production. 
The unfavourable response has been inter-
preted from Washington as confirmation of a 
predominantly "buy European " role on the 
part of the Independant European Programme 
Group (IEPG) which had been initially seen as 
an essential mechanism to concert the Euro-
pean inputs to a growing "two-way street" in 
high technology weapon systems. 
75. Although the common theme of the 
memoranda of understanding is the elimination 
of restrictions on defence equipment imports 
from other NATO countries, little progress has 
been made so far in the eyes of the Europeans 
towards the acceptance of European equipment 
in the United States. The Roland experience 
was not a happy one and even the development 
of the superlative British Aerospace Harrier 
into the McDonnell Douglas AV8-B has been 
sustained only by Congressional funding against 
total lack of funding by the Administration. If 
approved by the United States Government, the 
McDonnell Douglas-British Aerospace AV8-B 
could prove an outstanding example of trans-
atlantic co-operation not just in the airframe 
partnership between McDonnell Douglas and 
British Aerospace under McDonnell Douglas' 
leadership, but also in the partnership on the 
Pegasus engine between Pratt and Whitney and 
Rolls-Royce under Rolls-Royce's leadership. 
The aircraft itself meets a United States Marine 
Corps requirement very well and is also a 
candidate for an order from the Royal Air 
Force. 
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76. Furthermore, the Generlltl Electric/SNEC-
MA collaboration on the CFM-56 turbofan is 
beginning to bear fruit. A number of DC-8 
civil aircraft are being retrpfitted with the 
CFM-56 engine to improve fuel economy and 
reduce noise and a similar programme is under 
way to retrofit a significant n-1.1mber of KC-13 5 
tankers in service with Stnlttegic Air Com-
mand. The installation of the CFM-56 engine 
has also been proven on a Boeing 707. The 
French air force has decided ~o re-equip one of 
its four Douglas DC-8 long-range transport 
aircraft with the General Electric/SNECMA 
CFM-56 engine. The aim is to prolong the 
operational life of the aircraft by retrofitting it 
with a more modem, powerful and economical 
powerplant. The CFM-56 will probably also 
be installed in other existing transport aircraft 
of the French air force. It is also the intention 
of the French air staff to proc).lre this engine for 
r~rofitting into the Boeing I{C-13 5 tanker air-
er ft currently in service with the French air 
fo ce. A definite decision will be taken after 
the completion of trials on American KC-135 
tankers presently being conducted by the 
United States air force. 
I 
77. Lastly, the lessons of the biggest collabo-
rative programmes in Europe, the F-16 and the 
Tornado, show two equally valid approaches to 
joint production, both of whibh enhance inter-
operability and standardisation in the front 
line. Perhaps the F -16 route is the appropriate 
one for smaller countries and licence construc-
tion of an American aeroplane just as valid as 
offset in the form of licence construction of a 
European aircraft. However, the Europeans 
often see coproduction merely as a Trojan 
horse for American industrial domination and 
the erosion of European de~ign expertise and 
technical capability. For the bigger nations 
such as France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, with independent, design capabilities 
and an experience of devel<J>ping sophisticated 
military aircraft, the Tornado road is usually 
the right one. Collaboration depends on poli-
tical will allied to magnanitjnity and vision in 
high places. Given those prerequisites it 
should be possible for Britain, France and 
Germany to sink their petty industrial and air 
staff differences to develop the next generation 
of combat aircraft they all will need. If the 
political will to collaborate I exists at all WEU 
must encourage it. 
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The Assembly, 
Poland and European security 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
tabled by Mr. Valleix and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
2nd December 1980 
Expressing its attachment to the principles of the final act of the conferencip on security and 
co-operation in Europe and in particular the inviolability of state frontiers and the ban on the threat 
or use of force as a means of settling disputes between states; 
Recalling the unanimous condemnation expressed by the WEU member countlties when Warsaw 
Pact troops entered Czechoslovak territory in 1968 in violation of Czechoslovakia's national 
sovereignty; 
Reaffirming the traditional attachment of democratic Europe to the independence and 
sovereignty of Poland; 
Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is a1n essential part of 
European security; 
Disturbed by the many recent statements made in the Soviet Union, the Gtj!"man Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia about the situation in Poland, 
I. INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
To follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session; 
11. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention, inter alia in order to be able to recommend 
that the Council of Ministers meeting at the level of Ministers of Defence take all appropriate 
measures in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Signed: Valleix, De Poi, Pignion, Druon, Lenzer, Wilkinson, Baumel, Reddemann, Bennett, 
Bozzi, Caro 
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Relations with Parliaments 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur) 
1. As often stated by the WEU Council of 
Ministers, by national Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and of Defence, and during this session 
in the General Affairs Committee's report on 
the future of European security, at the present 
juncture WEU remains the only truly Euro-
pean organisation with responsibility for 
defence matters, and WEU has an organic link 
with national parliaments, which alone can 
supervise member states' defence policies. For 
its part the WEU Assembly can influence 
defence policies not only through the WEU 
Council but through national parliaments as 
well. 
2. There are two ways of reaching these 
parliaments and your Rapporteur believes they 
should be used simultaneously: 
(a) the transmission of adopted texts with 
the request that parliamentarians put 
questions or intervene in debates on 
matters raised in the WEU Assem-
bly; 
(b) exerting pressure on national parlia-
ments from the outside through the 
press and the electors. 
3. The Assembly should make use of both 
these methods. Therefore this report will have 
two parts: 
I. Activities of the Committee ; 
11. Relations between parliaments and 
press. 
I. Activities of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments 
4. Since its creation the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments has been in touch 
with the parliaments, including several regional 
parliaments1 and all parliamentarians from 
member states. The Committee has also regu-
larly reported to the Assembly of Western 
European Union on parliamentary matters of 
interest to members2• Since November 1979, 
the publication " Collected texts relating to par-
liamentary action in implementation of recom-
1. See Appendix Ill: Visits by the Committee. 
2. See Appendix 11: Studies undertaken. 
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mendations adopted by the Assembly " has 
included a chapter on questiol)s and debates on 
defence matters in the assembly of the Euro-
pean Communities. This dec~sion was taken at 
the request of certain Committee members in 
Besanc;on in October 1979. 
I 
5. The Rapporteur of the Committee's last 
report (Document 835), Mr. Schlingemann, 
very clearly set out what your Committee can 
and cannot do to promote the aims and work of 
WEU in the different nati<l>nal parliaments. 
This need not therefore be repeated but the 
Assembly must be shown exactly what the 
Committee has achieved. 
6. At the end of the last session it selected 
two texts for transmission to the national 
parliaments: 
- Recommendation 349 on the impact of 
the evolving situation in the Near and 
Middle East on Western European 
security (report tablerl by Sir Frederic 
Bennett on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee, Document 844); 
- Recommendation 352 on defence-
related information technology (report 
tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, Document 
840). 
As always, these texts were chosen with a view 
to their suitability for action in parliament. 
All texts are printed in the orange booklet on 
each part-session for transmtssion to all mem-
bers of parliament of the member countries. 
7. The Chairman of the <rommittee wrote to 
all members of the Committee with copies " for 
information " to the secreta*ies of the national 
delegations sending several pro forma questions 
which might be put on thel two recommenda-
tions selected, and asked that the questions 
actually put, the answers. and speeches in 
debates be sent to the secretariat of the 
Committee. Although the secretariat has to 
read all parliamentary prodeedings and docu-
ments from the seven member countries in 
order to prepare the month!~ bulletin on Euro-
pean activities, it helps very much if members 
send in the details of their aqtion. 
8. The results gathered have been rather 
promising: from the June session to the end of 
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September a total of sixty questions, answers 
and speeches have been recorded and circulated 
to members of the Committee prior to being 
printed in Collected Texts 32. Bearing in 
mind that this period covers some two months 
of summer holidays, your Rapporteur finds this 
most gratifying. 
9. Table II, giving the breakdown by recom-
mendation, shows that members have often 
been able to put questions on recommendations 
other than 349 and 352, and especially 348 
where the French asked a large number of ques-
tions on the abolition of paragraph V of 
Appendix Ill to Protocol No. Ill of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, allowing the Federal 
Republic to build certain warships. Recom-
mendations 347, 350, 351, 353 and 354 were 
also mentioned in the parliaments. In addi-
tion, WEU in general was mentioned in four-
teen speeches (ten in France, two in Italy and 
two in the United Kingdom). 
10. Apart from the Committee's activities 
proper, Collected Texts 32 include for informa-
tion (see paragraph 4) questions put in the 
Assembly of the European Communities rela-
ting to arms, ammunition, military security, etc. 
Your Committee has noted four such texts 
since June. 
11. Preliminary observations on 
relations between parliaments and press 
(i) Situation country by country 
A. Federal Republic of Germany 
I1. After the second world war political life 
in Germany started again at regional level 
(Uinderrat or Council of Regions in the Ameri-
can zone). In I948, the Parliamentary Council 
met to prepare a new constitution, which was 
adopted in May 1949. 
I2. In September I949 a press service was 
created to handle newspapers, the radio and 
television, and on the 7th of that month the 
first plenary session could be heard over the 
radio. The first televised plenary session was 
viewed on 6th October I953. Since I970 the 
Press Centre has had three sections: PZ I for 
press, radio and television; PZ 2 for correspon-
dence with parliament (documentation centre) ; 
PZ 3 for visitors to the Bundestag and to the 
Reichstag building in Berlin ; editing informa-
tion booklets and films. Since I978 the Press 
Centre has had its own building for receiving 
visitors to the Bundestag. 
I3. The number of accredited journalists rose 
from 200 in 1949-52 to 600 in I960-69 and is 
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now around 700. The number of visitors to 
the Bundestag and to Berlin was as follows: 
Bundeshaus 
1949-52 920,000 I961 195,614 1970 173,586 
I953 55,227 I962 2I4,649 I97I 237,102 
1954 557,703 1963 112,428 1972 207,889 
1955 461,586 1964 117,715 I973 254,398 
1956 409,178 1965 115,714 1974 235,456 
1957 289,746 1966 107,131 1975 218,153 
1958 258,930 1967 174,090 1976 232,168 
1959 225,31C 1968 164,512 1977 197,468 
1960 193,715 1969 I49,751 1978 200,708 
Reichstag 
Year Visitors Visitors 
Number of Number of to 
exhibitions groups participants 
1974 1,455 36,39~ 134,035 
1975 5,012 124,798 421,713 
1976 5,700 142,630 426,771 
1977 6,258 150,451 460,419 
1978 5,891 147,282 534,621 
14. The Press Centre has so far prepared the 
following publications: 
Collection " The Bundestag from A to 
z ". 
Collection "Zur Sache ". 
I. Magazine " Parliamentary News ". 
2. Magazine "Reichstag ". 
3. Leaflet " Legislative procedure ". 
4. Leaflet " The Reichstag in German 
history ". 
5. Poster" Forum Parliament". 
6. Booklet" The German Bundestag ". 
7. Booklet " In plenary sitting " (for 
visitors). 
8. Ernst Deuerlein: "The Reichstag. 
Essays, records and statements retra-
cing the history of parliamentary 
representation of the German peo-
ple " (second edition of a booklet 
published in 1963 by the Bundes-
zentrale fiir po/itische Bildung). 
9. Calendar" Parliament in Germany". 
10. Album" Portrait of a parliament". 
11. Exhibition of photographs " The 
defender of all the Germans " (in all 
the Bundestag constituencies). 
12. The federal assembly election of the 
Federal President 1949-74. Docu-
mentation. 
15. Section 2 edits four publications which 
appear every week or two weeks: HIB: Today 
in the Bundestag ; WIB: The week in the 
Bundestag; Mitteilungen: Information from the 
Bundestag ; Fernsehdienst: Information for tele-
vision. The totals for the years 1970-78 were 
as follows: 
Today in The week Information Information 
Year the in the from the for 
Bundestag Bundestag Bundestag television 
1970 117 - 18 -
1971 357 13 44 -
1972 213 17 41 -
1973 277 22 49 96 
1974 277 24 50 84 
1975 271 25 32 99 
1976 206 20 40 76 
1977 247 23 47 95 
1978 251 24 39 71 
B. Belgium 
16. Whether a specific newspaper is linked 
with a given political trend or not, political 
information, and summary records in parti-
cular, and scrutiny of the activities of the legis-
lative occupy a prominent place in the columns 
of Belgian daily papers. 
17. The political authorities have always 
been aware of the importance of free and plura-
list information, which is guaranteed by ade-
quate constitutional and legal provisions. The 
authorities even took active steps in this sense 
by deciding to grant material assistance to the 
press. 
18. As well as indirect, not to say covert, 
assistance, through preferential postal rates, the 
legislative authorities have, for several years, 
voted direct credits designed, in the words of 
the relevant bills passed each year, "to main-
tain the diversity of opinions in the press". 
19. The facilities afforded to journalists in 
carrying out their work are essentially the res-
ponsibility of the parliamentary bureaux and 
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their decisions are complemented by unwritten 
rules confirming well-established traditions. 
Thus, the two Belgian chambers have proce-
dure for accrediting parliamentary journalists 
and there is a post of parliamentary press 
syndic. There are special galleries, offices and 
lounges for journalists. 
20. Note should also be taken of the weekly 
publication of a parliamentary information 
bulletin by the Chamber of Representatives. 
This bulletin, destined for both the press and 
the public, gives a brief but complete account 
of this Assembly's work and records the activi-
ties of members of parliament in international 
organisations. 
21. As for the so-called " electronic " press, 
there has been television in the Chamber of 
Representatives for several years. One may 
wonder, however, whether the desired aim of 
bringing citizens nearer to their representatives 
and familiarising them with th~ operation of the 
parliamentary system has been fully attained. 
The fact is that there has never been a very 
large audience and, with tim~, numbers have 
fallen. 
22. It has therefore been copcluded that it is 
preferable to keep to occasiohal broadcasts of 
short extracts from major parliamentary debates 
rather than to televise them ditect and in full. 
C. France 
23. Relations between the National Assembly 
and the press vary considerably depending on 
whether work in the plenary sitting or in 
committee is considered. 
24. Plenary sittings are open to the public 
and hence the press has access. A gallery is 
reserved for duly-accredite(i journalists, of 
which there are about 250. The Office of the 
Sergeant-at-Arms is respons~ble for accredita-
tion, which is in principle r~served for staff of 
daily and weekly publications and press agen-
cies, and which gives them . access to part of 
the premises of the Palais B6urbon and conse-
quently allows them to meet parliamentarians. 
25. The main debates are televised by two of 
the three national channels, TF1 and Antenne 
2, under the supervision of the Bureau of the 
National Assembly. 1 
26. Committee meetings, which are an 
important part of parliamentary work, are not 
open to the public. Journalists are informed of 
this work by press commuQiques which com-
mittees have to issue aft~r each meeting. 
There is one exception to this rule. The acti-
vities of committees of enquiry and supervision, 
which are set up for specific purposes and for 
periods of six months, are wholly secret. 
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27. Finally, various documents published by 
the National Assembly are available to the 
press: summary reports circulated a few hours 
after debates, weekly bulletins setting out work 
conducted in plenary sitting and in committee, 
which are useful for reference, and reports sub-
mitted by members of parliament on bills and 
motions for laws and on budgetary texts. 
D. Italy 
28. There is a maximum of co-operation in 
relations between the Italian Parliament and the 
national and foreign press. Journalists are free 
to follow all debates from their own gallery. 
Officials of the Italian Parliament provide 
printed versions of decisions taken during 
debates· and summaries of speeches by members 
of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate 
within thirty minutes. This greatly facilitates 
the work of journalists. Parliament places at 
their disposal a large press room with tele-
phones, telex, typewriters and telescriptors free 
of charge. 
29. The system for work in committees is 
different: journalists are not admitted except in 
specific cases. Here too, officials hand out as 
soon as possible summaries of discussions and 
decisions in committees. 
30. Italian and foreign television teams are 
allowed to transmit live broadcasts of debates in 
plenary session after securing the permission of 
the President. 
31. Parliamentary journalists have their own 
association with its seat in the parliament buil-
ding, but even journalists who are not members 
of this association may be authorised to attend 
in both chambers. 
32. Journalists are free to avail themselves of 
all the services provided for members including 
telephones, hairdressers, the restaurant and bar, 
sports facilities, the post office, and so on. 
Once a year, in the summer, they are officially 
received by the President of the Chamber who 
is traditionally given a fan bearing the signa-
tures of the bureau of the association. This 
ceremony goes back to the last century when, 
during a very hot summer (and in the 19th 
century there was no air conditioning), the 
President was hardly able to direct the work of 
the Chamber. The journalists gave him a fan 
and, by tradition, he is still given one today 
although he no longer needs it. The ceremony 
symbolises the homage of press to parliament. 
By and large Italian newspapers, radio and 
television record what happens in Parliament 
and it cannot be said that Italians are not kept 
informed. 
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E. Luxembourg 
33. The Luxembourg Parliament co-operates 
as much as possible with the national press, for 
whose representatives a gallery is reserved from 
which they may follow debates in public sitting. 
34. Ushers regularly distribute to journalists 
the official texts circulated to members of par-
liament (parliamentary questions and govern-
ment replies, amendments, motions, resolu-
tions, parliamentary documents, reports) and, 
whenever possible, copies of speeches made 
during sittings. 
35. Parliamentary journalists have a press 
room equipped with telephones, typewriters 
and a loudspeaker so that debates in plenary 
sitting may be followed at all times. 
36. Several times a year, the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies receives the parliamen-
tary press at a press conference during which he 
gives appropriate information about the future 
work of the chamber and answers questions put 
by journalists. Recently at such a press confe-
rence a further improvement in the working 
conditions of parliamentary journalists in the 
Chamber of Deputies was announced (an extra 
office, etc.). 
37. Starting with the current session (October 
1980), a booth has been installed in the press 
gallery to allow Radio Luxembourg to record 
debates. When parliament is sitting, the radio 
broadcasts daily summaries of debates and live 
extracts during newscasts. So far, only more 
important events have been televised (opening 
of the session, particularly important statements 
and debates). 
38. All the various daily newspapers publish 
substantial summaries of debates in public 
sitting (followed about two weeks later by the 
verbatim report of debates distributed free of 
charge to all elector households by the Office of 
the Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies). 
39. Committee meetings are held in camera 
and the press is not admitted. 
F. Netherlands 
40. Within the Office of the Clerk the section 
Information and Public Relations is responsible 
for the relations with press and other media. 
41. Those journalists who regularly come to 
the parliament are considered parliamentary 
journalists. They are given a permanent entry-
pass to the buildings. Journalists who work ad 
hoc at the parliament are issued with a tempo-
rary pass. Journalists with either a temporary 
or a permanent pass are free to move within the 
building, with the exception of those parts 
marked" for members only". 
42. Television crews and photographers are 
subject to a special set of rules. The general 
idea is that only national media are given per-
mission to operate in the assembly hall. 
43. The permanent journalists are associated 
in the Parliamentary Press Club, that has its 
own board. This board acts as spokesman in 
discussion with parliamentary authorities. The 
Parliamentary Press Club members are given 
some spe~ial facilities. 
44. On both sides of the assembly hall, the 
parliamentary press has special offices, with 
telephone booths where journalists can tele-
phone free of charge. 
45. The seats in the two press galleries on the 
balcony of the assembly hall are allocated to 
the main papers or permanent journalists. 
46. All parliamentary documents distributed 
among members of parliament are sent free of 
charge to the members of the Parliamentary 
Press Club. 
47. The information section issues a daily 
bulletin on days the chamber sits with informa-
tion on the plenary session, committee meet-
ings, working visits, demonstrations, etc. 
Usually this bulletin is available in the morning 
between 11 and 11.30 a.m. 
48. All that is said in the public plenary 
session (and in public committee meetings) is 
taken in shorthand and is available within one 
hour for journalists (at the office of the steno-
graphers). If desired, photocopies can be 
made. 
49. In principle committee meetings are 
public. If that is not the case, the reason is 
stated. Public committee meetings are open to 
the press, naturally. 
G. United Kingdom 
50. A democratically-elected parliament gov-
erning a free people must have ample and effi-
cient channels through which news can flow to 
the public. The concept is so fundamental and 
obvious that it goes without saying in Britain 
today, although it was not ever so. 
51. The Press Gallery of the House of 
Commons grew up against a background of 
resentment and mistrust, with Mr. Speaker 
himself ordering its beginning. This was in 
1803. William Pitt made a very important 
speech on the war against the French but it 
went unreported because the public had rushed 
in and filled up all the seats reserved for repor-
ters. Mr. Speaker ordered that the back row of 
the Strangers' Gallery should be reserved for 
the press - and the press alone. 
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52. Today the entire Upper Gallery of the 
north end of the chamber is 1 reserved for the 
press. · 296 journalists hold gallery tickets, 
which includes journalists working for BBC, 
ITN and IRN (commercial radio). There are 
also some 100 foreign journ&lists included in 
membership of the gallery. 
53. Lobby journalists have ~heir own restau-
rants and bars, from which ~embers of parlia-
ment are barred unless specifically invited by a 
press man or woman. Reporters have access to 
desks and phones, and BBC lV and ITN have 
their own studios adjacent to Westminster. 
54. An experiment to broadcast Prime Minis-
ter's question time live was recently disconti-
nued, but the most authorita6ve parliamentary 
broadcasting from the chamber is the daily 
programme "Today in Parlilljffient" which is a 
carefully edited and balanced programme using 
live quotes. Another regular programme "The 
Week in Westminster " is dealt with by studio 
interviews of members of p&rliament involved 
in various aspects of each week's work. Both 
programmes cover also the 1 very considerable 
work of the House of Lords, and press arrange-
ments for both Houses of Paqliament operate in 
the same way. 
55. Both radio and televisipn frequently have 
up-to-the-minute interviews with politicians in 
newscasts. 
56. The press also attend many meetings of 
committees where so much parliamentary work 
is done. 
57. All British members of parliament are 
well aware of the importanqe to themselves of 
personal relationship with .journalists in the 
house, particularly with reborters from their 
own local newspapers. Whatever resentment 
may have been apparent in the past, there is 
none today. Publicity is very much part of the 
politicians stock-in-trade and even if reporters 
do not print exactly what the member would 
wish, he knows that without the means to 
publicise his personal cqntribution to the 
mother of parliaments, he is under a serious 
disadvantage. I 
(iz') The WEU AssemblJ1 and the press 
A 
58. Unlike the other international assemblies 
(assembly of the European Communities, Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), 
the WEU Assembly has always suffered from a 
basic handicap in its relations with the press. 
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59. Whereas the WEU Assembly, the only 
European assembly with defence responsibili-
ties, has developed its activities, set up commit-
tees and organised colloquies, the WEU Coun-
cil has decided to restrict the areas in which it 
exercises its responsibilities. The inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments and the studies of the Standing 
Armaments Committee are not likely to attract 
the attention of public opinion. Ministerial 
meetings are now held only once a year and are 
limited to necessarily confidential exchanges of 
views. Hence, there is a disparity between on 
the one hand the Assembly, which endeavours 
to draw the attention of public opinion to the 
positions adopted and, on the other, the Coun-
cil and its ministerial organs, which seek 
discretion and whose activities do not lead to 
the kind of action which is likely to make an 
impression. 
60. Armaments resulting from European co-
operation always stem from specific agreements 
between partners. Apart from an armoured 
transport vehicle, it is difficult to name a piece 
of military equipment resulting from co-opera-
tion in the framework of WEU. WEU has no 
military command or machinery for permanent 
defence consultations. It organises no manoeu-
vres which can be televised. Real defence co-
operation is carried out in the bodies of the 
Atlantic Alliance and of NATO. 
61. In spite of this serious handicap, the 
WEU Assembly has managed to make its voice 
heard like the other European assemblies. 
Nevertheless, since 1973, when the United 
Kingdom joined the European Communities, 
certain doubts have been expressed about the 
value of its recommendations and even the 
reason for its existence. 
62. Not least among the problems of the 
Assembly's press department has been the atti-
tude of some of the official information depart-
ments of member governments, particularly (as 
has happened) when they refer to WEU as " an 
organisation of the past ". 
63. To make the situation even worse, the 
Assembly itself has, on occasion, adopted 
recommendations urging that certain of WEU's 
activities, in the armaments field for instance, 
be transferred to other organisations such as the 
Communities. It must be recognised that, 
whatever may be the grounds for such a posi-
tion from a political standpoint, when the 
Assembly itself proclaims that WEU's responsi-
bilities would be better handled elsewhere it is 
very difficult for the Press Counsellor to interest 
journalists in the WEU debates. The assem-
blies of the European Communities and the 
Council of Europe have always been careful to 
avoid undermining their own positions in this 
way. 
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64. At the request of the Assembly, the 
Council agreed in 1979 to increase amounts 
earmarked in the budget for information from 
about 40,000 French francs to 160,000 francs, 
the Assembly having requested 250,000 francs. 
65. The new amount is a considerable 
increase but the present figure of 160,000 francs 
must be compared with the 3 million francs 
available to the Council of Europe under this 
head. 
66. Increased credits have allowed the Press 
Counsellor: 
(i) to organise more press operations 
outside Paris: meetings have been 
held in London, Bordeaux, Besan-
~on, Luxembourg and Bonn as it is 
now easier for the Press Counsellor 
to travel; 
(ii) to create a network of consultants: 
these journalists know the Assembly 
and are paid a very modest daily fee 
for the two or three days each year 
when they are required to assist the 
Press Counsellor in their home 
country; 
(iii) to invite journalists to attend plenary 
sessions at the Assembly's expense: it 
might have been thought that a free 
journey to Paris plus a subsistence 
allowance would be attractive and 
readily accepted. This is not so ; 
what might please a journalist is not 
so agreeable to the chief editors of 
his paper who sees no interest in 
depriving himself for four days of the 
services of a member of his staff. 
c 
6 7. Finally relations between the press and 
the Assembly might be improved if the govern-
ments of member countries agreed to invite the 
information departments of the Foreign Affairs 
and Defence Ministries to give consideration to 
the recommendations and resolutions of the 
European assembly with defence responsibilities 
and inform the press of the interest with which 
its work should be followed. 
68. For its part, the Presidential Committee 
might adopt a vigorous and imaginative policy 
of inviting guest speakers from member and 
non-member countries. Thus, it might be 
noted that the address by the -Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of China to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30th 
September 1980 aroused very great interest and 
dealt precisely with security matters. 
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Recommendations 
adopted in 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1074 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Total 
Annual average 
APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
Federal 
Belgium France Republic Italy Luxembourg Netherlands 
of 
Germany 
0 0 3 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 5 
2 0 3 0 0 4 
0 0 9 0 0 0 
3 12 2 8 0 3 
0 2 0 3 0 6 
2 4 4 6 2 3 
0 0 13 22 1 2 
4 14 9 11 1 5 
0 11 12 '24 0 5 
2 12 12 49 1 4 
14 9 22 29 2 6 
6 14 20 22 1 16 
11 15 17 8 0 4 
3 15 15 7 2 3 
0 4 19 9 0 6 
0 6 2 1 0 1 
0 4 2 6 1 0 
0 1 3 13 2 0 
10 28 8 19 3 11 
16 40 13 14 2 3 
4 18 4 15 1 1 
17 49 12 21 4 10 
9 47 12 10 12 1 
0 20 14 10 6 0 
107 325 231 307 41 99 
4.28 13 9.24 12.28 1.64 3.96 
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United Total lqngdom 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
I 
10 31 
3 41 
' 2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 57 
14 127 
14 105 
2 52 
241 1 351 
9.64 7.72 
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APPENDIX 11 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978 
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312 -
313 X 2 2 2 6 
314 X 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 
315 2 2 4 
June 316 - 33 
1978 317 2 1 3 
318 X 3 1 1 2 7 
319 -
320 -
321 1 1 
322 1 1 
323 X 6 1 7 
Nov. 324 1 1 
1978 325 7 2 1 2 12 94 326 X 2 4 3 2 11 
327 -
328 X 2 2 4 2 2 4 16 
Other action 7 26 4 4 3 2 46 
329 X 2 2 2 2 2 10 
330 -
June 331 2 2 
1979 332 - 36 333 X 2 2 2 6 
334 -
335 X 2 5 2 6 15 
Resolution 63 3 3 
336 -
337 X 2 2 2 6 
Dec. 338 X 1 2 3 
1979 339 X 2 2 340 -
341 X 2 8 10 69 
342 -
343 -
344 -
Other action 3 31 6 7 1 48 
345 
-
346 
-
347 2 2 
348 7 7 
June 349 X 1 2 6 9 52 
1980 350 2 2 
351 2 2 4 
352 X 4 2 6 
353 2 2 
354 6 6 
Other action 10 2 2 14 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
1Oth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-1 st November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
2nd-3rd April 1968 Luxembourg 
26th-27th March 1969 Rome 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th October 197 5 
11th-12th May 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-10th May 1977 
3rd-4th November 1977 
31st May-1st June 1978 
3rd November 1978 
3rd-4th May 1979 
29th-30th October 1979 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States of 
Jersey) 
Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of 
Bavaria) 
Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
Bonn - Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of 
Hesse) 
Paris - Cergy /Pontoise 
Rome 
The Hague 
Besan~on (Franche-Comte region) 
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Document 866 3rd December 1980 
Poland and European security 
DRAFT ORDER I 
submitted on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Expressing its attachment to the principles of the final act of the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe and in particular the inviolability of state frontiers and the ban on the threat 
or use of force as a means of settling disputes between states; 
Recalling the unanimous condemnation expressed by the WEU member countries when Warsaw 
Pact troops entered Czechoslovak territory in 1968 in violation of Czechoslovakia's national 
sovereignty; 
Reaffirming the traditional attachment of democratic Europe to the independence and 
sovereignty of Poland; 
Disturbed by the many recent statements made in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia about the situation in Poland, 
I. INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
To follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session; 
11. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 1 with 
1 abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman), MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Berrier, Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, 
Conti Persini, Deschamps (Alternate: Caro), Druon (Alter-
nate: Valleix), Gessner, Hanin, Hardy; von Hassel, Lagneau 
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(Alternate: Michel), Lord McNair, MM. Mange1schots 
(Alternate: van Waterschoot), Mende, Mommersteeg, Muller 
(Alternate: Reddemann), Peridier, Lord Reay (Alternate: 
Atkinson), MM. Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Urwin, 
Valiante, Vecchietti, Voogd. 
N.B. The names of those takmg part m the vote are 
printed in Italics. 
Document 866 
Amendment 1 
Poland and European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
3rd December 1980 
I. In part 11 of the draft order, leave out "extraordinary session forthwith" and insert "an urgent 
meeting of the Presidential Committee which may consider either convening an ext~aordinary session 
or arranging a special meeting of the General Affairs Committee, ". 
1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment negatived). 
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Signed: Hardy 
Document 866 
Amendments 2, 3 and 4 
Poland and European security 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Gessner 
2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft order. 
3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows: 
3rd December 1980 
"Welcoming the attitude of the European Council with regard to Poland as expressed in the 
declaration of 2nd December 1980 and associating itself with this declaration,". 
4. In part 11 of the draft order proper, leave out "should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention " and insert " should further developments in 
Poland make this necessary ". 
1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments 2 and 4 negatived; Amendment 3 agreed to). 
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Signed: Gessner 
Document 866 
Amendments 5 and 6 
Poland and European security 
AMENDMENTS 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Caro and others 
'I 
, I 
3rd December 1980 
5. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is an essential 
part of European security;". 
6. At the end of part 11 of the draft order proper, add: 
" inter alia in order to be able to recommend that the Council of Ministers meeting at the level 
of Ministers of Defence take all appropriate measures in accordance with Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. " 
l. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Caro, Va/leix,, Baume/, Lemoine 
Document 866 
Amendments 7, 8 and 9 
Poland and European security 
AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Mr. Pecchioli and others 
3rd December 1980 
7. Leave out paragraphs 1 to 4 of the preamble to the draft order and insert " Considering with 
grave concern recent developments in Poland;". 
8. Leave out part I of the draft order proper and insert: 
"Wishes the process of renewal to be pursued positively without any outside interference and 
therefore with absolute respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and 
state in the spirit of the principles affirmed in the final act of the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe;". 
9. Leave out part 11 of the draft order proper and insert: 
" Instructs the Presidential Committee to follow the evolution of the situation in Poland and, 
should the situation so require, order a report to be submitted to the Assembly. " 
Signed: Pecchioli, Vecchietti, Bernini, Antoni, Martino, Rubbi 
I. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments negatived). 
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